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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

May 14, 1990

NATIONAL SECURITY DIRECTIVE 40

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY  
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET  
THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL  
SECURITY AFFAIRS  
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
THE DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

SUBJECT: Decisions on START Issues (U)

At the upcoming U.S.-Soviet summit, I hope to reach substantive agreement on all of the major START issues on a basis that will advance U.S. national security interests and promote international stability. The following decisions are designed to help achieve that goal by making a best faith effort to resolve the issues that they address. (C)

1. **ALCMs and SLCMs.** Building on current areas of agreement with the Soviet Union and existing guidance, the U.S. can accept a package that includes the following elements:

ALCMs

- a. 600 km range threshold provided that non-nuclear ALCMs such as Tacit Rainbow are excluded from START limits. (S)
- b. Except as provided in subparagraph (d) below, current and future U.S. heavy bombers equipped for nuclear-armed ALCMs will be counted at 10 nuclear-armed ALCMs per bomber and will not be equipped for more than 20 nuclear-armed ALCMs per bomber. (S)
- c. Except as provided in subparagraph (d) below, current and future Soviet heavy bombers equipped for nuclear-armed ALCMs will be counted at 8 nuclear-armed ALCMs per bomber and will not be equipped for more than 12 nuclear-armed ALCMs per bomber. (S)

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Partially Declassified/Released on 11/16/98  
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by R. Soubers, National Security Council

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- d. Subject to a mutually acceptable definition of "as equipped," the U.S. may agree that any U.S. heavy bombers equipped for nuclear-armed ALCMs in excess of 150-180 will count against the 6000 warhead limit on an "as equipped" basis. Soviet heavy bombers equipped for nuclear-armed ALCMs in excess of 140 percent of the 150-180 threshold also will count against the 6000 warhead limit on an "as equipped" basis. (S)
- e. As an alternative to subparagraph (d), the U.S. may accept a sublimit on the number of U.S. heavy bombers equipped for nuclear-armed ALCMs that adequately protects options for the duration of the START Treaty. Under this approach, the Soviets may deploy up to 40 percent more heavy bombers equipped for nuclear-armed ALCMs than the U.S., subject to other START constraints, including the 1600/6000 START limits. (S)
- f. The U.S. requires a continuing right to convert up to 100 non-modern heavy bombers to "former heavy bombers" that would not be counted within the 1600/6000 START aggregates. The U.S. may propose that "non-modern" heavy bombers be defined as being those of a type that has been deployed longer than 10-15 years. (S)

#### SLCMs

As part of the ALCM/SLCM package, the U.S. may propose that each side make a declaration of policy concerning nuclear-armed SLCMs with ranges in excess of 600 km that includes the following elements:

- a. A statement that the declaration will be politically binding. (S)
- b. A specification of the maximum number of nuclear-armed SLCMs that will be deployed for each of the next five years. This specification would be updated annually. (S)
- c. A statement that no more than 875-1000 nuclear-armed SLCMs will be deployed at any one time for the duration of the START Treaty. (S)
- d. Information about which types of surface ships and submarines are capable of deploying nuclear-armed SLCMs. (S)

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- e. An annual exchange of data on nuclear SLCMs with ranges between 300 and 600 km. (S)
- f. A statement that nuclear-armed SLCMs with multiple independently targeted warheads will not be produced or deployed. (S)

2. **Verifying Non-Deployed Mobile Missile Production.** The U.S. may offer an approach to Perimeter Portal Continuous Monitoring (PPCM) based on the following principles:

- a. Numerical reciprocity. (S)
- b. Up to approximately four facilities in each country may be subject to PPCM. (S)
- c. The Soviet facilities at which PPCM should be established is a combination of up to approximately four solid propellant rocket motor production facilities and final assembly facilities that would give us the highest confidence in monitoring the production of mobile ICBMs. (S)

Solid rocket motor production facilities in both countries at which PPCM is not established should be subject to an annual quota of mandatory, short-notice inspections if they are determined to be capable of producing first-stage motors for mobile ICBMs. All other solid rocket motor production facilities in both countries at which PPCM has not been established should be subject to periodic, scheduled tours to confirm that they have not been given the capability to produce first-stage motors for mobile ICBMs. (S)

The U.S. and Soviet Union should first exchange lists of all their facilities that currently produce first stage motors of mobile ICBMs and other facilities at which they are prepared to accept PPCM. These lists will be mutually agreed. The two sides will then agree to establish PPCM at specified facilities on these lists. (S)

The U.S. and Soviet Union will also exchange lists of all solid propellant rocket motor production facilities. Following the identification of those facilities at which PPCM will be established, an exchange of data and one-time tours of all solid propellant rocket motor production facilities in both countries should be conducted to determine which facilities will be subject to mandatory short-notice inspections, and which will be subject to periodic, scheduled tours. (S)

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In order to implement this regime in the Soviet Union as soon as possible, the U.S. may accept the simultaneous implementation of such a regime in the United States, even if mobile ICBMs are not yet in production in the U.S. at that time. (S)

The U.S. should propose that questions about activities at facilities that are not subject to either short-notice inspections or periodic, scheduled tours may be raised in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC). The two sides may agree in the JCIC to inspect such facilities to aid in resolving any compliance concerns. (S)

3. **Limits on Heavy ICBMs.** On the understanding that the U.S. will seek the ultimate elimination of heavy ICBMs in follow-on negotiations, the U.S. may accept a package of constraints on heavy ICBMs consisting of:

- a. A maximum of 1540 RVs on 154 heavy ICBMs. (S)
- b. A ban on new types of heavy ICBMs. (S)
- c. A ban on mobile heavy ICBMs. (S)
- d. Such limitations on the modernization of existing types of heavy ICBMs as may be agreed between the two sides. (S)

4. **Limits on Mobile ICBMs and Mobile ICBM RVs.** The U.S. should propose a subceiling of 800-1200 on the number of deployed mobile ICBM RVs permitted in START. The U.S. will not seek a subceiling on the number of deployed mobile ICBMs permitted in START. (S)

5.

Accordingly, the U.S. should address the Backfire issue by seeking Soviet undertakings in the START context that would provide added confidence that it will remain dedicated to theater missions, and will not be employed as a strategic bomber. These should include, at a minimum, an undertaking that Backfire will not be given a capability to operate at intercontinental ranges.

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Additionally, the U.S. should seek a Soviet commitment to include all Backfires based in the ATTU region in CFE limits on aircraft.  
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