The Honorable Peter Hoekstra
United States House of Representatives
Chairman, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
2234 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515

25 April 2006

# Dear Chairman Hoekstra,

Over four months ago, on 16 December 2005, I wrote to you requesting to report to the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) probable illegal conduct in the Intelligence Community (IC) regarding Special Access Programs (SAP)s. I made this request under the provisions of the Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act (ICWPA). My concern was that probable unlawful and unconstitutional acts were conducted while I was an intelligence officer with the National Security Agency (NSA) and with the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). I informed you that these acts involve the Director of the National Security Agency, the U.S. Air Force Deputies Chief of Staff for Air and Space Operations, and the U.S. Secretary of Defense.

When I finally met with your staff on 17 MAR '06, last month, they believed that I fall into a "gray area" between intelligence and military special programs. They acknowledged, as NSA asserted in January 2006 (letter provided) that neither you, or any member of your committee, nor they on the HPSCI staff were cleared at a high enough security classification level to review the SAP programs and operations in question. Nonetheless, they did believe the intelligence committees should be cleared because intelligence personnel were so intimately involved. Your staff believed that someone in the House Armed Services Committee might be able to talk to me but were not sure whom. Your staff also told me that they were going to look into the matter in more depth and get back to me. They additionally mentioned that they were going to work with NSA and the Department of Defense to have some members and staff of the HPSCI cleared into the SAPs that I was involved in. Since that time I have not heard from your staff.

I have recently been researching the question of jurisdiction. In doing so, I have stumbled upon a directive that seems to address the question of who in congress is cleared to know about these SAP programs. U.S. Code, Title 10, Subtitle A, Part 1, Chapter 2, Subsection 119 (Special Access Program: Congressional Oversight), dated 12 July 2005 (provided) states that the Senate

and House Appropriations, Appropriations Defense Sub, and Armed Services Committees are responsible for reviewing "waved" SAP programs. No mention is specifically made in regard to the considerable intelligence missions associated with these SAPs.

With this Title 10 directive clearly addressing congressional oversight of SAPs, I have decided to make intelligence related inquires and requests that involve the SAP related ICWPA concern I need to report, to the aforementioned alternate committees. The very same request I made of you and the HPSCI over four months ago, I am now making to these alternate committees. They will be receiving letters from me in conjunction with this letter to you.

I still look forward to learning what you and your staff have determined as a result of the inquires spawned by our meeting last month. If you and any members or staff are granted permission from NSA to be read into the SAP programs that I was involved with, I am still willing to brief the HPSCI on my concerns of the intelligence missions surrounding these programs and operation.

Very Respectfully,

Russell D. Tice Former Intelligence Officer, National Security Agency

The Honorable Pat Roberts
United States Senate
Chairman, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
Member, Senate Armed Services Committee
109 Hart Senate Office Building
Washington, DC 20510-1605

25 April 2006

## Dear Chairman Roberts,

Over four months ago, on 16 December 2005, I wrote to you requesting to report to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) probable illegal conduct in the Intelligence Community (IC) regarding Special Access Programs (SAP)s. I made this request under the provisions of the Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act (ICWPA). My concern was that probable unlawful and unconstitutional acts were conducted while I was an intelligence officer with the National Security Agency (NSA) and with the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). I informed you that these acts involve the Director of the National Security Agency, the U.S. Air Force Deputies Chief of Staff for Air and Space Operations, and the U.S. Secretary of Defense.

To this date I have not received a response from you or the SSCI addressing my request to testify about these SAP programs. In a letter addressed to me by NSA on 09 Jan '06 (letter provided), of which NSA also provided you a copy, they asserted that neither you nor any senator on the SSCI retains high enough security clearances to hear about the intelligence work I performed in these very highly classified programs and operations. NSA's assertion did not appear credible to me, considering I was an intelligence officer and the ICWPA suggests that the congressional intelligence committees are responsible for intelligence oversight.

The press has suggested that the Senate Armed Services Committee may be the proper place for me to testify about the SAP intelligence misconduct that I would like to report. Other rumors circulated that no one in congress is allowed access to this information. One news article said that the SSCI Vice Chair admitted that the intelligence committee did not have jurisdiction. In their letter, NSA did not make mention of any other congressional committee that was cleared. The staff of the HPSCI believes that I fall into a "gray" area between intelligence and military special programs.

