Post-Millennium Terrorism Review

Introduction I want to thank Ron Nessen and Mike Armacost for helping to arrange this event. I'm also looking forward to participating in the panel following this with Richard Haass. Thank you for this opportunity to talk about the changing threats and challenges we face from terrorism, a subject many of you have followed closely. Today I would like to review the lessons from the recent millennial threat period, assess the current terrorism threat, and highlight American counterterrorism priorities. Then I want to leave you with a description of the road ahead in responding to the threat. Review of Millennium Period Toward the end of 1999, intelligence and law enforcement officials were on alert for terrorist activity surrounding the millennium. Three events dramatically changed our alert posture: First, in mid-December the Jordanian police arrested members of a cell planning attacks against western tourists. This cell was linked to Usama bin Laden, whose al-Qaida organization was responsible for the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in East Africa. Second, on December 14 alert Customs agents arrested an Algerian national smuggling almost 50 pounds of explosive materials and detonating devices into the United States. The other Algerians subsequently arrested in connection with this plot apparently were "Afghan alumni," trained with the mujahedin in Afghanistan and also linked to Usama bin Laden. Third, from December 24-31 hijackers linked to the Harkat ul-Mujahideen (HUM) of Pakistan held over 150 passengers hostage and killed one innocent honeymooner on Indian Airlines flight 814. What did these events mean? Although terrorists still target military installations (such as the 1996 Khobar Tower attack in Saudi Arabia) and diplomatic missions (as in Nairobi and Dar Es Salaam)--they have expanded their target list to include attacks on "softer targets" such as hotels and tourist sites and may be planning to bring those attacks into the continental United States--to an extent that quite frankly we were not anticipating. Fortunately, due to the outstanding work of intelligence and law enforcement officials--here and abroad--we were able to thwart several potentially deadly events. Impact of Terrorism Now I want to preface my assessment of the current threat with some brief remarks on the importance of terrorism. The obvious result of terrorism is the tragic loss of human life and property. But there are other detrimental effects. As terrorist expert Brian Jenkins has recently written: "Terrorist acts cause crisis, provoke outrage, fray community ties, and undermine faith in our democratic institutions. Only six people died in the World Trade Center bombing. But such an event, if repeated annually, would put intolerable strains on our society." Internationally, the threat of terrorism has even broader implications than at home where our prosperity and strong democratic institutions are more resilient. International terrorism can: Destroy or delay peace processes; Provoke, prolong or entrench conflicts; and otherwise Accelerate the cycle of violence in areas of the world important to our national interest. Examples of these phenomena were apparent in 1999: The five explosions in Moscow earlier this year claimed the lives of nearly 300 people and contributed to the decision-making that has driven the relentless attack by Russian troops in Chechnya. The hijacking of Indian Airlines flight 814 exacerbated an already tense situation and has slowed efforts toward reconciliation between India and Pakistan. In the Middle East, rejectionist groups, such as Hizbollah and Hamas, threaten the peace process with their terrorist attacks--which can increase tensions and reduce leaders' ability to come to the peace table. In effect, terrorism, in areas wracked by conflict, prevents leaders from advancing delicate peace processes--and terrorists know this all too well. It is a credit to the British and Irish Governments that they have been able to keep the peace process on track, especially after a car bomb killed 29 and wounded more than 330 others in the border town of Omagh in August 1998. Terrorism can also have a disproportionate impact on national economies. In 1996, a small group of Al-Gamat'Al-Islamayya operatives gunned down 58 international tourists and four Egyptians in Luxor Egypt--and Egypt's tourist economy is just now fully recovering. The terrorists achieved their goal, not of killing tourists, but of crippling Egypt's tourism industry. Egyptian efforts to combat terrorism seem to have been effective, and the Al-Gama'at Al-Islamiyya has declared a unilateral truce with the Egyptian Government. Nevertheless, unofficial statistics estimate that Egypt lost over one billion dollars of tourism revenues after the Luxor assault. And it is impossible to measure the impact on investment, not only for foreign investment, but national as well. In 1986 alone--the worst year on record for international terrorist attacks--Pan Am attributed a loss of $300 million to terrorism; 24% fewer American tourists traveled to Europe; and Greece lost half a billion dollars in tourism revenue, after a spate of terrorist attacks including the explosion on board TWA flight 840 as it approached Athens and the hijacking of an Egypt Air flight en route from Athens to Cairo. I hope and trust that the two recent hijackings in South Asia will not bring in a new era of hijacking--when international air travel has expanded exponentially since 1980. Let me also add that the U.S. Government has another inherent motivation for delegitimizing the terrorist option for international actors. As the world's strongest economic and military power, it would behoove many groups to find a way to attack us when we are soft--bypassing direct military confrontation with our armed forces. We must ensure terror does not become a viable instrument for those who are frustrated with American power, ideas, or policies. The Changing Face of Terrorism With that rather somber introduction, let me emphasize that we have had significant success against terrorism in the past 20 years--particularly against state sponsored terrorism. Unfortunately, a new breed of terrorist has emerged in recent years, partly in response to our success against state sponsors and partly as a product of different local, regional, and international circumstances. Today's terrorist threat comes primarily from non-state actors with few ties to governments, such as the al-Qaida network, Aum Shinrikyo in Japan, and