

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 15, 1991

NATIONAL SECURITY REVIEW 29

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
 THE SECRETARY OF STATE
 THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
 THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
 THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
 THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE
 THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
 THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
 THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION
 THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
 THE DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT
 AND BUDGET
 UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE
 CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
 ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL
 SECURITY AFFAIRS
 DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
 CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
 ADMINISTRATOR OF THE AGENCY FOR
 INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
 DIRECTOR OF THE ARMS CONTROL AND
 DISARMAMENT AGENCY
 ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL
 PROTECTION AGENCY
 ADMINISTRATOR OF THE NATIONAL AERONAUTICS
 AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION

SUBJECT: Intelligence Capabilities: 1992-2005

The end of the Cold War and collapse of Soviet Communism already have radically altered the international landscape. The dramatic changes in U.S. defense planning and our new nuclear initiative reflect the Department of Defense's recognition of these changes and a forward-looking restructuring of priorities and programs.

Many new, non-Soviet issues have assumed greater importance for the Intelligence Community in recent years, issues such as terrorism, narcotics, proliferation, economic intelligence, technology transfer, and others. Inevitably, however, the Community's primary mission and first priority has remained the Soviet Union, Soviet and Warsaw Pact military forces, and Soviet foreign activities. The collapse of the Soviet Empire and the extraordinary uncertainties in its wake will result in new demands for intelligence information on the former Soviet Union,

Classified on 5-30-94
 by [illegible] of [illegible]
 by [illegible] National Security Council

but should lead also to an intensification of effort in key non-Soviet areas already being addressed. New issues for intelligence attention are being suggested routinely.

CIA and the Intelligence Community have their roots deep in a Cold War that is now over and the threat of a Soviet military that is now struggling at home to preserve its very existence, to avoid its breakup into multiple republic armies. We are in transition from watching Soviet operational readiness to wondering about the control of Soviet nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe have been transformed, the Warsaw Pact dissolved, and Soviet activism abroad (especially in the Third World) dramatically curtailed. There is growing interest here at home in our intelligence services tackling new issues and problems. Together, these developments urgently require a top to bottom examination of the mission, role and priorities of the Intelligence Community.

The first step in this effort will be a comprehensive identification by policy departments and agencies of their anticipated intelligence information and support needs to the year 2005. This will require the projection of international developments as well as policy issues, problems and opportunities well into the future. In the first phase of the review, your intelligence organizations (where they exist) should not be involved. Instead, policy officials in your department or agency should develop for your personal consideration and approval the principal intelligence requirements for your organization into the next century. This is not a detailed requirements process. Rather, it is an identification of the categories of political, economic and military information needed for diverse issues and regions of the world. This includes intelligence needed to support our military forces. Beyond the traditional areas of interest, we need to consider intensified intelligence efforts in some global problems and new efforts in others. For example, will we need more and different intelligence information on international aspects of the environment, natural resource scarcities (such as water), global health problems, international research and development efforts, and so on? What kinds of economic intelligence do we need? At the same time, what information are you receiving now that you will not need at all or where you can accept far less detailed knowledge?

The Deputies Committee should prepare terms of reference for this review, and, at its conclusion, integrate and prioritize the requirements of all departments for NSC review and my approval. Departmental requirements should be forwarded for Deputies Committee review and integration by January 15, 1992. The integrated requirements report should be ready for NSC review by February 15, 1992.

Subsequent to approval of a policy-based mission and priorities report, the Director of Central Intelligence will identify resources available to address these priorities, resources not relevant to the new requirements and thus available for reallocation, and gaps where new resources may be needed. Based on the results of this analysis, the DCI should also provide to the NSC his recommendations for structural changes in the Community, organizational adjustments, possible new legislation, and alternative budget proposals needed to address the new requirements to the year 2005. These recommendations should be forwarded to the NSC by March 20, 1992.

Senior policymakers traditionally have neglected their critical role in setting intelligence priorities and requirements. The revolutionary world of today and tomorrow, the huge uncertainties we face, the constraints on our resources, and the need to plan well ahead all make it imperative that each of you take a personal interest in this effort.

The Intelligence Community today is being asked to cope with issues ranging from traditional Soviet military forces to the environment, from economic competitiveness to AIDS. We must establish the proper role, mission and priorities for U.S. intelligence in this changed and changing world. Otherwise, our capabilities will spread too thin to satisfy even the highest priorities and our inability to plan and invest long-term will leave us with inadequate intelligence assets to protect our vital interests and our security.

G. Bush

C