

This directive establishes U.S. national policy for restoration of the capability to launch satellites and missions into space to support U.S. national security, civil, and commercial goals using space. It is essential that U.S. space launch operations be reconstituted as efficiently as possible consistent with available funding and safety concerns; and that the reconstituted U.S. space launch assets provide a balanced, robust, flexible space launch capability which can function independently of failures in any single launch vehicle system, illow a return to regularly scheduled launch operations met continuing requirements, help make up for lost launch opportunities and restored space leadership. (U)

This directive supersees SDD 164. Prodous directives which nclude NSDDs 42, 80, 94, 44, and 181 remained lide but are odified accordingly. (U)

National Space Launch Capability

The U.S. national space launch capability will be based on a balanced mix of launchers, tendisting of the space Transportation System (STS) and expendable launch vehicles (ELVs). The elements of this mix will be defined to best support the mission needs of the national security, civil government and commercial sectors of U.S. space activities. Critical mission needs will be supported, whenever necessary, by both the STS and ELVs so as to provide added assurance that payloads can be launched regardless of specific launch vehicle availabilities. (U)

a. <u>National Security Frice Transportation</u> The national security space sector will be both the TS and El's as determined by specific mission requirements. Selected critical payloads will be designed for dual-compatibility, i.e. clpable f being launched by either the TS or the ELVS. Provision will be made for additional ELV launch activities needed to support the full range of orbits required by the national security missions. (C)

Implementation: The Department of Defense (DOD) will procure additional ELVs to maintain a malaned launch capability and to provide access to space The DOD will implement procedures b assure payload/launch whice compatibility and scheduling, and

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maintain a launch capability for ELVs at both the East and West Coast launch sites. DOD and NEA will jointry stablish a revised price for national security presions that use the ECS. (U)

b. <u>Civil Government Space Transportation</u>. The unique STS (Shuttle) capability to stovide manned actess to spice will be exploited in those areas that offer the seatest national return. The STS fleet will maintain the Nation' capability to support critical programs requiring man ed presince and other unique STS capabilities. NASA will us the Shuttle where the unique capabilities of the STS are required to support civil research and development programs. (U)

Implementation: Mosk will procure and structural spares and other necessary lost equipment needed to sustain the existing three-orbiter fleet and will do so in an expeditious and costeffective manner. Funding for procurement of a replacement fourth orbiter will begin in FY 1987 based on an OMB-approved program. NASA will establish sustainable STS flight rates to provide for planning and budgeting of Government space programs. The recommendations of the President's Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident will be considered and incorporated as appropriate. The STS will be based out for payleds that do not require a manned presence or the unique capabilities whe TS. NASA will not maintain an ELV adjutet to the STS. If there is a need for additional NASA capacity for povernment lauries, then NASA is authorized to contract for necessary ELV launch services. (U)

c. <u>Commercial Space Transportation</u>. The principles and policy of domestic exploitation of space for connercial purposes are enunciated in NSDD 94, dated May 15, 183. Those principles and policies remain valid. (1

Implementation: The shall no linear provide launch services for commercial and foreign payloads unless those spacecraft have unique, specific reasons to be launched aboard the Shuttle. Those reasons are: the spacecraft must be man-tended or the spacecraft is important for national security or foreign policy purposes. Satellite manufacturers whose spacecraft do not meet those criteria will be provided as realistic an appraisal as possible by NASA of when they could be scheduled on the Shuttle launch manifest prior to the 1995 commercial contract mandatory termination date. (U)

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