MEMORANDUM FOR: Intelligence Community Executive Committee Principals
SUBJECT:Revised DCID 1/7, Security Controls on the Dissemination of Intelligence Information
REFERENCE: DCID 1/7, dated 27 February 1987
1. Effective immediately, I have approved a revised Director of Central Intelligence Directive (DCID) 1/7, Security Controls on the Dissemination of Intelligence Information. A copy is attached. The previous edition, reference above, is obsolete.
2. I have approved the new DCID, because of the benefits attendant to the new policy direction, with further revision of sections dealing with NOFORN and ORCON to be completed. Additional changes will follow within 120 days of the date of the DCID.
3. Highlights from revised DCID 1/7 are as follows: Completely reorganizes and clarifies the language of the DCID.
5. NOCONTRACT will no longer be used on any newly created documents or other materials. In all but unresolved conflict of interest and unfair competitive advantage cases, Senior Officials of the Intelligence Community (SOICs) will now be able to release intelligence bearing the NOCONTRACT marking to appropriately cleared and access-approved contractors.
6. The presence of the WNINTEL and NOCONTRACT marking, in themselves, will have no bearing on the releasability of the information to contractors or users beyond the Intelligence Community.
7. Please ensure that these changes are widely disseminated among classification management, registry, and other personnel under your security cognizance who may have occasion to disseminate intelligence information to policymakers, warfighters, contractors and/or other consumers of information marked with security controls in DCID 1/7.
8. Questions should be directed to Mr. George P. Grau, or Mr. Gregory Pannoni at the Security Policy Board Staff on 703/602- 7074.
Very respectfully,
[signed]
William O. Studeman
Admiral, U.S. Navy
Acting
Attachment
Distribution of IC/EXCOM Principals:
1 - ADM W.O. Studeman, Acting DCI, Chairman
1 - Vacant, DDCI, Vice Chairman
1 - Mr. Richard Haver, EXDIR/ICA
1 - Mr. Leo Hazlewood, EXDIR/CIA
1 - Mr. John Deutch, DEPSECDEF
1 - Dr. Paul G. Kaminski, USD (A&T)
1 - ADM William Owens, JCS
1 - Mr. Jeff Harris, NRO
1 - Mr. Emmett Paige, ASD (C3I)
1 - Lt Gen James Clapper, DIA
1 - Ms. Tobi Gati, State/INR
1 - VADM J. M. McConnell, NSA
1 - Dr. Annette J. Krygiel, CIO
1 - Mr. Ken Baker, DOE
1 - Dr. Christine Williams, NIC
1 - Mr. John Harley, FBI
1 - Mr. Michael Romay, Treasury
1 - Mr. George Tenet, NSC
1 - RADM Edward Sheafer, USN
1 - RADM Dwaine Griffith, USN (Ret.), SP/Navy
1 - LTG Ira Owens, USA
1 - Maj Gen Ervin Rokke, USAF
1 - Mr. Richard Scruggs, DoJ
1 - Maj Gen Paul Van Riper, USMC
1 - Mr. Gordon Adams, OMB
Security Controls on the Dissemination of Intelligence Information
(Effective 12 April 1995)
Introduction
Pursuant to the provisions of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, Executive Order 12333, Executive Order 12356 and implementing directives [footnote 2] thereto, policies, controls, and procedures for the dissemination and use of intelligence information and related materials are herewith established in this Director of Central Intelligence Directive (DCID).
1.0 Policy
It is the policy of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) that intelligence be disseminated on a timely basis and as widely as possible, consistent with the "need to know" principle and requirement to protect sources and methods. The intelligence dissemination controls established herein may only be used to restrict dissemination of that intelligence derived from sources and methods. Inherent in this policy is a requirement for each Senior Official of the Intelligence Community (SOIC) to balance the need for disseminating intelligence with the requirement to ensure survivability of a source or method. SOICs will establish procedures to comply with this policy.
