THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
April 9, 1993

PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW DIRECTIVE/NSC-25

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES TO THE
UNITED NATIONS
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
THE CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
THE DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

SUBJECT: The Future of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (U)

In confronting the changed security environment of the post-Cold War era, the United States will continue to assign the highest priority to arms control and nonproliferation. Although the danger of a massive, coordinated nuclear strike against the United States is greatly diminished, the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, biological and enhanced conventional weapons and their delivery systems will constitute a fundamental security threat to the United States, its friends and allies, in the coming decade. The strategic nuclear, chemical, and conventional weapons agreements successfully negotiated during the last several years must be ratified, implemented and their compliance assured. At the Vancouver summit, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed that "negotiations on a multilateral nuclear test ban should commence at an early date." The two countries are also preparing to resume their dialogue on the ABM Treaty and cooperation in the area of strategic defense. Finally, arms control and confidence building measures in regional areas of tension could well take on added importance in the years ahead.

The U.S. Government must be efficiently organized to address the tasks associated with fulfilling these arms control and nonproliferation priorities. Some agencies have already taken steps to that end, particularly in terms of placing greater emphasis on addressing nonproliferation concerns. However, decisions have yet to be made with regard to one paramount issue: the future of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA).

DECLASSIFIED PER E.O. 13526
Given our commitments to stemming proliferation, implementing existing arms control agreements, and pursuing more vigorously new arms control priorities, the following organizational issues must be expeditiously addressed:

-- What has been the historical role of ACDA; how has that role changed; what is the budget/staffing of ACDA; how effective has the agency been?

-- Does having a separate agency devoted solely to analysis of arms control and nonproliferation issues and representation of those considerations in the interagency process best serve U.S. interests?

-- If so, what are the options for revitalizing and/or restructuring ACDA?

-- If not, how should the State Department be reorganized to assume ACDA's responsibilities? Would there be cost savings? If so, of what magnitude and how achieved?

-- What are the policy and resource implications of each alternative?

Part II: Tasking

This review will be conducted by the Interagency Working Group on Arms Control, under the chairmanship of the Senior Director for Defense Policy and Arms Control, National Security Council Staff, in consultation with the Interagency Working Group on Nonproliferation and Export Controls. The review will focus on two written products: (1) The March 28, 1993 State Department paper entitled "The Future Role of ACDA", which was prepared by the Under Secretary of State for International Security Affairs in informal consultation with representatives from DOD, ACDA and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee; and (2) a separate paper to be prepared by ACDA which will make the case for its continued existence, as concisely as possible.

All agencies should provide comments on the State Department paper and the options it outlines no later than Wednesday, April 14, 1993. The separate ACDA paper should be submitted to the NSC by this date as well.

The review should be completed by April 21, 1993. It should include clear policy options/recommendations which will reflect analysis of the reasonable spectrum of possibilities for the future of ACDA. Differences in view among agencies should be noted.

Anthony Lake
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs