April 6, 1970

National Security Decision Memorandum 50

TO: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
The Director, Office of Science and Technology
The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
The Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
The Director, United States Information Agency

SUBJECT: Release of Public Information Concerning Foreign Nuclear Tests

The President has directed that all recipients of classified intelligence information regarding foreign nuclear tests take all feasible steps to prevent unauthorized disclosure of the information. Such action is essential to safeguard intelligence sources and methods used in obtaining this information and to minimize speculation concerning the significance of data obtained from such tests.

Public release of information relating to the occurrence of foreign nuclear tests will be made in accordance with the procedures set forth in the attachment to this NSDM. All "non-routine" announcements, as defined under these procedures, will continue to require specific White House approval as authorized by the President. All public announcements will be made by the Atomic Energy Commission unless otherwise directed by the President.

National Security Action Memorandum 347 is superseded by this NSDM.

cc: The Attorney General
The Secretary of Commerce
The Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare
The Director, Office of Emergency Preparedness
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET
Attachment To
National Security Decision Memorandum

Subject: Procedures for Public Release of Information Concerning Foreign Nuclear Tests

I. Public release of information concerning foreign nuclear tests shall be handled in either a "routine" or a "non-routine" manner depending upon the nature of the test. Soviet and Communist Chinese tests which meet the criteria set forth in Section II will usually be classified as "routine". All other Soviet and Communist Chinese tests and all tests by other countries will be regarded as "non-routine".

A. In the case of foreign tests to be treated in a "routine" manner, a statement in accordance with the guidelines set forth in Section III will be released to the press by the Atomic Energy Commission at a time not earlier than three hours after the issuance of the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee's (JAEIC) statement to the interested agencies, unless that statement includes a recommendation against public release.

[Circumstances such as preannouncements or immediate post-announcement by the foreign country conducting the test, may dictate a delay shorter or longer than three hours.]

B. During this three-hour period, the White House and/or interested agencies shall notify the Atomic Energy Commission of any objections to or suggested variations in the standard content of the release.

The release will be handled as a "non-routine" case if any objections or suggested variations in the content of the release are raised.

C. In the case of all foreign tests to be treated in a "non-routine" manner, the Atomic Energy Commission, in coordination with the other interested agencies, will prepare recommendations concerning a public release and the content thereof for specific White House approval as authorized by the President.
II. As part of its report to concerned agencies on a foreign nuclear test, the JAEIC will recommend whether or not a test should be regarded as "routine" or "non-routine". If "non-routine", the JAEIC statement will indicate the reasons for the classification.

The following are considered to be "routine" unless otherwise specified by the JAEIC:

A. Soviet underground nuclear explosions with these parameters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Yield</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Semipalatinsk Nuclear Test Site</td>
<td>20-500 KT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Novaya Zemlya Nuclear Test Site</td>
<td>20-1500 KT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any other Soviet land area</td>
<td>20-100 KT</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B. Communist Chinese nuclear explosions with these parameters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Yield</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Atmospheric Test in the Lop Nor Area</td>
<td>20-5000 KT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Underground Test in the Lop Nor Area</td>
<td>20-300 KT</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

III. Standard formats for the public release on "routine" tests will include the following information:

A. Testing country/date/approximate time
   Approximate location
   Test environment
   Yield range expressed as 20-200 KT, 200-1000 KT, or greater than 1 MT
   Amplifying remarks based upon previously released information

B. All public release announcements on Soviet or Communist Chinese underground events will include the general qualification that recorded seismic signals are "presumably from an underground nuclear explosion".