Memorandum From the Executive Secretary (Souers) to the Members of the National Security Council
NSC 4
Washington, December 9, 1947.
//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, NSC Minutes, 4th Meeting. Confidential. Copies sent to the President, the Secretaries of State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, and the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board. For an early version of this document, see the memorandum from "REN" to Souers, November 25, and the two undated attachments (ibid.) in the Supplement.
COORDINATION OF FOREIGN INFORMATION MEASURES
REFERENCES
a. SANACC 304/11
b. NSC Action No. 11/1//1/NSC Action No. 11, taken at the NSC meeting on November 14, referred SANACC 304/11 to the NSC Staff for revision based on the comments at the meeting. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, Record of Actions, Box 55)
At its second meeting the National Security Council referred SANACC 304/11 to the National Security Council Staff for revision in the light of the comments at the meeting. The enclosed report has been prepared pursuant to that directive, after consultation with representatives of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy and the Air Force, and of the Central Intelligence Agency.
It is recommended that the National Security Council approve the enclosed report and authorize its submission to the President, with the recommendation that he approve the "Conclusions" contained therein and direct that they be implemented by all appropriate executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government under the coordination of the Secretary of State.
Sidney W. Souers/2/
/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
Enclosure/3/
/3/Confidential. The word "Draft" at the top of the first page has been crossed through. The typewritten date December 9 was changed by hand to December 17.
National Security Council Memorandum
NSC 4
Washington, December 17, 1947.
REPORT BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ON COORDINATION OF FOREIGN INFORMATION MEASURES
The Problem
1. To determine what steps are required to strengthen and coordinate all foreign information measures of the U.S. Government in furtherance of the attainment of US national objectives.
Analysis
2. The USSR is conducting an intensive propaganda campaign directed primarily against the US and is employing coordinated psychological, political and economic measures designed to undermine non-Communist elements in all countries. The ultimate objective of this campaign is not merely to undermine the prestige of the US and the effectiveness of its national policy but to weaken and divide world opinion to a point where effective opposition to Soviet designs is no longer attainable by political, economic or military means. In conducting this campaign, the USSR is utilizing all measures available to it through satellite regimes, Communist parties, and organizations susceptible to Communist influence.
3. The US is not now employing strong, coordinated information measures to counter this propaganda campaign or to further the attainment of its national objectives. The extension of economic aid to certain foreign countries, particularly in Europe, is one of the principal means by which the US has undertaken to defend its vital interests. The nature and intent of this aid and other US contributions to world peace is unknown to or misunderstood by large segments of the world's population. Inadequate employment of information measures is impairing the effectiveness of these undertakings.
4. None of the existing departments or agencies of the US Government is now charged with responsibility for coordinating foreign information measures in furtherance of the attainment of US national objectives. Upon the Department of State devolves the principal responsibility, under the President, for the formulation and execution of American foreign policy and the conduct of American foreign relations.
5. Facilities now existing in the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy and the Air Force in the field of foreign information or which can be utilized in this field are listed in the Appendix/4/ hereto.
/4/The appendix, not found, lists agencies and offices of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force involved in the dissemination of information overseas.
Conclusions
6. The present world situation requires the immediate strengthening and coordination of all foreign information measures of the US Government designed to influence attitudes in foreign countries in a direction favorable to the attainment of its objectives and to counteract effects of anti-US propaganda.
7. It is considered that the initial steps to implement paragraph 6 above should be designed to provide closer coordination of policies, more effective integration of existing facilities, and intensification of foreign information measures.
8. a. The Secretary of State should be charged with formulating policies for and coordinating the implementation of all information meas-ures designed to influence attitudes in foreign countries in a direction favorable to the attainment of US objectives and to counteract effects of anti-US propaganda. It is assumed that these functions will be exercised by the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, hereinafter referred to as the Assistant Secretary. The Assistant Secretary should consult with an informal group composed of representatives of other appropriate departments and agencies.
b. Appropriate departments and agencies should be directed to insure the most effective coordination and utilization of their appropriate facilities for the implementation of approved foreign information policies.
c. The Assistant Secretary should be assisted by a staff including qualified full-time personnel detailed from each appropriate department or agency. This staff should assist the Assistant Secretary in implementing the policies and plans established by the Secretary of State by:
(1) Obtaining the most effective utilization and coordination of all federal foreign information facilities;
(2) Initiating and developing for the approval of the Assistant Secretary specific plans and programs designed to influence foreign opinion in a direction favorable to US interests and to counteract effects of anti-US propaganda.
9. As a matter of priority, the Assistant Secretary should coordinate the determination of the requirement for funds necessary to insure performance of the functions assigned in paragraph 8 above.
10. The Assistant Secretary should be furnished by the Central Intelligence Agency with appropriate coordinated foreign intelligence.
11. The Assistant Secretary should be furnished by the appropriate departments with classified information necessary for the fulfillment of his responsibilities.
12. In carrying out the functions assigned in paragraph 8 above, the Assistant Secretary should maintain the closest possible liaison with the State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee.
