PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW DIRECTIVE/NSC-31

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
THE CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
THE DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY


Background

From March 1983 to January 1991, U.S. ballistic missile defense (BMD) policy was focused primarily on providing a defense against a massive nuclear first strike emanating from the Soviet Union. In January 1991, U.S. BMD policy was reoriented in light of the reduced Soviet threat toward protecting the United States, its forces deployed abroad, and its friends and allies against accidental, unauthorized, and/or limited ballistic missile strikes -- the Global Protection Against Limited Strikes system (GPALS). (U)

Congressional views regarding U.S. BMD policy are reflected in the 1991 Missile Defense Act (MDA), as amended in the FY 1993 Defense Authorization bill. The MDA, as amended, sets forth the following missile defense goals of the United States: (1) comply with the ABM Treaty, including any protocol or amendment thereto, while deploying an anti-ballistic missile system that is capable of providing a highly effective defense of the United States against limited attacks of ballistic missiles; (2) maintain strategic stability; and (3) provide highly effective theater missile defenses to ... the Armed Forces of the U.S. and to friends and Allies. It also urged an effort to negotiate selective amendments/clarifications to the ABM Treaty to improve defense effectiveness. (U)
In January 1992, Russian President Boris Yeltsin stated that Russia was ready "jointly to work out and subsequently to create and jointly operate a global system of defense in place of SDI." At the June 1992 Summit, it was agreed that the U.S. and Russia should work together with allies and other interested parties in developing a concept for a Global Protection System (GPS) as part of an overall strategy in response to the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. GPS talks between the U.S. and Russia at both the political and technical level took place last year, along with consultations with our allies and friends. While these talks have been constructive, no consensus has emerged regarding the form or implementation of a GPS concept. In particular, Moscow did not accept the need to modify the ABM Treaty, on the ground that the relevant threat was of intermediate rather than strategic range. On the other hand, the Russians indicated a need to defend against 3,500 km ballistic missiles and seemed attracted to cooperation with regard to sensors. 

On February 2, 1993 Secretary of Defense Aspin directed that FY 1994 funding for SDI be maintained at the FY 1993 nominal level, consistent with the following priorities:

-- Theater Ballistic Missile defense programs should be given highest priority and should be pursued on a prudent event-orientated schedule that provides for adequate testing prior to committing to major deployments.

-- National missile defenses should be given second priority relative to theater missile defenses. The national missile defense program should support deployment beginning no earlier than 2002 of a defensive capability for the continental United States.

-- Brilliant Pebbles funding should be reduced to support a technology base program. Brilliant Eyes development should be slowed pending further review of the role of this system in the revised ballistic missile defense architecture and its contribution to space-based surveillance and warning of ballistic missile attacks.

The Arms Control IWG has determined that the U.S. should propose to the Russians that the next session of the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) take place in June, 1993. In preparing for this SCC meeting, the U.S. Government must determine its position on the ABM and BMD-related issues identified in this PRD.

Review Objectives

This PRD requires a comprehensive examination of U.S. BMD policy, focusing on the following three areas:
the objectives the Administration should pursue as a priority in ballistic missile defense;

an assessment of what, if any, changes in the ABM Treaty should be sought in light of these objectives, and the modalities for achieving any changes; and

a strategy for pursuing our ballistic missile defense objectives with Russia and with friends and allies.

PART I: ASSESSMENT

A. The Threat

1. What is the current strategic threat to the U.S. from the Former Soviet Union (FSU), and how is this threat likely to change in the next 10-15 years?
   - What are the worst reasonable case scenarios of the strategic threat if a successor Russian government emerged with external ambitions or if turmoil in the FSU undermined command and control of strategic weapons? 

2. What is the current threat to the U.S. from an accidental and/or unauthorized ballistic missile launch from the FSU? How will this threat evolve over the next 10-15 years?

3. How might the analysis in questions one and two above change if Ukraine continues to stall in carrying out its Lisbon Protocol commitments?

4. What is the current intercontinental-range ballistic missile threat from China? How will this threat evolve over the next 10-15 years?

