PDD-71

Text: The Clinton Administration White Paper on Peace Operations

(On rebuilding effective foreign criminal justice systems) (5510)

The Clinton Administration's WHITE PAPER on PDD-71 dealing with
"Strengthening Criminal Justice Systems in Support of Peace
Operations" states that "the intent of PDD 71 is that the Executive
Branch of the U.S. Government improve its capacities to participate in
rebuilding effective foreign criminal justice systems by implementing
the directives described in this white paper.

"Furthermore," the white paper says, "together with U.S. allies, the
Executive Branch shall seek to improve the capacities of other
organizations to participate in these activities.

"By enhancing U.S. capabilities and helping others to do the same,"
the white paper says, "the U.S. will be better prepared to advance its
national interests when those interests require the reestablishment of
a criminal justice system overseas."

Following is the State Department text:

(begin text)

WHITE PAPER

The Clinton Administration's Policy on Strengthening Criminal Justice
Systems in Support of Peace Operations

February 2000

Contemporary peace operations and other complex contingencies, though
aimed at mitigating military conflict, often confront considerable
civil disorder, violence, and crime. Time and again, we have seen that
as military conflict ends (and armies demobilize), a security vacuum
develops that indigenous law enforcement organizations cannot fill, at
least initially. These institutions usually have been destroyed,
rendered ineffective by the conflict or corruption, or become part of
the conflict due to partisan behavior. In Somalia, for example, the
police simply left their posts in 1991 when a new government failed to
emerge after the Siad Barre government was deposed. In Haiti and
Bosnia, the police were involved in the conflict and consequently were
viewed as biased combatants rather than public servants by large
segments of the population. Even before the conflict arose, the public
safety forces in Haiti, as in many areas where peace operations are
conducted, were the primary instrument for state-sponsored repression
of the citizens.

The phenomenon of nonexistent, inept, or partisan police forces is not
unique to peace operations. Similar problems occurred following the
U.S. interventions in Grenada and Panama during the 1980s.
Furthermore, in all these situations the other aspects of the
indigenous criminal justice system, the judicial system, the penal
system, and the law code, were in disarray and needed substantial
reform.

Effective indigenous law enforcement and criminal justice systems are
necessary for a society to achieve and maintain durable peace.
Therefore, helping to reestablish an indigenous criminal justice
system is often, and appropriately, a fundamental aspect of a
successful peace operation or other complex contingency operation. The
experience of the U.S. Government and the international community has
demonstrated the difficulty and complexity of this task. In spite of
the difficulties that have been faced, our experience also
demonstrates that participating in both bilateral and multilateral
efforts to reconstitute indigenous criminal justice systems, promoting
public safety in the short term and developing responsive criminal
justice institutions over the long term, can successfully and
economically support American interests.

In addition to helping bring peace operations to successful
completion, an effective and just criminal justice system in countries
emerging from conflict serves other very important U.S. interests. In
particular, it helps to deter the presence of criminals who seek to
base their operations in areas where they can operate without fear of
arrest and prosecution. Such wrongdoers often include organizers of
terrorism, illicit drug and arms trafficking, and international
criminal syndicates.

Intent

The intent of PDD 71 is that the Executive Branch of the U.S.
Government improve its capacities to participate in rebuilding
effective foreign criminal justice systems by implementing the
directives described in this white paper. Furthermore, together with
U.S. allies the Executive Branch shall seek to improve the capacities
of other organizations to participate in these activities. By
enhancing U.S. capabilities and helping others to do the same, the
U.S. will be better prepared to advance its national interests when
those interests require the reestablishment of a criminal justice
system overseas.

Scope of the PDD

PDD 71 is the third in a series of PDDs designed to promote U.S.
interests by improving our ability to effectively manage or resolve
inter and intra-state conflict. The other two documents, PDD-25, U.S.
Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations and PDD-56, Managing
Complex Contingency Operations, and this new directive should be
applied together. This directive amplifies guidance given in PDD-25
concerning police and judicial dimensions of peace operations.

