NATIONAL SECURITY DECISIN DIRECTIVE NUMBER 322

U.S. INTER. TSWIND LICY IN CHAD (S)

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r 14, 1988

Principal U.S. long term goals in central Africa are regional stability, promotion of governments and institutions favorable to U.S. and Western interests, and containment/reversal of Libyan and Soviet influence. Achievement of these goals requires continuation of traditional economic and political development policies, assistance to perfective dly states to defend themselves from regional of extra-regional aggression, and encouragement of peaceful eso do on if disputes. At present, the principal challenges to these goals are Libyan territorial expansionism and subversion as all as the opportunities Libyan success would create for the growth of Soviet presence and activity in the region. The material ave historically plagued Chad -- North-South polarization, elong ic disparity and tribal/religious faction lism -- ar and her real threat to Chad's integrity. (S)

Despite a resumption of diplo elations between Tripoli and Ndjamena and Qadhafi's promise to terminate his support to Chadian dissidents, it is unlikely that the status quo will undergo any significant modification in the near term. Although Libya has declared its readiness for reconciliation with Chad, Libya continues to claim the Aozou strip and to occupy parts of Efforts to resolve the fundamental issues between the two it. countries have every chance of foundering on Libyan intransigence. In the meantly bya's significant military resources -- including de comment à a chemical warfare capability -- and its past recomment in provoked aggression against Chad constitute a tar fin th eat to Chad and its tellib a's diplomatic "charm here, by a continues to support neighbors. More broadly, neighbors. More broadly, es, te Lil offensive" in Africa and e ewhore, a terrorism to further its preign poli objectives, although it may be relying more heavily su oga s. We seek to counter the Libyan threat by adding ur securit assistance efforts to those made by France, which is considering reducing its troop presence in Chad. Additional add' ability to mount credible operations against Libyan forces or to conduct offensive

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Declassified/Released on\_\_\_\_\_\_ under provisions of E.O. 12958 by J. Saunders, National Security Council operations constitutes a contract pressure point against the regime of Colonel Dadhafi. mould abya join Chad in a sincere search for peace under the suspices of the OAU or other parties, the U.S. will lend its support to the peace process and accept any outcome agreeable to bith lice. (S)

France's leading security ole in central Africa serves U.S. goals of regional stability and the preforminance of Western influence. The nature and conduct of U.S. relations with Chad must be consonant with or global relationship with France and not displace France in its row and char is principal security partner. The United State does not desire to take on the burden now carried by the French. The Char of government must be made aware of this limitation; U.S. The Char of government must be tempered by it. Recognition of France's leading security role in central Africa does not, however, limit U.S. options in countering terrorism by opposing its state sponsors in Libya. (S)

In pursuit of these goals and interests, U.S. policy is:

- -- to help the Chadians deter Libyan aggression;
- -- to work with the Frach of other friendly governments to ensure that the Chadian Jovernment has the resources necessary to resist the an upgression, conduct operations against I by forces, and hold and administer its soler to territory;
- -- to promote internal mical reconciliation in Chad;
- -- to encourage Clad's reconcruction and economic development.

To implement this policy, e U.S. as matter of high priority, shall:

- -- consult closely with the Chadian, French, and key African Governments on the Libyan threat to Chad and cooperate with them to thwart Qadhafi in Chad;
- -- carefully consider French requests for military cooperation, including those involving capabilities or assets not readily article to France;
  - reinforce Frence, commitment to Chad with various means available to us, including irrnishing intelligence to both the French and had an Sovernments, and taking measures to strengthe chose elements of the French government that upport residing Libyan designs against Chad;
    - use other USG esources, is a propriate, to provide Chad assistance not the wise available;

seize the opportunity not stant to obtain valuable intelligence on Sovrey and Libyan capabilities;


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- encourage other countries to contribute to Chad's security needs;
- -- on a continuing basis, as essible that an initiary prospects and counsel restraint when appropriate to guard against GC minitary overextension;
- discourage any concertion if other governments with Libyan efforts to the the Chad's sovereignty;
- -- consult periodically with friendly neighboring states to allay any suspicion that the USG supports any possible Chadian intentions to pose a military threat;
- -- support the GOC in taking advantage of opportunities for peaceful resolution of the dispute with Libya;
- -- encourage GOC policies which strengthen internal political reconciliation;
- -- provide economic ssistance o Chad;
- -- encourage international financial institutions to engage fully in made aconstruction and development;
- -- use appropriate informatical channels to communicate active U.S. support for Cad' legitimate territorial defense against unlaw Liby n incursions. (S)

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