5. What other countries are likely to develop intercontinental-range missile capabilities over the course of the next 10-15 years?

6. What is the threat to U.S. friends and allies and U.S. forces deployed abroad from intermediate- and short-range ballistic missiles? How will this threat evolve over the next 10-15 years?

B. Ballistic Missile Defense Systems

1. What are U.S. national security requirements for strategic and theater ballistic missile defense?
2. What is the maximum level of defense that can be provided by a single ABM site, that is compliant with the ABM Treaty, against a range of limited attack scenarios, including accidental or unauthorized launch of a few CIS SLBMs or ICBMs or a single launch of an intercontinental range missile by a proliferant state?

- What contribution would sensor enhancements (e.g., ground-based ABM radars, GSTS, Brilliant Eyes, upgrades to existing BMES radars) make to the effectiveness of such a single-site defense?

- What would this system cost to deploy and maintain, over what period?

- How much more effective could this defense be made by adding more ground-based sites and/or interceptors (with or without various sensor enhancements)? How much more would it cost to deploy and to maintain? Would such an expanded defense pose a threat to Russia's deterrent capability using START II forces?

3. What are the capabilities of THAAD and other ground-based ATBMs against theater ballistic missiles?

- What capabilities would a Russian interceptor comparable to THAAD have against U.S. strategic systems, UK/French systems?

4. What ATBM capabilities can be developed with sea-based and/or air-delivered ATBMs?

- Could the sea or air-based systems contribute to multi-tier defense? How mobile would they be? How long could they remain on station?

5. What increase in capability would deployment of space-based sensors (e.g., Brilliant Eyes) provide to theater defenses?

6. What is the status of the Arrow ATBM program? Is the program consistent with the MTCR and ABM Treaty?

7. Under current budget assumptions, what are the probable dates of deployment for currently-planned ground and space-based sensors, theater and ABM interceptors?

8. What states of the FSU have ABM systems or components or other ABM-related facilities (e.g., early warning LPARS, ABM production facilities) on their soil?

- What is the status and capabilities of these systems, components, and ABM-related facilities?
From a technical point of view, how could these systems be internetted?

- To what degree has the effectiveness of the FSU's missile detection, tracking and battle management system been degraded by the breakup of the FSU?
- What newly independent states have the capability to produce, deploy, and/or export these systems?

C. ABM Treaty

1. Can additional ground-based radar sites, GSTS, or Brilliant Eyes be deployed without changes to the ABM Treaty?

   - Can existing BMEWS radars be upgraded? If so, to what extent and under what conditions or limitations? Should we build X-ban early warning radars?

   - What legal issues must be resolved to certify a single site is treaty compliant?

2. What, if any, changes would have to be made to the ABM Treaty to deploy an effective defense of the United States against limited threats?

3. What threshold demarcates ATBM and ABM interceptors? What are Russian views on the dividing line between ATBMs and ABMs?

4. What changes and/or clarifications to the ABM Treaty, if any, would have to be made in order to develop effective theater missile defenses?

5. What are the attitudes of Russia, other potential ABM Treaty successor states, and our friends and allies, to the possible changes to the ABM Treaty discussed above?

6. What has the U.S. done with regard to multilateralizing the CFE, INF, TTBT and START Treaties? Has the approach taken in each case furthered U.S. interests?

7. What is Russia proposing to do with regard to multilateralizing the ABM Treaty?

8. How are the interests of the newly independent states vis-a-vis their relationship with Russia affected by the ABM multilateralization issue?
9. What was the status of the SCC agenda as of the last session?

10. What would be the effect of a U.S. decision to multilateralize the ABM Treaty on (1) the goals established in the MDA, as amended, and (2) U.S. proposals in the discussions on a Global Protection System, as left pending at the end of the last administration?

11. Leaving aside considerations that go beyond the ABM Treaty as now written and observed, does the U.S. have an interest in multilateralizing the Treaty per se?

