NATIONAL SECURITY DIRECTIVE 27

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR ECONOMIC AND DOMESTIC POLICY
UNITED STATES COORDINATOR FOR REFUGEE AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: Soviet Emigration Policy (U)

Freer Soviet emigration has created in Rome, Vienna, and Moscow enormous backlogs of applicants for admission as refugees to the United States. More than 200,000 Soviet citizens may apply in Fiscal Year 1990. For humanitarian, political, and management reasons, it is necessary to take steps to clear up the backlogs and regularize the process. (U)

I have made the following decisions regarding management of our Soviet emigration policy:

-- Soviet refugee applications received after October 1, 1989, should be adjudicated in Moscow, except as required to deal with hardship cases. (U)

-- Embassy Moscow staffing should be increased as feasible to handle the backlog and increased adjudication requirement. Every effort should be made to negotiate staff increase arrangements independent of permanent embassy ceilings and commitments for reciprocity, as larger numbers of Soviet embassy personnel here raise counterintelligence concerns. (U)
After the approximately 30,000 or more Soviet emigrants now in the Rome pipeline are adjudicated, there should be no more refugee adjudications in Rome except hardship cases. (U)

We should accept all Soviet applications for refugee admission, but priority will be given to family reunification and those of special concern, e.g., refuseniks, in scheduling interviews and apportioning refugee numbers. Those applicants without family ties in the United States (Priority 6) will be interviewed on a selective basis. (U)

Some approved Soviet refugees may be sent through Rome or Vienna to provide an opportunity for resettlement counseling by voluntary agencies and to lessen the strain on insufficient air transport from Moscow to the United States. (U)

Soviet citizens who do not qualify for refugee status in the adjudication process will be offered parole, as is the current practice. The Administration will continue to support strongly its legislation now with Congress to establish a special immigration category that would allow 30,000 people of special foreign policy interest to enter the United States each year for five years. This would replace the parole category; clearly, a large portion of these should be Soviets. (U)

The Soviet refugee admissions ceiling for FY 1990 to be proposed in congressional consultations is 50,000. (U)

Regular immigration will continue to be available to Soviet citizens. (U)

A Washington Processing Center is to be established to assist Embassy Moscow with processing paperwork, thus moving some of the burden of increased processing from Moscow. (U)

The effect of these decisions is a larger program and a generous, humane policy that will more rationally manage the growing number of Soviet emigrants applying for admission to the United States. The number of Soviet citizens we are prepared to take into the United States will increase in FY 1990, the backlog of refugees
to be processed through Rome will be eliminated, Soviet emigrants will be better able to decide whether to apply for admission to the US or emigrate elsewhere, and refugee adjudications will be continued in Moscow after the Rome-Vienna pipeline closes, with emphasis on family reunification. (U)