2.0 Purpose
2.1 This Directive establishes policies, controls, and procedures for the dissemination and use of intelligence information to ensure that, while facilitating its interchange for intelligence purposes, it will be adequately protected. This directive amplifies applicable portions of the 23 June 1982 Information Security Oversight Office Directive No. 1, which implements Executive Order 12356.
2.2 Policies and procedures governing the release of intelligence to contractors and consultants are set forth in this directive. Additional controls are prescribed on the dissemination of intelligence to foreign governments and to foreign nationals and immigrant aliens, including those employed by the US Government.
3.0 Definitions
3.1 Intelligence information and related materials (hereinafter referred to as "Intelligence") includes the following classified information:
3.1.1 foreign intelligence and counterintelligence defined in the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, and in Executive Order 12333;
3.1.2 information describing US foreign intelligence and counterintelligence activities, sources, methods, equipment, or methodology used for the acquisition, processing, or exploitation of such intelligence; foreign military hardware obtained for exploitation; and any other data resulting from US intelligence collection efforts; and
3.1.3 information on Intelligence Community protective security programs (e.g., personnel, physical, technical, and information security).
3.2 "need to know" is the determination by an authorized holder of classified information that access to information in his/her possession is required by another person to perform a lawful and authorized function. Such persons must possess an appropriate security clearance and access approval.
3.3 Intelligence Community (and agencies within the Intelligence Community) -- the United States Government agencies and organizations identified in section 3 of the National Security Act, as amended.
3.4 Senior Official of the Intelligence Community (SOIC) -- the head of an agency, office, bureau or intelligence element listed in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended.
4.0 General Applicability
4.1 In support of the Policy Statement in Section 1.0, classifiers and markers of disseminated intelligence information are encouraged to take a risk management approach when preparing information for dissemination. They are further encouraged to organize the material in such a way as to minimize reference(s) to sources and methods. In the interest of the widest possible dissemination of information to policymakers, warfighters and other consumers, classifiers and markers should carefully consider whether there is a useful purpose or need to mark material with any dissemination control(s) marking(s).
4.2 The controls and procedures established by this directive shall be applied uniformly in the dissemination and use of intelligence originated by all Intelligence Community components.
4.3 The substance of this directive shall be promulgated by each Intelligence Community component, and appropriate procedures permitting prompt interagency consultation will be established.
5.0 Use By and Dissemination Among Executive Branch Departments/ Agencies of the US Government
5.1 Executive Order 12356 provides that classified information originating in one US agency shall not be disseminated beyond any recipient agency without the consent of the originating agency. However, to facilitate use and dissemination of intelligence within and among Intelligence Community components and to provide for the timely flow of intelligence to consumers, the following controlled relief to the "third agency rule" is hereby established:
5.1.1 Each Intelligence Community component consents to the use of its intelligence in intelligence products of other components and to the dissemination of those products within executive branch departments/ agencies of the US Government, including contractors of the Intelligence Community in accordance with section 7 below, except as specifically restricted by controls defined in this directive or other DCIDs.
5.1.2 As provided in 5.1.1, classified intelligence even though it bears no restrictive control markings, will not be released in its original form to any US executive branch department/ agency not on original distribution without the consent of the originator.
6.0 Responsibilities of Intelligence Community Departments/ Agencies Disseminating to US Components Outside the Intelligence Community
Any component disseminating intelligence beyond the Intelligence Community assumes responsibility for ensuring that recipient organizations agree to observe the need to know principle and the restrictions prescribed by this directive and to maintain adequate safeguards.
7.0 Policy and Procedures Governing the Release of Intelligence to Contractors and Consultants
7.1 General Policies and Procedures for Contractors:
7.1.1 Senior Officials of the Intelligence Community (SOICs), or their designees, may release intelligence to appropriately cleared and access-approved US contractors and consultants (hereinafter "contractor") having a demonstrated "need to know" without referral to the component provided that:
7.1.1.1 The SOIC, or her/his designee, certifies in writing that disclosure does not create an unfair competitive advantage for the contractor or a conflict of interest with the contractor's obligation to protect the information. In the event that the issue of an unfair competitive advantage or conflict of interest cannot be resolved, consultation with the originator and resolution of the issue is required prior to release to contractors.
