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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 4, 1987

NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION
DIRECTIVE NUMBER 256

INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE SEVENTH NST NEGOTIATING ROUND (S)

The attached instructions provide guidance for the seventh round of the Nuclear and Space Talks (NST) which begins on January 15, 1987, in Geneva. They provide guidance for the Negotiating Group to use in building on the proposals made during my meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev in Reykjavik, Iceland. (S)

Ronald Reagan

Attachments

1. Overall Instructions (S)
2. START Instructions (S)
3. INF Instructions (S)
4. Defense and Space Instructions (S)

Declassified/Released on 3/22/96
under provisions of E.O. 12958
by J. Saunders, National Security Council

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E.O. 12356:

TAGS:

SUBJECT: {S} OVERALL INSTRUCTIONS FOR ROUND VII OF
US/SOVIET NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

REF: {A} PRESIDENTIAL LETTER TO US NEGOTIATORS FOR
DECEMBER 2-5 MEETING WITH SOVIET COUNCIL MEMBERS; {B} STATE
336325; {C} STATE 330271; {D} STATE 291634

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. FOLLOWING IS GUIDANCE FOR US DELEGATION FOR THE
SEVENTH ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION
BEGINNING ON JANUARY 15, 1987. GUIDANCE FROM PREVIOUS
ROUNDS AND SPECIAL DECEMBER MEETING REMAIN IN EFFECT,
EXCEPT AS MODIFIED BELOW. SPECIFIC GUIDANCE FOR EACH OF
THE THREE NEGOTIATING GROUPS IS BEING PROVIDED SEPTEL.

3. PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVES FOR ROUND VII INCLUDE:

--CONTINUE TO SEEK PROMPT AND FORTHRIGHT SOVIET
RESPONSES TO NEW US PROPOSALS AS SET FORTH IN APPLICABLE
INSTRUCTIONS FOR US DELEGATION AND EACH OF THE
NEGOTIATING GROUPS AND PRESENTED IN ROUND VI AND AT

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ATTACHMENT 1

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DECEMBER LIMITED COMPOSITION MEETINGS. US DEL SHOULD EMPHASIZE, AS APPROPRIATE, THAT OUR PROPOSALS REPRESENT US EFFORTS TO BEGIN ON AREAS OF CONVERGENCE AND REACH AGREEMENT BASED ON REYKJAVIK, TO RESPOND TO EXPRESSED SOVIET CONCERNS, TO LAY OUT OUR ULTIMATE GOAL AND TO IDENTIFY PRACTICAL SHORT TERM STEPS TO ACHIEVE THOSE OBJECTIVES.

--CONTINUE TO SEEK SHORT AGREEMENT TO THE TEXT OF DOCUMENTS REFLECTED IN THE SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS TO THE THREE NEGOTIATING GROUPS FOR ROUND VII.

--REJECT SOVIET ATTEMPTS TO HOLD PROGRESS IN ONE NEGOTIATING FORUM HOSTAGE TO PROGRESS IN ANOTHER, WHILE, AT THE SAME TIME, MAKING CLEAR THOSE AREAS WHERE, IN THE US VIEW, SUBSTANTIVE INTERRELATIONSHIPS EXIST. IN PARTICULAR, DELEGATION SHOULD CONTINUE TO REBUT SOVIET EFFORTS TO MISCHARACTERIZE THE UNDERSTANDINGS REACHED AT REYKJAVIK, TO LINK PROGRESS IN INF TO PROGRESS IN OTHER AREAS, OR TO PORTRAY SD AS AN OBSTACLE TO ARMS CONTROL.

--IN COUNTERING POSSIBLE SOVIET ALLEGATIONS THAT THE US AGREED TO ELIMINATE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS IN TEN YEARS AND SOVIET INSISTENCE ON RESOLUTION OF THIS ISSUE AS A THRESHOLD MATTER, POINT OUT THAT ACHIEVING 50 PERCENT REDUCTIONS IN START AND SIGNIFICANT INF REDUCTIONS AS AGREED IN REYKJAVIK ARE VITAL FIRST STEPS IN A PROCESS LEADING TO THE ELIMINATION OF OFFENSIVE BALLISTIC MISSILES AND ARE AREAS WHERE CONSIDERABLE COMMON GROUND EXISTS, AND, THUS, SHOULD BE FOCUS OF CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS.

4. IN ELABORATING ON US PROPOSALS, DELEGATION SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT MEASURES FOR EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION CONFORMING TO THE THREE PRINCIPLES AGREED AT REYKJAVIK MUST BE ADDRESSED AND AGREED CONCURRENTLY WITH NEGOTIATIONS ON REDUCTIONS AND LIMITATIONS.

5. IF SOVIETS RAISE OTHER, NON-NST ARMS CONTROL ISSUES, DELEGATION SHOULD REMIND THAT THESE ISSUES SHOULD BE PURSUED IN THE APPROPRIATE FORA, NOT HERE. IF SOVIETS SPECIFICALLY LINK NUCLEAR TESTING AND NST, DELEGATION SHOULD RESPOND AS PER PARA 5 OF REY C.