PDD 71 applies to U.S. Government processes dealing with peace
operations and other complex contingency operations as defined in PDDs
25 and 56 respectively. The Peacekeeping Core Group (PCG) as described
in PDD-25, under the review of the Deputies Committee, shall remain
the primary interagency policy development body for peace operations,
including the issues related to public safety and criminal justice
addressed in this directive. Further, when an Executive Committee
(ExCom) as described in PDD-56 is established, it shall be the primary
interagency mechanism to conduct political-military planning and to
coordinate the day-to-day management of U.S. participation in a
specific operation.

This white paper is organized in four sections: improving U.S.
Government organization and capabilities, improving capabilities of
other organizations, activities at the operational level, and general
policy guidance.

Improving U.S. Government Organization and Capacities

Create a Lead Agency: The State Department shall create an office, or
modify an existing one, to assume lead agency responsibility for the
full spectrum of issues related to U.S. Government involvement in the
reform of criminal justice systems during peace operations and complex
contingencies. This office shall be responsible for policy
development, all aspects of provision and oversight of U.S. CIVPOL to
field operations, development and implementation of training and
technical assistance plans and programs for foreign police forces, and
priority setting and coordination among other U.S. activities relating
to the criminal justice system, among other tasks. Consolidation of
these functions within the agency that has primary responsibility for
foreign policy will enable the U.S. Government to be more responsive
by clarifying responsibilities among the Departments of State,
Justice, and Defense and the U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID).

When the integrated planning processes described in PDD-56 are used,
the lead agency shall normally lead development of the portions of the
political-military (pol-mil) plan dealing with public safety and
restoration of the criminal justice system. When related issues fall
under the purview of another part of the Government, such as reform of
the judicial system, which has traditionally been accomplished by
USAID and the Department of Justice, the lead agency shall normally
organize and lead an interagency working group of the various
governmental organizations to coordinate and prepare products for the
pol-mil plan. When the lead agency is developing policies and
long-range plans for future programs and contingencies, it shall
involve the Department of Justice and other interested agencies.

At the request of the Peacekeeping Core Group (PCG) or ExComm, the
lead agency shall be responsible for developing and providing pol-mil
planning advice and liaison on public safety and criminal justice
issues in peace operations and complex contingencies to other
organizations and countries.

At the request of the PCG or ExComm, the lead agency shall organize
and lead an interagency criminal justice assessment team for a
specific operation. The purpose of such a team shall be to gather
information and facilitate development of a comprehensive plan for
reform. Assessment teams could also be used to help develop
benchmarks, measure progress against those benchmarks, and develop
advice for mid-course corrections. An assessment team will normally be
composed of a full range of criminal justice experts from throughout
the U.S. Government, including persons from the Department of Justice,
USAID, and federal law enforcement agencies. The Departments of State,
Defense, Justice, Treasury, Transportation, Agriculture, Interior, and
any law enforcement agencies under their auspices shall be prepared to
participate in these assessment teams as needed.

It is appropriate for the lead agency to use contractor support to
assist in its duties when cost effective, reasonable, and consistent
with laws and regulations. Furthermore, the other Departments and
Agencies shall consider providing various types of support to the lead
agency, including seconding personnel to serve in the responsible
office.

Since our efforts to help rebuild foreign criminal justice systems are
usually a multiyear activity, the lead agency and other responsible
agencies shall seek adequate, designated funding in subsequent years
of a particular operation until our foreign policy goals are
accomplished. Further, the Secretary of State and the Director of the
Office of Management and Budget shall work together to ensure that
programs conducted by or through the lead agent are funded at a level
that reflects the high priority I give to these activities.

Enhance U.S. Government Capacity to Provide CIVPOL to Field
Operations: Since 1994, which marked the initiation of the operation
in Haiti, the United States has steadily increased its contributions
of civilian police officers to peace operations. In 1996, the U.S.
contribution was 154 officers in an average month; in 1997 the average
was 275. By the end of 1999, the U.S. had more than 600 CIVPOL
deployed. These contributions have been to operations in Haiti, the
Former Yugoslavia, and East Timor. It will be in the U.S. interest to
continue to participate in and support CIVPOL activities. As always,
future decisions on U.S. involvement in CIVPOL activities will be
coordinated on a case-by-case basis through the Peacekeeping Core
Group, as described in PDD-25.

