THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
November 26, 1963
NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 273
TO: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Administrator, AID
The Director, USIA
The President has reviewed the discussions of South Vietnam which
occurred in Honolulu, and has discussed the matter further with
Ambassador Lodge. He directs that the following guidance be issued
to all concerned:
1. It remains the central object of the United States in South
Vietnam to assist the people and Government of that country to win
their contest against the externally directed and supported Communist
conspiracy. The test of all U. S. decisions and actions in this area
should be the effectiveness of their contribution to this purpose.
2. The objectives of the United States with respect to the withdrawal
of U. S. military personnel remain as stated in the White House state-
ment of October 2, 1963.
3. It is a major interest of the United States Government that the
present provisional government of South Vietnam should be assisted
in consolidating itself and in holding and developing increased public
support. All U.S. officers should conduct themselves width this
objective in view.
4. The President expects that all senior officers of the Government
will move energetically to insure the full unity of support for established
U.S. policy in South Vietnam. Both in Washington and in the field, it
is essential that the Government be unified. It is of particular importance
that express or implied criticism of officers of other branches be
scrupulously avoided in all contacts with the Vietnamese Government
and with the press. More specifically, the President approves the
following lines of action developed in the discussions of the Honolulu
meeting, of November 20. The offices of the Government to which
central responsibility is assigned are indicated in each case.
5. We should concentrate our own efforts, and insofar as possible
we should persuade the Government of South Vietnam to concentrate
its efforts, on the critical situation in the Mekong Delta. This concentra-
tion should include not only military but political, economic, social,
educational and informational effort. We should seek to turn the tide
not only of battle but of belief, and we should seek to increase not only
the control of hamlets but the productivity of this area, especially where
the proceeds can be held for the advantage of anti-Communist forces.
(Action: The whole country team under the direct supervision of
the Ambassador.)
6. Programs of military and economic assistance should be
maintained at such levels that their magnitude and effectiveness in the
eyes of the Vietnamese Government do not fall below the levels sustained
by the United States in the time of the Diem Government. This does not
exclude arrangements for economy on the MAP account with respect to
accounting for ammunition, or any other readjustments which are
possible as between MAP and other U. S. defense resources. Special
attention should be given to the expansion of the import, distribution,
and effective use of fertilizer for the Delta.
(Action: AID and DOD as appropriate. )
7. Planning should include different levels of possible increased
activity, and in each instance there should be estimates of such factors as:
A. Resulting damage to North Vietnam;
B. The plausibility of denial;
C. Possible North Vietnamese retaliation;
D. Other international reaction.
Plans should be submitted promptly for approval by higher authority.
(Action: State, DOD, and CIA. )
8. With respect to Laos, a plan should be a developed and submitted
for approval by higher authority for military operations up to a line
up to 50 kilometers inside Laos, together with political plans for
minimizing the international hazards of such an enterprise. Since it
is agreed that operational responsibility for such undertakings should
pass from CAS to MACV, this plan should include a redefined
method of political guidance for such operations, since their timing
and character can have an intimate relation to the fluctuating
situation in Laos.
(Action: State, DOD, and CIA.)
9. It was agreed in Honolulu that the situation in Cambodia is
of the first importance for South Vietnam, and it is therefore urgent
that we should lose no opportunity to exercise a favorable influence
upon that country. In particular a plan should be developed using
all available evidence and methods of persuasion for showing the
Cambodians that the recent charges against us are groundless.
(Action: State.)
10. In connection with paragraphs 7 and 8 above, it is desired
that we should develop as strong and persuasive a case as possible
to demonstrate to the world the degree to which the Viet Cong is
controlled, sustained and supplied from Hanoi, through Laos and
other channels. In short, we need a more contemporary version
of the Jorden Report, as powerful and complete as possible.
(Action: Department of State with other agencies as necessary.)
s/ McGeorge Bundy
McGeorge Bundy
cc:
Mr. Bundy
Mr. Forrestal
Mr. Johnson
NSC Files
(page 3 of 3 pages)
[DECLASSIFIED - was classified TOP SECRET
Auth: EO 11652
Date: 6-8-76
By: Jeanne W. Davis
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ]
11/21/63
DRAFT
TOP SECRET
NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO.