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6. THE DELEGATION SHOULD CONTINUE TO EMPHASIZE THE NEED FOR COMPLIANCE WITH EXISTING ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS, NOTING OBSTACLES IN THE PATH OF ACHIEVING ARMS REDUCTIONS BY SOVIET NONCOMPLIANCE. SOVIETS RAISE MATTER OF US EXCEEDING SALT LIMITS, DELEGATION SHOULD UNDERSCORE THAT US POLICY DECISIONS ON THE SALT I INTERIM AGREEMENT AND SALT II IN LARGE PART RESULTED FROM SOVIET NONCOMPLIANCE WITH THESE AGREEMENTS. THE DELEGATION SHOULD STRESS THAT THESE AGREEMENTS ARE BEHIND US, BOTH AS A MATTER OF LEGAL OBLIGATION AND AS A MATTER OF POLICY COMMITMENT. THE US HAS MADE A STANDING OFFER OF ESTABLISHMENT OF A NEW INTERIM FRAMEWORK OF MUTUAL RESTRAINT FOR STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS. OUR FOCUS, HOWEVER, SHOULD BE ON PROGRESS IN NST TOWARD EARLY AGREEMENT ON RADICAL AND STABILIZING REDUCTIONS IN THE OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR ARSENALS OF BOTH THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION 44

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SUBJECT: (S) INSTRUCTIONS FOR START NEGOTIATING GROUP

REFERENCES: (A) 86 STATE 33073; (B) 86 STATE 25800; (C)
86 STATE 138816; (D) 86 STATE 50773; (E) 86 STATE 12554;
(F) 85 STATE 288129; (G) 85 STATE 162424; (H) 85 STATE
72684

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT

2. FOLLOWING IS GUIDANCE FOR THE U.S. NEGOTIATING GROUP
ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS FOR ROUND VII. EXCEPT AS
MODIFIED BELOW, PREVIOUS INSTRUCTIONS REMAIN UNCHANGED.

3. OVERALL OBJECTIVE. THE NEGOTIATING GROUP'S OBJECTIVE
REMAINS AN EQUITABLE, VERIFIABLE, AND STABILIZING
AGREEMENT DEEPLY REDUCING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. THE
NEGOTIATING GROUP'S CHIEF OBJECTIVE FOR ROUND VII IS TO
SEEK AGREEMENT TO A BASIC FRAMEWORK, INCLUDING NUMERICAL
SUBLIMITS. TO AID THAT PROCESS, THE NEGOTIATING GROUP
SHOULD SEEK SOVIET AGREEMENT IN ROUND VII TO KEY ELEMENTS
OF AN AGREEMENT FOR REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE
ARMS, AS DETAILED BELOW, BASED ON THE AREAS MUTUALLY
AGREED TO DURING THE REYKJAVIK MEETING AND THE ADDITIONAL
U.S. ELEMENTS TABLED DURING ROUND VI.

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4. KEY ELEMENTS OF AN AGREEMENT. THE NEGOTIATING GROUP IS AUTHORIZED TO TAKE EARLY IN ROUND ONE THE FOLLOWING U.S. PROPOSAL FOR KEY ELEMENTS OF AN AGREEMENT:

BEGIN TEXT OF KEY ELEMENTS:

KEY ELEMENTS OF AN AGREEMENT FOR

REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

REDUCTIONS

THE SIDES SHALL REDUCE THEIR STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AS FOLLOWS:

1600 SNDVS/COMPOSITION OF FORCES

-- THE SIDES SHALL REDUCE THE AGGREGATE NUMBER OF DEPLOYED ICBMS, DEPLOYED SSBS AND HEAVY BOMBERS TO A LEVEL NOT TO EXCEED 1600. THERE SHALL BE CONSTRAINTS ON NON-DEPLOYED ICBMS AND ALBMs.

6000 WARHEADS

-- THE SIDES SHALL REDUCE THE AGGREGATE NUMBER OF WARHEADS ON DEPLOYED ICBMS, DEPLOYED SSBS AND HEAVY BOMBERS TO A LEVEL NOT TO EXCEED 6000. FOR THE PURPOSES OF COUNTING WARHEADS PURSUANT TO THIS LIMIT, EACH HEAVY BOMBER CARRYING GRAVITY BOMBS OR SHORT-RANGE ATTACK MISSILES SHALL COUNT AS ONE WARHEAD AND EACH LONG-RANGE ALBM CARRIED BY A HEAVY BOMBER SHALL COUNT AS ONE WARHEAD.

SUBLIMITS

-- THERE SHALL BE SUBLIMITS NOT TO EXCEED 4800 BALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEADS, 3300 ICBM WARHEADS, AND 1650 WARHEADS ON PERMITTED ICBMS, EXCEPT THOSE ON SILO-BASED LIGHT AND MEDIUM ICBMS WITH SIX OR FEWER WARHEADS.

MOBILE ICBMS

-- MOBILE ICBMS SHALL BE BANNED.

THROW-WEIGHT REDUCTIONS

-- STRATEGIC BALLISTIC MISSILE THROW-WEIGHT SHALL BE REDUCED BY 50 PERCENT FROM THE HIGHEST OF THE TWO SIDES'

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LEVELS. THIS THROWNIGHT REDUCTION SHALL BE CODIFIED THROUGH DIRECT OR INDIRECT LIMITS.

VERIFICATION

-- THE SIDES IN THE COURSE OF NEGOTIATING A TREATY TO CODIFY THE ABOVE REDUCTIONS AND LIMITATIONS SHALL CONCURRENTLY NEGOTIATE MEASURES WHICH PERMIT EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE OBLIGATIONS ASSUMED. SPECIFIC VERIFICATION MEASURES SHALL INCLUDE, INTER ALIA:

- {1} AN EXCHANGE OF COMPREHENSIVE AND ACCURATE DATA, BOTH PRIOR TO REDUCTIONS AND THEREAFTER,
- {2} ON-SITE OBSERVATION OF ELIMINATION DOWN TO AGREED LEVELS,
- {3} EFFECTIVE MONITORING OF THE REMAINING INVENTORIES AND ASSOCIATED FACILITIES, INCLUDING ON-SITE INSPECTION, AND,
- {4} NON-INTERFERENCE WITH THEM AND OTHER AGREED MEASURES.

