MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
THE CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
THE DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

SUBJECT: Review of United States Non-Proliferation Policy (U)

I assign major importance to preventing the proliferation and use of nuclear weapons, chemical and biological weapons, and missiles capable of carrying these weapons. Therefore, I am hereby directing a review of U.S. policy on all these aspects of non-proliferation. This review shall be conducted by the PCC on Non-Proliferation Policy, chaired by the Department of State, and should take into account and supplement those being conducted under NSR 12 and NSR 14.

This review is to define and clarify U.S. non-proliferation policy goals for chemical weapons, biological weapons, nuclear weapons, and missiles that can carry these weapons. The review should assess the threat to U.S. security and interests in each case, provide a critical re-examination of the underlying assumptions of current policy, and analyze alternative courses of action. The review should evaluate the effectiveness of existing mechanisms used in pursuit of that policy, and identify possible additional or alternative policy instruments, including political, diplomatic, economic or military initiatives. It should address ways to prevent or discourage the acquisition of the weapons and systems of concern, and to prevent their use. Recommendations for new initiatives should not be limited to adjustments to current policy, but should include a fresh look at the entire question of preventing proliferation and use of destabilizing weapons systems.

The overview and missile non-proliferation sections should be completed and submitted for review by June 29; the nuclear non-proliferation section by July 7; and the chemical weapons and biological weapons sections by July 28. The summary and conclusions section should be completed by August 4.
Overview - The overview section should:

a) Describe the threat posed to U.S. interests by the continuing proliferation of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons and missile technology. This should include both a current threat assessment (including to U.S. forces and territory), an analysis of the trends, and an assessment of their impact on stability;

b) Assess the policy implications of the interrelationship among the four areas of non-proliferation and their synergistic effect on each other;

c) Analyze the relationship of non-proliferation policies to other national security interests in our bilateral relations with affected states; and

d) Clarify the relationship of non-proliferation policies to bilateral and multilateral arms control objectives, programs of cooperation and defense policies.

Missile Proliferation

ASSESSMENT:

a) What U.S. programs of cooperation, direct or indirect, currently exist to help allies or friends develop ballistic missile capabilities.

b) What countries have missile development programs or plans? How advanced are they? Which programs involve multinational cooperation?

c) What are the specific threats to U.S. interests posed by missile proliferation? What is its impact on the security environment of our allies and friends? Should we be most concerned about the threat to regional stability? Use by terrorists? Direct threats to U.S. territory or forces? About which countries or regions should we be most concerned?

d) What should our missile non-proliferation objectives be? How should we integrate efforts to prevent the use of these delivery systems with attempts to stop or slow their acquisition? Where should we concentrate our efforts?

e) How well has the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) worked? What are its weaknesses, and how has it been implemented by the U.S. and other partners? What is the relationship between the MTCR and our interest in space cooperation with other countries?

f) How effective is intelligence gathering and coordination with the MTCR partners as an instrument of missile non-proliferation policy? How should it be improved?
g) What is and should be the relationship between U.S. missile non-proliferation policy, our programs of cooperation, and U.S. arms control objectives? (8)

h) What leverage does the U.S. have to affect missile non-proliferation? What are the opportunities and prospects for regional political initiatives? (8)

OPTIONS FOR POLICY

i) How can the U.S. pursue programs of cooperation with other countries on space launch and ballistic missile programs while preventing missile proliferation? (8)

j) Are the MTCR restrictions appropriately targeted or should they be amended or expanded? Should new or additional guidelines be proposed for agreement with the MTCR partners? (8)

k) How should we proceed with the Missile Technology Control Regime? Should we seek additional adherents among Western suppliers? How can the MTCR’s objectives be extended to suppliers who are unlikely to join the MTCR? (8)

l) How should we deal with the Soviets, the Chinese, and other non-Western suppliers? Should we continue to press the Soviets to join the MTCR or seek another mode of cooperation on missile non-proliferation? (8)

m) How should we deal with already existing projects of missile proliferation concern? (8)

n) What active and passive defense measures should the U.S. consider supplying to other countries as part of a policy to counter missile proliferation? To what countries? Under what circumstances? (8)

o) What are possible alternative or additional political, diplomatic, economic and military options to achieve U.S. non-proliferation objectives? (8)

Nuclear Non-Proliferation

ASSESSMENT

a) What countries have nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons development programs? How far advanced are they? Which programs are receiving or have received foreign help? (8)

b) What is the threat posed to U.S. interests by the proliferation of nuclear weapons? What is its impact on our allies and friends and on international stability? (8)

c) What should our non-proliferation objectives be, and to what aspects of the problem should we give priority attention? (8)
d) How effective has the Non-Proliferation Treaty been in preventing or slowing acquisition of nuclear weapons capability? Are the assumptions on which the Treaty was based still valid today? What should U.S. objectives for the 1990 NPT Review Conference be? (G)

e) What has been the impact of programs to promote peaceful nuclear cooperation? (G)

f) How effective are the IAEA safeguards? What are the shortcomings in the system? To what extent and in what circumstances should we rely on safeguards to protect against proliferation? (G)

g) What leverage does the U.S. have to affect nuclear non-proliferation? How can we influence the behavior of countries that are not party to the NPT and that have significant nuclear programs? (G)

h) How effective have bilateral consultations with the Soviet Union and other supplier countries been in preventing or slowing nuclear acquisition? Should we do more? If so, what? (G)

i) How adequate are U.S. export controls for nuclear materials and technology? How adequate are the export controls of other potential suppliers? What are the weaknesses in the systems? What can we do to make them more effective? (G)

