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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 9, 1989

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NATIONAL SECURITY REVIEW IS

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
 THE SECRETARY OF STATE
 THE SECRETARY OF TREASURY
 THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
 DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
 DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
 ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
 NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
 CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
 ADMINISTRATOR, AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL
 DEVELOPMENT

SUBJECT: National Security Review -- South Africa (S)

I hereby direct the National Security Council to prepare a comprehensive review of U.S. policy toward South Africa. This review should include an assessment of the situation in South Africa and, insofar as it relates directly to our South African policy, the southern African region. (S)

The review should be completed no later than May 15, 1989. It should include policy options/recommendations. It should also delineate any differences between the various agencies. At a minimum, the review should address the following questions and issues:

PART I. Assessment

South Africa

- What are U.S. political, economic, and strategic interests in South Africa? What constitutes U.S. policy priorities? Will these priorities change dramatically over the next four years? (S)
- What are the dominant trends in white politics? What is the probable result of the incoming change at the head-of-state level? What is the current strategy of the South African Government (SAG) toward reform and power-sharing negotiations? What are the prospects of the SAG developing a coherent strategy for dealing with its problems? What is the impact on the overall situation and decision-making process of the deterioration of the South African economy? What, if any, impact do white reformist political entities

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NSC DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW [E.O. 12958 as amended]
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 by R.Soubers on 6/1/2004

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have on the SAG? What is the impact of the right-wing white political entities? Is there potential for alliance politics in the white community in the near future? (S)

-- What is the level of influence of the security forces on the decision-making process? Is the current level of influence likely to increase or decrease over the next four years? (S)

-- What are the dominant trends in black politics? How unified is the black community and who are the primary actors in the black political community? What is the relationship of the internal black opposition to exile entities such as the African National Congress (ANC)? Do the internal parties or the exiles have a coherent strategy for negotiations with the SAG? What is the influence of the black labor union movement? What impact has the state of emergency had on the activities and structure of the black opposition? (S)

-- What is the current strategy of the ANC toward South Africa? What is our policy regarding the ANC? What influence do we have with the ANC? What is the level of influence in South Africa of other exile groups, for example the Pan Africa Congress (PAC)? (S)

-- What level of influence does the United States Government have with the SAG and/or the internal black opposition? How can this level of influence be enhanced? What assets does the United States Government possess which it could apply to influence behavior by the government or its opposition? (S)

-- What are the probable ramifications for United States Government interests in the region of continued stalemate and sporadic violence in South Africa and within the region? What is the potential for a major outbreak of violence that could destabilize South Africa and/or the region? (S)

-- What role, if any, does the U.S. business community have in influencing events in South Africa? In a broader sense, what has been the contemporary role of the private sector in South Africa and what is its current level of influence with the government and the black community? Is this level of influence likely to increase or decrease over the next four years? (S)

-- What has been the impact of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 (CAA) on the economy of South Africa? What has been the impact of sanctions on the non-white population? Of all sanctions? What has been the impact of sanctions on the decision-making process in the SAG regarding reform and

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negotiations? Is the CAAA an impediment to the conduct of United States government policy towards South Africa? Do state and local government initiatives, aimed at forcing American companies to disinvest from South Africa and at pressuring the United States government to implement further punitive measures, constitute an asset or an impediment toward the effective application of policy? (S)

-- What is South Africa's nuclear weapons capability? What, if any, impact does it have concerning the region? What is the SAG's position toward adhering to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)? (S)

The Region

-- What is the probable influence of the Namibian independence process on future events in South Africa? (S)

-- Who are the key actors in the region? In brief, what are the policies of the other key regional players towards South Africa? Is there a trend in the region towards moderate or radical behavior towards South Africa? What is the level of influence the United States Government has with these players? (S)

-- Can we build on the recent Angola-Namibia settlement in an attempt to institutionalize the regional peace process? Could this peace process be broadened to include issues such as Mozambique or, more generally, the Front Line States (FLS)? (S)

Soviet Policy

-- Has there been a significant alteration in Soviet policy towards South Africa? What is Moscow's policy towards South Africa's neighbors regarding their behavior towards South Africa? What is the Soviet policy towards the African National Congress (ANC), and that group's political and military policies? (S)