SCHEDULE OF REDUCTIONS

-- THESE REDUCTIONS WILL BE CARRIED OUT IN A PHASED MANNER AND COMPLETED BY THE END OF 1984.

SLCMS

-- THE SIDES SHALL FIND A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION TO THE QUESTION OF LIMITING DEVELOPMENT OF LONG-RANGE, NUCLEAR-ARMED SLCMS. WHEN SUCH A SOLUTION IS FOUND, IT WILL NOT INVOLVE COUNTING LONG-RANGE, NUCLEAR-ARMED SLCMS WITHIN THE 6000 WARHEAD AND 3600 SDV LIMITS.

END TEXT OF KEY ELEMENTS.

5. IN PRESENTING DURING ROUND VII THE KEY ELEMENTS PROPOSAL AS A DOCUMENT FOR AGREEMENT, U.S. NEGOTIATOR SHOULD STRESS THE IMPORTANCE THE U.S. PLACES ON THE NEGOTIATION OF APPROPRIATE SUBLIMITS AND STATE THAT AGREEMENT ON THE THREE U.S.-PROPOSED SUBLIMITS COULD HELP RESOLVE SOME OF THE MOST IMPORTANT REMAINING DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE SIDES. THE U.S. NEGOTIATOR SHOULD EMPHASIZE THAT IN THE PAST, THE SOVIET PROPOSAL WOULD HAVE EFFECTIVELY INCLUDED SUBLIMITS IN TWO OF THE THREE CATEGORIES PROPOSED BY THE UNITED STATES. THE

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NEGOTIATOR SHOULD ALSO STATE THAT, AS PREVIOUSLY PROPOSED, THE U.S. PREFERRED SUBLIMITS OF 4500, 3000 AND 1500. HOWEVER, THE SOVIET UNION HAS PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE U.S. APPROACH OF THESE THREE CATEGORIES OF SUBLIMITS. THE UNITED STATES IS PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE HIGHER NUMBERS OF 4800, 3300 AND 1650 AS TABLED ON OCTOBER 22 AND CONTAINED IN THE KEY ELEMENTS DOCUMENT, IN AN EFFORT TO SPLIT THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE PREFERRED U.S. SUBLIMITS AND THE PREVIOUSLY PROPOSED SOVIET PERCENTAGE SUBLIMITS THAT WOULD BE APPLICABLE TO BALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEADS. THESE HIGHER SUBLIMITS THEREFORE REPRESENT, TOGETHER WITH 1600 SNDVS AND 6000 WARHEADS, A NUMERICAL FRAMEWORK ON WHICH FINAL AGREEMENT SHOULD BE REACHED. THE NEGOTIATING GROUP SHOULD PRESENT RATIONALE FOR THE U.S. KEY ELEMENTS PROPOSAL BY REITERATING THE JUSTIFICATION FOR ITS PROPOSALS PRESENTED IN PREVIOUS ROUNDS, PARTICULARLY THOSE IN FAVOR OF THE THREE U.S. WARHEAD SUBLIMITS, AS WELL AS ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE ELEMENTS OF THE SOVIET APPROACH THAT DO NOT PROVIDE FOR AN EQUITABLE OUTCOME. THE NEGOTIATING GROUP SHOULD VIGOROUSLY REJECT AS UNTRUE ANY SOVIET ALLEGATIONS THAT THE U.S. AGREED AT REYKJAVIK TO DISCARD THE U.S. PROPOSED SUBLIMITS OR THAT THE U.S. AGREED TO ELIMINATE ALL STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS BY 1990.

6. HEAVY ICBM SUBLIMITS. SHOULD THE SOVIETS RAISE THEIR PROPOSAL FOR A 50-PERCENT REDUCTION IN HEAVY ICBMS AS AN ACCEPTABLE ALTERNATIVE TO THE U.S. PACKAGE OF SUBLIMITS, THE U.S. NEGOTIATING GROUP SHOULD RESPOND BY STATING THAT THE SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO REDUCE HEAVY ICBMS IS A WELCOME STEP THAT HELPS TO CREATE ADDITIONAL CONSTRUCTION GROUND AND ADDRESSES SOME OF THE CONCERNS REPRESENTED IN THE U.S.-PROPOSED 1650 SUBLIMIT. HOWEVER, IT DOES NOT ADDRESS THE QUESTION OF SUBLIMITS ON TOTAL BALLISTIC MISSILE AND ICBM WARHEADS AND ONLY PARTIALLY TAKES INTO ACCOUNT U.S. CONCERNS REPRESENTED IN THE THIRD U.S. PROPOSED SUBLIMIT. THE SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR A 50-PERCENT REDUCTION IN HEAVY ICBMS THEREFORE CANNOT SUBSTITUTE FOR THE THREE U.S.-PROPOSED SUBLIMITS.

7. HEAVY ICBM MODERNIZATION. ON THE QUESTION OF HEAVY ICBM MODERNIZATION, THE NEGOTIATING GROUP MAY REITERATE THAT THE U.S. POSITION IS THAT THE STATES SHALL ESTABLISH CONSTRAINTS THAT BAN THE DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION, FLIGHT-TESTING OR DEPLOYMENT OF NEW OR MODERNIZED VERSIONS OF HEAVY ICBMS AS WELL AS PROHIBIT PRODUCTION AND ADDITIONAL DEPLOYMENTS OF EXISTING TYPES OF HEAVY ICBMS.