The current process used by our Government to recruit, prepare, train,
and deploy civilian police officers to CIVPOL operations is not
adequate. The lead agency shall place special emphasis on making
immediate improvements. Improvements should focus, in part, on
improving the speed with which the U.S. is able to provide personnel
for specific CIVPOL operations and enabling the U.S. to participate in
UN Standby Arrangements with CIVPOL. The lead agency also should
develop mechanisms to improve the discipline and accountability of
U.S. CIVPOL officers deployed in UN missions, to include the
possibility of a more formal affiliation with the lead agency. The
lead agency shall identify any new legislative authorities that would
be necessary to implement such improvements. Another broad area for
improvement relates to the recruitment and preparation of U.S. CIVPOL.
In this regard, the lead agency, or another agency operating under its
supervision, must develop training programs for U.S. CIVPOL that
incorporate all aspects of service in a CIVPOL field operation. To
further enhance the law enforcement expertise of the lead agency, the
U.S. Secret Service and the U.S. Park Police shall consider providing,
if requested, an individual with appropriate law enforcement and
technical expertise to the lead agency to serve within the office
responsible for the management of U.S. CIVPOL contributions.

The lead agency shall specify funds within its budget submissions to
cover the costs related to the provision of U.S. CIVPOL to field
operations, including reimbursement to the state and municipal law
enforcement agencies for their participation and seek any additional
implementing legislation, if necessary. Necessary reimbursement
procedures shall be negotiated between the federal government and the
law enforcement agencies. Given the organization of the U.S. law
enforcement system, the majority of U.S. CIVPOL will likely come from
state and municipal law enforcement agencies. Members of the federal
law enforcement agencies should also be available for CIVPOL service
on a voluntary basis similar to municipal officers, or via another
appropriate method.

Enhance U.S. Government Capacity to Provide Training and Developmental
Assistance to Foreign Police Forces: The U.S. Government should
enhance its capability to train and develop foreign police forces
during peace operations and other complex contingencies. The agencies
involved in implementation must work from a common set of goals and
must receive adequate institutional support, especially at the
headquarters-level. Furthermore, they must devise programs that
include mechanisms to ensure that human rights issues receive adequate
attention and oversight.

To carry this out, the Secretary of State and the Attorney General,
within four months of the signing of PDD 71, shall prepare a plan to
implement this guidance and present it to the President through the
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. In the plan,
the Attorney General should specifically address measures by the
Department of Justice which are necessary to broaden and strengthen
ICITAP's capacity to engage in long-range planning to support the
policy and planning development work of the lead agency, as well as
ICITAP's capacity to both provide training and coordinate with CIVPOL
activities in support of peace operations and other complex
contingencies.

Create an Interagency Partnership in Judicial, Penal, and Legal Code
Developmental Assistance: In the increasingly global world, U.S.
national security and other interests are inescapably linked to the
effectiveness of foreign criminal justice systems. When such systems
break down or are destroyed, the damage is felt in a variety of ways,
ranging from economic interests, to humanitarian concerns, to the
physical safety of American citizens. We must therefore continue to
expand and improve cooperation and development activities with other
countries, especially those emerging from periods of instability where
havens of criminal impunity might otherwise develop.

To respond rapidly and effectively to emerging contingencies, the
Secretary of State will call upon relevant departments and agencies to
participate in operations pertaining to urgent and immediate
interventions in the criminal justice sector. The Department of State,
as lead agency, will harmonize and assure rapid response assistance,
training and other necessary support to strengthen judicial and penal
systems and legal code reform during complex contingencies and in
their aftermath.

The Attorney General and the Administrator of the U.S. Agency for
International Development shall establish a partnership that will
include subordinate offices, including ICITAP, OPDAT, and the USAID's
Center for Democracy and Governance, to improve the capability of the
U.S. Government to develop and assure delivery of rapid response
assistance. Working through the Center for Democracy and Governance,
these offices will conduct contingency planning and develop emergency
assistance programs, relying on analyses of ongoing and past
assistance programs and resulting lessons learned to guide future
actions. The Center will draw upon the expertise of USAID's Office of
Transition Initiatives as well as the expert resources available
within other departments and agencies as necessary.