Our Allies

-- What sanctions have other countries implemented against South Africa? Can we assess their impact and, if so, what has been the impact? What are the current attitudes/policies of our allies towards South Africa? What are the current trends in those policies? What is the likely allied responsiveness to U.S. leadership role? What are the areas of special allied competence or leadership regarding this issue? (S)

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PART II. Policy Options

South Africa

-- Should our strategy focus largely on South Africa or should it meld South Africa into a policy which is more oriented towards the region? (S)

-- Should United States Government policy goals stress the elimination of apartheid and creation of tangible movement towards power-sharing negotiations? Should the United States Government establish specific targets regarding the aforementioned goals, e.g., the release of Nelson Mandela, the release of all political prisoners, the lifting of various forms of censorship, freedom of political and economic movement, and enhancement of black bargaining power? What should be the additional targets? (S)

-- Conversely, should United States Government policy goals be less specific regarding the aforementioned near- and longer-term targets, especially if it is concluded that the situation in South Africa is not ripe for resolution? (S)

-- In relation to attaining our policy goals, should the United States Government increase its economic assistance to disadvantaged South Africans? Should we more aggressively engage members of the S.G., the white opposition, the black community in South Africa, and the ANC in discussions on how to move forward on reform and facilitate negotiations? Should such talks include the discussion of an outline or game plan prepared by the United States Government? Should key South Africans be invited to visit the U.S. and to engage in discussions with senior members of the United States Government? Should the United States Government consider providing financial or diplomatic, or military assistance to the ANC and/or other exile groups? (S)

-- What alterations, if any, should we seek in the CAAA? How could changes be brought about? Is the threat of sanctions more effective than actual application? If so, should the United States Government use this threat and how could this threat be most effectively applied? Under what circumstances should the United States Government consider applying additional punitive measures? What could constitute such measures? (S)


-- Should we encourage American businesses to remain engaged in South Africa? Should the United States Government work more closely with these companies in developing a coherent plan of action? What should that strategy include? If state

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and local initiatives represent continued interference in our application of policy, how should we address this problem? (S)

Should the Department of Justice be tasked to provide a legal opinion on the constitutionality of such statutes relating to South Africa? (S)



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Should we more actively discuss the issue of South Africa with Congress? What should be our goals in convening such discussions? Is additional sanctions legislation inevitable or is Congress contemplating a new statute which would not include the application of further punitive measures? Who in Congress can we best work with to formulate a coherent, effective policy? (S)

How should the Administration handle South Africa as a public relations issue? Should we be more vocal or critical of events in South Africa and the region? (S)

Should the United States Government alter its posture in international forums, e.g., should we take a more aggressive stance in the UN concerning sanctions? (S)

How should the United States Government deal with South Africa as a human rights issue? (S)

Should we coordinate our policy toward South Africa with our allies? If so, how? (S)

Are strategic minerals still an important issue regarding United States Government policy toward South Africa? If so, how should we address this matter and what posture best serves United States Government interests? How can we coordinate this matter with our allies which have similar dependencies? (S)

Should the United States Government continue to press the SAG to adhere to the NPT? Should we continue to coordinate on this issue with our allies? Should we also continue to consult with the Soviets on this matter? What incentives or disincentives are available to the United States Government or our allies to obtain the SAG's adherence to the NPT? (S)

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The Region

- How might USG influence events in Namibia in such a way as to positively affect developments in South Africa? (S)
- Assuming that the United States Government could influence the course of events in Namibia in a manner which would have a positive impact on events in South Africa, should the United States Government move quickly to lift sanctions against Namibia? If not, if any, African programs should we consider for a new government in Namibia? Is it in our interest to consider other measures? If so, what could they be? (S)
- Should the United States Government coordinate its policy towards South Africa with Pretoria's neighbors? Which of the neighbors should we talk to and what should we urge them to do? How should this dialogue be conducted? Should the United States Government provide additional security and/or economic assistance to South Africa's neighbors? (S)

The Soviets

- Should the United States Government continue to discuss the issue of southern Africa with the Soviets? Should we focus this dialogue only on the issue of national reconciliation in Angola or is it in our interest to broaden the dialogue to include Mozambique and/or South Africa itself? (S)

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