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8. STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTIONS IN SECOND FIVE YEARS. IF THE SOVIETS RAISE THIS ISSUE OF THE U.S. DEFENSE AND SPACE PROPOSAL FOR THE ELIMINATION OF ALL OFFENSIVE BALLISTIC MISSILES BY 1996, THE NEGOTIATING GROUP SHOULD STATE THAT THE START GROUP SHOULD GIVE THE HIGHEST PRIORITY TO THE NECESSARY FIRST STEP IN A PROCESS LEADING TO THE ELIMINATION OF OFFENSIVE BALLISTIC MISSILES -- THAT IS, THE REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS TO 6000 WARHEADS ON 1600 SNDVS IN THE FIRST FIVE YEARS, WHICH IS AN AREA WHERE CONSIDERABLE COMMON GROUND EXISTS.

9. MOBILE ICBMS. THE NEGOTIATING GROUP SHOULD AVOID DISCUSSING RECENT U.S. DECISIONS CONCERNING THE FUTURE OF THE U.S. LAND-BASED MISSILE FORCES EXCEPT TO STATE THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT STILL PROPOSES A BAN ON MOBILE ICBMS DUE TO VERIFICATION DIFFICULTIES AND THE MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF SUCH DIFFICULTIES. THE NEGOTIATING GROUP SHOULD MAKE CLEAR TO THE SOVIETS OUR WILLINGNESS TO LISTEN TO THEIR PROPOSALS. MOBILE ICBM VERIFICATION WHILE NOTING THAT THEIR PROPOSALS TO DATE HAVE BEEN INADEQUATE. UNTIL AGREEMENT ON OFFENSIVE REDUCTIONS IS REACHED AND IMPLEMENTED, THE U.S. IS FREE TO DEVELOP AND DEPLOY ICBMS IN MOBILE BASING MODES.

10. START VERIFICATION REGIME. THE U.S. NEGOTIATOR MAY, AT HIS DISCRETION, ADDRESS THE ISSUE OF START VERIFICATION REGIME. RECALLING THE VERIFICATION PRINCIPLES AGREED AT RYKUNIK, THE NEGOTIATING GROUP SHOULD NOTE THAT THESE ELEMENTS ARE ALSO RELEVANT TO START AND PRESENT THE FOLLOWING AS ELEMENTS OF A VERIFICATION REGIME FOR START (FYI: THESE ELEMENTS ARE NOT NECESSARILY INCLUSIVE OF ALL VERIFICATION PROVISIONS A START AGREEMENT WOULD REQUIRE):

-- AN EXCHANGE OF COMPREHENSIVE AND ACCURATE DATA BOTH PRIOR TO REDUCTIONS AND THEREAFTER;
-- ON-SITE OBSERVATION OF ELIMINATION DOWN TO AGREED LEVELS (NEGOTIATING GROUP SHOULD PROBE FOR RATIONALE FOR THE EXCLUSION OF THIS ELEMENT FROM THE SOVIET NOVEMBER 7 PROPOSALS);

-- EFFECTIVE MONITORING OF REMAINING INVENTORIES AND ASSOCIATED FACILITIES, INCLUDING ON-SITE INSPECTION;
-- INTERFERENCE WITH AGREED MEASURES OF WITH NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION WILL BE PROHIBITED, AS WILL CONCEALMENT MEASURES WHICH IMPEDE VERIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT.

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-- THE ENCRYPTION OF TELEMETRY ON SYSTEMS SUBJECT TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT WILL BE OMITTED; AND,
-- ON BOARD ENGINEER TEST MEASUREMENTS SHALL BE MADE, AND ALL SUCH MEASUREMENTS SHALL BE BROADCAST USING UNENCRYPTED TELEMETRY, DURING EACH TEST FLIGHT OR TRAINING FLIGHT OF AN ICBM OR SLBM. YY

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SUBJECT: INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE INF NEGOTIATING GROUP,
ROUND VII

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REF: {A} 86 STATE 331883, {B} 86 STATE 336325, {C} 86
STATE 290224, {D} 86 STATE 138683, {E} 86 STATE 054775,
{F} 86 STATE 012553, {G} 86 STATE 059027, {H} 86 NST
GENEVA 10560 {INF 954}, {I} PRESIDENT'S LETTER OF
INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE LIMITED COMPOSITION MEETINGS 2-5 DEC
1986.

1. SECRET -- ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THERE FOLLOWS GUIDANCE TO THE INF NEGOTIATING GROUP
FOR ROUND VII OF THE NUCLEAR AND SPACE TALKS. PREVIOUS

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GUIDANCE ON INF REMAIN UNCHANGED EXCEPT AS MODIFIED BY THESE INSTRUCTIONS

3. AS BEGUN DURING THE LIMITED COMPOSITION MEETINGS IN DECEMBER 1986 DELEGATION SHOULD ATTEMPT TO DOCUMENT JOINTLY WITH THE SOVIET SIDE AREAS OF COMMON GROUND BASED ON THE REYKJAVIK OCTOBER 11 - 12 MEETING AND THE RESULTING GUIDANCE CONTAINED IN REFS A AND B AND I. DELEGATION SHOULD ALSO IDENTIFY CURRENT AREAS OF DISAGREEMENT INCLUDING BOTH LONG-STANDING ISSUES AND AREAS WHERE SOVIET POSITION NOW VARIES FROM WHAT WE UNDERSTOOD HAD BEEN AGREED IN REYKJAVIK. THE GOAL OF THIS EFFORT SHOULD BE TO IDENTIFY CLEARLY THOSE ELEMENTS OF A FUTURE INF AGREEMENT ON WHICH THERE IS CONVERGENCE BETWEEN THE SIDES AND THOSE REMAINING UNSOLVED ISSUES REQUIRING FURTHER CONSIDERATION.

