

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON
April 9, 1993PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW DIRECTIVE/NSC-24DECLASSIFIED
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR ECONOMIC POLICY

SUBJECT: U.S. Policy Toward Turkey ~~(S)~~

Turkey has a unique geostrategic position, at the crossroads of Europe, Eurasia, and the Middle East. As part of the Administrations's review of key foreign policy issues, we should undertake a thorough analysis of U.S.-Turkish relations to establish a comprehensive and coherent Administration approach toward Turkey. ~~(S)~~

In preparation for a possible Presidential meeting with Prime Minister Demirel, addressees are asked to provide contribute by April 30, 1993 to a policy paper that incorporates our best current information and assessments on Turkey -- its domestic and regional situation, as well as what would be required to implement possible policy initiatives, including an initial analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of pursuing such initiatives. No presumptions should be made about limitations on policy. Possible conflicts among different policy options should, of course, be part of the analysis. ~~(S)~~

BACKGROUND

A valuable, if at times problematic, ally during the Cold War, Turkey has emerged in a new light and importance in the wake of communism's collapse. Events in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe over the past four years, combined with the persistent rise of Iranian-inspired fundamentalism, and the threat to Gulf resources represented in Saddam Hussein's Iraq, underscore the critical nature of solid Western relations with Turkey. The United States will be key to these relations, in part because of thinly-veiled continental neuralgia toward Turkey, and in part because Turkey lies at the intersection of two regions of the world that host interests we consider among our most important -- Europe and the Middle East. ~~(S)~~

Three areas (in order of priority) where U.S.-Turkish interests overlap:

- Looking South. In the Gulf and Middle East, Turkish cooperation is a critical component of our strategy to contain both Iraq and Iran. At the same time, we want to align Turkey with our moderate Arab friends in the Gulf and Egypt and with Israel against radical forces. (S)
- Looking West. We want to encourage strong Western ties to Ankara, urge the Turks to take clear steps toward resolution of Cyprus and improve their human rights performance, encourage priorities Turkish policies in the Balkans and Southern Europe, and offer political support to the Turkish government against domestic criticism of its limited role. (S)
- Looking East. In Central Asia and the Caucasus, we want to encourage a Turkish role of model secular democracy as a bridge to the new republics and counterweight to Islamic extremism promoted by Iran, while helping to avoid exacerbating Russian-Turkish tensions. (S)

PART I: ASSESSMENT

General/Domestic

1. What is Turkey's current domestic economic, sociological, and political situation and how do these factors constrain or impel its foreign policy pursuits? (S)
2. What are the threats to Turkish democracy and how serious are they? Under what circumstances would the military stage another coup? What are the prospects for a significant challenge to secularism and democracy from Islamic fundamentalism? (S)
3. How serious are the terrorist threats to Turkey and what is the ability of the Turkish government to deal with them? What more could the U.S. do to assist Turkey in its anti-terrorist campaign? What is the current Turkish performance on human rights and what more can we do to encourage improvement? (S)
4. How has the end of the Cold War altered Turkey's domestic and regional situation and role in Western affairs? What has the effect been on the role/influence of the Turkish military? What changes will Ankara's new role impose on Turkey as NATO ally, member of Europe, and cooperative friend of the U.S.? (S)
5. What domestic or regional factors would cause Turkey to lean more toward more radical Muslim states, exploit the limits of Turkic sympathies, or become more active -- perhaps interventionist -- around its periphery? (S)

Iraq/Iran/The Middle East

6. What is likely to be Turkey's long term policy toward Saddam Hussein and the coalition effort to compel Iraqi compliance with all relevant UN resolutions? Will Turkey continue to extend the mandate for Provide Comfort? Under what scenarios will Turkey allow PCII aircraft to carry out air strike missions in Iraq?

(S)

7. What leverage does the U.S. have to influence the Turkish-Iraqi relationship? What can the U.S. do to maintain Turkey's support for enforcement of UN resolutions on Iraq?

(S)

8. How will Turkey's relationship with the Iraqi Kurdish Front and the Iraqi National Congress evolve? What impact will this evolution have on Iraqi-Turkish relations?