As the responsible committee for intelligence in the Senate, I have been waiting for your directions on this matter. If another committee is the proper place for me to testify, I believe it is your responsibility to forward my request to that committee and keep me informed of the process. You are also a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee and, as such, should know if SAP related intelligence programs fall within the jurisdiction of intelligence and/or the military committees. If the SSCI is indeed the proper place for me to convey this intelligence related misconduct, I likewise believe it is your responsibility to inform me of such. This, of course, has not been the case.

In the absence of any direction, I recently have been researching this question of jurisdiction. In doing so, I have stumbled upon a directive that seems to address the question of who in congress is cleared to know about these SAP programs. U.S. Code, Title 10, Subtitle A, Part 1, Chapter 2, Subsection 119 (Special Access Program: Congressional Oversight), dated 12 July 2005 (provided) states that the Senate and House Appropriations, Appropriations Defense Sub, and Armed Services Committees are responsible for reviewing "waved" SAP programs. No mention is specifically made in regard to the considerable intelligence missions associated with these SAPs.

Nonetheless, with this Title 10 directive clearly addressing congressional oversight of SAPs, and in the absence of any direction from the SSCI committee you chair, I have decided to direct all further intelligence related inquires and requests that involve the SAP related ICWPA concern I need to report, to the aforementioned alternate committees. The very same request I made of you and the SSCI over four months ago, I am now making to these alternate committees. They will be receiving letters from me in conjunction with this letter to you.

Very Respectfully,

Russell D. Tice Former Intelligence Officer, National Security Agency

The Honorable Jerry Lewis United States House of Representatives Chairman, Appropriations Committee 2112 Rayburn House Office Building Washington, D.C. 20515

25 April 2006

Dear Chairman Lewis.

Under the provisions of the Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act (ICWPA) and in the absence of an official response from the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), I intend to report to the Appropriations Committee probable unlawful and unconstitutional acts conducted while I was an intelligence officer with the National Security Agency (NSA) and with the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). These acts involve the Director of the National Security Agency, the U.S. Air Force Deputies Chief of Staff for Air and Space Operations, and the U.S. Secretary of Defense.

These probable unlawful and unconstitutional acts were conducted via very highly sensitive intelligence programs and operations known as Special Access Programs (SAP)s. I was a technical intelligence specialist dealing almost exclusively with SAP programs and operations at both NSA and DIA. U.S. Code, Title 10, Subtitle A, Part 1, Chapter 2, Subsection 119 (Special Access Program: Congressional Oversight), dated 12 July 2005 states that the House Appropriations Committee is responsible for reviewing "waved" SAP programs.

Due to the highly sensitive nature of these programs and operations, I will require assurances from your committee that the staffers and/or congressional members to participate retain the proper security clearances, and also have the appropriate SAP cleared facilities available for these discussions.

Please inform me when you require my appearance on Capitol Hill to conduct these discussions in relation to this ICWPA report.

Very Respectfully,

Russell D. Tice Former Intelligence Officer, National Security Agency

The Honorable David R. Obey
United States House of Representatives
Ranking Minority Member, Appropriations Committee
2314 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515

25 April 2006

Dear Congressman Obey,

Under the provisions of the Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act (ICWPA) and in the absence of an official response from the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), I intend to report to the Appropriations Committee probable unlawful and unconstitutional acts conducted while I was an intelligence officer with the National Security Agency (NSA) and with the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). These acts involve the Director of the National Security Agency, the U.S. Air Force Deputies Chief of Staff for Air and Space Operations, and the U.S. Secretary of Defense.

These probable unlawful and unconstitutional acts were conducted via very highly sensitive intelligence programs and operations known as Special Access Programs (SAP)s. I was a technical intelligence specialist dealing almost exclusively with SAP programs and operations at both NSA and DIA. U.S. Code, Title 10, Subtitle A, Part 1, Chapter 2, Subsection 119 (Special Access Program: Congressional Oversight), dated 12 July 2005 states that the House Appropriations Committee is responsible for reviewing "waved" SAP programs.

Due to the highly sensitive nature of these programs and operations, I will require assurances from your committee that the staffers and/or congressional members to participate retain the proper security clearances, and also have the appropriate SAP cleared facilities available for these discussions.

Please inform me when you require my appearance on Capitol Hill to conduct these discussions in relation to this ICWPA report.

