MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
DIRECTOR OF THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT
AGENCY

SUBJECT: United States Policy Toward North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program

The continuing development of a nuclear weapons program by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), occurring in the context of diplomatic and strategic change in Northeast Asia and the world, compels a review of U.S. policy on preventing nuclear weapons proliferation on the Korean Peninsula. This review should be completed not later than February 22, 1991. It should include clear policy options/recommendations across the full range of options for dealing with this issue. Any differences in view between agencies should be noted. At a minimum, the review should address the following questions and issues:

PART I: ASSESSMENT

-- Broadly identify U.S. interests with respect to the Korean Peninsula and their relationship to the DPRK’s nuclear program. These should include the implications of DPRK possession of nuclear weapons for U.S. forces and U.S. security commitments, responses of the
Republic of Korea (ROK) and Japan, broader nonproliferation concerns beyond the region, and the potential for DPRK transfer of nuclear technology to others. (TS)

-- What is the Intelligence Community’s assessment of the DPRK’s nuclear program, its prospects, limitations and milestones? What leverage can the U.S. and other key actors bring to bear on the program? What is the assessment of the DPRK’s responsiveness to pressures or inducements to curb its nuclear program? What implications does the DPRK missile program have for the nuclear program? (TS)

-- What is the Intelligence Community’s assessment of how different regional actors, including the South Korean society, government and military, view the DPRK’s nuclear program? What are their likely reactions if and as the DPRK’s nuclear program achieves various milestones? How long will South Korea wait before acting? What role does the U.S. play, in their eyes? (TS)

-- What current and projected diplomatic, political and economic trends in the region and elsewhere will affect U.S. dealings with the ROK and DPRK and how could they be used to alter DPRK behavior? (TS)

PART II: OPTIONS FOR POLICY

-- How does the issue of nuclear nonproliferation relate to other major U.S. goals and interests in the region? What should be U.S. goals in addressing the issue of nuclear and missile proliferation on the Peninsula? What role can IAEA safeguards play? What further steps are required? (TS)

-- What are U.S. options (including continuation of current policy) and points of leverage for preventing the development and/or employment of nuclear weapons on the Peninsula? How can the U.S. and ROK work together and with others (e.g., Japan, USSR, PRC) to prevent this development? (TS)
Within the confines of each of the options, fully set forth the pluses and minuses of the possible course of action, identifying any implications for broader U.S. nuclear policy and any applicable legislation.

Each option should contain an outline for the anticipated game plan it represents.