(S)

9. What are the implications for U.S. goals vis-a-vis Iraq of Turkey's Kurdish problem? What are the prospects for continued Syrian, Iraqi and Iranian support for the PKK? How can the U.S. influence PKK sponsors?

(S)

10. What is likely to be Turkey's long-term policy toward Iran? Does Turkey perceive Iran to be a threat to its national interests in the region and its stability at home? What are the relationships between Turkey, Iran, the Kurds, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and what are the implications for Turkish-Iranian relations? How can the U.S. influence Turkish-Iranian relations?

(S)

11. What are the prospects for improved Israeli-Turkish relations and cooperation between the two in the region? What can the U.S. do to stimulate cooperation?

(S)

12. What are the prospects for greater cooperation between Turkey and the GCC States? How critical is continued GCC financing for the Turkish military? Does the U.S. role in creating the Turkish Defense Fund offer us leverage?

(S)

Europe/The Balkans

13. What are the prospects for Turkish-European relations? What opportunities/assets do the Turks have to deepen their connections with the West? How can the U.S. facilitate relations between Turkey and Europe?

(S)

14. What is the Turks' attitude toward a successful conclusion of the Cyprus negotiations? What must Ankara do to help achieve a breakthrough in the negotiations this year? How can the U.S. work most effectively with the Turkish government to this end?

(S)

15. How do the Turks view improvements in relations with Greece? What pitfalls exist and how can the U.S. play a facilitating role?

(S)

16. What are Turkish policies in the Balkans more broadly? What do we foresee for Turkish-Bulgarian relations? With Turkey's

relationship with Albania, Macedonia and the other states of post-war Yugoslavia? (S)

Caucasus/Central Asia

17. What are the Turks' long term goals for Central Asia? What initiatives/resources are they bringing to bear to achieve their goals? What specific programs are the Turks conducting in Central Asia? To what extent are they coordinating with U.S. programs? Can we create greater synergy? At what level of commitment? Should we channel some U.S. funds through Turkey to reduce the overhead costs of delivering U.S. assistance? (S)

18. How does Iranian-Turkish competition in Central Asia influence Turkish actions there? How can the U.S. support Turkish efforts to compete effectively with Iran for influence in the region? (S)

19. What are the long term prospects for Russian-Turkish relations? Where do potential flash points exist? How can the U.S. defuse potential tensions that might arise? (S)

20. How has the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute influenced prospects for Turkish-Armenian relations? How realistic are the scenarios in which Turkey would intervene militarily in the NKO dispute? How has the Turkish-Azeri relationship complicated Turkey's aspirations for relations with Armenia/Russia/Central Asia? (S)

U.S.-Turkish Relations

21. What are the current political, economic, diplomatic, and military contours of the U.S.-Turkish relationship? (S)

22. What is the state of U.S.-Turkish military cooperation? What can we expect in the upcoming DECA review? What do the Turks expect regarding security assistance? Intelligence cooperation? How will our own budget climate affect what we are prepared to give them? (S)

PART II: POLICY OPTIONS

1. What material and political resources do we have to apply now to achieve our strategic goals? (S)

2. Given those issues and circumstances for which the Turks expect/will solicit our active political support, what additional diplomatic contingency plans should we develop in the event of Turkish military intervention in the Balkans or the Caucasus? (S)

3. What concrete steps should we take over the next year to our advance our strategic goals? I.e., how can we use security assistance, surplus equipment, democratization programs/funding, political support to Ankara on key issues, etc. to advance our shared agenda? (S)

4. Do we need new consultation mechanisms to shepherd our policy along more effectively? Are there programs/initiatives we can

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
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develop and announce in conjunction with a President/Premier meeting? (S)

TASKING

The Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs will convene an Interagency Working Group, task specific drafting responsibilities, and set deadlines for drafts. Differences of opinion should be clearly stated rather than compromised for the sake of an agreed product. (S)

A final decision paper is due to the NSC Executive Secretary not later than April 30, 1993. (S)



Anthony Lake
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

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