4. ADDITIONALLY, DELEGATION SHOULD PRESS FOR SOVIET FLEXIBILITY ON MAJOR OUTSTANDING ISSUES IN INF NEGOTIATIONS INCLUDING LINKAGE AND THE U.S. RIGHT TO GLOBAL EQUALITY IN SRINF MISSILES. IN ADDITION, DELEGATION SHOULD PRESS SOVIETS TO CONSIDER APPARENT NEW AREAS OF DIFFERENCE RAISED IN SOVIET REPRESENTATION OF THEIR PROPOSAL ON NOVEMBER 7 AND ELABORATION OF IT DURING THE LIMITED COMPOSITION MEETINGS AND MUST TO ACCEPT, CONSISTENT WITH THE RESULTS AT REYKJAVIK, A SINGLE AGREEMENT FOR THE LIMITATION OF U.S. AND SOVIET LRINF MISSILES IN EUROPE AND THE SIMULTANEOUS REDUCTION TO 100 U.S. AND SOVIET LRINF MISSILE WARHEADS OUTSIDE OF EUROPE; GLOBAL VICE EUROPEAN ONLY CONSTRAINTS ON SRINF MISSILES; AND THE NEED FOR A VERIFICATION SYSTEM WHICH INCLUDES ON-SITE OBSERVATION OF THE PROCESS OF DISMANTLEMENT, DESTRUCTION AND CONVERSION WHICH THE SOVIETS HAVE NOT INCLUDED IN THEIR REVIEW OF AGREED VERIFICATION ELEMENTS. WHEN PRESSING SOVIETS ON THESE ISSUES, DELEGATION SHOULD NOTE SOVIET MOVEMENT FROM PREVIOUS ACCEPTABLE POSITIONS ON WHICH THE SOVIETS SHOULD NOT EXPECT U.S. CONCESSIONS FOR RETURNING.

5. IN SUPPORT OF THE BASIC APPROACH AND OBJECTIVES DESCRIBED IN REF A GUIDANCE, WASHINGTON IS PREPARING A DRAFT INF TREATY (REF C) WHICH, WHEN COMPLETED AND APPROVED, SHOULD BE TABLED WHEN THE DELEGATION DEEMS IT APPROPRIATE.

6. ON THE SRINF QUESTION POSED BY DELEGATION IN REF H, DELEGATION SHOULD RETAIN CURRENT APPROACH ON SRINF, THAT

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IS, CONSTRAINING IN INITIAL INF AGREEMENT THOSE SRINF MISSILES BETWEEN THE RANGES OF THE SOVIET SS-23 AND SCALEBOARD AND BANNING THOSE BETWEEN THE SCALEBOARD AND THE U.S. PERSHING II.

7. ON SCHEDULE OF REDUCTIONS, DELEGATION SHOULD PROPOSE THAT REDUCTIONS BE DIVIDED INTO THREE PERIODS THE EXACT TIMING OF WHICH CAN BE AGREED CLOSER TO THE DATE OF TREATY SIGNATURE. DELEGATION SHOULD PROPOSE THAT PERMITTED LEVEL OF U.S. AND SOVIET LRINF MISSILE WARHEADS BE EQUAL AT THE END OF EACH PERIOD OF REDUCTIONS.

8. IN PRESENTING THE ABOVE APPROACH, DELEGATION SHOULD

-- PROTECT THE U.S. RIGHT TO REDUCE LRINF SYSTEMS IN EXCESS OF EUROPEAN LIMITS BY RELOCATION TO THE U.S.

-- PROTECT U.S. RIGHT TO CONVERT PERSHING II MISSILES REDUCED UNDER THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT TO PERSHING IB MISSILES,

-- INSIST ON THE U.S. RIGHT TO CEILINGS EQUAL TO SOVIET SHORTER RANGE INF MISSILES ON A GLOBAL BASIS,

-- STATE THAT AN INTERIM INF AGREEMENT SHOULD REMAIN IN EFFECT UNTIL SUPERSEDED BY A LATER AGREEMENT PROVIDING FOR FURTHER REDUCTIONS TOWARD THE AGREED GOAL OF THE TOTAL ELIMINATION OF LRINF MISSILES.

-- CONTINUE TO CALL FOR FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS FOR REDUCTIONS IN SRINF MISSILES TO BEGIN ON A HIGH PRIORITY BASIS, AT LEAST WITHIN SIX MONTHS

AFTER AN INITIAL INF AGREEMENT IS REACHED. SHOULD THE SOVIETS RAISE QUESTIONS ON NEGOTIATING FORUM FOR SHORTER RANGE INF MISSILES IN THIS REGARD, DELEGATION SHOULD NOTE THAT AT THIS TIME IT IS THE U.S. OPINION THAT THE INF NEGOTIATING GROUP MAY PROVIDE THE MOST LOGICAL FORUM.