The President has reviewed the discussions of South Vietnam which occurred
in Honolulu, and has discussed the matter further with Ambassador Lodge.
He directs that the following guidance be issued to all concerned:
1. It remains the central object of the United States in South Vietnam
to assist the people and Government of that country to win their contest
against the externally directed and supported Communist conspiracy. The
test of all decisions and U. S. actions in this area should be the effectiveness
of their contribution to this purpose.
2. The objectives of the United States with respect to the withdrawal
of U. S. military personnel remain as stated in the White House statement
of October 2, 1963.
3. It is a major interest of the United States Government that the
present provisional government of South Vietnam should be assisted in
consolidating itself and in holding and developing increased public support.
All U.S. officers should conduct themselves with this objective in view.
4. It is of the highest importance that the United States Government
avoid either the appearance or the reality of public recrimination from one
part of it against another, and the President expects that all senior officers
of the Government will take energetic steps to insure that they and their
subordinates go out of their way to maintain and to defend the unity of the
United States Government both here and in the field.
More specifically, the President approves the following lines of
action developed in the discussions of the Honolulu meeting of November 20.
The office or offices of the Government to which central responsibility is
assigned is indicated in each case.
5. We should concentrate our own efforts, and insofar as possible
we should persuade the Government of South Vietnam to concentrate its
efforts, on the critical situation in the Mekong Delta. This concentration
should include not only military but political, economic, social, educational
and informational effort. We should seek to turn the tide not only of battle
but of belief, and we should seek to increase not only our control of land but
the productivity of this area wherever the proceeds can be held for the
advantage of anti-Communist forces.
(Action: The whole country team under the direct supervision of the
Ambassador.)
6. Programs of military and economic assistance should be
maintained at such levels that their magnitude and effectiveness in the eyes
of the Vietnamese Government do not fall below the levels sustained by the
United States in the time of the Diem Government. This does not exclude
arrangements for economy on the MAP account with respect to accounting
for ammunition, or any other readjustments which are possible as between
MAP and other U. S. defense resources. Special attention should be given
to the expansion of the import distribution and effective use of fertilizer
for the Delta.
(Action: AID and DOD as appropriate. )
7. With respect to action against North Vietnam, there should
be a detailed plan for the development of additional Government of Vietnam
resources, especially for sea-going activity, and such planning should
indicate the time and investment necessary to achieve a wholly new level
of effectiveness in this field of action.
(Action: DOD, and CIA. )
8. With respect to Laos, a plan should be a developed for military
operations up to a line up to 50 kilometers inside Laos, together with
political plans for minimizing the international hazards of such an enter-
prise. Since it is agreed that operational responsibility for such undertakings
should pass from CAS to MACV, this plan should provide an alternative
method of political liaison for such operations, since their timing and
character can have an intimate relation to the fluctuating situation in Laos.
(Action: State, DOD, and CIA.)
9. It was agreed in Honolulu that the situation in Cambodia is of the
first importance for South Vietnam, and it is therefore urgent that we should
lose no opportunity to exercise a favorable influence upon that country. In
particular, measures should be undertaken to satisfy ourselves completely
that recent charges from Cambodia are groundless, and we should put
ourselves in a position to offer to the Cambodian a full opportunity to
satisfy themselves on this same point.
(Action: State.)
10. In connection with paragraphs 7 and 8 above, it is desired
that we should develop as strong and persuasive a case as possible to
demonstrate to the world the degree to which the Viet Cong is controlled,
sustained and supplied from Hanoi, through Laos and other channels. In
short, we need a more contemporary version of the Jorden Report, as
powerful and complete as possible.
(Action: Department of State with other agencies as necessary.)
McGeorge Bundy
TOP SECRET
[DECLASSIFIED - was classified TOP SECRET
Auth: EO 12356, Sec. 3.4
Date: 1/21/91
By: SKF, NARA
[National Security Action Memorandums (NSAM)]