NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 263
TO: Secretary of State
Secretary of Defense
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
SUBJECT: South Vietnam
At a meeting on October 5, 1963, the President considered
the recommendations contained in the report of Secretary
McNamara and General Taylor on their mission to South
Vietnam.
The President approved the military recommendations
contained in Section I B (1 -3) of the report, but directed
that no formal announcement be made of the implementation of
plans to withdraw 1,000 U.S. military personnel by the end
of 1963.
After discussion of the remaining recommendations of the
report, the President approved the instruction to Ambassador
Lodge which is set forth in State Department telegram No.
534 to Saigon.
McGeorge Bundy
Copy furnished: Director of Central Intelligence
Administrator, Agency for International Development 11/21/63
DRAFT
TOP SECRET
NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO
The President has reviewed the discussions of South Vietnam
which occurred in Honolulu, and has discussed the matter
further with Ambassador Lodge. He directs that the following
guidance be issued to all concerned:
1. It remains the central object of the United States in
South Vietnam to assist the people and Government of that
country to win their contest against the externally directed
and supported Communist conspiracy. The test of all
decisions and U.S. actions in this area should be the
effectiveness of their contributions to this purpose.
2. The objectives of the United States with respect to the
withdrawal of U.S. military personnel remain as stated in
the White House statement of October 2, 1963.
3. It is a major interest of the United States Government
that the present provisional government of South Vietnam
should be assisted in consolidating itself in holding and
developing increased public support. All U.S. officers
should conduct themselves with this objective in view.
4. It is of the highest importance that the United States
Government avoid either the appearance or the reality of
public recrimination from one part of it against another,
and the President expects that all senior officers of the
Government will take energetic steps to insure that they and
their subordinate go out of their way to maintain and to
defend the unity of the United States Government both here
and in the field. More specifically, the President approves
the following lines of action developed in the discussions
of the Honolulu meeting of November 20. The office or
offices of the Government to which central responsibility is
assigned is indicated in each case.
5. We should concentrate our own efforts, and insofar as
possible we should persuade the government of South Vietnam
to concentrate its efforts, on the critical situation in the
Mekong Delta. This concentration should include not only
military but political, economic, social, educational and
informational efforts. We should seek to turn the tide not
only of battle but of belief, and we should seek to increase
not only our control of land but the productivity of this
area whenever the proceeds can be held for the advantage of
anti-Communist forces. (Action: The whole country team under
the direct supervision of the Ambassador.)
6. Programs of military and economic assistance should be
maintained at such levels that their magnitude and
effectiveness in the eyes of the Vietnamese Government do
not fall below the levels sustained by the United States in
the time of the Diem Government. This does not exclude
arrangements for economy on the MAP accounting for
ammunition and any other readjustments which are possible as
between MAP and other U.S. defense sources. Special
attention should be given to the expansion of the import
distribution and effective use of fertilizer for the Delta.
(Action: AID and DOD as appropriate.)
7. With respect to action against North Vietnam, there
should be a detailed plan for the development of additional
Government of Vietnam resources, especially for sea-going
activity, and such planning should indicate the time and
investment necessary to achieve a wholly new level of
effectiveness in this field of action. (Action: DOD and CIA)
8. With respect to Laos, a plan should be developed for
military operations up to a line up to 50 kilometers inside
Laos, together with political plans for minimizing the
international hazards of such an enterprise. Since it is
agreed that operational responsibility for such undertakings
should pass from CAS to MACV, this plan should provide an
alternative method of political liaison for such operations,
since their timing and character can have an intimate
relation to the fluctuating situation in Laos. (Action:
State, DOD and CIA.)
9. It was agreed in Honolulu that the situation in Cambodia
is of the first importance for South Vietnam, and it is
therefore urgent that we should lose no opportunity to
exercise a favorable influence upon that country. In
particular, measures should be undertaken to satisfy
ourselves completely that recent charges from Cambodia are
groundless, and we should put ourselves in a position to
offer to the Cambodians a full opportunity to satisfy
themselves on this same point. (Action: State.)
10. In connection with paragraphs 7 and 8 above, it is
desired that we should develop as strong and persuasive a
case as possible to demonstrate to the world the degree to
which the Viet Cong is controlled, sustained and supplied
from Hanoi, through Laos and other channels. In short, we
need a more contemporary version of the Jordan Report, as
powerful and complete as possible. (Action: Department of
State with other agencies as necessary,.)
McGeorge Bundy
[National Security Action Memorandums (NSAM)]