

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 11, 1993

PRESIDENTIAL DECISION DIRECTIVE/NSC-17

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
U.S. PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE TO
THE UNITED NATIONS
CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
DIRECTOR OF THE ARMS CONTROL AND
DISARMAMENT AGENCY
DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
POLICY

SUBJECT: U.S. Policy on Ballistic Missile Defenses and the
Future of the ABM Treaty (S)

This Presidential Decision Directive establishes and directs the
implementation of U.S. Policy on Ballistic Missile Defenses (BMD)
and the Future of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. (S)

Background

On April 26, 1993, Presidential Review Directive (PRD)-31 tasked
a comprehensive examination of U.S. BMD policy, focusing on the
following three areas:

- The objectives the Administration should pursue as a
priority in BMD. (S)
- An assessment of what, if any, changes in the ABM Treaty
should be sought in light of these objectives and the
modalities for achieving any changes. (S)
- A strategy for pursuing our BMD objectives with Russia and
with friends and allies. (S)

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
MR 8/1/01

The Review was completed by the Interagency Working Group (IWG) on Arms Control and forwarded to the Deputies Committee on November 13, 1993. It was considered by the Principals Committee on November 22, 1993. (C)

U.S. BMD Objectives and Program

Consistent with the assessment of the ballistic missile threat contained in PRD-31, on August 30, 1993, I approved the recommendations from the Bottom-Up Review (BUR), including the Secretary of Defense's recommendations for a fundamental restructuring of BMD programs. (C)

Specifically, the U.S. will pursue a BMD program between FY95 and FY99 that will provide for:

- Enhanced theater missile defense (TMD) capability later this decade. (U)
- Maintaining national missile defense (NMD) as a technology research and development (R&D) program. (U)
- A modest follow-on technologies (FOT) and research and support (R&S) program. (U)

The TMD programs identified in the BUR will play a key role in minimizing two critical dangers to U.S. security: regional threats to U.S. interests and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In general, our TMD forces should:

- Provide highly effective protection against limited tactical ballistic missile attacks for forward deployed and concentrated or dispersed expeditionary elements of the armed forces of the United States and for the facilities and forces of friends and allies of the United States. (U)
- Effectively protect allied population centers. This protection could provide the opportunity for U.S./allies to execute military options in support of national objectives with minimum interference from enemy missile forces. (U)

ABM Treaty

Consistent with U.S. BMD programmatic objectives, the following will be the policy of the United States with regard to the ABM Treaty. (S)

- ABM Treaty interpretation. The Administration has already informed the Congress that it will adhere to the traditional, or "narrow," interpretation of the ABM Treaty. (U)
- NMD ABM Treaty issues: The United States will not seek amendments to the ABM Treaty to permit (1) expansion of the number of ABM sites and ground-based interceptors beyond

those currently permitted (1 and 100, respectively), (2) development, testing or deployment of space-based sensors for direct battle management (i.e., satellites capable of substituting for ABM radars) or (3) development, testing or deployment of space-based interceptors. The United States will, however, reexamine these options if a decision is taken at some future date to elevate NMD to an acquisition and deployment program. (C)

- Brilliant Eyes (BE) ABM Treaty issues: The objective BE space-based sensor system is not sufficiently defined to determine its ABM Treaty implications. If, at some future date, the USG concludes that the ABM Treaty would prohibit the objective BE system, the USG will determine at that time whether to seek changes or redesign the system to make it consistent with the USG interpretation of the ABM Treaty. However, the United States will not negotiate at this time ABM Treaty amendments or otherwise seek formal agreement to the objective BE system. (C)
- Succession: The United States will agree to negotiate a protocol that will multilateralize the ABM Treaty, i.e., to give each of the Bishkek signatories, as well as Georgia and Azerbaijan, the option of becoming parties to the ABM Treaty. (C)
- TMD/ABM clarification: The requirement for robust TMD programs has been validated as a top priority in our defense planning; thus, ensuring that the ABM Treaty is updated to reflect changes in TMD technologies is more important than ever. (U)

The U.S. will propose to our ABM Treaty partners that for purposes of determining treaty compliance a TMD system would not be deemed to have been "given the capability to counter" a strategic ballistic missile (SBM) unless it had actually been tested against an SBM. An SBM would, in turn, be defined as having a maximum velocity greater than 5.0 km/second. (S)

- Linkage: The U.S. will implicitly link our positions on succession and TMD/ABM clarification. The U.S. will not conclude one without the other. (S)

BMD Cooperation

The U.S. will be prepared to discuss (1) sharing of ballistic missile early warning information, (2) planning for use of ATBM forces and (3) employing technology cooperation to assist in forging a positive security relationship between the United States and Russia and to serve as part of a general strategy to address the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. The United States will adopt a regional/bilateral approach to BMD cooperation in each of the above three areas. (C)

In general, the degree to which we are willing to share technology will depend on the country with which we propose to cooperate. In the specific case of Russia, the extent to which we would pursue missile defense technology cooperation would depend on their continued progress in political and economic reform; adherence to arms control agreements and the Missile Technology Control Regime; and a willingness to enter into and abide by a bilateral agreement on cooperative activities. (C)

The United States will, however, limit these cooperative programs with Russia in two important ways:

- First, the technology development should be generic and not involve direct cooperation in any current U.S. system development (i.e., joint space sensor technology programs should include experiments not tied to BE or other operational system development). (C)
- Second, the United States should focus on jointly developing new technology products rather than transferring existing technology. Thus, only the carefully controlled U.S. technology necessary for specific projects would be incorporated into them. (C)

Our program with Russia will proceed on its own merits, although the pace of cooperation will be implicitly linked to our ability to move forward with our own TMD programs. That, in turn, will require a forthcoming response from Russia (and the other New Independent States that would be made Party to the ABM Treaty) on our TMD/ABM demarcation proposals. (C)

Encouraging other countries to acquire Anti-Tactical Ballistic Missiles (ATBMs), and (as appropriate) sharing U.S. technologies permitted by the MTCR, can further U.S. security interests in some regions of the world, reduce escalatory tendencies that unchecked offensive military capabilities can create and contribute to U.S. counter-proliferation efforts. (C)

However, potential tensions and tradeoffs exist between pursuing missile defenses and limiting or preventing proliferation. A tension between our BMD efforts and our nonproliferation goals may arise if and when we need to cooperate with a non-MTCR country in the development or sale of missile interceptors. Entering into such cooperation could easily put the U.S. in the position of engaging in behavior that we would object to -- and might have to impose sanctions on -- if it were carried out by other countries. Thus, the U.S. will strictly limit the number of non-MTCR states with which such cooperation occurs. (C)

The Department of Defense and Department of State will formulate a specific proposal for (a) early warning, (b) TMD and (c) technology cooperation with Russia (and, as appropriate, other countries and/or regions) and submit it to the IWG on Arms Control no later than January 7, 1994. (C)

Negotiating Forum

The United States will use the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) as the forum for negotiating clarifications, modifications, state succession and procedural applications of the ABM Treaty. Meeting in the SCC will serve to reaffirm the Administration's commitment to the ABM Treaty and will constitute a good faith effort to cooperate with the Russians on issues over which they have serious concerns. (S)

Higher-level political discussions should be used to reach broad agreement on our basic implementation strategy and to set parameters for the SCC sessions to follow. These discussions will also be the main forum for articulating to the Russians our revised BMD cooperation objectives, supplemented by technical discussions in sub-level working groups. (S)

Implementation

The NSC staff will coordinate the taskings identified in this PDD. (U)

William J. Clinton

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