the FARC in Colombia. Terrorists are acting more on their own and are resorting to car bombs, suicide bombings, and attacking civilian buildings and diplomatic posts. They have their own funding networks--through narcotrafficing, private businesses, independent wealth, charities, and local financial support. They are individually recruiting new members. In many states where the government is weak in providing basic public services, these groups create parallel public institutions, such as schools, public health services, and social networks. They are also exploiting volatile areas, such as Chechnya, Afghanistan, and Colombia where local conflicts help terrorist recruitment. Their infusion of resources and training in conflict-ripe areas makes for a very deadly mix. Especially since the end of the Cold War, a number of terrorist groups have portrayed their cause in religious and cultural terms. This is often a transparent tactic designed to conceal political goals, generate popular support, and silence potential opposition. It feeds upon the resentments and suffering of people who feel forgotten or marginalized in today's rapidly globalizing society. In general, these emerging non-state actors exhibit less constraint than state actors and other groups did in past decades. Some actively are seeking to gain weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to increase the lethality as well as the psychological impact of their attacks. Timothy McVeigh, the Oklahoma City bomber, was quoted as saying he wanted a "body count" in his bombing--as it was necessary to get the level of attention he wanted for his twisted mind of conspiracy theories and hate. Ramsi Yousef, the leader of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing in New York City, wanted to knock down the one tower into the other and kill every one in both high-rise office buildings. Now I've given you a snapshot of today's somewhat more freelancing terrorists, driven by religious and cultural ideology to carry out increasingly lethal attacks. Next, to complete the threat picture, I will lay out the regional priorities as we combat the threat of terrorism around the globe. American Priorities: Afghanistan and Iran Afghanistan The primary area of concern for terrorism today is South West Asia; specifically--and for different reasons--Afghanistan and Iran. First, Afghanistan. Afghanistan provides sanctuary for the most active terrorists that directly threaten American interests today--and most of them are in an area controlled by the Taliban. The Taliban has expressed to me on several occasions that they would like to have good relations with the United States--and I have no reason not to believe they mean it. They remember fondly the support we gave the Afghan resistance during the 1980s in their struggle to eject Soviet occupation. I also believe that they do not want individuals or organizations to plan and conduct terrorist operations from their soil. However, why then do we find terrorists within their midst? Although I do not pretend to speak about the intentions of the Taliban, it is obvious to me that most of the groups that reside in Afghanistan have multiple motives, and their primary motive is usually support for other resistance operations or local conflicts. This includes Usama bin Laden--who supports the Taliban in their struggle against the northern alliance, militants in Chechnya, and the Harkat ul-Mujahideen (HUM)--which wages a struggle in Kashmir. However, these organizations are also involved in terrorist activities and have been designated by the Department of State in a very careful and methodical process--the Foreign Terrorist Organization or FTO designation process. The presence of these groups is increasingly threatening to a number of states, both in the region and beyond, which helps explain the rapid and unanimous passing of United Nations Security Council resolution 1267 on October 15 last year, imposing international sanctions on the Taliban until they turn over Usama bin Laden to a country where he can be brought to justice. The presence of these terrorist groups also contributes to the inability of the Taliban to gain the recognition they seek. What should the Taliban do? Again, I fully understand that the Taliban will continue to make judgements it considers to be in its best interest. The best I can do is outline to them what they need to do if they hope to get out of an increasingly tight box of international condemnation due to their providing safehaven to terrorists, notwithstanding some of their public statements. First, they must comply with UN Security Council Resolution 1267 and find a way to get bin Laden to justice to face charges for his terrorist crimes. They have spoken to me about several initiatives on how to move forward on this issue--and I encourage them to proceed. If they accomplish this, those sanctions will be removed. We will not move the goal posts. However, it is also important that the Taliban make very clear to all groups within their territory that support for terrorist operations or the conduct of terrorist operations is unacceptable, and they need to expel all those who are engaged in these types of activities. U.S. policy--and UN sanctions--are not anti-Afghan. We still very much support the aspirations of the Afghan people to live in peace and freedom. In fact, we are the biggest donor of humanitarian aid to Afghanistan, and the sanctions are designed to limit the suffering of the people. The best way for the Taliban regime to help themselves in this regard is to comply with the resolution. Iran Next I will turn to Iran, a larger, richer, and more important country bordering Afghanistan to the west. For us Iran poses a different problem. We broke diplomatic relations 20 years ago, and since then finger-pointing, blaming, and name-calling have characterized our exchanges. Now, amid the confusing signals coming out of Tehran--like the assassinations of dissidents, the trials of journalists, the closing of newspapers--there are signs of change and new openness. While we welcome these changes, terrorism remains a serious concern. Iran continues to support such terrorist groups as Hizballah, HAMAS, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and Ahmed Jabril's PFLP-GC for the purpose of attacking the Middle East peace process. As CIA Director George Tenet recently testified, "Iran...remains the most active state sponsor of terrorism." And I fully agree. We are also concerned about possible Iranian involvement in the attack on