During the planning and execution of peace operations and complex
contingencies, the Center for Democracy and Governance shall
coordinate its developmental assistance activities with the lead
agency, which will retain overall responsibility for planning,
overseeing, and coordinating U.S. actions to rebuild the criminal
justice sector. Programs must be developed that enable the U.S. to
respond quickly to help establish rudimentary judicial and penal
capacity during peace operations and complex contingencies. These
programs must at the same time lead to sustainable, credible, and
legitimate state institutions necessary for long-term stability.
Therefore, they should be implemented in the context of a broader
criminal justice reform strategy.

The Secretary of State, the Attorney General, the USAID Administrator,
and the Director for the Office of Management and Budget shall work
together to ensure this initiative receives authority and funding that
is commensurate with the high priority that I place on it. The
operating costs of the Center shall continue to be borne by USAID
while costs of DOJ's participation in the Center's contingency
planning and program development shall be borne by the Department of
Justice. The field operations conducted through it should normally be
funded from foreign assistance appropriations and other sources as
appropriate. None of these funds shall be used by other USAID or USG
elements for judicial, penal, or legal code developmental assistance
unless coordinated through the Center.

Improving the Capacities of Other Organizations and Countries

Despite the critical importance of U.S. enhancements in these areas,
U.S. Government capabilities should not become the international
community's instrument of first resort whenever CIVPOL-related
requirements arise. Many other countries and organizations have
similar interests and responsibilities and should share the burden of
these activities. Therefore, the U.S. Government shall seek to enhance
the capacities of non-U.S. entities including those of other
countries, international organizations, and non-governmental
organizations. Furthermore, the U.S. Government shall seek to build
and sustain the will of other countries and organizations to be
involved in this type of activity and develop mechanisms for greater
cooperation and coordination.

The UN is the international body with the most extensive experience
and dedicated mechanisms focused on peace operations. Indeed, until
the recent advent of the police role for the OSCE in Eastern Slovenia
and Kosovo, the UN had been the only international or regional
organization to mount a significant CIVPOL operation. Among
international organizations, the U.S. Government shall focus its
reform efforts for CIVPOL activities on the UN, just as we did for
general peacekeeping reforms following PDD-25. At the same time, the
United States shall continue to support efforts to improve regional
organizations' peace operations capabilities, including those related
to criminal justice systems. In particular, the U.S. will work to
further develop the capacities of the OSCE to conduct these
operations.

Because we can only advocate, rather than direct, specific policies
and processes of international organizations, PDD 71 outlines general
policy objectives. During the implementation phase, specific proposals
and a strategy for achieving them shall be developed. To facilitate
these policy objectives, the State Department shall seek like-minded
states and organizations to serve as partners in our efforts to
improve the capacities of the UN and other regional organizations.

Within the UN Secretariat staff, greater emphasis should be placed on
matters related to the criminal justice system during peace
operations. The current staff devoted to CIVPOL matters in DPKO is
insufficient to accomplish the planning, coordination, and conduct of
these operations. The United States shall advocate that DPKO
strengthen its capabilities by installing an appropriate, senior-rank
individual, with appropriate staff support, to oversee criminal
justice matters. The United States will consider providing individuals
with criminal justice expertise to serve within DPKO. Furthermore,
criminal justice functions should be fully integrated with other
peacekeeping functions in DPKO. Adequate planning capacity within DPKO
should account for CIVPOL requirements, including a criminal justice
element, before a new operation is initiated or a mandate renewed.
Criminal justice planners should be integrated into UN assessment
teams that deploy to sites of potential peacekeeping operations and
CIVPOL capabilities of more member states should be entered into the
UN Standby Arrangements system. The Standby Arrangements system
enables the international community to respond more quickly to crises
through rosters of pre-identified, screened and trained police experts
from around the world who can be deployed on very short notice.
Finally, other organizations or UN specified agencies should develop
means to take over the longer-term aspects of criminal justice
development once the peacekeeping phase of a complex contingency is
completed and peace-building activities have begun.

