Pentagon Official Testifies Before House Committee on Plan Colombia

BRIAN E. SHERIDAN
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR 
SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
SUBCOMMITTEE ON WESTERN HEMISPHERE

September 21, 2000

STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD

I am pleased to have the opportunity to testify before this Committee
to discuss the implementation of the Department of Defense's portion
of the Fiscal Year 2000 supplemental appropriation that supports the
Government of Colombia's execution of Plan Colombia.

Drug abuse is an undeniable threat to our national security; one that
is measured by the thousands of lives lost in our country every year
and that costs our country billions of dollars annually. Reducing the
supply of drugs on our streets is an integral component of our
National Drug Control Strategy and the Department of Defense (DoD)
plays a key supporting role in creating the opportunity for law
enforcement agencies, both our own and those of foreign nations, to
interdict the flow of drugs into our country. DoD is committed to this
counterdrug mission.

The demand for illegal drugs in the United States, specifically for
cocaine and heroin, is met primarily from the growing fields and
production laboratories in Colombia. The vast sums of money that this
illegal activity provides have served to exacerbate current domestic
issues facing the people of Colombia. The U.S. and Colombian
Governments, and our citizens, share a common objective to reach our
specific national goals - to reduce drug abuse in our own country and
to bring peace and stability to Colombia. A significant reduction in
the flow of illegal drugs to the US, with the corresponding reduction
in the supply of "easy money" which supports both guerillas and
illegal self-defense forces operating in Colombia, serves the national
interests of both our countries. For these reasons, it is absolutely
necessary that the U.S. continue to support Colombia in its effort to
reduce the production and transport of cocaine and heroin that is
destined for the US.

Over the past two years Colombia, specifically the area east of the
Andes, has become the center of the cocaine trade, largely as a result
of successful interdiction and eradication efforts in Peru and
Bolivia. The remoteness of southern Colombia and the lack of
government control in large areas of this region has precluded
Colombian interdiction operations to the point that the expansion of
coca growing areas, especially in the Putumayo Department, has
progressed virtually unchecked. Most of the world's coca is now grown
in Colombia and over ninety percent of the cocaine consumed in the
U.S. is manufactured or passes through Colombia. The United States,
the nation with the greatest cocaine demand, currently consumes over
200 metric tons annually from the Andean region.

DoD has been supporting Colombian counterdrug efforts for over ten
years. The additional funding provided by the FY00 Emergency
Supplemental will allow the Department to build on past programs, in
short, to accelerate the implementation of the efforts in Colombia
that ultimately proved to be successful in Peru and Bolivia. The
supplemental is a balanced and executable plan that will not require
an appreciable increase in the number of U.S. military personnel
present in Colombia. This effort is responsive to Plan Colombia and
consistent with current U.S. policy. Furthermore, these programs, in
coordination with other interagency efforts, form the core of a sound,
responsive, and timely assistance package that will significantly
enhance Colombia's ability to conduct effective counterdrug
operations.

Let me briefly outline the Department's programs. Before I do so
however, let me raise a cautionary note regarding the timing of the
execution of the programs and delivery of equipment associated with
this increased support for Plan Colombia. While the funding was
appropriated in July of this year, several reporting requirements were
mandated which precluded immediately obligating the funding. As a
result, most of the supporting contracts are just now being submitted
for review by the Department and many of the dates reflect only our
best estimate of the expected delivery date.

SUPPORT FOR THE PUSH INTO SOUTHERN COLOMBIA
Counternarcotics Battalion Support

The Department has commenced training the second Colombian
counternarcotics battalion using members of the U.S. 7th Special
Forces Group. This training is scheduled to be completed in the
December 2000 time frame. The third battalion is currently scheduled
to begin training in early 2001. These battalions will give the
Colombian Army a complete counterdrug brigade in the Putumayo/Caqueta
region to engage what is the world's largest coca cultivation center.
Plans include positioning counternarcotics battalions at Tres Esquinas
and Larandia.

Counternarcotics Brigade Headquarters

The establishment of a counterdrug brigade headquarters is sequenced
to support the strategic and tactical operation of the counterdrug
Brigade located in southern Colombia. Department support for this
program is scheduled to begin in the first quarter of fiscal year
2001. Allocated funding will provide for training, communications
equipment, computer needs, facility modification, and similar
requirements. The counternarcotics brigade headquarters is scheduled
to be operational in February 2001.

