

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

20500

WASHINGTON

May 21, 1993

PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW DIRECTIVE/NSC-34

DECLASSIFIED

PER E.O. 13526

2010-1227-M (2-23)

KDE 9/25/19

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY  
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET  
THE CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT  
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
THE DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

SUBJECT: U.S. Policy on Strategic Nuclear Arms Control  
Beyond the START I and START II Treaties (S)

As stated in PDD-3, ratification and implementation of START I and START II are priority objectives of U.S. foreign, security, and non-proliferation policy. PDD-3 also states that acceleration of START I and START II is in the U.S. interest, and directs the USG to develop a schedule and plan by June 1, 1993 for (a) accelerated START I implementation in all four FSU states, including early deactivation and warhead removal, and (b) working out an assistance package to Russia that would allow it to agree to move up to December 2000 the deadline for achieving final reductions under START II. (S)

Even after completion of the reductions of START I and START II, however, the strategic forces of the United States and Russia will roughly equal those existing in the late 1960s, despite the fact that the likelihood of conflict has decreased substantially. Further, as the United States and Russia work together to establish a new relationship of partnership, an opportunity exists to institutionalize additional confidence building measures. It is, therefore, appropriate to consider what additional approaches the United States could pursue with Russia to reduce strategic forces further or to enhance strategic stability in other ways, consistent with American security interests in a still dangerous world. (S)

This Policy Review Directive (PRD) requires a comprehensive review of the political, military, technical, diplomatic, and verification considerations associated with (a) reductions below the level of START II, (b) force structure provisions not involving reductions, and (c) confidence building and declaratory policy measures in the area of strategic offensive arms. (S)

~~SECRET~~

Declassify On: OADR

~~SECRET~~

The following guidance is provided for the conduct of the review:

- the review should assume either that START I and START II enter into force essentially unchanged, or that the U.S. and Russia move toward START I and START II levels through separate but parallel unilateral policies.
- the review should assume that accelerating completion of the START II reductions and elimination of nuclear weapons and strategic offensive arms from Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine remain vital U.S. objectives. Any relationship (either positive or negative) between options developed by the review and these priority objectives should be explicitly noted.
- the review should assume that the complete elimination of nuclear weapons is not feasible. All options should include retention by the United States of a credible nuclear capability.
- the review should assume that the U.S. complies with the ABM Treaty as written, or as modified through modest amendments consistent with the Missile Defense Act of 1991. (S)

PART I: ASSESSMENT

A. Further Reductions

1. What are the likely strategic forces of the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and China in the year 2000, assuming START II is ratified and implemented? What are the likely nuclear capabilities of other states in the year 2000? (S)
2. What would be Russia's attitude toward further reductions beyond the level of START II (a) involving only the United States and Russia, (b) involving all five declared nuclear powers? What reductions would Russia be likely to seek or accept in each case? (S)
3. What would be the attitude of the United Kingdom, France, and China toward participation in negotiations on further reductions? What are the incentives to induce them to participate in negotiations on further reductions? What limitations on its own forces would each be likely to accept? (S)
4. What, if any, would be the military benefits to the United States of further reductions in Russian strategic offensive arms? How much would Russia have to reduce for us to realize these benefits? How much would these benefits depend on the composition/ characteristics of Russian forces? (S)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

5. What would be the impact on United States security and deterrence policy of further reductions in U.S. strategic offensive arms? Are there specific reductions or force restructuring measures which would require our targeting policy to be changed? (S)
6. What is the maximum level of further reductions the United States can make while still maintaining a viable triad of strategic forces? What strategic force structure characteristics and capabilities should be preserved at any level below START II? (S)
7. What role should United States nuclear weapons play in deterring conventional aggression in regional crises or the use of nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction by a Third World state? (S)
8. Are there any direct military benefits to the United States from reductions in Chinese strategic offensive arms? How much would China have to reduce for us to realize these benefits? Are there indirect benefits, in terms of regional security or non-proliferation, from reductions in Chinese strategic offensive arms? (S)
9. Is there a level of Russian strategic offensive arms below which the monitoring and verification regime of START I and START II would be inadequate? If so, what is that level? (S)
10. At what point would potential breakout or cheating become a significant problem? Are there means to address this problem at lower levels? (S)
11. To what extent will prospects for extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) indefinitely in 1995 be influenced by the presence or absence of negotiations on further reductions? From the NPT perspective, does it matter if those negotiations involve only Russia and the United States or all five declared nuclear powers? (S)
12. What effect would a CTB have on negotiating further reductions? (S)
13. What effect would failure to implement the Lisbon Protocol have on negotiating further reductions? (S)

#### B. Force Structure Alterations

1. Assuming that Russian strategic offensive arms are reduced to START II levels, is there any restructuring of Russian strategic forces which would significantly increase strategic stability? If so, what, if any, considerations might induce Russia to undertake such a

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

restructuring? What changes would Russia be likely to seek in U.S. force structure? (S)

2. Would the elimination of ballistic missiles (ICBMs and SLBMs) from the U.S. and Russian strategic arsenals be a net plus or a net minus for U.S. security:
  - if they were eliminated from the strategic arsenals of the United States and Russia only?
  - if they were eliminated from the strategic arsenals of all five declared nuclear powers? (S)
3. What would be the Russian attitude toward the phased elimination of all ICBMs and SLBMs:
  - if they were eliminated from the strategic arsenals of the United States and Russia only?
  - if they were eliminated from the strategic arsenals of all five declared nuclear powers? (S)
4. What would be the attitude of the United Kingdom, France, and China toward the phased elimination of all ICBMs and SLBMs? (S)
5. Historically, the United States has concluded that legal restrictions on nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) are unverifiable. Is there any reason to alter this conclusion? (S)
6. What would be the Russian attitude toward imposing legal restrictions on nuclear-armed SLCMs? Would they insist on them, accept them but not insist on them, or resist them? (S)