U.S. personnel at Khobar, Saudi Arabia in 1996. As former Assistant Secretary Martin Indyk testified last Fall, "We have information about the involvement of some Iranian officials in the Khobar attack. We have not reached the conclusion that the Iranian Government was involved or responsible for the attack." We have asked Iran to cooperate in this investigation but have not received a satisfactory response. The investigation continues. Through sanctions and diplomatic pressure, and with the cooperation of our friends, we have made clear to the Iranian Government our strong objection to its support for terrorism. The Secretary has explicitly offered, without preconditions, to sit down with the Islamic Republic and create a roadmap leading to better relations. Should Iran ever agree to enter a dialogue with the U.S. Government, you can be sure that terrorism will top the list on the agenda. So far the response to our offer has not been promising, and relations with the U.S. remains the "third rail" of Iranian domestic politics. For example, in response to Secretary Albright's offer to develop a road map, Iranian Foreign Minister Kharrazi recited a tired list of Iranian complaints. In the meantime, we are repeating our willingness to talk without preconditions, and, at the same time, have worked closely with our EU and G-8 friends to carry a clear message: supporting terrorism and undermining the Middle East peace process are losing games that will keep Iran from gaining what it desires most--membership in the international family. What Do We do About It? This brings me to the final point I want to discuss: What do we do about the new threats and challenges? An effective campaign to counter terrorism and bring to justice those who have perpetrated terrorism acts must be multilateral and tightly coordinated. Diplomacy is our key tool in forging critical cooperation with other countries and raising the political will of other states to act against terrorists. Terrorists are cunning and will exploit any gap they see between countries or within a country's own counterterrorism efforts. We must "drain the swamp" in which terrorists operate. What does this mean? We seek to limit the room which terrorists have in which to operate, plan, move, and work. We work to show terrorists that there is no room--both physically and politically--for them to use terrorism as their means of expression. Terrorists can only exist if they have space in which they can recruit, train, plan, and find refuge. They find this space in countries or areas where a state allows them to operate or where no legitimate government has control--lawless areas in which any criminal can move freely. Today's swamps include Afghanistan, parts of Sudan, the Bekaa Valley in Lebanon, and the rural jungles of Colombia. Let me describe the strategy of "draining the swamp" by outlining a few of our key activities: We pressure state sponsors, isolating them from the international community. We criminalize terrorism through the process of designating Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs). We depoliticize the message of terrorism through public statements separating actor from action. We build international consensus for zero tolerance by working with our G-8 and EU partners. We support the construction of an international legal framework to allow states and the UN, EU, OAS, and other organizations to legally be tough on terrorism. We work bilaterally to arrest, disrupt, and expel terrorists. Finally, we bolster the capacity of those countries that need it to fight terrorism, through our international training programs which are run by state, law enforcement, and intelligence agencies. When we "drain the swamp"--or limit the area that terrorists have to move--we expose the terrorists. Draining the swamp also means making clear to governments that they will be held accountable for controlling these areas. This requires a coordinated international effort to pressure those regimes, such as the Taliban in Afghanistan, which harbor terrorists, to police these swamps, expel the terrorists, and shut down areas of operation. In some cases, such as Colombia, it means helping those with the will to cooperate. This also means putting pressure on other states--many of whom are our allies--to cut off terrorist trafficking of fighters, money, weapons, or equipment through these countries. Some countries would prefer to "let sleeping dogs lie" if a terrorist organization does not seem to directly threaten their interests. This idea of "blind tolerance" cannot be permitted, even for seemingly benign cells like those in East Africa in the years leading up to the embassy bombings. Finally, draining the swamp also means promoting a shift in public rhetoric around the world. Too often terrorism--a criminal act--is put in the light of religious expression, freedom fighting, or political statement. The international community already offers groups legitimate means of expression, and violence and terrorism are not among these legitimate forms of expression. Terrorism is a crime. Plain and simple. Terrorists are criminals, just like the murderers who sit in prisons in our countries. The fact that they espouse a political or religious view does not change the fact that murder is murder. We must make this point clear in the media. We must let terrorists know that we see them like common criminals, and intend on prosecuting them like any other criminal. Conclusion In conclusion, we have made progress in decreasing state sponsorship of terrorism. As countries on the list of state sponsors of terrorism change their behavior, we will consider them for removal from the list. We will also scrutinize the actions of other states which could find themselves on the list if their policies warrant. We have made it through the New Year's celebrations unscathed, thanks to hard work by intelligence and law enforcement. But in counterterrorism, we face new threats and new challenges ahead. Today's weapon of choice for terrorists remains the AK-47, the car bomb, and the rocket. But terrorists looking for a bigger impact will increasingly turn to weapons of mass destruction and cyberterrorism. We will need to match our intelligence collection and defensive strategies to these new threats and challenges. But the main instruments of counterterrorism will remain constant: American leadership, zero tolerance, and draining the swamp so that terrorists have nowhere to go and nowhere to hide. Thank you. I look forward to taking your questions. [end of document]