Army Aviation Infrastructure Support

The Colombian Army does not have the infrastructure necessary to
support the number and mix of helicopters that will be provided by the
Department of State using emergency supplemental funding. DoD will
fund a variety of critical aviation infrastructure needs to support
the UH-1N, UH-1H Huey II and UH-60 helicopters that are required to
provide mobility for the counternarcotics battalions. This program
will include funding for electrical utilities and road infrastructure,
aviation fuel storage and fueling systems, security improvements,
parking aprons and helicopter pads, a maintenance hanger, an
operations facility, and a taxiway. DoD has conducted several site
surveys and hosted conferences to facilitate planning for this
challenging requirement. Support contracts are expected to be awarded
in the first quarter of fiscal year 2001 and continue through 2002.

Military Reform  

For some time the Department has been managing a contractor led
endeavor to provide the necessary assistance to Colombia to support
the government's effort to restructure its military establishment so
it can successfully engage the drug threat throughout the country. The
focus of this effort is not tactical but organizational in nature,
centered at the Minister of Defense level and the uniformed services
of Colombia. The contractor's efforts have focused on restructuring
and improving military planning, logistics support for ground and air
operational assets, development of counternarcotics military doctrine,
development of counternarcotics military strategy, new concepts on
recruitment and conscription, development of an integrated
intelligence capability, improved computerization and command and
control, and similar initiatives. The program will also support
efforts to promote human rights and effect judicial reforms. This is
an on-going effort and is subject to periodic review. Supplemental
funding will be utilized to extend this program should it prove to be
necessary.

Organic Intelligence Capability

The intelligence collection capability in the region will be enhanced
to support operations by the counternarcotic battalions. This program
will provide the counternarcotics battalions with a combination of
airborne and ground tactical intelligence capabilities to directly
assist in the planning and execution of counterdrug operations. It is
scheduled to begin in the third quarter of fiscal year 2001 and be
sustained for an extended period of time.

SUPPORT FOR INTERDICTION EFFORTS

Tracker Aircraft Modification  

In the first quarter of fiscal year 2001, DoD will provide for the
modification of two Colombia Air Force C-26 Merlin aircraft by
installing APG-66 air-to-air radars, Forward Looking Infrared Radars
(FLIRs), and communications equipment. The completed aircraft will
give Colombia an organic capability to terminally track and intercept
illegal smuggling aircraft that move the cocaine from the HCl labs in
southeastern Colombia to the Colombian coasts for transshipment to the
United States. These modified aircraft will replicate the terminal
radar interceptor that supported the Peruvians in their successful air
denial operation against the Peru-to-Colombia air bridge. The aircraft
modifications should be completed in the summer of 2001.

AC-47 Aircraft Modifications  

Commencing in the first quarter of fiscal year 2001, the Department
will support the installation of a FLIR in one of the three
operational Colombian AC-47 aircraft. The FLIR will greatly enhance
the aircraft's ability to support night operations against drug
smuggling activities.

Funding will also support modification of an additional Colombian
DC-3, converting it into an AC-47 aircraft with FLIR, night vision
cockpit, and fire control systems. This will be the 5th AC-47 in the
Colombian inventory. These planes have been used repeatedly by the
Colombian military to strafe drug trafficking aircraft. The aircraft
upgrades are scheduled to be completed in the third quarter of fiscal
year 2001.

Ground Based Radar

The contract for the installation of a ground-based radar at Tres
Equinas, Colombia that will provide positive air control for the
counternarcotics brigade helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft that
operate in the region is scheduled to be awarded in the first quarter
of fiscal year 2001. The Tres Equinas radar will provide improved
detection and monitoring of smuggling air activity in the Putumayo
region of Colombia, where over 70% of Colombia's coca cultivation
occurs. The program includes the upgrade of an existing TPS-70 owned
by DoD, and the installation costs for installing the radar at Tres
Esquinas. The radar site is scheduled to be operational in October of
2001.

Radar Command and Control

The DoD supported radar command and control program will provide
Colombia a modern and operationally effective system, located in
Bogota, which will be capable of monitoring multiple radar sites
throughout Colombia. It will support positive control of Colombian Air
Force air interdiction operations throughout Colombia. The current
system is outmoded and needs to be replaced. The contract will be
awarded in the first quarter of fiscal year 2001 with completion
expected in the first quarter of fiscal year 2002.

Andean Ridge Intelligence Collection  

This ongoing program supports Colombia with critical intelligence
against drug smuggling activities. It provides for collection sites
located in critical areas throughout the drug cultivation and
trafficking regions.