-- CONTINUE TO PRESS THE FULL VERIFICATION POSITION CONTAINED IN REF G AND SUBSEQUENT GUIDANCE

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SUBJECT: INSTRUCTIONS FOR DEFENSE AND SPACE NEGOTIATING GROUP
FOR ROUND VII

REFERENCES: {A} 85 STATE 2686 {B} 85 STATE 162423 {C}
85 STATE 288125 {D} 86 STATE 012552 {E} 86 STATE 138817
{F} 86 STATE 291909; {G} 86 STATE 293378; {H} 86 STATE
293566; {I} 86 STATE 305735; {J} 86 STATE 315021; {K} 86
STATE 320131; {L} 86 STATE 330272; {M} 86 STATE 336324
{N} NSC MEMO TO THE US NEGOTIATORS TO THE NST, SUBJ:
DECEMBER MEETING WITH SOVIET COUNTERPARTS, DIRECTIVE ON
DEFENSE AND SPACE ARMS, 28 NOV 86

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. FOLLOWING IS GUIDANCE FOR THE U.S. DEFENSE AND SPACE
NEGOTIATING GROUP TO THE NEGOTIATIONS ON NUCLEAR AND
SPACE ARMS FOR ROUND VII, BEGINNING JANUARY 15, 1987.
EXCEPT AS MODIFIED BELOW, GUIDANCE FOR THE DEFENSE AND
SPACE NEGOTIATING GROUP FOR THE PREVIOUS ROUNDS
{REFTELS} REMAINS IN EFFECT.

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3. OVERALL OBJECTIVE AND APPROACH. BOTH SIDES HAVE AGREED TO ACCELERATE NEXT NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA. ACCORDINGLY, THE NEGOTIATING GROUP SHOULD REVIEW WITH THE SOVIETS THE BASIC ELEMENTS OF THE U.S. APPROACH TO DEFENSE AND SPACE ISSUES, WITH THE PURPOSES OF REALIZING U.S. OBJECTIVES AND DENYING ANY CONFLICTING SOVIET GOALS. PRIMARY U.S. OBJECTIVES FOR THE DEFENSE AND SPACE NEGOTIATING GROUP IN ROUND VII ARE:

-- TO CONTINUE TO REVIEW AND DISCUSS WITH THE SOVIETS, AS APPROPRIATE, THE SUBSTANCE OF THE PRESIDENT'S JULY DEFENSE AND SPACE PROPOSAL AND THE ELEMENTS FOR AN AGREEMENT WHICH WE PROPOSED IN REYKJAVIK AS AN ALTERNATIVE, BOTH OF WHICH REMAIN ON THE TABLE.

-- TO CONTINUE TO FOCUS THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE U.S. PROPOSALS AND OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE U.S. AGENDA (E.G., THE HIGHEST U.S. PRIORITIES ARE: TO ACHIEVE RADICAL REDUCTIONS IN OFFENSIVE FORCES, TO AVOID CONSTRAINTS BEYOND THOSE EXISTING UNDER THE ABM TREATY, TO STOP SOVIET EROSION OF THE ABM TREATY REGIME, TO DISCUSS HOW TO IMPROVE STABILITY THROUGH A POSSIBLE JOINTLY MANAGED TRANSITION TO GREATER RELIANCE ON STRATEGIC DEFENSES IN COMBINATION WITH FURTHER RADICAL REDUCTIONS IN BALLISTIC MISSILES, AND TO FACILITATE DEPLOYMENT OF STRATEGIC DEFENSES AT SOME FUTURE TIME).

-- WHILE MAINTAINING THE PRINCIPAL FOCUS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE U.S. PROPOSALS AND U.S. AGENDA, TO RESPOND TO SOVIET PURSUIT OF THEIR PROPOSALS, AS THEY RELATE TO THE WORK OF THE DEFENSE AND SPACE NEGOTIATING GROUP AND ITS INTERRELATIONSHIPS WITH OTHER AREAS, BY CONTINUING TO CRITICIZE, QUESTION, AND PROBE THEM IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE GUIDANCE BELOW AND PREVIOUS INSTRUCTIONS, AND BY POINTING TO WAYS IN WHICH THE U.S. PROPOSALS RESPOND TO SOVIET CONCERNS.

4. SPECIFIC APPROACH. NEGOTIATING GROUP SHOULD CONTINUE TO EXPLAIN THE MERITS OF SUBSTANTIVE PROPOSALS TABLED BY THE UNITED STATES, ESPECIALLY THOSE IN ROUND VI. AT THE SAME TIME, THE NEGOTIATING GROUP SHOULD SEEK TO CLARIFY AND CRITIQUE AS APPROPRIATE THE SOVIET PROPOSALS TABLED IN ROUND VI.

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-- THE NEGOTIATING GROUP IS AUTHORIZED TO DRAW FROM PREVIOUS INSTRUCTIONS, ADDITIONAL NSC INSTRUCTIONS AND APPROVED DEFENSE AND SPACE PAPERS, TO THE EXTENT NECESSARY TO EXPLAIN THE U.S. POSITION AND PROPOSALS AND IN RESPONSE TO SOVIET QUESTIONS.

-- IN PARTICULAR, IN ELABORATING THE U.S. PROPOSAL FOR ELIMINATION OF ALL OFFENSIVE BALLISTIC MISSILES AS A CONDITION FOR MEETING THE SOVIET DEMAND FOR A COMMITMENT NOT TO WITHDRAW FROM THE ABM TREATY THROUGH 1996, THE NEGOTIATING GROUP IS AUTHORIZED TO DRAW FROM REFERENCE N AS MODIFIED BELOW:

{1}. THE SIDES SHALL UNDERTAKE THROUGH 1996 {1} NOT TO EXERCISE THEIR EXISTING RIGHT OF WITHDRAWAL FROM THE ABM TREATY, WHICH IS OF UNLIMITED DURATION (THE DESIRE OR INTENT OF A PARTY TO DEVELOP, TEST, OR DEPLOY ADVANCED STRATEGIC DEFENSES SHALL NOT IN AND OF ITSELF CONSTITUTE A BASIS FOR WITHDRAWAL), AND {2} TO REDUCE OFFENSIVE ARMS ACCORDING TO THE SCHEDULE OF REDUCTIONS OUTLINED BELOW. THIS UNDERTAKING AND THE PROVISIONS BELOW WOULD BE INCORPORATED INTO A DEFENSE AND SPACE AGREEMENT RECORDED IN A NEW TREATY.