Very Respectfully,

Russell D. Tice Former Intelligence Officer, National Security Agency

The Honorable C. W. Bill Young United States House of Representatives Chairman, Appropriations Committee's, Subcommittee on Defense 2407 Rayburn House Office Building Washington, D.C. 20515

25 April 2006

Dear Chairman Young,

Under the provisions of the Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act (ICWPA) and in the absence of an official response from the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), I intend to report to the Appropriations Committee's Subcommittee on Defense probable unlawful and unconstitutional acts conducted while I was an intelligence officer with the National Security Agency (NSA) and with the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). These acts involve the Director of the National Security Agency, the U.S. Air Force Deputies Chief of Staff for Air and Space Operations, and the U.S. Secretary of Defense.

These probable unlawful and unconstitutional acts were conducted via very highly sensitive intelligence programs and operations known as Special Access Programs (SAP)s. I was a technical intelligence specialist dealing almost exclusively with SAP programs and operations at both NSA and DIA. U.S. Code, Title 10, Subtitle A, Part 1, Chapter 2, Subsection 119 (Special Access Program: Congressional Oversight), dated 12 July 2005 states that the House Appropriations Committee's Subcommittee on Defense is responsible for reviewing "waved" SAP programs.

Due to the highly sensitive nature of these programs and operations, I will require assurances from your committee that the staffers and/or congressional members to participate retain the proper security clearances, and also have the appropriate SAP cleared facilities available for these discussions.

Please inform me when you require my appearance on Capitol Hill to conduct these discussions in relation to this ICWPA report.

Very Respectfully,

Russell D. Tice Former Intelligence Officer, National Security Agency

The Honorable John Murtha
United States House of Representatives
Ranking Minority Member, Appropriations Committee's,
Subcommittee on Defense
2423 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515

25 April 2006

Dear Congressman Murtha,

Under the provisions of the Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act (ICWPA) and in the absence of an official response from the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), I intend to report to the Appropriations Committee's Subcommittee on Defense probable unlawful and unconstitutional acts conducted while I was an intelligence officer with the National Security Agency (NSA) and with the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). These acts involve the Director of the National Security Agency, the U.S. Air Force Deputies Chief of Staff for Air and Space Operations, and the U.S. Secretary of Defense.

These probable unlawful and unconstitutional acts were conducted via very highly sensitive intelligence programs and operations known as Special Access Programs (SAP)s. I was a technical intelligence specialist dealing almost exclusively with SAP programs and operations at both NSA and DIA. U.S. Code, Title 10, Subtitle A, Part 1, Chapter 2, Subsection 119 (Special Access Program: Congressional Oversight), dated 12 July 2005 states that the House Appropriations Committee's Subcommittee on Defense is responsible for reviewing "waved" SAP programs.

Due to the highly sensitive nature of these programs and operations, I will require assurances from your committee that the staffers and/or congressional members to participate retain the proper security clearances, and also have the appropriate SAP cleared facilities available for these discussions.

Please inform me when you require my appearance on Capitol Hill to conduct these discussions in relation to this ICWPA report.

Very Respectfully,

Russell D. Tice Former Intelligence Officer, National Security Agency

The Honorable Duncan Hunter United States House of Representatives Chairman, Armed Services Committee 2265 Rayburn House Office Building Washington, D.C. 20515

25 April 2006

Dear Chairman Hunter,

Under the provisions of the Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act (ICWPA) and in the absence of an official response from the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), I intend to report to the Armed Services Committee probable unlawful and unconstitutional acts conducted while I was an intelligence officer with the National Security Agency (NSA) and with the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). These acts involve the Director of the National Security Agency, the U.S. Air Force Deputies Chief of Staff for Air and Space Operations, and the U.S. Secretary of Defense.

These probable unlawful and unconstitutional acts were conducted via very highly sensitive intelligence programs and operations known as Special Access Programs (SAP)s. I was a technical intelligence specialist dealing almost exclusively with SAP programs and operations at both NSA and DIA. U.S. Code, Title 10, Subtitle A, Part 1, Chapter 2, Subsection 119 (Special Access Program: Congressional Oversight), dated 12 July 2005 states that the House Armed Services Committee is responsible for reviewing "waved" SAP programs.

Due to the highly sensitive nature of these programs and operations, I will require assurances from your committee that the staffers and/or congressional members to participate retain the proper security clearances, and also have the appropriate SAP cleared facilities available for these discussions.

Please inform me when you require my appearance on Capitol Hill to conduct these discussions in relation to this ICWPA report.