Memorandum From the Executive Secretary (Souers) to the Members of the National Security Council
NSC 4-A
Washington, December 9, 1947.
//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, NSC Minutes, 4th Meeting. Top Secret.
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS
REFERENCE
SANACC 304/11/1//1/Document 249.
1. The National Security Council at its second meeting referred SANACC 304/11 to the NSC Staff for revision in the light of the comments at the meeting.
2. SANACC 304/11 appears to be designed to accomplish the following two related but separate purposes:
a. To initiate steps looking toward the conduct of covert psychological operations designed to counteract Soviet and Soviet-inspired activities.
b. To ensure that all overt foreign information activities are effectively coordinated.
3. Therefore, in the interest of security and clarity, the Staff of the National Security Council has prepared separate reports to the National Security Council designed to achieve each of the above purposes. This report deals with the purpose described in 1-a, while NSC 4/2/ deals with the purpose stated in 1-b.
/2/Document 252.
4. The enclosed draft directive to the Director of Central Intelligence is believed to be an appropriate and adequate action by the Council with reference to covert psychological operations abroad. This directive contains the following desirable provisions:
a. It specifies the reason and the authority for the Council's action;
b. It grants sufficient authority to the Central Intelligence Agency; while
c. At the same time it ensures that Central Intelligence Agency will conduct such operations in a manner consistent with U.S. foreign policy, overt foreign information activities, and diplomatic and military operations and intentions abroad.
5. The names of appropriate departments and agencies to be represented on the panel referred to in subparagraph 3-a, will be recommended by the NSC Staff in a separate memorandum./3/
/3/Document 255.
6. It is therefore recommended that the National Security Council approve and issue the enclosed directive to the Director of Central Intelligence.
Sidney W. Souers/4/
/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
Enclosure/5/
Draft Directive to Director of Central Intelligence Hillenkoetter
Washington, undated.
/5/Top Secret. Paragraph 3 of this draft was dropped in the final version and replaced by a paragraph that made the Director of Central Intelligence responsible for ensuring that psychological warfare operations were consistent with U.S. foreign policy. See the attachment to Document 257.
1. The National Security Council, taking cognizance of the vicious psychological efforts of the USSR, its satellite countries and Communist groups to discredit and defeat the aims and activities of the United States and other western powers, has determined that, in the interests of world peace and U.S. national security, the foreign information activities of the U.S. Government must be supplemented by covert psychological operations.
2. The similarity of operational methods involved in covert psychological and intelligence activities and the need to ensure their secrecy and obviate costly duplication renders the Central Intelligence Agency the logical agency to conduct such operations. Hence, under authority of Section 102 (d) (5) of the National Security Act of 1947, the National Security Council directs the Director of Central Intelligence to initiate and conduct, within the limit of available funds, covert psychological operations designed to counteract Soviet and Soviet-inspired activities which constitute a threat to world peace and security or are designed to discredit and defeat the United States in its endeavors to promote world peace and security.
3. In order to insure that such psychological operations are in a manner consistent with U.S. foreign policy, overt foreign information activities, and diplomatic and military operations and intentions abroad, the Director of Central Intelligence is charged with:
a. Obtaining approval of all policy directives and major plans for such operations by a panel to be designated by the National Security Council.
b. Coordination of operations with the senior U.S. diplomatic and military representatives in each area which will be directly affected by such operations.
4. Nothing contained herein shall be construed to require the Central Intelligence Agency to disclose operational details concerning its secret techniques, sources or contacts.
Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Hillenkoetter to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Souers)
Washington, December 15, 1947.
//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, NSC Minutes, 4th Meeting. Top Secret.
1. Reference is made to NSC 4-A (Report to the National Security Council by The Executive Secretary on Psychological Operations) as distributed under date of 9 December 1947,/1/ with particular reference to the proposed Directive To The Director of Central Intelligence.
/1/Document 253.
2. In the event the subject project is implemented, it is requested that consideration be given to rewording paragraph 3.b., of the proposed Directive to The DCI as follows:
"b. The senior U.S. diplomatic representative in each area, and the military commander in each occupied area, will be kept informed of psychological operations being conducted in areas under their jurisdiction."
3. We feel the suggested rewording will satisfy the intent of the original wording and will--
a. Provide greater security to our organized covert operations, and
b. Will follow the existing interdepartmental agreement that the senior U.S. representative in each foreign area is responsible for the coordination of all overt intelligence activities.
RH Hillenkoetter
Rear Admiral, USN
Memorandum From the Executive Secretary (Souers) to the National Security Council
Washington, December 16, 1947.
//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, NSC Minutes, 4th Meeting. Top Secret.
SUBJECT
Representation on the panel recommended in NSC 4-A/1//1/Document 253.
It is recommended that the panel referred to in paragraph 3-a of the draft directive in NSC 4-A consist of one representative from each of the following Departments:
Department of State
Department of the Army
Department of the Navy
Department of the Air ForceAt the suggestion of General Gruenther, it is also recommended that the Joint Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff, be invited to designate a representative who shall sit with the above panel as an observer.
Sidney W. Souers