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## THE WHITE HOUSE

## WASHINGTON

May 20, 1985

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NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION  
DIRECTIVE 170

RADIO MARTI (U)

It is the policy of the United States to support the right of the people of Cuba to seek and receive information and ideas through any media and, regardless of frontiers, in accordance with Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Consistent with this policy, this Administration has supported the development of Radio Marti under the aegis of the Voice of America. Broadcasting to Cuba will be operated in a manner consistent with the broad foreign policy of the United States and in accordance with the high professional standards which exist in the Voice of America. A balanced and comprehensive programming package, including news, commentary, and other information about events in Cuba, is authorized. (e)

On the basis of a review of VOA planning preparations for Radio Marti and consistent with the authorizing legislation passed by Congress in 1983, USIA is hereby authorized to commence full Radio Marti broadcasting on May 20, 1985. (S)

USIA is authorized to utilize the 1180 AM frequency band. USIA is further authorized to broadcast an additional signal to Cuba on the shortwave band, using existing VOA transmitter facilities in the United States. USIA will also carry out the other legislative requirements, including compensation to United States radio broadcasting station licensees should Cuban interference affect their signal. (S)

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By CS, NARA, Date 2/28/01

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-- Alert Cuba of the U.S. plans to proceed with Radio Marti broadcasting on May 20 underscoring our commitment to undertaking this legal means of communications between our people. The Department of State should develop this demarche in a manner designed to explore the prospect of more extensive bilateral discussions, possibly including safety at sea, narcotics, hijacking, and radio interference. This discussion can also include American willingness not to oppose equivalent Cuban broadcasting to the United States. This could take the form of not taking action to prevent Cuban broadcasting on an ITU assigned frequency to the U.S. A special paper on the bilateral relationship should be forwarded to the NSC by May 20. (TS)

-- Establish a firm and supportable legal and political position both concerning Radio Marti but also as a backdrop for any subsequent decisions that may be taken should the Cubans engage in aggressive countermeasures. Approaches should be made to appropriate international organizations and Third Countries. (C)

-- Key Congressional representatives should be alerted in advance of the commencement of Radio Marti broadcasting. Selected domestic organizations, including appropriate authorities in the communication industry, should also be notified in advance. (S)

-- A press strategy and press control point should be developed. The Department of State should take the lead in responding to policy-related questions; USIA should be prepared to deal with technically-related items. (S)

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-- Consideration of DOD perception management moves involving deployment of aircraft, naval vessels, or military personnel. (S)

The Department of Defense is instructed to proceed immediately with planning to develop an airborne platform capable of jamming Havana television signals. A plan should be submitted to the NSC by May 22 covering the capabilities, cost estimates and timing for this development. (S)

The Department of State should establish and lead an inter-agency task force effective immediately which will serve to coordinate and monitor all the actions above. Particular attention should be given to the coordination of the deterrence strategy, the briefings of key foreign and domestic

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officials, the preparation of Congressional press strategies, monitoring of Cuban countermeasures, and U.S. public re-actions. The task force will be the key action arm of the U.S. Government in implementing the Radio Marti decision and keeping the NSC and the President alerted to any actions requiring policy classification or decision. ~~(S)~~

Ronald Reagan

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