MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR ECONOMIC POLICY
ACTING ADMINISTRATOR, AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: U.S. Policy Toward Zaire (U)

Faced with escalating violence, a rapidly deteriorating economic situation, strong political and public opposition, and coordinated U.S., French and Belgian pressure, President Mobutu reluctantly and grudgingly compromised with Zaire's National Conference in 1992 and established a tripartite transition mechanism to put Zaire on the road to multi-party, electoral democracy. Since then, Mobutu has demonstrated his determination to cling to power despite his near-total lack of legitimacy. Splits and disarray within the opposition have aided his attempts to resist democratization. He has worked to undermine the transition process using his control of the security forces, his de facto stranglehold on the money supply, and his considerable political skills. The wave of violence that swept Kinshasa January 28-30 was one result. (TS)

Over the past year, the U.S. has publicly distanced itself from Mobutu. We have strongly supported the efforts of Archbishop Laurent Monsengwo, first as chairman of the National Conference and now as head of the High Council, to mediate a peaceful course between Mobutu and the opposition that would lead to national elections. However, the ineptness of the Tshisekedi government and Mobutu's ruthless but effective maneuvering have brought Zaire to the edge of an abyss. We need to determine whether and how to remain engaged in Zaire, the aims we should seek, and the policy tools available to achieve those aims. (TS)

This policy review should be completed by February 24. It should include clear policy options/recommendations across the full range of options for dealing with this issue. Any difference in
view among agencies should be noted. At a minimum, the review should address the following questions and issues:

Part I: Assessment

-- What are U.S. interests and objectives in Zaire?

-- What are the interests and objectives of our NATO allies primarily concerned with Zaire, France and Belgium? Are they compatible with ours?

-- What are the prospects for a successful transition to a post-Mobutu Zaire? Could Mobutu be part of this transition, or must he completely stand aside if it is to succeed? What other actors (such as Monsengwo and Tshisekedi) are likely to play a role in the transition?

-- What are the likely scenarios for a failed transition?

-- Can Zaire maintain itself as a single state, or is ethnic and regional fragmentation inevitable? What would be the costs of its disintegration?

-- What are the consequences (political, regional, economic, humanitarian) of a failed transition? What are the costs to the U.S. likely to be (e.g., share of UN operation, humanitarian relief, refugee expenses)?

Part II: Options for Policy

-- What should our role in Zaire be vis-a-vis France and Belgium? Should we attempt to take the lead, seek a cooperative consultative relationship, or urge them to take the initiative?

-- At what level, if any, should the U.S. be engaged in Zaire? (Options could range from total disengagement to active intervention.)

-- What posture should we adopt on Mobutu’s role, both in the transition and the post-transition phases?

-- What should we do to influence Mobutu? The use of direct financial sanctions against Mobutu personally, as well as the state, should be explored fully. Other possible levers could include the church or other indigenous institutions, and other interested countries in Africa or beyond.

-- What should our public posture be toward Zaire, and toward Mobutu?

-- What should our attitude be toward personal security and asylum abroad should Mobutu voluntarily leave Zaire?

-- If Mobutu steps aside, voluntarily or involuntarily, and a transition process takes hold, what should we do, if anything, to maximize its prospects for success? How can we
encourage the evolution of a civil society in which democracy and respect for human rights can take firm root? This should include options for political support, U.S. direct assistance, and the role of the IFIs.

-- Within the confines of each of the options, fully set forth the pluses and minuses of the possible courses of action, identify any implications for broader U.S. African policy, any applicable legislative constraints (including the Brooke Amendment), and any budgetary implications (including foreign assistance.)

-- Each option should contain an outline of an implementing strategy. (S)

Part III: Tasking

-- The IWG on Africa, under the chairmanship of the Department of State, should carry out this review. (U)

Anthony Lake
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