Colombian Ground Interdiction  

The Colombian ground interdiction program is still in the initial
planning stages. Supplemental funding will be used to initiate a
Colombian program to control drug smuggling on the major roads across
the Andes and those roads feeding the northern coast and western coast
cocaine transshipment regions. This funding will start the process of
Colombia regaining control of their major roads, which currently are
routinely utilized by the drug trafficking forces. Road control is
important since it can help control cocaine and precursor chemical
smuggling across the Andes and to/from major ports. As reference,
there are 4 or 5 major roads across the Andes and these highways feed
the road network located west of the Andes. Vehicle traffic on the
highways west of the Andes serves as the principal mode of moving
chemicals and cocaine to/from the northern coast and western coast
cocaine ports and transshipment regions.

All these programs that I just outlined build on our current strategy
-- no change in DoD policy is required to execute the programs funded
by this supplemental. There is nothing new here for DoD. However,
there will be challenges to confront in the course of our efforts to
attack the center of the cocaine industry in southern Colombia. It
will not be easy, but it is worth the effort. Let me share with you my
concerns.

DoD Concerns

Colombian Military Organization

The Colombian military has limitations based on resources, training
practices, lack of joint planning and operations. They need to better
coordinate operations between the services and with the Colombian
National Police (CNP). The restructuring of the military is essential
if Colombia is to have continuing operational success against the drug
threat. The Colombian Congress has given President Pastrana authority
to implement a number of reform measures now under review by the
Ministry of Defense; those reforms will make the Colombian military a
more modern, professional and effective force. The Colombian military
needs help and, as was previously outlined, we plan to use a small
portion of supplemental funding towards this end.

Human Rights

I am also concerned, as are members of Congress, about human rights.
The human rights practices and procedures that the U.S. government has
put in place, in response to legislative enactments, and the example
set by the small number of our troops training Colombian forces has
had an impact, as have President Pastrana's reforms. Human rights
violations imputed to the armed forces have dropped by 95% over the
last five years, to fewer than two percent of the total violations in
1999. Armed forces cooperation with the civilian court system in
prosecuting human rights violations committed by military personnel
has improved. Some military officers accused of collaboration with or
tolerance of illegal self defense force activities have been
dismissed, while others face prosecution. The armed forces have
demonstrated greater aggressiveness recently in seeking out and
attacking illegal self-defense forces. Clearly, the Colombian Armed
Forces have come a long way, yet no one would dispute that more must
be done. I am also alarmed by the reported dramatic increase in human
rights violations attributed to both the illegal self-defense forces
and insurgents - this is symptomatic of Colombia's crisis in general
and, as I see it, a call to action. The Colombian government needs the
resources and training to address this problem and the supplemental
represents a significant contribution on the part of the U.S.

Counterdrug vs. Counter Insurgency

Lastly, let me address the "targets" of this supplemental package, and
our source zone strategy as a whole. The targets are the
narco-traffickers, those individuals and organizations that are
involved in the cultivation of coca or opium poppy and the subsequent
production and transportation of cocaine and heroin to the US. Only
those armed elements that forcibly inhibit or confront counterdrug
operations will be engaged, be they narco-traffickers, insurgent
organizations, or illegal self-defense forces.

I know that some are concerned that we are being drawn into a
quagmire. Let me assure you, we are not. There are numerous
restrictions, constraints, and reviews that are involved in the
approval of the deployment of U.S. military personnel on counterdrug
missions in Colombia. Suffice it to say, the process is comprehensive,
involving reviews by the Embassy in Bogota and U.S. Southern Command
in Miami as well as the Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of
Defense. I personally look not only at who is deploying and what they
are doing, but at the specific locations to which they are going.
Furthermore, each and every deployment order states, in no uncertain
terms, that DoD personnel are not to accompany host nation personnel
on operational missions. This will not change. As I have said, the
execution of this increased support does not require a change in U.S.
policy. Is there risk to U.S. personnel providing counterdrug support?
Yes, there is. However, we are aggressively working to minimize that
risk.

In summary, the Department of Defense supports this additional
assistance for Colombia. U.S. Southern Command and my office
participated extensively in its formulation. It integrates fully our
source zone strategy, affording the opportunity to enhance those
counterdrug programs that have proven successful in Peru and Bolivia.
President Pastrana has asked for international support to address an
internal problem that has international dimensions -- fueled in part
by our country's demand for cocaine. It is time to move forward.