7.1.1.2 Release is made only to contractors which have been certified by the SOIC (or designee) of the sponsoring organization as performing classified services in support of a national security mission.
7.1.1.3 The contractor has an approved safeguarding capability/ storage facility if retention of the intelligence is required.
7.1.1.4 Contractors will not release intelligence to any of their components or employees not directly engaged in providing services under contract or other binding agreement or to another contractor (including subcontractors) without the consent of the sponsoring agency. The sponsoring agency shall verify that any second contractors satisfy all applicable security requirements and adhere to all of the policies and procedures contained in this directive.
7.1.1.5 Intelligence released to contractors, all reproductions thereof, and all other material generated based on, or incorporating data therefrom (including authorized reproductions), remain the property of the US Government. Final disposition of the intelligence information will be governed by the sponsoring agency.
7.1.1.6 National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs), Special National Intelligence Estimates (SNIEs), and Interagency Intelligence Memoranda may be released to appropriately cleared contractors with the requisite need-to-know except as regulated by provisions concerning proprietary information as defined in section 7.1.1.7 and 10.2, below.
7.1.1.7 Intelligence which bears the control marking "CAUTION - PROPRIETARY INFORMATION INVOLVED" (abbreviated "PROPIN" or "PR") will not be released to contractors unless prior permission has been obtained from the originator and those providing the intelligence to the originator. This control marking is further described under section 10.2, below.
7.1.1.8 Contractors shall make provisions to ensure that intelligence in their custody is not released to foreign nationals, whether or not they are employees or contractors themselves, unless authorized by the originating agency through the sponsoring agency. Authorized release to foreign nationals will be undertaken through established channels in accordance with DCID 5/6, Intelligence Disclosure Policy and the National Policy and Procedures for the Disclosure of Classified Military Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations (abbreviated title: National Disclosure Policy 1 or NDP1).
7.2 Policies and Procedures for Contractors Inside Government Owned or Controlled Facilities.
Contractors who perform duties inside a government owned or controlled facility will follow the procedures and policies of that sponsoring Intelligence Community member in accordance with section 7.1 of this directive.
7.3 Policies and Procedures for Contractors Outside Government Owned or Controlled Facilities.
7.3.1 Contractors who perform duties outside of government owned or controlled facilities will adhere to the following policies and procedures:
7.3.1.1 The SOIC of the sponsoring agency, or her/his designee, is responsible for ensuring that releases to contractors of intelligence marked ORCON and/ or PROPIN are made only with the consent of the originating agency pursuant to this DCID and through established channels. (See sections 10.1 and 10.2 respectively.)
7.3.1.2 The sponsoring agency shall maintain a record of material released.
7.3.1.3 Contractors shall establish procedures to control all intelligence received, produced and held by them for the duration of the contract or any other binding agreement; and to permit identification of all persons who have had access to intelligence in their custody.
7.3.1.4 All reproductions of intelligence will be classified, marked and controlled in the same manner as the original(s).
7.3.1.5 SCI released to contractors shall be controlled pursuant to the provisions of DCID 1/19, Security Policy for Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI).
7.3.1.6 Sponsoring agencies shall delete any reference to the Central Intelligence Agency, the phrase "Directorate of Operations," the place acquired, the field number, the source description, and field dissemination from all CIA Directorate of Operations reports passed to contractors, unless prior approval to do otherwise is obtained from CIA.
8.0 Dissemination to Foreign Governments
8.1 Intelligence, even though it bears no restrictive control markings, may only be released in its original form to foreign governments with the permission of the originator and in accordance with DCID 5/6, Intelligence Disclosure Policy and the NDP-1.
8.2 Information contained in intelligence product/ report of another Intelligence Community component, which bears no restrictive control markings, may be used by recipient Intelligence Community components in reports provided to foreign governments provided that:
8.2.1 Foreign release is made through established foreign disclosure channels and procedures as set forth in DCID 5/6, Intelligence Disclosure Policy and the NDP-1.