#### C. Strategic Confidence Building and Operational Measures

1. What aspects of current U.S. strategic operational policy are likely to be of concern to Russia? What aspects of their operational policy are of concern to us? (S)
2. Which previous Russian/Soviet proposals (ASW free zones, ballistic missile submarine stand-off zones, restrictions on stealth technology, etc.) are the Russians likely to advocate in future negotiations? What new CBMs might the Russians propose?
  - What, if any, are the advantages and disadvantages to the United States of each of these proposals?
  - What would be the attitude of the United Kingdom, France, or China to being involved in negotiations based on such proposals? (S)

3. Are there confidence building and/or operational measures vis-a-vis Russia, beyond those in existing treaties, which could be in the interest of the United States (detargeting strategic forces, reducing SSBN patrol rates, zero or reduced alert status, separating warheads from delivery vehicles, etc.)? How verifiable would these measures be? What would be the Russian attitude toward them? (S)
4. Are there confidence building measures with China in the area of strategic offensive arms which would be in our interest? What would be the attitude of China toward such measures? (S)
5. How is Russia's declaratory policy on nuclear weapons use likely to evolve in the post-Communist era? What would be the implications of a Russian decision to drop their No First Use pledge? (S)

PART II: POLICY OPTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Further Reductions

1. Should the United States seek to negotiate reductions in U.S. and Russian strategic offensive arms below the level of START II?

-- Options should include:

- o no further reductions;
- o 2000-2500 warheads (previous Russian proposal);
- o 1750 warheads (another fifty percent); and
- o a few hundred warheads.

-- In each case the military and political rationale for seeking such reductions should be noted, along with potential drawbacks to the United States.

(S)

2. For each potential reductions level, how, if at all, should the United Kingdom, France, and China be involved in such negotiations?

-- Options should include:

- o no involvement;
- o seek agreement that these three states will not increase beyond current levels; and

- o seek agreement that these three states will reduce their strategic offensive arms below current levels. (~~S~~)
- 3. For each potential reductions level, what, if any, additional verification provisions beyond those of START I and START II would be required? (~~S~~)
- 4. Should the United States be willing to accept some linkage between further offensive reductions and our BMD policy? (~~S~~)
- 5. Should the United States proceed unilaterally with cuts below the START II level? (~~S~~)
- 6. Should the U.S. seek to negotiate measures relating to warhead elimination and controls on fissile material in conjunction with deeper cuts, as stipulated by the Biden amendment? Should such measures involve all five nuclear powers? (~~S~~)

B. Force Structure Alterations

- 1. Should the United States seek to negotiate any restructuring of Russian strategic forces after they are reduced to START II levels? (~~S~~)
- 2. Should the United States seek the elimination of ballistic missiles (ICBMs and SLBMs) from the U.S. and Russian strategic arsenals? From all five declared nuclear powers?

-- Options should include:

- o not to seek such elimination;
- o to seek such elimination from the arsenals of the United States and Russia only;
- o to seek such elimination from the five declared nuclear powers; and
- o to seek a global ban.

-- In each case the military and political rationale for seeking such reductions should be noted, along with potential drawbacks to the United States.

-- In each case in which eliminations are proposed, the review should indicate what verification measures should be included in the U.S. proposal.

(~~S~~)

- 3. Should the United States seek additional restrictions on nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs), and if so what?

- Options should include:
  - o not to seek such restrictions;
  - o to seek to convert existing restrictions to a legally binding form;
  - o to seek lower levels or a ban through reciprocal political statements; and
  - o to seek lower levels or a ban in a legally binding form.
  
- In each case in which additional legal restrictions are proposed, the review should indicate what verification measures should be included in the U.S. proposal. ~~(S)~~

C. Strategic Confidence Building and Operational Measures

1. If the Russians renew their call for ASW free zones or ballistic missile submarine stand-off zones, should the United States agree to discuss such proposals?

- If so, should the United States conduct such discussions bilaterally or should we seek to include the United Kingdom, France, and China?  
~~(S)~~

2. Should the United States seek to negotiate any confidence building and/or operational measures with Russia in the area of strategic offensive arms?

- Options should include:
  - o de-targeting strategic forces;
  - o reducing SSBN patrol rates (e.g., from two-thirds to about one-third for Ohio-class boats);
  - o sharing of early warning data;
  - o zero or reduced alert status;
  - o separating warheads from delivery vehicles.

- Should such negotiations aim at a legally binding agreement or reciprocal political obligations?

- How can we involve Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus in this process? ~~(S)~~

3. Should the United States seek to negotiate any confidence building measures with China in the area of strategic offensive arms? If so, what measures?

~~SECRET~~

8

~~SECRET~~

Should such negotiations aim at a legally binding agreement or reciprocal political obligations? (S)

4. Does the U.S. have an interest in discouraging the Russians from dropping their No First Use pledge? If so, what options do we have for influencing this decision? Should the U.S. consider adopting a "No First Use" policy? (S)

D. Negotiating Forum

1. In what forum should we seek to negotiate (a) further reductions, (b) force structure alterations, and (c) strategic confidence building and operational measures? (S)

PART III: TASKINGS

This review shall be conducted by the Interagency Working Group on Arms Control, under the chairmanship of the Senior Director for Defense Policy and Arms Control, National Security Council and completed by July 9, 1993. (S)



Anthony Lake  
Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~