Thomas Pickering, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Remarks on Colombia

Thomas Pickering,
Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
Remarks on Colombia at a Dinner in honor of the 30th Anniversary
of the Andean Development Corporation, Washington, DC
September 8, 2000




As prepared


Thank you for inviting me to address you.  This evening I would
like to focus my remarks on Colombia.  Those of us who closely
follow events in the Americas can't help but notice how much
Colombia has been in the news lately.  It seems that almost every
day stories about Colombia appear on the front pages of major
newspapers, not just in the United States but throughout the
hemisphere. Unfortunately the news from Colombia is not always
good, and I don't imagine that Colombia as a story will disappear
anytime soon.

What I would like to do this evening is to give you some context
as concerns the situation in Colombia and to shed light on what
the U.S. Government is doing to help the Colombian Government
solve the many complex problems it faces.

Before I get too far, I'd like to clear up a misperception about
the term "Plan Colombia."  Many of us, including many within the
U.S. Government, have taken to using the name "Plan Colombia" to
describe the $1.3 billion support package for Colombia that
President Clinton signed into law this past July.  That is really
a misnomer.  "Plan Colombia" is the $7.5 billion comprehensive
package put together last year by the Colombian Government.  Of
this $7.5 billion about 25% will be devoted to counter-narcotics
efforts.  The other 75% will go toward other programs, about
which I will speak later.

The United States' $1.3 billion contribution to Plan Colombia is
significant, but equally if not more significant is the fact that
the Colombians themselves have committed to spending $4.5 billion
of their own funds to see the plan through to a successful
conclusion.  $4.5 billion dollars is a serious contribution for a
country that has been experiencing a recession so severe that
last year its economy shrank by 5% and unemployment reached 20%.

Beyond the United States' and Colombia's own contributions to the
Plan, international financial institutions have also pledged more
than $1 billion dollars and more is expected.  Similarly, a
number of European states and Japan have made important
contributions.

The reality here is that far from being a purely military plan,
only 12% of the total is currently calculated to relate to
military and police support, while 88 % is dedicated to
non-military program and activities.  Another way of saying this
is that 25% of the funding is related to counter-drug activities,
while 75% is focused on building and strengthening civil society,
including human rights issues.

The overall situation in Colombia is difficult.  Imagine working
in an environment where journalists, human rights workers, local
businessmen, and foreign investors are all constant targets.
Imagine living in Washington and being unable to drive to the
Maryland shore for fear of being kidnapped by criminals or
guerrillas, and imagine a 40-year insurgency taking place not far
from the nation's capital that is led by groups that have
virtually no support among the country's people and are financed
by drug trafficking.  Last year's recession -- a 4.5% drop in GDP
-- was Colombia's worst in a century.

This is the reality in today's Colombia.  Moreover, all of these
problems create a vicious cycle.  The poor economy leads to high
unemployment and creates a ready pool of discontented individuals
for guerrillas, drug lords, and paramilitaries to recruit from,
while the violence associated with insurgents and paramilitaries
-- essentially, the absence of peace -- decreases investor
confidence, worsening the economy.   Narcotics trafficking feeds
the coffers of the guerrillas and paramilitaries, strengthening
them in their assault on democratic institutions.

In this regard I note the good news as well.  Yesterday, in its
first review of Colombian economic performance since agreeing to
a $2.7 billion credit facility last December, the International
Monetary Fund said that President Pastrana's Government was set
to meet its fiscal targets for this year.

This is indeed good news, but the only permanent solution is a
permanent peace.  The U.S. Government fully supports the peace
process. We agree with President Pastrana's assessment that a
solution to the country's civil conflict is essential to the
solution of all the other problems facing Colombia.

I note that in the past few days the Colombian Government and the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, better known as the FARC,
have agreed to begin discussion of a September 22 cease-fire and
suspension of hostilities.  This is a welcome development that
could help Colombia move toward peace and national
reconciliation.

The U.S. Government has made an extraordinary commitment to help
Colombia in this time of crisis.  Our support package is
comprehensive in scope.  Not only does it help Colombia deal with
the threat of narcotics trafficking, and the armed guerrillas and
paramilitaries who protect and profit from the trafficking, but
it also includes substantial funding for alternative development
assistance and voluntary eradication of illicit crops.  And there
is a great deal more.  The USG also intends to provide
significant assistance for internally displaced persons and for
environmental protection programs, resources for local governance
and improvement of governing capacity, and programs to help
improve the administration of justice and, very importantly, to
protect human rights.  This is a significant contribution toward
the 75% of Plan Colombia that I mentioned earlier is not focused
on counter-narcotics activities.

Respect for human rights is as vitally important to the people of
Colombia as it is for the people of the United States.  Some have
raised concern about the President's waiver of five of the human
rights conditions contained in the support package.  Another
condition was "certifiable" after just a few months; good
progress has been made on two others which we expect to be ready
soon.  However, in order to reach the point where the President
can certify that Colombia has met these conditions, the  USG and
the Government of Colombia must move forward now to address the
underlying causes of those problems.  Other conditions involve
certifying progress which could not be done until a baseline was
established; that baseline is now in place.  Certification is
helping the United States and Colombia to make progress by
focusing attention on the issues highlighted in the
appropriations legislation.

