Pentagon Spokesman's Regular Briefing, Oct. 31

DoD News Briefing
Tuesday, October 31, 2000 1:30 p.m. EST
Presenter: Mr. Kenneth H. Bacon, ASD PA

Q: Has the secretary taken a position on the legislation now pending
before the president on disclosure of classified information? And if
so, is he making any specific recommendation for a veto or for
signing?

Bacon: Well, that's in the defense authorization - that's - sorry --
in the intelligence authorization bill, which is not as much in his
lane of responsibility as the defense authorization bill.

Q: It attacked officials here.

Bacon: Yes. His general counsel is actively engaged in discussing this
issue with the Justice Department and other aspects of the government.
I'm not aware that Secretary Cohen himself has taken a view on this.
He's certainly aware of the provision, but I'm not aware that he's
taken a view.

Q: Are you at odds at all with the secretary on this, with your
reportorial background? I mean, the secretary lamented in a speech, a
recent speech to CSIS, that one of the worst disappointments he's had
as secretary is the leaks of classified information to Washington
newspapers. He said he often read memos to him in the paper in the
morning before they reached his desk. And you sharply, sharply
attacked this. Is there any difference between you two on this?

Bacon: No, but I think that there is a lot of room for confusion on
what this provision would mean and what it wouldn't mean. The
provision basically says that people who disclose classified
information could be liable for criminal penalties. It won't make it
any easier to find the people who leak information than it is today.
It doesn't do anything to give the government more powers to seek out
and find those who leak classified information.

What it does say is that people who reveal classified information,
whether wittingly or unwittingly, if they are caught doing that, could
be imprisoned and pay a fine of up to $10,000. It has a slightly
different standard than the current law does for determining when
somebody would violate the law by leaking classified information. It's
a somewhat broader standard.

It does not in any way that I can see punish journalists for
publishing classified information. In that way, it's no different from
current law. It does not speak to the people who publish classified
information; it speaks to the people who provide classified
information improperly.

Q: So this wouldn't be like the National Secrets Act in Britain or
anything like that?

Bacon: Well, I mean, some people in Congress have said that that is
what it's like, but it is different, in that my understanding of the
National Secrets Act, and my understanding is just based on what I
read about it, is that people who publishing classified information
can be held liable to prosecution. This does not contain that
provision - in part, because we have a First Amendment in our
Constitution.

Yes?

Q: Speaking of classified information, it was reported in the Seattle
Post-Intelligencer that low-observable radar stealth technology has
been transferred to the Russians. Is the Pentagon aware of that? Any
kind of investigation going on that they have a hand in?

Bacon: I am not aware of that, but I'll check into it. I don't know
what I can tell you once I check into it, but I'll check into it. [The
Department is aware of this matter. It was a joint investigation by
the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Air Force's Office of
Special Investigations. No data obtained in this case indicates that
information provided to anyone outside of allowable channels was
classified, nor does any data in this case indicate that passed
information represents a degradation of the U.S. lead in the area of
stealth technology. The Russian Academy of Sciences did have access to
and use of U.S. supercomputers for the purpose of running computations
using a modeling code that the Russians developed, but at no time did
the Russians have access to classified information within the
supercomputers. It's important to note that the Russians' use of the
supercomputers was not unlawful, as current U.S. laws only cover the
export of supercomputer hardware, not the use of the supercomputers
themselves. There is no indication in this case that the Russians' use
of the supercomputers was detrimental to either the U.S. Air Force or
the U.S. government. The case opened in 1997 and closed in 1999.]

Q: Thank you.

Bacon: Sure.