News

USIS Washington File

06 January 2000

Text: NSC Advisor Berger's Remarks to the National Press Club, Jan. 6

(End of '99 saw largest US counter-terrorism operation in history)
(3520)

National Security Advisor Samuel R. Berger told reporters at the
National Press Club January 6 that the last weeks of 1999 "saw the
largest US counter-terrorism operation in history."

Berger said that "terrorist cells were disrupted in eight countries
and attacks were almost certainly prevented thanks to the good work of
our law enforcement and intelligence agencies.

"But the threat remains real," said Berger. "We'll need to keep
meeting this challenge just as we met it last week: with both
vigilance and a refusal to be intimidated."

Part of the challenge, he said, will be "to make it more difficult for
weapons of mass destruction and the missiles that carry them to fall
into the wrong hands."

That, he said, requires the United States "to do many things well at
the same time: helping the nations of the former Soviet Union secure
weapons and their key components. Continuing to prevent Iraq from
threatening its neighbors. Restraining North Korea's missile and
nuclear program and Iran's. Aggressively pursuing terrorists and
maintaining pressure against those who shelter them, including the
Taliban. Strengthening global standards against proliferation. And,
yes, that means eventually finding the common ground on the Test Ban
Treaty that last year's truncated debate in the Senate prevented."

The NSC Advisor also gave reporters at the National Press Club
luncheon a thorough review of U.S. foreign policy achievements around
the globe during the year of 1999.

Following is the White House text, as prepared for delivery:

(begin text)

THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary

January 6, 2000

As Prepared for Delivery

REMARKS BY SAMUEL R. BERGER
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
TO THE NATIONAL PRESS CLUB

National Press Club Building
Washington, D.C.

American Leadership in the 21st Century

This is a historic milestone for me - my first chance in years to give
a speech without alluding to the bridge to the next century or evoking
the next millennium. Instead, I want to look back with you on some of
the things our Administration did in foreign policy back in the 1900's
and reflect on challenges of an era that is already upon us.

1999 was a busy, intensive and generally successful year for American
foreign policy. Indeed, it's hard to imagine it all happened in one
year: A revitalized Middle East peace process, with the Wye accords
being implemented, and genuine engagement on peace between Israel and
both Syria and the Palestinians at the same time. The defeat of ethnic
cleansing in Kosovo, with NATO united, Russia helping us make and keep
the peace, and Balkan integration into Europe now high on the
international agenda. A WTO agreement with China. Economic recovery in
Asia, much aided by strong US economic growth and the President's
commitment to keep our markets open. With the democratic transitions
in Nigeria and Indonesia, the passage of more people to freedom in
1999 than in 1989, the year the Berlin Wall fell. Independence for
East Timor after a quarter century of conflict. The peace process in
Northern Ireland moving forward again. Talks resumed on the future of
Cyprus. A Caspian pipeline agreement that can help assure our energy
security and reinforce the independence of the new nations of central
Asia. A historic debt relief initiative for the poorest countries of
the developing world.

Imagine the questions you'd be asking me today had we made a different
set of choices last year: You'd want to know how we could justify
letting a million Kosovars spend the winter despairing in refugee
camps. You might be asking how we could have let a regional economic
downturn spark a global depression, or whether our failure to reach a
WTO agreement with China would make that country more recalcitrant on
the world stage, or what happened to the hope for a comprehensive
peace in the Holy Land?

We had our share of disappointments last year, too, from CTBT to
Seattle. But I am pleased with the progress we have made, and
satisfied that an active year in foreign policy has sparked a
constructive discussion about America's role in the world.

One reason we are where we are today is that we -- the Congress and
the Administration, led by the President and Secretary Albright -
generally have maintained a bipartisan consensus about the need for
American leadership, though for five of the last seven years we have
had divided government. Without that consensus, we could not have
opened NATO to new democracies, or approved aid to dismantle former
Soviet weapons, or approved NAFTA, or created the WTO, or ratified
START II, or given our armed forces the backing they needed from the
Balkans to the Persian Gulf. I think one reason the protests in
Seattle seemed so unusual is that we have gotten used to having more
consensus about our role in the world in this decade, or at least less
contention, than we had over the last three decades of the Cold War.

But that doesn't mean that the consensus isn't threatened, and it
doesn't mean that there aren't competing visions of our role.

Today, just about everyone believes we need a strong military to
protect our interests in a world of continuing, if shifting, dangers;
unfortunately, some think that's about all we need - and undervalue
and underfund our efforts to prevent conflicts. All agree we need
friends and allies when the going gets tough; some seem to think we
can afford to alienate them when they need us to play our part in
international institutions and arrangements. That way of looking at
the world is reflected in the radical cuts to our foreign affairs
budget Congress proposed last fall, in the vote on the Test Ban Treaty
that a small group of Senators forced against the wishes of more than
60 of their colleagues, in protectionist sentiments in both political
parties. I have called that vision a new isolationism. It's one part
go-it-alone and another part don't-go-at-all.

