January 22, 1993

PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW DIRECTIVE/NSC-1

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: U.S. Policy Regarding the Situation in the Former Yugoslavia (S)

We are scheduling a Principals Committee meeting for Wednesday, January 27, in preparation for a possible NSC meeting, to consider specific steps we might take with regard to the former Yugoslavia. The Principals committee meeting will decide on the process for providing a coordinated interagency response to this Directive before an NSC meeting. (S)

The objective is to develop broad strategic goals and strategies that will guide our policies toward the former Yugoslavia. The Administration needs to decide what it wants to achieve and what price it is prepared to pay to get it. To that end the meeting will consider an initial range of options, such as:

-- Concentrating on ensuring delivery of humanitarian relief supplies in Bosnia-Hercegovina;
-- Stopping further Serbian aggression;
-- Rolling back Serbian conquests to date;
-- Taking punitive action against Serbia for the effect it might have on others;
-- Attempting to strengthen the Vance/Owen negotiating track;
-- Building a strategy around reaffirmation of the Bush Administration’s Christmas demarche, including a more detailed statement to the Serbs of what it means and of the instruments we are prepared to use to enforce it. (S)
In preparation for the Principals Committee meeting and a possible NSC meeting, please provide by Tuesday, January 26, the best current information on the questions listed in Part I, below, and an assessment of what would be required to implement the possible actions listed in Part II, including an initial analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of doing so. No presumptions should be made about limitations on policy. Possible conflicts among different policy options should of course be part of the analysis. (S)

Some questions are tasked to more than one Department or Agency. We appreciate that the short deadline may make a coordinated product impossible. If agencies do choose to coordinate their responses, any differences of opinion should be clearly stated rather than compromised for the sake of an agreed product. (S)

BACKGROUND

During the campaign, President Clinton called for stronger action on Yugoslavia but without specifying particular steps beyond enforcing the no-fly zone over Bosnia-Hercegovina, to which the Bush Administration already had given strong American support. (S)

In a Christmas day demarche to Serbian President Milosevic, the Bush Administration warned that certain circumstances could provoke a forceful response from the United States. We will circulate a separate paper for Principals' use on this issue. (S)

In his confirmation hearing, Secretary of State Christopher said that the Clinton Administration "will vigorously pursue concerted action with our European allies to end the slaughter in Bosnia...Europe and the world community in general must bring real pressures, economic and military, to bear on the Serbian leadership to halt its savage policy of ethnic cleansing." (S)

PART I: ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION

1. What are the present and likely humanitarian needs in Bosnia-Hercegovina and what supplies would be necessary to meet them? (CIA, DOD) (S)

2. What is the refugee situation, inside Bosnia-Hercegovina and elsewhere, and what additional resources are needed to deal adequately with it? (CIA, STATE) (S)

3. How many detainees are in camps, and under whose control? How is this estimate computed? (CIA) (S)

4. What are the status and prospects of the Vance/Owen negotiations in Geneva? (STATE) (S)

5. What do the parties perceive as their prospects in and motivations for the negotiations? (CIA, STATE) (S)

6. What is the status of the fighting in Bosnia and its likely course if present Western policies remain unchanged? (CIA) (S)
6. What are the prospects for the war's spilling over into Kosovo, Vojvodina, or Macedonia? (STATE, CIA) (S)

7. How might Macedonia's application for UN membership affect the situation? (STATE, CIA) (S)

8. How dependent are the Bosnian Serbs on support from Belgrade and how does Belgrade influence events in Bosnia? (CIA, STATE) (S)

9. To what degree is the arms embargo being violated, and by whom? To what military and political effect? (CIA, STATE) (S)

10. What are the prospects for the war's resumption in Croatia? (CIA, STATE) (S)

11. What are the views of this conflict in Moscow and how might it exacerbate Yeltsin's political problems? (STATE, CIA) (S)

12. What is the role of Islamic countries in the conflict and what is the likely impact of it on them and their relations with the U.S. and other Western states? (STATE, CIA) (S)

13. To what degree in Kiev or elsewhere will American and/or UN actions play a role in the credibility of security assurances? (CIA, STATE) (S)

II. POSSIBLE ACTIONS

1. What are the options for action, short of military action, in the former Yugoslavia itself (e.g., tightening sanctions, including military assistance to cut overland or Danube routes; stepping up efforts to establish a war crimes tribunal and to identify and bring criminals to justice; support to the opposition in Serbia; complete diplomatic and economic isolation of Serbia)? What would be the costs and benefits of each? (STATE, CIA) (S)

2. What economic assistance would front-line states (Hungary, Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, and Macedonia require to keep full implementation of sanctions from undermining their efforts at political and economic reform? What are the political effects of filling these needs or leaving them unmet? (CIA, STATE) (S)

3. What actions would be required, up to and including the use of force, to ensure that neither Serbs nor others interfere with delivery of humanitarian relief supplies? (CIA, STATE, DOD) (S)

4. Is there an alternative to the present relief effort, e.g. by opening a rail line or air drops? (CIA, DOD) (S)

5. What types and scale of military equipment, e.g. anti-tank weapons or communications gear, would best enable Bosnia to
prevent further conquests? To establish better defensive perimeters around territory the government still controls? To retake territory conquered by Serbia? Would it be possible to selectively lift the arms embargo so the GOB could defend what it now holds but not launch significant counterattacks, and if so how? What training would Bosnia need to use any additional arms effectively? Who might be willing to provide equipment, money, or training? (STATE, CIA) (S)

6. What would be required militarily and politically to halt further Serbian aggression in Bosnia-Hercegovina, including defending Sarajevo and other territory still held by the government? (STATE, CIA, DOD) (S)

7. What would be required to establish and defend safe havens? (CIA, DOD) (S)

8. What would be required to roll back Serbian conquests in Bosnia-Hercegovina? (CIA, DOD) (S)

9. What would be required, militarily and politically, to enforce implementation of the Vance Plan in Croatia? (STATE, CIA, DOD) (S)

10. If the Bosnian government and all other former-Yugoslav parties accept the constitutional principles in the Vance/Owen plan for Bosnia-Hercegovina, how might the U.S. influence implementing details that would remain to be worked out, including specific times for actions which would enable us to judge whether Serbs and others were complying? (STATE) (S)

11. If a completed peace agreement is not entirely satisfactory in principle or implementing details, might the U.S. go beyond its provisions in enforcing it or in pursuing goals that it does not encompass? (STATE, DOD) (S)

12. What would be required to enforce the provisions of a settlement if Serbs or others did not comply willingly? (CIA, DOD) (S)

13. What threats of -- or action on -- punitive military steps against Serbia would be necessary simply to deter similar aggression elsewhere? (STATE, CIA) (S)

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