The U.S. Government will advocate that UN missions make use of a
suitable mix of military and paramilitary forces to accomplish the
assigned tasks of any new peace operation. Constabulary forces, that
is, paramilitary forces that train for and conduct a law enforcement
function in their home countries, should be deployed by the UN in
appropriate circumstances. Such forces bring specialized skills, such
as crowd control capabilities, that are not common to traditional
military or civilian police organizations. These forces are most
effective when deployed as units rather than individuals. Generally,
constabulary and other paramilitary units should be placed under the
operational control of the military force commander, like the
Multinational Support Units (MSU) that have been part of the military
forces in Bosnia and Kosovo. In some circumstances, it may be
appropriate to place a constabulary-type force under the operational
control of the UN police commissioner. When under the operational
control of the military force commander, and when feasible and
allowable under existing statutes, these elements should receive
logistic, intelligence, and other types of support in the same manner
as the regular military units.

The lead agency shall develop methods to provide specialized training
to foreign civilian police and foreign gendarme or constabulary forces
in order to enhance their preparedness for service in peace operations
and other complex contingencies. The lead agency shall seek new
legislative authorities, if required, and adequate funding to allow
such activity. This new capacity will provide the U.S. Government a
means to improve the overall performance of CIVPOL operations, by
enhancing the quality of CIVPOL participants. The training should
include standard operating procedures for field operations, which may
need to be developed in concert with other countries, the United
Nations, and other international organizations. Given the high
priority the President places on human rights issues and risks
involved in training foreign police forces, the U.S. will ensure
appropriate mechanisms to guarantee that human rights issues are fully
considered.

Improving Activities at the Operational Level

U.S. experiences in recent operations have shown that a number of
operational level activities related to rebuilding the indigenous
criminal justice system can be improved. The aim should be to have an
indigenous public security and law enforcement network with trained,
certified, and equipped police -- all of which are firmly embedded in
a system of legitimate and credible justice sector institutions. A key
measure of progress would be to assess the extent to which a
self-sufficient and impartial law enforcement system is being
established.

Enhance CIVPOL Headquarters Capacities: Currently, operational-level
headquarters capacities for CIVPOL are generally deficient. If field
activities are to be improved, this shortfall must be corrected.
Ideally, the CIVPOL component should be capable of operating
independently, since CIVPOL will not always be deployed with military
forces, as was the case at the end of the Haiti operation.
Headquarters capacity becomes even more important if the CIVPOL
component is controlling some sort of special security unit or a
constabulary force. At a minimum, the headquarters should have the
ability to conduct current operations, plan future operations, collect
and assess field information, and manage its logistical support. The
headquarters element should also have the ability to conduct liaison
with elements of the host state and the other components of the
peacekeeping force as well as other actors involved in rebuilding the
criminal justice system.

Where appropriate, the CIVPOL headquarters should be capable of
assuming responsibility to coordinate and oversee the overall reform
process for the criminal justice sector. As more outside agencies
become involved with this sector, the importance of coordination
increases. The CIVPOL operational headquarters should incorporate a
coordination mechanism akin to the Civil Military Operations Center
(CMOC) used by the military and civilian agencies to synchronize their
activities. When the United States is participating in a peace
operation involving CIVPOL, but is not leading it, the PCG shall give
special consideration to contributing qualified U.S. personnel to the
operation to serve in the planning and coordination roles of the
CIVPOL headquarters. Enhance Coordination and Synchronization: Just as
CIVPOL and other peacekeeping functions should be coordinated at the
strategic level, they must also be coordinated fully at the
operational level. The United States Government shall advocate that
military peacekeepers and CIVPOL shall, as feasible, coordinate
activities to ensure maximum support of the overall objectives of the
operation. Past operations have been successful by colocating
headquarters, or colocating with the CMOC, or developing other
effective liaison processes, to allow sharing of information on
planning and execution processes. In addition, in every recent peace
operation involving CIVPOL, the conduct of joint and/or parallel
patrols consisting of indigenous police, CIVPOL monitors, and military
peacekeepers has proven valuable in maintaining public safety and
raising the effectiveness of the indigenous police. The first source
for CIVPOL communications and logistic support should be from
commercial sources; however, since the military component of a
peacekeeping operation is more likely to have effective communication
systems, logistic support systems, and intelligence or information
structures throughout the area of operations, the military commander
should consider providing the CIVPOL component access to and mutual
use of these capabilities when feasible and allowable by law and when
it will not interfere with execution of the mission of the military
component. Independent CIVPOL support systems should be developed as
soon as possible to minimize the dependency on military systems and
allow full withdrawal of military forces as soon as the military
mission is completed.