Of course, it is possible to agree that America must play an active
role in the world, but still to disagree about how. Every
Administration is tempted to deny that from time to time. Dean Acheson
once sarcastically observed that the only way to run a country was to
"say politics stops at the seaboard -- and anyone who denies that
postulate is an SOB and a crook and not a true patriot. Now if people
will swallow that," Acheson added, "you're off to the races."

The duty of internationalists in both parties is not to agree on every
matter of policy, but to come together around the basic principle that
Americans benefit when nations coalesce to deter aggression, to
resolve conflicts, to open markets, to raise living standards, to
prevent the spread of dangerous weapons, and to meet other dangers
that no nation can meet alone. . . . and that a key to forging such
coalitions is American leadership. That's what the bipartisan,
internationalist center believes, and I am gratified that as 1999
ended, it reclaimed center stage. The Administration and the Congress
agreed on a budget that restored funding for our global priorities. We
agreed to pay our UN dues and arrears, bolstering America's
credibility as a global leader.

Having advanced the argument that America should continue to lead, the
beginning of a new century should cause us to reflect on the larger
purpose of that leadership. For we are experiencing something more
than just a changing of the digits on the calendar; this period in
history has been a genuine changing of the times - a time of
collapsing empires, expanding freedoms, eroding barriers and emerging
threats. The success of our foreign policy in this new era is going to
depend on our ability to help answer a few fundamental, long-term
questions.

One critical question for the next generation and beyond is whether
our former adversaries Russia and China will emerge as stable,
prosperous, democratic partners of the United States.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union nine years ago, our engagement
with a democratic Russia has produced concrete results -- the
dismantlement of 5,000 former Soviet nuclear weapons, the withdrawal
of Russian troops from the Baltics, Russia's role in ending the
conflict in Kosovo on acceptable terms, and the cooperation our troops
have forged in Bosnia and Kosovo. Russia itself is still struggling
with demons that have bedeviled it for years: the legacy of
totalitarianism, poverty, corruption, conflict in the Caucasus. But
the way President Yeltsin left office last week reflected just how
much has changed. For the first time in their thousand year history,
the Russian people now know that leaders can voluntarily transfer
power, under constitutional rules, instead of holding on till death or
being forced from office. Just as important, their new government has
promised to uphold basic liberties and Russia's break with communism,
and to hold free and fair Presidential elections. The world will be
looking with great interest as the Russian government moves forward in
meeting this pledge.

Acting President Putin enjoys strong support from the Russian people
and a newly elected Duma. That's no guarantee of progress on the
issues that matter most to us, but we certainly intend to seek it,
including further reductions in strategic weapons as we work to
develop a national missile defense system while preserving the ABM
Treaty. Whoever is elected Russia's next President will also inherits
a tough challenge -- to give Russians the sense of stability they
crave after years of wrenching change and the hope their sacrifices
will be rewarded. The question is whether stability and hope will be
based on strengthening or weakening the rule of law? That question
applies to Chechnya as well: We've made clear that Russia's fight
against terrorism is right, but its use of indiscriminate force is
wrong. And it is inviting far more serious problems for itself than it
can possibly be solving. But we should not stop supporting those
forces in Russia that are trying to strengthen the rule of law and
build faith in democratic institutions. Russia is paying a price for
its conduct in Chechnya; Russian democracy must not.

As for China, a sense of realism cautions us to be prepared for the
possibility that this emerging power emerges as a threat. But we
should not presuppose that outcome, or make it more likely by acting
as if it has already happened. Realism also tells us to see China in
all its complexity: as a country that has lifted hundreds of millions
of its citizens from poverty and expanded personal freedoms, but whose
progress is held back by resistance to political reforms vital to its
growth and stability. We can protect our security and promote the
right kind of change in China by continuing a policy of principled,
purposeful engagement with China's leaders and people.

That is reflected in the deal we reached last fall to bring China into
the WTO. It is a good agreement. Our market already is open to China's
goods and services. This agreement gains us better access to China's
market in every sector from agriculture to telecommunications to
automobiles.

But the agreement is in our interest even apart from its economic
benefit. There is simply no better way right now to encourage China to
choose deeper economic reform and respect for the rule of law. To
choose to play by international rules, instead of defying them. To
choose integration with the world, instead of self-isolation. The only
people who could possibly gain from China remaining outside the WTO
are the most backward-looking, anti-democratic elements in China
itself. That's why I am confident that when the debate is over and the
votes are counted, the Congress will support this agreement by
establishing Permanent Normal Trade Relations with China.

A second question that will shape the character of the coming century
is whether, as the first non-imperial global power in history, we can
use our influence and strength to prevent and if need be to help end
regional conflicts that threaten wider war?

To that end, we have worked hard in the last seven years to help
complete the job of building an undivided, democratic, peaceful Europe
-- a Europe that embraces new democracies from the Baltics to the
Balkans, a Europe that embraces Turkey as well as Greece.