{2}. DURING THE PERIOD THROUGH 1996, THE SIDES SHALL STRICTLY OBSERVE ALL PROVISIONS OF THE ABM TREATY WHILE CONTINUING RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING, WHICH ARE PERMITTED BY THE TREATY.

{3}. THE SCHEDULE OF REDUCTIONS TO BE COMPLETED DURING THE PERIOD THROUGH 1996 IS AS FOLLOWS:

- A. THROUGH 1991, THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS OF THE TWO SIDES SHALL BE REDUCED BY FIFTY PERCENT AS SPECIFIED IN A SEPARATE START AGREEMENT TO BE NEGOTIATED NOW. THE DEFENSE AND SPACE AGREEMENT SHALL NOT ENTER INTO FORCE BEFORE THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE START AGREEMENT.

- B. BY THE END OF 1996 ALL OF THE REMAINING OFFENSIVE BALLISTIC MISSILES OF THE USSR AND THE UNITED STATES SHALL BE ELIMINATED.

{4}. THE U.S. OFFER NOT TO EXERCISE ITS EXISTING RIGHT TO WITHDRAW FROM THE ABM TREATY DOES NOT EXTEND FOR A TEN-YEAR PERIOD BEGINNING WHEN AN AGREEMENT TAKES EFFECT; RATHER THE OFFER EXTENDS THROUGH 1996. AT THE END OF 1996, EITHER SIDE SHALL BE FREE TO DEPLOY ADVANCED STRATEGIC DEFENSES IF IT SO CHOOSES, UNLESS THE SIDES AGREE OTHERWISE.

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(5). THE DEFENSE AND SPACE TREATY, IN WHICH THE UNDERTAKINGS WILL BE RECORDED WILL BE PERMANENT, UNLESS OTHERWISE AGREED BY THE PARTIES, IN EITHER PARTY:

- A. DOES NOT COMPLY WITH THE AGREEMENT PROVIDING FOR REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AGREED FOR THE PERIOD THROUGH 1991 ACHIEVING FIFTY PERCENT REDUCTIONS AS SPECIFIED IN A SEPARATE START AGREEMENT.
- B. DOES NOT COMPLY WITH THE AGREED PROVISIONS FOR REDUCTIONS LEADING TO THE TOTAL ELIMINATION BY THE END OF 1996 OF ALL OFFENSIVE BALLISTIC MISSILES.

(6). THE CONDITIONS SPECIFIED IN PARAGRAPH 5 WOULD BE IN ADDITION TO THE STANDARD RIGHTS OF A PARTY TO WITHDRAW FROM AN AGREEMENT SUCH AS IN THE EVENT OF MATERIAL BREACH OF THE AGREEMENT BY THE OTHER PARTY OR SHOULD THE PARTY JUDGE ITS SUPREME NATIONAL INTERESTS TO BE JEOPARDIZED.

(7). THE SIDES IN THE COURSE OF NEGOTIATING A D&S TREATY SHALL CONCURRENTLY NEGOTIATE MEASURES WHICH PERMIT EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE OBLIGATIONS ASSUMED. SPECIFIC VERIFICATION MEASURES SHALL INCLUDE NONINTERFERENCE WITH AND OTHER AGREED MEANS OF VERIFICATION, INCLUDING EFFECTIVE MONITORING OF INVENTORIES AND ASSOCIATED FACILITIES, INCLUDING ON-SITE INSPECTION, COMPREHENSIVE AND ACCURATE DATA EXCHANGE.

(8). WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE REDUCTIONS AND LIMITATIONS ABOVE, THE SIDES SHALL NEGOTIATE OTHER APPROPRIATE RESTRAINTS.

5. THE NEGOTIATING GROUP SHOULD ATTEMPT TO CLARIFY THE AREAS OF AGREEMENT AND DISAGREEMENT. IN SEEKING SUCH CLARIFICATION, THE NEGOTIATING GROUP SHOULD KEEP IN MIND THAT, AS NOTED IN REFERENCE F, ... "IT IS NOT IN THE U.S. INTEREST TO ACCEPT ANY CHANGES IN THE UNDERSTANDING OF KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS ASSOCIATED WITH THE ABM TREATY WHICH ALTER THAT WHICH HAS ALREADY BEEN NEGOTIATED AND AGREED. THE NEGOTIATING GROUP SHOULD COUNTER AND REJECT SOVIET ATTEMPTS INTERECALLY TO AMEND THE ABM TREATY AND TO NARROW THAT WHICH IS PERMITTED BY THE TREATY. IN RESPONDING TO SOVIET ATTEMPTS TO PROMOTE THEIR PROPOSED DEFINITIONS, THE NEGOTIATING GROUP SHOULD CONTINUE TO MAKE CLEAR THAT THE KEY DEFINITIONS WERE UNDERSTOOD BY THE ABM TREATY NEGOTIATORS IN 1972. THE

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NEGOTIATING GROUP SHOULD EMPHASIZE THAT THE U.S. WILL NOT ACCEPT ADDITIONAL CONSTRAINTS ON RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING BEYOND THOSE ESTABLISHED BY THE TREATY."