Very Respectfully,

Russell D. Tice Former Intelligence Officer, National Security Agency

The Honorable Ike Skelton
United States House of Representatives
Ranking Minority Member, Armed Services Committee
2206 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515-2504

25 April 2006

Dear Congressman Skelton,

Under the provisions of the Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act (ICWPA) and in the absence of an official response from the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), I intend to report to the Armed Services Committee probable unlawful and unconstitutional acts conducted while I was an intelligence officer with the National Security Agency (NSA) and with the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). These acts involve the Director of the National Security Agency, the U.S. Air Force Deputies Chief of Staff for Air and Space Operations, and the U.S. Secretary of Defense.

These probable unlawful and unconstitutional acts were conducted via very highly sensitive intelligence programs and operations known as Special Access Programs (SAP)s. I was a technical intelligence specialist dealing almost exclusively with SAP programs and operations at both NSA and DIA. U.S. Code, Title 10, Subtitle A, Part 1, Chapter 2, Subsection 119 (Special Access Program: Congressional Oversight), dated 12 July 2005 states that the House Armed Services Committee is responsible for reviewing "waved" SAP programs.

Due to the highly sensitive nature of these programs and operations, I will require assurances from your committee that the staffers and/or congressional members to participate retain the proper security clearances, and also have the appropriate SAP cleared facilities available for these discussions.

Please inform me when you require my appearance on Capitol Hill to conduct these discussions in relation to this ICWPA report.

Very Respectfully,

Russell D. Tice Former Intelligence Officer, National Security Agency

The Honorable Thad Cochran United States Senate Chairman, Appropriations Committee 113 Dirksen Senate Office Building Washington, D.C. 20510

25 April 2006

Dear Chairman Cochran,

Under the provisions of the Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act (ICWPA) and in the absence of an official response from the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI), I intend to report to the Appropriations Committee probable unlawful and unconstitutional acts conducted while I was an intelligence officer with the National Security Agency (NSA) and with the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). These acts involve the Director of the National Security Agency, the U.S. Air Force Deputies Chief of Staff for Air and Space Operations, and the U.S. Secretary of Defense.

These probable unlawful and unconstitutional acts were conducted via very highly sensitive intelligence programs and operations known as Special Access Programs (SAP)s. I was a technical intelligence specialist dealing almost exclusively with SAP programs and operations at both NSA and DIA. U.S. Code, Title 10, Subtitle A, Part 1, Chapter 2, Subsection 119 (Special Access Program: Congressional Oversight), dated 12 July 2005 states that the Senate Appropriations Committee is responsible for reviewing "waved" SAP programs.

Due to the highly sensitive nature of these programs and operations, I will require assurances from your committee that the staffers and/or congressional members to participate retain the proper security clearances, and also have the appropriate SAP cleared facilities available for these discussions.

Please inform me when you require my appearance on Capitol Hill to conduct these discussions in relation to this ICWPA report.

Very Respectfully,

Russell D. Tice Former Intelligence Officer, National Security Agency

The Honorable Robert C. Byrd
United States Senate
Ranking Minority Member, Appropriations Committee &
Member, Armed Services Committee
311 Hart Senate Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20510

25 April 2006

Dear Senator Byrd,

Under the provisions of the Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act (ICWPA) and in the absence of an official response from the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI), I intend to report to the Appropriations Committee probable unlawful and unconstitutional acts conducted while I was an intelligence officer with the National Security Agency (NSA) and with the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). These acts involve the Director of the National Security Agency, the U.S. Air Force Deputies Chief of Staff for Air and Space Operations, and the U.S. Secretary of Defense.

These probable unlawful and unconstitutional acts were conducted via very highly sensitive intelligence programs and operations known as Special Access Programs (SAP)s. I was a technical intelligence specialist dealing almost exclusively with SAP programs and operations at both NSA and DIA. U.S. Code, Title 10, Subtitle A, Part 1, Chapter 2, Subsection 119 (Special Access Program: Congressional Oversight), dated 12 July 2005 states that the Senate Appropriations Committee is responsible for reviewing "waved" SAP programs.

Due to the highly sensitive nature of these programs and operations, I will require assurances from your committee that the staffers and/or congressional members to participate retain the proper security clearances, and also have the appropriate SAP cleared facilities available for these discussions.

Please inform me when you require my appearance on Capitol Hill to conduct these discussions in relation to this ICWPA report.

