PDF Version as Released by DIA

09 June 2003

Defense Agency Issues Excerpt on Iraqi Chemical Warfare Program

(DIA director Jacoby clarifies press reports on agency assessment) (1290)

The Defense Department released on June 7 an unclassified excerpt of
an earlier Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) study on Iraq's chemical
warfare (CW) program in which it stated that there is "no reliable
information on whether Iraq is producing and stockpiling chemical
weapons, or where Iraq has -- or will -- establish its chemical
warfare agent production facilities."

But the excerpt, drawn from a classified DIA study published in
September 2002, also Stated that "Iraq will develop various elements
of its chemical industry to achieve self-sufficiency in producing the
chemical precursors required for CW agent production." The full
excerpt is based on the DIA's analysis titled: "Iraq -- Key WMD
Facilities -- An Operational Support Study."

The official unclassified excerpt was leaked to the media on June 6.
Navy Admiral Lowell Jacoby, director of the Defense Intelligence
Agency (DIA), stepped forward the same day to clarify his agency's
2002 assessment of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, saying "DIA
joined in the intelligence community assessment ... that they had a
weapons of mass destruction program in place."

Jacoby made his remarks during a media availability on Capitol Hill at
the invitation of Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) Chairman John
Warner (Republican, Virginia) following a closed hearing on the
missions of the 75th Exploitation Task Force and the Iraq Survey Group
-- both of which are involved in the search for information relating
to Iraq's WMD. Warner said Jacoby's clarification -- first made during
the closed committee session -- had interest to the public at large.

Jacoby was responding to questions raised after the June 6 press
reports suggesting that in the lead-up to policy decisions about Iraqi
weapons capabilities, the DIA found there was no reliable information
that Iraq was producing and stockpiling chemical weapons. The DIA
director said the quote appearing in media reporting was actually a
single sentence lifted out of a much longer planning document.

"It talks about the fact that at the time, in September 2002, we could
not specifically pin down individual facilities operating as part of
the weapons of mass destruction programs, specifically, the chemical
warfare portion," he said, according to an unofficial transcript of
the exchange with reporters. "It is not, in any way, intended to
portray the fact that we had doubts that such a program existed ...
was active, or ... was part of the Iraqi WMD infrastructure" Jacoby

"We did not have doubts about the existence of the program," the
director said. As of September 2002, he continued, "we could not
reliably pin down, for somebody who was doing contingency planning,
specific facilities, locations or production that was underway at a
specific location at that point in time."

Asked if additional information surfaced about Iraq after September,
Jacoby said: "there was (a) continuing flow of information coming in
to us for analysis and assessment during that whole period."

Prior to Jacoby's clarification, media reporting about the DIA study
fueled a brewing controversy by suggesting that elements of the Bush
administration may have shaded or exaggerated existing intelligence
about Iraq's WMD programs to gain support for the war in 2003.

Warner urged people to trust the administration "as we go forward to
search out" answers about Iraq's WMD capabilities. "I would hope we
would have the opportunity to have public hearings to dispel whatever
doubts remain," he said.

Warner went on to emphasize that committee members will draw their
conclusions about the reliability of the intelligence "only after a
very careful and methodical review of material, evidence of all types,
and testimony from a wide range of individuals.

Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman
General Richard Myers made remarks to reporters on June 5 during a
media stakeout following a meeting with House Intelligence Committee
members. Rumsfeld endorsed existing intelligence about Iraq and said
that he believes "that the presentation (to the United Nations) made
by Secretary Powell (February 5) was accurate and will be proved to be

Following is the unclassified excerpt of the 2002 DIA study:

(begin excerpt)

A substantial amount of Iraq's chemical warfare agents, precursors,
munitions, and production equipment were destroyed between 1991 and
1998 as a result of Operation Desert Storm and UNSCOM (United Nations
Special Commission) actions. Nevertheless, we believe Iraq retained
production equipment, expertise and chemical precursors and can
reconstitute a chemical warfare program in the absence of an
international inspection regime. Iraq's successful use of chemical
weapons in the past against Iranian troops and Kurdish civilians
increases the likelihood of a chemical warfare reconstitution. Iraq
has not signed the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).

There is no reliable information on whether Iraq is producing and
stockpiling chemical weapons, or where Iraq has -- or will --
establish its chemical warfare agent production facilities. Unusual
munitions transfer activity in mid-2002 suggests that Iraq is
distributing CW munitions in preparation for an anticipated U.S.
attack. Iraq retains all the chemicals and equipment to produce the
blister agent mustard but its ability for sustained production of
G-series nerve agents and VX is constrained by its stockpile of key
chemical precursors and by the destruction of all known CW production
facilities during Operation Desert Storm and during subsequent UNSCOM
inspections. In the absence of external aid, Iraq will likely
experience difficulties in producing nerve agents at the rate executed
before Operation Desert Storm.

Iraq is steadily establishing a dual use industrial chemical
infrastructure that provides some of the building blocks necessary for
production of chemical agents. In addition, Iraq has renovated and
added production lines at two facilities formerly associated with
Baghdad's chemical warfare program -- Habbaniyah I and Habbaniyah II.
Activities include building reconstruction, salvage operations, and
equipment movement and deliveries in the months that followed the 1998
expulsion of United Nations inspectors. Baghdad is rebuilding portions
of its chemical production infrastructure under the guise of a
civilian need for pesticides, chlorine, and other legitimate chemical
products, giving Iraq the potential for a small "breakout" production

Although we lack any direction information, Iraq probably possesses CW
agent in chemical munitions, possibly including artillery rockets,
artillery shells, aerial bombs, and ballistic missile warheads.
Baghdad also probably possesses bulk chemical stockpiles, primarily
containing precursors, but that also could consist of some mustard
agent or stabilized VX.

Iraqi doctrine for the use of chemical weapons evolved during the
Iran-Iraq war, and was fully incorporated into Iraqi offensive
operations by the end of the war in 1988. Iraq demonstrated its
ability to use chemical weapons during that conflict in the following
roles: in a defensive role to disrupt or halt an overwhelming enemy
offensive; as a preemptive weapon to disrupt staging areas before an
offensive attack; and as an offensive weapon during well-staged
attacks to regain territory. Authority for use of chemical weapons
during that war eventually became delegated to corps commanders. The
Iraqis delivered chemical agents with artillery, multiple rocket
launchers, mortars, and aerial bombs dropped by fixed-wing aircraft
and helicopters. Iraq also used chemical agents against Kurdish
civilians in 1988. Historical precedent suggests Saddam already may
have deployed chemical weapons to western Iraq, as he did during
Operation Desert Storm to be used against Israel in the event of
coalition military action that threatens the regime.

Iraq will develop various elements of its chemical industry to achieve
self-sufficiency in producing the chemical precursors required for CW
agent production. Iraq might construct a new dedicated CW facility or
facilities at remote sites to avoid detection or, alternatively,
upgrade the production capabilities at its Habbaniyah I and II
facilities to produce the agent mustard and binary components
necessary for the production of nerve agents.

(end excerpt)

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