6. THE NEGOTIATING GROUP SHOULD ENCOURAGE THE SOVIETS TO SIMPLIFY THEIR APPROACH AND TO ACCEPT INSTEAD AN APPROACH THAT WOULD ONLY ENTAIL LIMITATIONS, UNDER THE CONDITIONS THE US HAS PROPOSED, ON DEPLOYMENT RATHER THAN ADDITIONAL LIMITATIONS ON RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND TESTING.

7. FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND REFERENCE, FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF REF N: BEGIN TEXT
"DIRECTIVE ON DEFENSE & SPACE ARMS."

"(1) THE SIDES SHALL UNDERTAKE FOR TEN YEARS (1) NOT TO EXERCISE THEIR EXISTING RIGHT OF WITHDRAWAL FROM THE ABM TREATY, WHICH IS OF UNLIMITED DURATION, AND (2) TO REDUCE OFFENSIVE ARMS ACCORDING TO THE SCHEDULE OF REDUCTIONS OUTLINED BELOW. THIS UNDERSTANDING AND THE PROVISIONS BELOW SHALL BE INCORPORATED INTO A DEFENSE AND SPACE AGREEMENT RECORDED IN A NEW TREATY.

(2) DURING THE TEN YEAR PERIOD THE SIDES SHALL STRICTLY OBSERVE ALL PROVISIONS OF THE ABM TREATY WHILE CONTINUING RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING, WHICH ARE PERMITTED BY THE TREATY.

(3) THE SCHEDULE OF REDUCTIONS TO BE COMPLETED DURING THE TEN YEAR PERIOD IS AS FOLLOWS:

- A. WITHIN THE FIRST FIVE YEARS, THROUGH 1991, THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS OF THE TWO SIDES SHALL BE REDUCED BY FIFTY PERCENT, AS SPECIFIED IN A SEPARATE START AGREEMENT TO BE NEGOTIATED NOW. THE DEFENSE AND SPACE AGREEMENT SHALL NOT ENTER INTO FORCE BEFORE THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE START AGREEMENT.

- B. DURING THE FOLLOWING FIVE YEARS, THROUGH 1996, THE REMAINING OFFENSIVE BALLISTIC MISSILES OF THE USSR AND THE UNITED STATES SHALL BE ELIMINATED.

- C. THUS, BY THE END OF 1996, ALL OFFENSIVE BALLISTIC MISSILES OF THE USSR AND THE UNITED STATES WILL HAVE BEEN COMPLETELY ELIMINATED.

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{4} AT THE END OF THIS TEN YEAR PERIOD, EITHER SIDE SHALL BE FREE TO DEPLOY ADVANCED STRATEGIC DEFENSES IF IT SO CHOOSES, UNLESS THE SIDES AGREE OTHERWISE.

{5} THE DEFENSE AND SPACE TREATY IN WHICH THE UNDERTAKINGS WILL BE RECORDED WILL TERMINATE, UNLESS OTHERWISE AGREED BY THE PARTIES, IF EITHER PARTY:

- A. DOES NOT COMPLY WITH THE AGREEMENT PROVIDING FOR REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AGREED FOR THE PERIOD THROUGH 1991, ACHIEVING FIFTY PERCENT REDUCTIONS BY THE END OF 1991; OR

- B. DOES NOT COMPLY WITH THE AGREED PROVISIONS FOR REDUCTIONS LEADING TO THE TOTAL ELIMINATION BY THE END OF 1996 OF ALL OFFENSIVE BALLISTIC MISSILES.

{6} THE CONDITIONS SPECIFIED IN PARAGRAPH 5 WOULD BE IN ADDITION TO THE STANDARD RIGHTS OF A PARTY TO WITHDRAW FROM AN AGREEMENT SUCH AS IN THE EVENT OF MATERIAL BREACH OF THE AGREEMENT BY THE OTHER PARTY OR SHOULD THE PARTY JUDGE ITS SUPREME NATIONAL INTERESTS TO BE JEOPARDIZED. THE DESIRE OR INTENT OF A PARTY TO DEVELOP, TEST OR DEPLOY ADVANCED SYSTEMS OF STRATEGIC DEFENSE SHALL NOT CONSTITUTE AN EXTRAORDINARY EVENT JEOPARDIZING ITS SUPREME NATIONAL INTERESTS.)

{7} THE SIDES IN THE COURSE OF NEGOTIATING A TREATY TO CODIFY THE ABOVE REDUCTIONS AND LIMITATIONS SHALL CONCURRENTLY NEGOTIATE MEASURES WHICH PERMIT EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE OBLIGATIONS ASSUMED. SPECIFIC VERIFICATION MEASURES SHALL INCLUDE:

- {A} A COMPREHENSIVE AND ACCURATE EXCHANGE OF DATA, BOTH PRIOR TO REDUCTIONS AND THEREAFTER;

- {B} ON-SITE OBSERVATION OF ELIMINATION DOWN TO AGREED LEVELS; AND

- {C} EFFECTIVE MONITORING OF THE REMAINING INVENTORIES AND ASSOCIATED FACILITIES INCLUDING ON-SITE INSPECTION.

{8} WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE REDUCTIONS AND LIMITATIONS ABOVE, THE SIDES SHALL NEGOTIATE OTHER APPROPRIATE MEASURES." END TEXT 44

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