D. Global Protection System

1. What is the status of GPS discussions with Russia, NATO, and others?

2. What are the positions of and major issues and concerns that have been raised by Russia and our friends and allies?

3. What elements of a GPS appear to be broadly acceptable to Russia, friends and allies?

4. What is the Russian view of GPS and how does it accord with our own view? What would be the Russian reaction if we dropped GPS?

PART II: POLICY OPTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. National Missile Defense

1. Should the U.S. pursue an ABM Treaty-compliant defense of the United States?

   - Should we pursue development of such a defense with an option to deploy or should we decide now to seek actual deployment? In what time frames?

   - Should we consider a defense that exceeds that now permitted by the ABM Treaty?
B. Theater Missile Defense

1. What emphasis should we give to BMD vis-a-vis other instruments of our nonproliferation policy? How do we square the sharing of defensive missile protection or technology with MTCR objectives? (S)

2. Which theater missile defense systems should we deploy? (S)

3. Should we seek to deploy Brilliant Eyes or some less capable variant to enhance theater defenses even if we do not decide now to deploy a defense of the United States? (S)

4. If Brilliant Eyes or other sensor enhancements are required to provide an effective defense of the U.S. or to enhance the effectiveness of theater defenses, how should we proceed to ensure that these actions are consistent with the ABM Treaty as it is written or might be amended; e.g., should we seek Russian agreement that such upgrades are permitted under the Treaty, or do we need to propose an amendment? (S)

5. Should we seek a clear demarcation of the line between ATBMs and ABMs? If so, should such clarification be formally recorded in a joint declaration, an agreed statement in the SCC, or an amendment or protocol to the Treaty? (S)

C. ABM Treaty

1. Should we continue to seek the amendments to the ABM Treaty recommended in the MDA? Specifically, should we seek:

   - construction of numbers of ABM sites and ground-based interceptors beyond those currently permitted;

   - use of space-based sensors for direct battle management;

   - the ability to develop and test space-based missile defenses beyond what is currently permissible under the Treaty? (S)

2. If we seek clarification/changes to the ABM Treaty, in what time frame would they be needed to permit the necessary development, testing, or deployment of effective ATBM and ABM systems? (S)
3. How does the current political crisis in Russia affect the time-table by which we should seek these changes/clarifications?

D. Global Protection System

1. Should we continue to pursue a multilateral Global Protection System? If so, what elements should it contain, and how much will they cost? For example:
   - in what context and under what conditions should we offer Russia and others early warning information and, if so, how much? Are we prepared to offer Brilliant Eyes and other data that would enhance ballistic missile defenses? In exchange for what?
   - what kinds of technologies, e.g., ATBMs, sensors, are we prepared to share? Is it feasible to share the benefits of GPS without sharing the technology? With what countries could we share such technology or benefits? What are the implications for our nonproliferation objectives? Are we prepared to make technology sharing a truly two-way street?
   - how should this be linked to our BMD objectives and ABM Treaty issues?

2. Should we adopt an all-or-nothing approach to gaining international agreement to GPS or take a step-by-step approach?
   - Are there some steps which have intrinsic value (e.g., the sharing of early warning information) and which should be pursued independently of our BMD objectives?
   - Should we continue to seek Russian agreement to the GPS concept before bringing other participants into the discussions?
   - Are there special requirements -- e.g., ensuring the viability of the Russian BMD system -- that suggest a need for priority inclusion of the relevant non-Russian NIS in the GPS?

E. Negotiating Forum and Game Plan

1. In what forum should we seek our ballistic missile defense objectives: the SCC, ad hoc meetings or a formal negotiation at a designated location?
- How do we approach this issue in NATO? with other friends and allies?

- Should we seek recommitment to the June 1992 summit statement? 

2. Assuming a decision is made to discuss succession in the SCC, are there other discrete issues that can also be addressed to advance our agenda? 

3. Taking all factors into account, how should the U.S. respond to the Russian proposal to reconvene the SCC? 

PART III: TASKINGS

This review shall be conducted by the Interagency Working Group on Defense and Arms Control, under the chairmanship of the Senior Director for Defense Policy and Arms Control, National Security Council, and completed by May 28, 1993.

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