

WASHINGTON  
December 14, 1988  
NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION  
DIRECTIVE NUMBER 322U.S. INTERESTS AND POLICY IN CHAD (S)

Principal U.S. long term goals in central Africa are regional stability, promotion of governments and institutions favorable to U.S. and Western interests, and containment/reversal of Libyan and Soviet influence. Achievement of these goals requires continuation of traditional economic and political development policies, assistance to permit friendly states to defend themselves from regional or extra-regional aggression, and encouragement of peaceful resolution of disputes. At present, the principal challenges to these goals are Libyan territorial expansionism and subversion, as well as the opportunities Libyan success would create for the growth of Soviet presence and activity in the region. We must also recognize, and be prepared to address, the internal problems that have historically plagued Chad -- North-South polarization, economic disparity and tribal/religious factionalism -- as another real threat to Chad's integrity. (S)

Despite a resumption of diplomatic relations between Tripoli and Ndjamena and Qadhafi's promise to terminate his support to Chadian dissidents, it is unlikely that the status quo will undergo any significant modification in the near term. Although Libya has declared its readiness for reconciliation with Chad, Libya continues to claim the Aozou strip and to occupy parts of it. Efforts to resolve the fundamental issues between the two countries have every chance of foundering on Libyan intransigence. In the meantime, Libya's significant military resources -- including development of a chemical warfare capability -- and its past record of unprovoked aggression against Chad constitute a continuing threat to Chad and its neighbors. More broadly, despite Libya's diplomatic "charm offensive" in Africa and elsewhere, Libya continues to support terrorism to further its foreign policy objectives, although it may be relying more heavily on surrogates. We seek to counter the Libyan threat by adding our security assistance efforts to those made by France, which is considering reducing its troop presence in Chad. Additionally, Chad's ability to mount credible operations against Libyan forces or to conduct offensive

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operations constitutes a continuing pressure point against the regime of Colonel Qadhafi. Should Libya join Chad in a sincere search for peace under the auspices of the OAU or other parties, the U.S. will lend its support to the peace process and accept any outcome agreeable to both sides. (S)

France's leading security role in central Africa serves U.S. goals of regional stability and the predominance of Western influence. The nature and conduct of U.S. relations with Chad must be consonant with our global relationship with France and not displace France in its role as Chad's principal security partner. The United States does not desire to take on the burden now carried by the French. The Chadian government must be made aware of this limitation; U.S. policy actions must be tempered by it. Recognition of France's leading security role in central Africa does not, however, limit U.S. options in countering terrorism by opposing its state sponsors in Libya. (S)

In pursuit of these goals and interests, U.S. policy is:

- to help the Chadians deter Libyan aggression;
- to work with the French and other friendly governments to ensure that the Chadian Government has the resources necessary to resist Libyan aggression, conduct operations against Libyan forces, and hold and administer its sovereign territory;
- to promote internal political reconciliation in Chad;
- to encourage Chad's reconstruction and economic development. )

To implement this policy, the U.S. as a matter of high priority, shall:

- consult closely with the Chadian, French, and key African Governments on the Libyan threat to Chad and cooperate with them to thwart Qadhafi in Chad;
- carefully consider French requests for military cooperation, including those involving capabilities or assets not readily available to France;
- reinforce French commitment to Chad with various means available to us, including furnishing intelligence to both the French and Chadian Governments, and taking measures to strengthen those elements of the French government that support resisting Libyan designs against Chad;
- use other USC resources, as appropriate, to provide Chad assistance not otherwise available;
- seize the opportunity now extant to obtain valuable intelligence on Soviet and Libyan capabilities;

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- funding permitting, provide adequate U.S. funds for Chad's normal security assistance needs, emphasizing defense against Libya to supplement French support;
- encourage other countries to contribute to Chad's security needs;
- on a continuing basis, assess Chadian military prospects and counsel restraint when appropriate to guard against GOC military overextension;
- discourage any cooperation by other governments with Libyan efforts to undermine Chad's sovereignty;
- consult periodically with friendly neighboring states to allay any suspicion that the USG supports any possible Chadian intentions to pose a military threat;
- support the GOC in taking advantage of opportunities for peaceful resolution of the dispute with Libya;
- encourage GOC policies which strengthen internal political reconciliation;
- provide economic assistance to Chad;
- encourage international financial institutions to engage fully in Chad's reconstruction and development;
- use appropriate informational channels to communicate active U.S. support for Chad's legitimate territorial defense against unlawful Libyan incursions. (S)

*Ronald Reagan*