ROCKEFELLER UNVEILS PHASE II REPORT ON “PREWAR INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS ON POSTWAR IRAQ”

--Report Details Intelligence Community Judgments Prior to War About Expected Difficulties Following Invasion--

Washington, DC -- The Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Senator Jay Rockefeller, today unveiled one of the final remaining sections of the Committee’s review on pre-war intelligence.  The report made public today, “prewar intelligence assessments about postwar Iraq,” is available on the Committee’s website and is accompanied by two recently declassified Intelligence Community assessments from January 2003.      

“Today’s report shows that the Intelligence Community gave the Administration plenty of warning about the difficulties we would face if the decision was made to go to war.  These dire warnings were widely distributed at the highest levels of government, and it’s clear that the Administration didn’t plan for any of them,” Rockefeller said. 

“The Intelligence Community believed an American invasion would be exploited by Iran and al Qaeda terrorists and that an occupation of Iraq would fuel Islamist extremism.  They also assessed that al Qaeda would seek to re-establish its presence in Afghanistan while the United States was diverted in Iraq.  

“Sadly, the Administration’s refusal to heed these dire warnings, and worse, to plan for them, has led to tragic consequences for which our nation is paying a terrible price.   

“Finally, the report shows that the Administration was not forthcoming with the American people about the potential costs of going to war,” Rockefeller concluded.  

The Senate Intelligence Committee released their first report on intelligence related to Iraq on July 9, 2004. The first phase dealt strictly with the Intelligence Community’s failures related to Iraq’s weapons capabilities. The findings and recommendations of that report were an important impetus leading to landmark legislation reforming the United States Intelligence Community in late 2004. 

The second phase of the Committee’s review was to look at all aspects of intelligence, including potential misuse of intelligence by Administration officials.   The five sections included: 1) whether public statements and reports and testimony regarding Iraq by U.S. Government officials made between the Gulf War period and the commencement of Operation Iraqi Freedom were substantiated by intelligence information;  2) the postwar findings about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and weapons programs and links to terrorism and how they compare with prewar assessments; 3) prewar intelligence assessments about postwar Iraq;  4) any intelligence activities relating to Iraq conducted by the Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation Group (PCTEG) and the Office of Special Plans within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; and; 5) the use by the Intelligence Community of information provided by the Iraqi National Congress (INC).  

Last fall, the Committee completed and publicly released two sections of Phase II: the role of the INC, and post-war findings on Iraq WMD and ties to terrorists.  The Committee continues to work on the remaining sections of Phase II, which include a review of public statements, and the activities of former Under Secretary Feith.       

Earlier this year, the Pentagon Inspector General released a report on the intelligence activities conducted by the Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation Group (PCTEG) and the Office of Special Plans and concluded they were inappropriate. 

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