The Honorable Marco Rubio  
Acting Chairman  
Select Committee on Intelligence  
United States Senate  
Washington, DC 20510

The Honorable Mark R. Warner  
Vice Chairman  
Select Committee on Intelligence  
United States Senate  
Washington, DC 20510

Acting Chairman Rubio and Vice Chairman Warner:

(U) The enclosed classified report and unclassified summary respond to section 5503 of  
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020; DIVISION E—Intelligence  

(U) Originals of this letter are being sent to the appropriate congressional committees, as  
well as House and Senate leadership. If you have any questions, you may contact Legislative  
Affairs at (703) 275-2474.

Sincerely,

Robert L. Cooper  
Acting Assistant Director for  
Legislative Affairs

Enclosures:  
1. (U) ODNI Summary [Unsourced], Summary of Assessment of Intentions of Political  
Leadership of the Russian Federation, 17 July 2020 (U)  
2. (U) ODNI Report [Unsourced], Assessment of Intentions of Political Leadership of the  
Russian Federation, 17 July 2020 (b)(3)

Classified By: (b)(3), (b)(6)  
Derived From: ODNI CG  
Declassify On: 20451231

Upon removal of attachments, this document is UNCLASSIFIED  
Approved for release by ODNI on 11-04-2021, FOIA Case # DF-2021-00079
(U) Summary of Assessment of Intentions of Political Leadership of the Russian Federation

17 July 2020

National Intelligence Council
UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY

This product was drafted by ODNI's National Intelligence Council, National Intelligence Officer for Russia and Eurasia.

We assess that Russia's leaders do not currently intend to launch military operations against members of NATO. Moscow would not back away from conflict with the Alliance, however, if it determined that activity by NATO members posed an immediate threat to critical Russian interests. Russian leaders want to avoid kinetic war with the U.S. and NATO, and are cognizant of the dangers to Russia from such a conflict.

We assess that Moscow is increasingly concerned about U.S. military activity, especially in Europe, and that this increases the potential for unintended Russian escalation.

- Moscow is particularly concerned about a possible U.S. military base in Poland, reestablishment of the U.S. Navy Second Fleet, the increased U.S. military budget, expanding missile defenses, and near-permanent U.S. rotations and forces in Europe.
- We assess that Russia intervenes abroad primarily to prevent a perceived geopolitical loss rather than to make new geopolitical gains, and intervenes where it sees the costs and risks as manageable.

We assess Moscow will continue to try to divide both NATO and the EU, weaken public support for those institutions, obstruct their enlargement, and boost Russia-friendly political figures and groups. Russia almost certainly will try to capitalize on what it sees as mounting tensions between Washington and Europe.