THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
March 28, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY

SUBJECT: Amendment to Nuclear Weapons Deployments (PD/NSC-51) (U)

The Nuclear Weapons Deployment Authorization for FY 1979-1980 is amended: In consonance with the NATO December 12, 1979 TNF decision, the Secretary of Defense is authorized to withdraw to the US 1000 W31 HONEST JOHN warheads from the NATO Guidelines Area. The withdrawal can be initiated immediately, and will be reflected in the FY 80-81 Nuclear Weapons Deployment plan. (S/P/D) (u)

The Department of Defense should assess the military and political implications of different timing options for the withdrawal. This assessment should be submitted to the SCC by April 7, 1980. (D) (u)

If asked about the withdrawal, State and Defense should draw on the attached public explanation. In addition, once the withdrawals have begun, State should notify our NATO Allies, using the attached explanation for Allies. (U)

Zbigniew Brzezinski

 classified w/DRDA

SECRET / FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Review March 17, 1986
Declassified 8/1/95
under provisions of E.O. 12356
by D. Van Tassel National Security Council
(F86-207)
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET//RESTRICTED DATA

September 10, 1979

Presidential Directive//NSC-51

TO: The Vice President
    The Secretary of State
    The Secretary of Defense
    The Secretary of Energy

SUBJECT: Nuclear Weapons Deployments (U)

The President has approved the Secretary of Defense's Nuclear Weapons Deployment Authorization request for FY 1979-1980, with the following changes:

6.2(a)

- Until further notice, however, these weapons should be retained in the SDC under US control, with the understanding that the weapons remain excess and may be withdrawn to CONUS should circumstances warrant.

6.2(b)

- The proposed deployment level is approved. However, DOD is to suggest an adjusted level for end FY 1980 in the FY 1980-81 authorization request that is consistent with the adjusted troop withdrawal decision of July 20, 1979. (U)

Deviations from the deployment levels approved by this directive are authorized only as follows:

6.2(d)

- Where necessary for prudent management, actual deployments may vary by plus or minus 10 percent (up to a maximum of [redacted] from the total authorizations by country and afloat or by category for each region, whichever is more restrictive, except:

6.2(f)

(1) Where substantial changes in deployments are scheduled to occur between fiscal years, in which case the 10 percent will apply after the new deployment level is reached, but not later than the end of each fiscal year; and

6.2(f)

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Classified & Extended by Z. Brzezinski
Review on August 24, 1999
Reason for Extension: NSC 1.13(f)

Security Classification Review
(2) For nuclear weapons, where the plus 10 percent but no minimum deployment level is required. (TS/FA)

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The conditional authorizations contained in the request (less the changes listed above) are approved subject to the specified conditions being met. (U)

Any other changes to the approved deployment levels must be coordinated between the Departments of State and Defense, and submitted to the President for approval. (U)

The following additional rules govern nuclear weapons deployments:

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For the purpose of this directive, the NATO Guidelines Area (NGA) (Belgium, The Netherlands, and the FRG) is treated as an entity. However, the NSC Staff and the State Department will be notified prior to any redistribution within the NGA that would result in increased weapons levels within either Belgium or The Netherlands. (TS) (U)

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The support of non-US forces will be in accordance with the Programs of Cooperation (POC) levels listed in the March 29, 1979 request, subject to the following constraints:

1) Custodial arrangements are to be complete and units and facilities are to be certified and have US unilateral communications to the supporting US custodial detachment prior to the deployment of weapons in support of non-US forces. Pending fulfillment of these conditions, these weapons may be deployed in support of US forces, subject to the other restrictions in this directive.

2) In the event of unexpected delays in scheduled modernization programs, weapons may be deployed up to the previous year's POC levels, provided the total authorizations by country or by category for each region are not exceeded. (TS) (U)

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All nuclear weapons deployed to NATO will have permissive action link devices installed and locked, except for those in the NGA for MBFR purposes, or being returned to CONUS for retirement. (TS/ERD) (U)

This directive supersedes PD/NSC-29. (TS) (U)

The proposed Nuclear Weapons Deployment Authorization request for FY 1980-1981 should be submitted in September 1979 for Presidential approval. (U)

Zbigniew Brzezinski

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UNCLASSIFIED
1000 WARHEAD WITHDRAWAL

Public Explanation

At the December 12, 1979 NATO special meeting, Foreign and Defense Ministers decided that, as an integral part of its decision to deploy new long-range theater forces, 1000 US nuclear warheads should be withdrawn from Europe as soon as feasible. The US now intends to move forward with this withdrawal.

The withdrawal of the 1000 US nuclear warheads remains an integral part of NATO's long-range theater nuclear forces modernization program. The Alliance decision was a unilateral step, not contingent upon any unilateral Soviet troop and tank withdrawal. This withdrawal is militarily prudent. It will not reduce the effectiveness of NATO's theater nuclear forces. It will permit a streamlining of the overall stockpile to leave more modern and effective capabilities, facilitate the maintenance of a high level of stockpile security, and provide the basis for greater operational flexibility and efficiency. In summary, the 1000 warhead withdrawal is in the overall security interest of the US and its allies and will contribute to achievement of greater stability in the military balance in Europe.

Explanation for Allies

The US has initiated the withdrawal of 1000 nuclear warheads from Europe, as agreed by NATO Foreign and Defense Ministers at their meeting on December 12, 1979. Our aim is to complete the withdrawal one year after it begins, provided weather and logistic requirements permit.
The withdrawals will be made from the stockpile HONEST JOHN warheads which are excess to SACEUR's operational requirements and which previously had been maintained in the theater pending the outcome in negotiations of the NATO Option III proposal in MBFR. The withdrawals will permit a streamlining of the overall stockpile to leave more modern and effective capabilities, facilitate the maintenance of a high level of stockpile security, and provide the basis for greater operational flexibility and efficiency.

These withdrawals are being done as part of the overall TNF modernization program without reducing the effectiveness of NATO's theater nuclear forces. They make manifest the NATO commitment to strive for greater stability in the military balance between East and West in Europe, at lower levels of forces consistent with overall Alliance security interests.

For these reasons, the US believes it is prudent to proceed with the withdrawals despite the altered political and strategic context brought on by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. It is important that the Alliance proceed with the implementation of all aspects of the December 12, 1979 TNF decision.