In some instances, military support to the CIVPOL component has proven
essential to successful accomplishment of the overall mission. Such
support might take the form of technical assistance resident in the
civil affairs, psychological operations, military intelligence, or
military police elements of armed forces. At the same time, we must
avoid situations in which the CIVPOL component is completely dependent
upon the military peacekeeping component. Such military support may
not always be feasible, or allowable under existing statutes, and the
military-unique aspects of the mission will likely be completed prior
to the public safety related tasks. Any U.S. military equipment,
services or supplies should normally be provided to CIVPOL on a
reimbursable basis.

Enhance CIVPOL Competence: The United States will advocate that
whichever organization is organizing a particular peace operation, be
it the UN or a regional grouping like the OAU or the OSCE, a military
alliance such as NATO, or a lead state, will develop specific job
descriptions and other standards for the various individual experts
required in an operation, e.g., police monitor and mentor, police
operations planner, penal system advisor, judicial system advisor,
etc. The United States will urge that the organizing body abide by the
highest standards for recruitment and have the authority to dismiss
CIVPOL that fail to perform adequately. The U.S. lead agency will
prepare template job descriptions and other standards that would speed
the process of recruiting a CIVPOL force and share them with potential
CIVPOL organizing bodies.

Training and preparedness of individuals and units being supplied to
coalition peace operations should remain a national responsibility.
However, international organizations or other organizing bodies may
need to supplement national training from time to time. The U.S. lead
agency shall maintain the capacity to provide tailored training
packages to U.S. and international CIVPOL when requested by the
organizing body or the contributing state and when appropriate U.S.
funding or appropriate reimbursement is available.

General Policy Guidance

Constabulary Activities: As already described, in some cases
indigenous police forces are unable to provide adequate public safety
when peacekeepers arrive. In these cases, outside agencies may need to
assist in ensuring basic public safety until this function can be
accomplished effectively by newly strengthened indigenous police.
Generally, outsiders should not be tasked to conduct law enforcement
as there are significant complications to using outsiders to enforce
the law of the country in crisis, with which outsiders may not be
familiar. Furthermore, ultimate responsibility to conduct law
enforcement should not be taken away from local police forces as this
may breed dependency. Rather, outsiders may be given responsibility to
carry out a more narrow range of activities to create and maintain a
reasonable measure of public safety. Such tasks may include actions to
regulate movements which may be necessary for the cause of safety;
intervene to stop civil violence, such as vigilante lynchings or other
violent public crimes; stop and deter widespread or organized looting,
vandalism, riots, or other mob-type action; and disperse unruly or
violent public demonstrations and civil disturbances, among other
tasks. For the purposes of PDD 71, this general category of tasks
shall be termed constabulary activities.

Military or paramilitary forces are best suited to accomplish
constabulary tasks. International civilian police officers (CIVPOL) as
they have been traditionally deployed to peace operations do not have
the unit cohesion, training, or equipment to conduct constabulary
functions. Generally, the United States shall prefer that constabulary
functions, when they are necessary, be conducted by a paramilitary
force such as exists in many other countries. However, suitable
partners may not always be available, or a short lag time may occur
before a civilian, paramilitary force becomes operational in a
specific situation. Therefore, U.S. military forces shall maintain the
capability to support constabulary functions abroad, and if necessary
carry out constabulary functions under limited conditions for a
limited period of time. For example, in Haiti, in operation UPHOLD
DEMOCRACY, the U.S. military contingent temporarily conducted
constabulary functions and other law enforcement-like activities until
civilian organizations were able to conduct these tasks. Maintaining a
constabulary capability in no way obligates the U.S. military to
conduct these tasks in any particular operation or to develop
specialized constabulary units dedicated to this mission. As always,
specific missions and tasks of any U.S. military elements serving in
peace operations will be developed and approved by the National
Command Authority.