OPTIONS FOR POLICY

j) Should the Non-Proliferation Treaty be amended? How can non-adhering countries be brought into compliance with the Treaty? (G)

k) How might the Treaty of Tlatelolco be brought fully into force in Latin America, and how might it be made more effective? What activities should the U.S. regard as "peaceful" under Article I? (G)

l) How could the nuclear safeguards system under the IAEA be strengthened? (G)

m) What additional political, diplomatic, economic or military initiatives should the U.S. consider to further nuclear non-proliferation objectives? (G)

Chemical Weapons

ASSESSMENT

a) What countries have chemical weapons programs? What is their nature, and how advanced are those programs? What supplies do they have? What countries share or sell CW weapons or
technologies, and under what circumstances? What countries sell precursors? (8)

b) What is the threat posed to U.S. interests, territory and forces by chemical weapons? What is their impact on the security environment of our allies and friends? (8)

c) Summarize and assess our present policy on chemical weapons non-proliferation. In which areas has it been effective? What should our chemical weapons non-proliferation objectives be? Given the number of states that already possess or may soon possess chemical weapons capability, and the problem of dual-use, what priority should be given to efforts to prevent use, compared to trying to prevent further proliferation? Where should we concentrate our efforts? (8)

d) How does our position on a treaty banning chemical weapons relate to our chemical weapons non-proliferation objectives? (8)

e) How effective has the Australia Group been in preventing or slowing proliferation of chemical weapons? (8)

f) How effective are existing bilateral efforts, e.g., with the Soviet Union and other non-Australia Group members, on chemical weapons non-proliferation? (8)

g) How effective are existing U.S. export control mechanisms for chemical weapons and their precursors? How effective are export controls by other supplier countries? How effective has implementation been? What are its weaknesses? (8)

h) What is the potential contribution of new technological developments (e.g. new detection and analysis capabilities) to our non-proliferation efforts? How could these be exploited, and in what time frame? (8)

i) What leverage does the U.S. have in the area of chemical weapons non-proliferation? (8)

OPTIONS FOR POLICY

j) What role can and should the private chemical industry play in CW non-proliferation efforts? What can the U.S. do to promote this? (8)

k) Should the Administration seek additional or improved export controls for CW? If so, what should they be? (8)

l) Should the U.S. seek changes in the Australia Group, e.g., formal coordination of export controls? What alternative or additional international arrangements should be considered? What are possible new multilateral or bilateral initiatives to prevent proliferation, e.g., possibly along the lines of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and IAEA safeguards? (8)
m) Should the U.S. give priority to political and diplomatic non-proliferation initiatives in regions of major concern such as the Middle East? (S)

n) Should the U.S. consider offering assistance in CW defensive programs as a means of countering chemical weapons acquisition? If so, to which countries and under what circumstances? (S)

o) What additional political, diplomatic, economic and military means should the U.S. consider to limit further CW proliferation, and/or prevent use? (S)

Biological Weapons

ASSESSMENT

a) What countries have biological weapons programs or capabilities, and how advanced are they? (S)

b) What is the threat posed to U.S. interests, including U.S. territory and forces, by the proliferation of biological weapons? What is its impact on the security environment of our Allies and friends? (S)

c) What should be our biological weapons non-proliferation objectives? Given the number of states which already or may soon possess biological weapons capability, and the problem of dual-uses, what priority should be given to efforts to prevent use in addition to preventing further acquisition? Where should we concentrate our efforts? (S)

d) What is the relationship of the 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction to biological weapons non-proliferation? How effective has it been? Should we encourage the adherence of additional states? If so, how? How can the prohibitions in the Convention be strengthened? (S)

e) Summarize and assess our present policy on biological weapons non-proliferation. In which areas has it been effective? Are there supplies or equipment unique to biological weapons research or production? Given the dual-use nature of much of the equipment and supplies, what role can or should export controls play in biological weapons non-proliferation? How effective are existing U.S. export controls? How effective are export controls by other supplier countries? How stringent and consistent is the implementation of existing export controls? (S)

f) What is the potential contribution of new technological developments, if any, to our biological weapons non-proliferation efforts? In what time frame could these be exploited? (S)
g) What leverage does the U.S. have in the area of biological weapons non-proliferation? (2)

OPTIONS FOR POLICY

h) What role can and should private industry play in biological weapons non-proliferation efforts? What can the U.S. do to promote this development? (2)

i) Should the focus of the Australia Group be broadened to include biological weapons? (2)

j) Should the Administration seek additional or improved export controls for biological weapons or technology? If so, what should they be? (2)

k) What additional political, diplomatic, economic and military means should the U.S. consider to limit further biological weapons proliferation and/or prevent use? (2)

Summary and Conclusions - This section should:

a) Assess the U.S. capacity to affect non-proliferation in all four areas, taking into account the full range of political, diplomatic, economic and military instruments available to us;

b) Recommend priorities for Administration action, including efforts to secure Congressional, Allied and public support for Administration policy; and

c) Propose strategy for securing the support of the Soviet Union, China, and other key non-Allied countries for U.S. non-proliferation objectives, including possible initiatives in multilateral as well as bilateral fora. (2)

Export control decisions, fulfillment of legal obligations and plans for the 1990 NPT Review should proceed. Any other proposed initiatives which cannot await the results of my decisions on the overall review should be submitted separately for my consideration. (2)