8.2.2 No reference is made to the originating agency or to the source documents on which the released product is based.
8.2.3 The information is extracted or paraphrased to ensure that the source or manner of acquisition of the intelligence and/or, location where the intelligence was collected (if relevant to protect sources or methods), is not revealed and cannot be deduced in any manner.
8.3 RESTRICTED DATA and FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA are prohibited from foreign dissemination under the provisions of sections 123 and 144 of Public Law 585, Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. 9.0 Dissemination to Foreign Nationals or Foreign Contractors
9.1 Intelligence, even though it bears no restrictive control markings, will not be released, either in its original form or otherwise, to foreign nationals or immigrant aliens (including those employed by, used by, or integrated into the US Government) without the permission of the originator and must be in accordance with DCID 5/6, Intelligence Disclosure Policy and the NDP-1.
9.2 Release of intelligence to a foreign contractor or company under contract to the US Government must be through the government under which the foreign contractor or company operates. Direct release from the US Government to a foreign company or contractor is prohibited, except by government to government agreement. Provisions concerning dissemination to foreign governments are disclosed in section 8.0, above.
10.0 Authorized Control Markings
10.1 "DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR" (ORCON)
10.1.1 This marking may be used only on classified intelligence that clearly identifies or would reasonably permit ready identification of intelligence sources or methods that are particularly susceptible to countermeasures that would nullify or measurably reduce their effectiveness. It is used to enable the originator to maintain continuing knowledge and supervision of the further use of intelligence beyond the original dissemination. This control marking may not be used when an item of information will reasonably be protected by use of any other control markings specified herein or in other DCIDs.
10.1.2 Information bearing this marking may be disseminated within the headquarters elements [footnote 3] of recipient organizations and may also be incorporated in whole or in part into other briefings or production, provided the briefing or intelligence product is presented or distributed only to original recipients of the information. Dissemination beyond headquarters elements or to agencies other than the original recipients requires advance permission from the originator.
10.1.3 Information bearing this marking must not be used in taking investigative action without the advance permission of the originator.
10.1.4 As this is the most restrictive marking herein, agencies will establish procedures to ensure that 1) that it is only applied to particularly sensitive intelligence and, 2) timely review of requests for further dissemination of intelligence bearing this marking. This marking may be abbreviated "ORCON" or "OC."
10.2 "CAUTION - PROPRIETARY INFORMATION INVOLVED" (PROPIN)
10.2.1 This marking is used, with or without a security classification, to identify information provided by a commercial firm or private source under an express or implied understanding that the information will be protected as a proprietary trade secret or proprietary data believed to have actual or potential value [footnote 4]. Information bearing this marking shall not be disseminated outside the federal government in any form without the express permission of the originator of the intelligence and provider of the proprietary information. This marking precludes dissemination to contractors irrespective of their status to, or within, the US Government without the authorization of the originator of the intelligence and provider of the information. This marking may be abbreviated "PROPIN" or "PR."
10.3 "NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS" (NOFORN)
10.3.1 It is the policy of the DCI that no classified intelligence will be shared with foreign nationals or foreign governments except in accordance with the provisions of section 8.0 and 9.0, above. However, based on the unique dissemination requirements of some Intelligence Community organizations, this control marking may be used on intelligence that, if released to foreign governments or foreign nationals, could jeopardize intelligence sources or methods, or when it would not be in the best interest of the United States. This control marking is used to identify classified intelligence that may not be released in any form to foreign governments, foreign nationals, or non-US citizens without permission of the originator and in accordance with the provisions of DCID 5/6, Intelligence Disclosure Policy and NDP-1. This marking may be abbreviated "NOFORN" or "NF". It is not authorized for use in conjunction with the "AUTHORIZED FOR RELEASE TO" (REL) control marking described in section 10.4 below.
