

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 22, 1989

NATIONAL SECURITY DIRECTIVE 15

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
THE CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY POLICY
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
THE DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
THE DIRECTOR, FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY

SUBJECT: Open Skies (U)

I wish to challenge the Soviets to expand and institutionalize their apparent moves toward increased openness in a fashion which will enhance stability and transparency. I have therefore proposed to our NATO Allies, to the Soviet Union, and to its allies, an "Open Skies" initiative. Under this proposal, participating nations would agree to open their skies for regular unarmed aerial surveillance flights. Participation by the Soviet Union is a sine qua non for moving forward with this initiative. Following Soviet agreement to participate, participation in this initiative would be open, on an individual nation basis, to all members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Warsaw Pact. (S)

To further this initiative, the United States will:

- Support convening a conference separate from any existing forum, of all interested members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Participants will be invited to attend as individual nations, not as members of a specific alliance.
- At that conference, negotiate a formal international agreement, open to signature by any member nation of NATO or the Warsaw Pact, providing for the acceptance of regular unarmed aerial surveillance flights.

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Declassify: OADR

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PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
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- Include in that agreement: (a) flight safety considerations, (b) limitations, if any, of aircraft type and sensors, and provisions to ensure lack of armament, (c) arrangements to ensure that the entire territory of parties to the agreement can be overflown and (d) specific provisions providing for the access limitations, if any, on such flights.
- Make provisions, as required, in the agreement for protecting our own sensitive national security interests, including, if necessary, provisions barring such flights in some areas. (✓)

The invitation will be restricted to members of the two principal alliances to ensure that this does not become an excuse for such things as Cuban overflights of the U.S., or a device for regimes such as Libya to obtain the right to fly over U.S. installations. In addition, I reject the Soviet desire to expand the zones or boundaries of the current talks on European conventional force reductions and confidence building. Therefore this open skies proposal will be kept independent of such talks specifically to avoid any confusion about our resistance to changing the mandate or zones of the current negotiations. (✓)

The Secretary of State should make a recommendation on the nation which should host such an "Open Skies" conference and when. (✓)

The Arms Control Policy Coordinating Committee will prepare a report setting forth options for implementing this initiative. The report should include consideration of the following:

- The quota of overflights and how that quota could be allocated among the various participating nations.
- The specific United States aircraft to be employed and restrictions, if any, on the type of aircraft involved.
- Restrictions, if any, on the equipment carried. Specifically, should equipment for recording electronic signals be allowed? Should there be any restrictions on the types of camera equipment?
- Rights of the nation being overflown. Should an observer be allowed or required on board overflying aircraft? Should there be a requirement to share photographic data collected, either with the overflown party or other parties to the agreement? What, if any, inspection procedures are required to ensure only authorized equipment is being carried?
- Restrictions, if any, on areas which may be overflown.

- Provisions for mandatory, real-time refueling within the overflown country in order that a single aircraft may make a complete transit of the Soviet Union or other party to the agreement.
- Provisions for manning such flights, to include whether multinational observer crews should be used and whether observers from the overflown party should be included.
- Restrictions, if any, on bases from which overflights may originate. Specifically, must such flights originate from a country party to the agreement? Since no Warsaw Pact state is adjacent to the United States, from where may Soviet overflights originate?
- Procedures to ensure air traffic safety.
- Notification procedures.
- Provisions for harmonizing this initiative with the existing classified regime governing overflights of the Federal Republic of Germany by Warsaw Pact military aircraft and with the existing regime governing the Berlin Control Zone and the air access corridors to Berlin.
- United States policy towards suggestions that these flights, after a trial period, be incorporated into other existing or projected arms control regimes (e.g., CSCE or Conventional Forces in Europe).
- United States policy towards provision of U.S. aircraft to allow participation by other nations, NATO and/or Warsaw Pact, which do not possess suitable indigenous aircraft.
- United State policy should nations other than the member states of NATO and the Warsaw Pact (for example, European neutrals or Asian countries) seek to participate in the initiative. (S)

The Federal Bureau of Investigation and Federal Aviation Administration should participate in the preparation of this report, which should be submitted for my consideration not later than July 15, 1989. (U)

