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September 15, 1982


National Security Decision
Directive Number 56

PRIVATE INF EXCHANGE (S)

With respect to the private INF exchange which took place at the close of the last session, I have decided the following:

- The U.S. should continue to press for the zero/zero approach.
- No actions should be taken to close the private channel. If the Soviets respond in that channel, the following points should be made:
 - The U.S. believes the zero/zero proposal is the best approach to reduce the risk of nuclear conflict and to ensure effective verification.
 - The U.S. cannot accept a position in which the Soviets retain short time-of-flight SS-20 ballistic missiles while the U.S. foregoes Pershing II ballistic missiles (and retains only the slower, air-breathing GLCMs*).
 - If the Soviets continue to be adamantly opposed to zero/zero, we should place the responsibility on them to propose alternatives for equitably reducing the total missile force structures. (S)

In preparing for the possibility of a Soviet response to the exchange, an NSPG working group should prepare, on a close-hold basis, talking points which outline the specific military and other reasons why the U.S. cannot accept it. (S)



* and shorter range ballistic systems

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