THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 4, 1993

PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW DIRECTIVE 2

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: U.S. Policy Toward Cambodia

We are scheduling a Deputies Committee Meeting for the week of March 1, in preparation for a possible Principals Committee Meeting, to consider specific steps we might take with regard to Cambodia.

The objective of this review is to develop broad strategic goals and strategies that will guide our policies toward Cambodia. In preparation for the Deputies Committee meeting and a possible Principals meeting, an options paper should be prepared based on the best current information, addressing the questions listed below in Parts I and II. No presumptions should be made about limitations on policy. Possible conflicts among different policy options should of course be part of the analysis.

BACKGROUND

Cambodia continues to be an important concern for the United States, both in terms of preventing further human rights abuses and the significant investment we have made in the United Nations peace process.

The Paris Accords signed in October, 1991, provide for a UN supervised cease fire, disarmament and free and fair elections to form a new government. Signed by Prince Sihanouk and the four warring factions, the Accords have resulted in the establishment of the symbolic Supreme National Council and the presence of 18,000 peacekeeping forces on Cambodian soil. Due to Khmer Rouge unwillingness to proceed with the disarmament portions of the Agreement, the Paris Accords have been only partially implemented. Political freedom has, however, expanded considerably and approximately 4.6 million Cambodians have registered to vote. A significant consensus has emerged among "core group" countries supporting the Cambodian settlement that a
presidential election in conjunction with UNTAC supervised assembly elections would assist in maintaining stability. Prince Sihanouk is expected to be the easy winner in the Presidential election now anticipated in May. (S)

On the other hand, the State of Cambodia and the Khmer Rouge continue military skirmishes and the threat of renewed fighting hangs over the country threatening to disrupt elections. A growing concern has been the escalating political violence directed at non-communist political operatives and attributed in some cases to supporters of the Phnom Penh regime. (S)

Given the non-implementation of the military provisions of the Paris Accords, the newly elected Cambodian government will face a serious military threat from a heavily armed Khmer Rouge still in control of about a half million people and 15% of the country. This will present the international community, including the United States, with very serious decisions on the depth and nature of our engagement to try to defer or deal with what could be a major new crisis. (S)

PART I: ASSESSMENT

-- What are Khmer Rouge long term political and military capabilities and objectives? Is there any evidence it is not still a potential massive human rights violator? (S)

-- How effective are the UN sponsored economic sanction against the Khmer Rouge? (S)

-- Will the Khmer Rouge seek to disrupt elections through military and/or political means? What is its capacity to do so? (S)

-- Will the State of Cambodia faction use political violence to affect the outcome of the election? (S)

-- In view of the above questions, what are the prospects for elections to be held in Cambodia which will be considered free and fair by the populace? What can the U.S. do to help the elections be free and fair? (S)

-- Will the State of Cambodia (or any other faction) seek to postpone or cancel the assembly elections? (S)

-- What will be the military capabilities of the newly elected government to defend itself against the Khmer Rouge? (S)

-- What is the status of outside assistance to the Khmer Rouge? What is likely to be after the election? (S)

-- How does the Cambodian settlement relate to Vietnamese-Chinese relations? (S)

-- What, if any, is the role of the Vietnamese in Cambodia? Are there any "hidden" troops? (S)
Have the Vietnamese fulfilled their requirements for the "roadmap?" (S)

Status of Refugees along border. (S)

PART II: OPTIONS FOR POLICY

How does the issue of Cambodia relate to U.S. interests in Vietnam, Thailand, and the stability of Southeast Asia? (S)

What should be U.S. goals in addressing the issue of Cambodia? (S)

What actions should the U.S. take to strengthen the prospects for the survival of democracy in post-electoral Cambodia? (S)

What sanctions (economic and otherwise) would be useful in convincing the Khmer Rouge either to avoid challenge to the elections or to a new government? (S)

What type of assistance (if any) should the UN and/or U.S. provide to the new Cambodian military force, either in the event of a peaceful outcome after the elections or in the event of fighting with the Khmer Rouge? (S)

What type of ongoing UN civilian presence (if any) should the U.S. support after the new government is formed? (S)

What contributions should the international community, including the U.S., make to post-war reconstruction (e.g., regarding refugees)? How might plans therefor be used to encourage a peaceful outcome? (S)

What powers should the U.S. support for the newly elected Cambodia President (Prince Sihanouk)? (S)

What should the U.S. position be if Prince Sihanouk and/or the new Prime Minister seek to include Khmer Rouge leaders in a new government, even if they don't stand for election to the Assembly? (S)

PART III: TASKING

The Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs shall convene an Interagency Working Group, task specific drafting responsibilities, and set deadlines for drafts. (S)

Should there be differences of opinion, they shall be clearly stated rather than compromised for the sake of an agreed product. (U)

The final options paper is due to the NSC on February 26, 1993. (S)

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