Colombia, under President Pastrana, has made important strides to
improve human rights conditions, but more remains to be done.
There can be no tolerance for those who violate human rights or
who collaborate in or condone such violations.  The Pastrana
Administration has taken a number of important measures to
improve the human rights situation and is working to move the
peace process forward, which offers the greatest hope of
eliminating human rights violations for good.

I would also emphasize that all U.S. assistance to Colombian
military and police forces is provided strictly in accordance
with Section 564 of the FY 2000 Foreign Operations Appropriations
Act -- the so-called Leahy Amendment.  No assistance is provided
to any unit of the security forces for which we have credible
evidence of the commission of gross violations of human rights.
The USG is firmly committed to the Leahy Amendment and has a
rigorous process in place to screen those units being considered
for assistance.

One of the major reasons we have focused so much attention on
Colombia recently is our awareness of the potential threat
Colombia's problems pose throughout the region.  Our success in
lowering cocaine production in Peru and Bolivia by 60% has its
lessons for Colombia.  The first lesson is that these programs
can work.  The second is that success elsewhere tends to shift
the focus to other countries, just as success in Colombia, if not
dealt with, will shift the focus of production deeper into the
jungle in Colombia and to countries beyond its borders. Another
reality is that, left unchecked, there is no guarantee that
lucrative narcotics production will not spread elsewhere as a
result of its regular growth.  We have already seen that happen
in Colombia.

Colombia's conflict also significantly threatens violence and
instability in the border regions of its immediate neighbors such
as the Darien region of Panama, northern Ecuador, and western
Venezuela. Moreover, the recent increase of narcotics cultivation
and trafficking in Colombia, related to guerrilla control of
southern Colombia, is a far greater threat to the entire region
than that Colombian violence, opposed or unopposed, would spill
over the border.

The truth is, if the Colombians don't deal with their narcotics
problem, it's certain to become worse and spill over the border.
If Colombia does deal with it, we can get a leg up on stopping
the regionalization of drug abuse and trafficking.  The
contamination of drug abuse and narcotics trafficking brings with
it violence and corruption, a real threat to virtually every
nation in the region from Mexico to Argentina and throughout the
Caribbean.  For this reason, the USG has included significant
funds in our support package for Plan Colombia to help Colombia's
neighbors as we seek to stem cultivation and trafficking
throughout the region.  This Administration looks to the next
year for larger regional support by the United States.  If the
year 2000 had a Plan Colombia focus, 2001 will have an Andean
regional focus.

Additionally, the USG regularly consults at every level with its
hemispheric neighbors on counternarcotics and security matters
related to the situation in Colombia and has sought their support
for President Pastrana's peace process.  I note that in addition
to President Clinton's trip to Colombia last week, Secretary
Albright visited five countries in the region just three weeks
ago.  I, myself, have been to South America four times in the
last year.  Increasingly, our regional partners recognize that
the crisis in Colombia represents a hemispheric problem in which
they have a direct and immediate stake.  They said so clearly in
their statement issued in Brazil last week at the end of the
South American Presidents' summit.

Let me emphasize that the United States does not provide
counterinsurgency support to the Government of Colombia.  This is
not another Vietnam.  The number of U.S. military personnel in
Colombia on any given day rarely exceeds 300.  Congress has
capped the number of military personnel allowed in the country at
any time at 500 and the Secretary of Defense has issued orders
prohibiting our personnel from participating in any combat
operation.   Colombia will provide all of the men and most of the
wherewithal for the fight; our role is training, equipping, and
providing intelligence support.

Unfortunately, the print and electronic media in this and other
countries of the hemisphere have been carrying numerous stories
and opinion pieces that portray American troops in the most
ominous terms while often predicting that they are the vanguard
of a massive military presence to come.

In reality, what we are really seeing is more of the same.  U.S.
military personnel have engaged in training operations with their
Colombian counterparts for years, certainly before anyone ever
heard of Plan Colombia.

As President Clinton stated last week in his televised speech to
the Colombian people.  "Please do not misunderstand our purpose.
We have no military objective.  We do not believe your conflict
has a military solution.  We support the peace process.  Our
approach is both pro- peace and anti-drug."

In conclusion, let me respond to those critics who say the United
States should stay out of Colombia.  Doing nothing is always a
choice, but in this case it is not an option.  Doing nothing
would not address Colombia's sharp increase in coca production,
it would allow paramilitary and guerrilla groups to continue
their mayhem unhindered, and it would not be a guarantee or
firewall against regional spread.

It is also clearly not in the U.S. national interest, nor that of
any country in the hemisphere, to have a corrupt narco-state
among its neighbors.  A comprehensive approach to Colombia's
problems is needed and the framework for that has been provided
by President Pastrana's Plan Colombia.  The Colombians have a lot
of work ahead of them.  Those who expect instant results will be
frustrated.  Change is going to take a long time, but with the
help of its friends, including the United States, Colombia will
reach the goals of seriously curtailing narcotics production,
reestablishing complete sovereignty over its national territory,
helping those who have suffered during the on-going conflict,
bolstering its democracy, governance and human rights record, and
seeing the peace process through to a satisfactory conclusion.

Thank you very much.






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