Very Respectfully,

Russell D. Tice Former Intelligence Officer, National Security Agency

The Honorable Ted Stevens
United States Senate
Chairman, Appropriations Committee's,
Subcommittee on Defense
522 Hart Senate Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20510

25 April 2006

Dear Chairman Stevens,

Under the provisions of the Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act (ICWPA) and in the absence of an official response from the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI), I intend to report to the Appropriations Committee's Subcommittee on Defense probable unlawful and unconstitutional acts conducted while I was an intelligence officer with the National Security Agency (NSA) and with the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). These acts involve the Director of the National Security Agency, the U.S. Air Force Deputies Chief of Staff for Air and Space Operations, and the U.S. Secretary of Defense.

These probable unlawful and unconstitutional acts were conducted via very highly sensitive intelligence programs and operations known as Special Access Programs (SAP)s. I was a technical intelligence specialist dealing almost exclusively with SAP programs and operations at both NSA and DIA. U.S. Code, Title 10, Subtitle A, Part 1, Chapter 2, Subsection 119 (Special Access Program: Congressional Oversight), dated 12 July 2005 states that the Senate Appropriations Committee's Subcommittee on Defense is responsible for reviewing "waved" SAP programs.

Due to the highly sensitive nature of these programs and operations, I will require assurances from your committee that the staffers and/or congressional members to participate retain the proper security clearances, and also have the appropriate SAP cleared facilities available for these discussions.

Please inform me when you require my appearance on Capitol Hill to conduct these discussions in relation to this ICWPA report.

Very Respectfully,

Russell D. Tice Former Intelligence Officer, National Security Agency

The Honorable Daniel Inouye
United States Senate
Ranking Minority Member, Appropriations Committee's,
Subcommittee on Defense
722 Hart Senate Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20510

25 April 2006

Dear Senator Inouye,

Under the provisions of the Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act (ICWPA) and in the absence of an official response from the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI), I intend to report to the Appropriations Committee's Subcommittee on Defense probable unlawful and unconstitutional acts conducted while I was an intelligence officer with the National Security Agency (NSA) and with the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). These acts involve the Director of the National Security Agency, the U.S. Air Force Deputies Chief of Staff for Air and Space Operations, and the U.S. Secretary of Defense.

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Please inform me when you require my appearance on Capitol Hill to conduct these discussions in relation to this ICWPA report.

Very Respectfully,

Russell D. Tice Former Intelligence Officer, National Security Agency

The Honorable John Warner United States Senate Chairman, Armed Services Committee 225 Russell Senate Office Building Washington, D.C. 20510

25 April 2006

Dear Chairman Warner,

Under the provisions of the Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act (ICWPA) and in the absence of an official response from the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI), I intend to report to the Armed Services Committee probable unlawful and unconstitutional acts conducted while I was an intelligence officer with the National Security Agency (NSA) and with the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). These acts involve the Director of the National Security Agency, the U.S. Air Force Deputies Chief of Staff for Air and Space Operations, and the U.S. Secretary of Defense.

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Please inform me when you require my appearance on Capitol Hill to conduct these discussions in relation to this ICWPA report.

Very Respectfully,

Russell D. Tice Former Intelligence Officer, National Security Agency

The Honorable Carl Levin
United States Senate
Ranking Minority Member, Armed Services Committee
269 Russell Senate Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20510-2202

25 April 2006

Dear Senator Levin,

Under the provisions of the Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act (ICWPA) and in the absence of an official response from the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI), I intend to report to the Armed Services Committee probable unlawful and unconstitutional acts conducted while I was an intelligence officer with the National Security Agency (NSA) and with the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). These acts involve the Director of the National Security Agency, the U.S. Air Force Deputies Chief of Staff for Air and Space Operations, and the U.S. Secretary of Defense.

These probable unlawful and unconstitutional acts were conducted via very highly sensitive intelligence programs and operations known as Special Access Programs (SAP)s. I was a technical intelligence specialist dealing almost exclusively with SAP programs and operations at both NSA and DIA. U.S. Code, Title 10, Subtitle A, Part 1, Chapter 2, Subsection 119 (Special Access Program: Congressional Oversight), dated 12 July 2005 states that the Senate Armed Services Committee is responsible for reviewing "waved" SAP programs.

Due to the highly sensitive nature of these programs and operations, I will require assurances from your committee that the staffers and/or congressional members to participate retain the proper security clearances, and also have the appropriate SAP cleared facilities available for these discussions.

Please inform me when you require my appearance on Capitol Hill to conduct these discussions in relation to this ICWPA report.

Very Respectfully,

Russell D. Tice Former Intelligence Officer, National Security Agency