Executive Authority: Generally, the U.S. Government shall advocate
that CIVPOL not be given responsibility to enforce local law
(executive authority) -- the responsibility for local law enforcement
will remain with the indigenous police forces. In some instances, it
may be appropriate to give monitors the authority (if not the
responsibility) in their mandate to respond to local crimes when
indigenous police are unable to take action. This authority may
include the right to use detention and deadly force, for example, in
an instance where there is a risk of death or serious bodily harm. In
these situations, which place them at greater risk, CIVPOL officers
should be given sufficient discretion over whether or not to exercise
their authority. Where CIVPOL officers are granted such authority,
their activities must be thoroughly coordinated with the military
force commander to avoid the potential for conflict between elements
of the overall peace operation force.

In some exceptional circumstances, such as those in Kosovo and East
Timor where the international community is responsible for
administration of a territory, CIVPOL might appropriately be tasked
with full law enforcement responsibility and authority.

Protection of CIVPOL: CIVPOL, as other peacekeepers, have the right to
self-defense. Appropriate measures therefore must be taken to ensure
that monitors are adequately protected. In many cases, the prestige
and respect imbued to monitors because of their affiliation with the
overall peacekeeping operation provides sufficient safety. In the
instances where monitors have been at risk, they were able to call
upon the military component of the operation for support. Recently, in
Haiti, this type of support was transferred from the military
component of the operation to a civilian, paramilitary unit.
Generally, this method of protecting CIVPOL monitors has worked well.
However, in some instances, this method may be insufficient. In these
cases, the United States shall consider advocating that the CIVPOL
monitors be armed in order to facilitate their self-defense. The U.S.
will generally not consider sidearms alone to constitute adequate
defense for the monitors, as they often will be significantly
"outarmed" by the civilian population and, in particular, criminals
and other rogue elements. We must recognize that if CIVPOL monitors
are armed, their training and preparation needs will increase.
Nonetheless, in addition to increasing the personal security of
CIVPOL, experience in Haiti suggests that, in some situations, an
armed CIVPOL monitor is better able to mentor indigenous police if by
being armed they are allowed to be present in the dangerous situations
indigenous police face. Obviously, in those situations where CIVPOL
are tasked to conduct law enforcement, they must be armed
appropriately.

The Role and Limits of Military Support: Actions related to criminal
justice are primarily civilian in character: military forces are not
police officers. U.S. armed forces do not normally have inherent law
enforcement authority overseas. Furthermore, using military forces for
law enforcement tasks over an extended period may send inappropriate
signals to civil authorities and the local population, may place U.S.
forces in situations for which they have not been thoroughly trained,
and may detract from other purposes of the military forces. We should
use democratic civilian policing models as the basis for rebuilding
and training indigenous police forces, and that is what we hope to
build in recovering societies. Nonetheless, the military component of
a peace operation does have a vital role to play in the overall
recovery of criminal justice capacities. Unless basic public safety is
provided, the civilian organizations will be unable to conduct their
tasks. If public safety is not maintained, the social fabric will not
be ready for the assistance to be provided by the civilian agencies.
In addition to the task of contributing to public safety, there are a
number of supporting tasks that the military can conduct to hasten the
progress of the civilian agencies dealing with criminal justice, as
described above in the section on operational level improvements.

U.S. military personnel shall not provide formal training to foreign
criminal justice systems unless authorized under existing authorities.
However, this does not restrict U.S. military personnel from
interacting with or conducting joint operational activities with
elements belonging to the indigenous criminal justice system. In
accordance with laws and regulations, the U.S. military may provide
training and assistance to host state security elements that are part
of the host state's defense establishment. Furthermore, DOD shall, if
appropriately directed and on a case-by-case basis under appropriate
legal authorities, provide assistance and support to the agencies
providing training and developmental assistance to foreign police
forces. Such assistance and support may include, inter alia,
logistics, communications, transportation, and selected technical
expertise.

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