10.4 "AUTHORIZED FOR RELEASE TO... (name of country{ies}/ international organization)" (REL or REL TO)
10.4.1 This marking is used to identify classified intelligence that an originator has predetermined to be releasable or has been released, through established foreign disclosure procedures and channels, to the foreign country{ies}/ international organization indicated. Further foreign dissemination of the material (in any form) is authorized only after obtaining permission from the originator and in accordance with DCID 5/6, Intelligence Disclosure Policy and the NDP-1. This marking may be abbreviated "REL (abbreviated name of country{ies}/ international organization)." It is not authorized for use in conjunction with the "NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS" (NOFORN) control marking described in paragraph 10.3, above.
10.4.2 In the case of intelligence controlled under DCID 6/2, Critical Information, authorized distribution indicators, published separately, may be used instead of the "REL" control marking.
11.0 Procedures Governing Use of Authorized Control Markings
11.1 Any recipient desiring to use intelligence in a manner contrary to the restrictions established by this directive shall obtain the advance permission of the originating agency. Such permission applies only to the specific purpose agreed to by the originator and does not automatically apply to all recipients. Originators will ensure that prompt consideration is given to recipients' requests with particular attention to reviewing and editing, if necessary, sanitized or paraphrased versions to derive a text suitable for release subject to lesser or no control marking(s).
11.2 The control markings authorized above shall be shown on the title page, front cover, and other applicable pages of documents, incorporated in the text of electrical communications, shown on graphics, and associated (in full or abbreviated form) with data stored or processed in automated information systems. The control markings also shall be indicated by parenthetical use of the marking abbreviations at the beginning or end of the appropriate portions. If the control markings apply to all portions, the document may be marked with a statement to this effect rather than marking each portion individually.
11.3 The control markings in section 10 shall be individually assigned at the time of preparation of intelligence products and used in conjunction with security classifications and other markings specified by Executive Order 12356 and its implementing directives. The markings shall be carried forward to any new format in which the same information is incorporated, including oral and visual presentations.
12.0 Obsolete Restrictions and Control Markings
12.1 The following control markings are obsolete and will not be used subsequent to the date of this directive:
12.1.1 WNINTEL and NOCONTRACT. The control markings, "Warning Notice-- Intelligence Sources or Methods Involved" (WNINTEL) and "NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS/ CONSULTANTS" (abbreviated NOCONTRACT or NC) are no longer authorized for use after the date of this directive. The WNINTEL and NOCONTRACT control markings will not be used on any newly created documents or other materials. For automated information systems, a phased- in elimination of the WNINTEL and NOCONTRACT control markings will be accomplished as systems are upgraded or software is modified, but not later than five years from the date of this directive. No permission of the originator is required to release, in accordance with this DCID, material marked WNINTEL prior to the date of this directive. Section 7.1 governs requirements for release of intelligence bearing the NOCONTRACT marking produced before the date of this directive. Remarking of material bearing the WNINTEL and NOCONTRACT control marking is not required. However, holders of material bearing this marking may line through or otherwise remove the marking from documents or other material. The presence of this marking, in itself, will have no bearing on the releasability of the information to contractors.
12.1.2 Other obsolete markings include: WARNING NOTICE-- INTELLIGENCE SOURCES OR METHODS INVOLVED, WARNING NOTICE-- SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED, WARNING NOTICE-- INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED, WARNING NOTICE-- SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED, CONTROLLED DISSEM, NSC PARTICIPATING AGENCIES ONLY, INTEL COMPONENTS ONLY, LIMITED, CONTINUED CONTROL, NO DISSEM ABROAD, BACKGROUND USE ONLY, USIB ONLY, NFIB ONLY.
12.2 Questions with respect to current applications of all control markings authorized by earlier directives on the dissemination and control of intelligence and used on documents issued prior to the date of this directive should be referred to the agency or department originating the intelligence so marked.
13.0 Reporting Unauthorized Disclosures
13.1 Violations of the foregoing restrictions and control markings that result in unauthorized disclosure by one agency of the intelligence of another shall be reported to the Director of Central Intelligence through appropriate Intelligence Community channels.
14.0 Interpretation
14.1 Questions concerning the implementation of this policy and these procedures shall be referred to the Community Management Staff.
[signed: W.O. Studeman]
Acting Director of Central Intelligence
Date 4/12/95