

J: Will think over and comment tomorrow.

G[?]: [illegible] can take line which shows NVN we are exasperated which may lead to negotiations.

HAK: [illegible, I?] will talk to large group of Congress.

Meet—tomorrow 1010 AM.

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## 270. National Security Decision Memorandum 58<sup>1</sup>

Washington, April 28, 1970.

TO

The Secretary of State  
The Secretary of Defense  
The Attorney General  
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

Actions to Protect U.S. Forces in South Vietnam

I hereby rescind National Security Decision Memorandum 57<sup>2</sup> and substitute therefor the following instruction which I am promulgating to protect U.S. forces operating in South Vietnam:

—Authorization for attacks on identified North Vietnamese/Viet Cong base areas in Cambodia up to a depth of 30 kilometers. Primary responsibility for these attacks, whenever possible, should be with GVN forces with U.S. support where necessary. Combined U.S./GVN operations are also authorized. Under this specific authorization, combined U.S./GVN operations, with the exception of the already approved operation against base area 352/353, will be submitted to me for approval on a case-by-case basis.

—Authorization for the provision of U.S. tactical air/helicopter and artillery up to a depth of 30 kilometers in all base areas north of and including 352/353.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-073, WSAG Meeting, Principals, 4/28/70. Top Secret; Sensitive; Principals Only. A copy was sent to Wheeler.

<sup>2</sup> Document 260.

—This directive does not affect GVN operations inside of Cambodian territory which have been previously authorized.<sup>3</sup>

The Washington Special Actions Group is charged with coordinating these activities.

**Richard Nixon**

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<sup>3</sup> In telegram 5812 to McCain and Abrams, April 28, Wheeler informed them that the President had approved “certain military actions to protect U.S. forces operating in South Vietnam,” and repeated the authorizations as outlined in NSDM 58. Wheeler noted that his message was “an execute directive” and that the operation should commence not later than early on Friday, May 1, Saigon time. Wheeler also asked McCain and Abrams to advise when coordination with the JGS of ARVN had been completed. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 590, Cambodian Operations, Chronology, Vol. III, Nodis/Khmer, HAK)

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## **271. Minutes of Washington Special Actions Group Meeting<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 29, 1970, 10:35 a.m.

### **PARTICIPANTS**

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President  
David Packard, Deputy Secretary for Defense  
Gen. Earle Wheeler, Chairman, JCS  
Richard Helms, Director of Central Intelligence  
U. Alexis Johnson, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs  
Thomas Karamessines, Central Intelligence Agency  
Marshall Green, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian Pacific Affairs

### **SUBJECT**

Cambodia

Wheeler: The Parrot’s Beak operation got off on time. It’s been excellent for the ARVN. They have used US gunships. Resistance is light so far. The main problem has been maintaining radio contact with the advance units.

Johnson: We have a cable from Phnom Penh. The attaché is asking about the attack.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-114, WSAG Minutes, Originals, 1969–1970. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room.

<sup>2</sup> Not found.