There is a great deal to do to advance this vision for the region:
helping Kosovo through its first free elections while continuing to
clamp down on violence; bolstering the democratic opposition in
Serbia; promoting investment in the Balkans; encouraging progress in
the Cyprus talks and greater cooperation between Greece and Turkey;
helping more new democracies get ready for membership in NATO. Some of
this will require money and the steady support of our Congress over
many years. But if we're persistent, the payoff will be huge. Not just
a post-Cold War Europe, but a durably post-war Europe where American
soldiers are never again called to fight.

We also have a chance now to help the people of the Middle East to end
50 years of conflict that has threatened the peace of the world and
isolated their region from the life of the world.

If you are hoping for an up-to-the-minute update on the Israeli-Syrian
talks underway again this week in Shepherdstown, I will disappoint you
by citing an old adage: When making peace in the Middle East, say
nothing at all and you'll get misquoted only half the time. I will say
that for the first time in several years, the parties - Israel, Syria
and the Palestinians -- have a common goal in sight, and the common
sense to see that they have a historic opportunity to achieve it now.
The President and Secretary Albright will spare neither time nor
effort to help them succeed.

Building peace in the Middle East, in southeast Europe and elsewhere
is a long-term challenge. In the meantime, America will sometimes be
called upon to decide what to do when brutal and dangerous conflicts
break out. And while we cannot and should not respond to every
outbreak of violence and injustice around the world, neither can the
United States afford never to respond.

That is true because, as we have seen so many times in this century,
big wars that harm our interests almost always start as small wars
that the world does not care enough to do something about. It is also
true because in a globalized world, we see -- almost instantly -- the
killing and uprooting of innocent men, women and children thousands of
miles away. In such a world, we cannot choose not to know; we can only
choose not to act.

Over the years, our administration has chosen to act where America's
interests and values were at stake. For all the recent discussion of
humanitarian intervention, we should remember that America hasn't used
force for purely humanitarian ends since the commitment to end famine
in Somalia in 1992. From Haiti to Iraq to Bosnia and Kosovo, we have
acted both to help others and to protect ourselves from the
consequences of unchecked conflict and violence.

I expect you will continue to ask hard, appropriate questions of the
Administration about when and how America should use force. But those
who are examining this issue critically need to ask themselves some
hard questions, too. What precisely would they have done differently
about Kosovo, Bosnia, Iraq, Haiti, East Timor, and why do they think
that would have been more effective? How would they have dealt with
the consequences of not acting?

A third question we will face in the next century is whether
terrorists and potentially hostile nations will acquire the means to
undermine our defenses, and cause us to live in fear once again.

Thankfully, the New Year's Eve celebrations around the world passed
without a terrorist attack. But just because we dodged a bullet
doesn't mean there was no bullet to dodge. The last weeks of 1999 saw
the largest US counter-terrorism operation in history. Terrorist cells
were disrupted in eight countries and attacks were almost certainly
prevented thanks to the good work of our law enforcement and
intelligence agencies. But the threat remains real. We'll need to keep
meeting this challenge just as we met it last week: with both
vigilance and a refusal to be intimidated.

Part of the challenge will be to make it more difficult for weapons of
mass destruction and the missiles that can carry them to fall into the
wrong hands. That requires the United States to do many things well at
the same time: helping the nations of the former Soviet Union secure
weapons and their key components. Continuing to prevent Iraq from
threatening its neighbors. Restraining North Korea's missile and
nuclear program and Iran's. Aggressively pursuing terrorists and
maintaining pressure against those who shelter them, including the
Taliban. Strengthening global standards against proliferation. And
yes, that means eventually finding the common ground on the Test Ban
Treaty that last year's truncated debate in the Senate prevented.

We also are working to convince Russia that the missile defense system
we are planning is not designed to undermine their deterrence, nor
would it be capable of doing so. We must also convince some of our
critics at home who say we should preemptively abandon the ABM Treaty
and arms control and move forward unilaterally. The difference between
us is that we see defense against missile attack as part of a broader
national security strategy. Some seem to think missile defenses should
be the sum total of our strategy. We believe it is a far wiser course
to move forward in a way that takes into account the technical
feasibility of a missile defense system, its cost, the nature of the
threat, and its impact on our overall security, including arms
control.

A fourth question is the one that came into stark relief in Seattle:
How can we shape globalization so that it spurs growth and lifts the
poor as well as the rich, improves the dignity of labor and
strengthens protection of the environment?

In various ways, the protestors in Seattle were raising that question.
But they offered a confusing answer. Many complained that the WTO is
too powerful, yet argued, in effect, that the WTO should acquire new
powers to impose and enforce labor and environmental standards around
the world. All expressed solidarity with poor people in the developing
world. Yet it is hard to see how the 1.3 billion people around the
world living on a dollar a day will ever be able to live in dignity if
we deny them the chance to sell the fruits of their labor and
creativity beyond their borders. There are practices such as forced
labor and child labor that the world should not tolerate. But we must
also understand that, for the poorest countries, trade means growth
and growth means improved working conditions. We don't want a race to
the bottom in the international economy, but neither do we want to
keep the bottom down. It is not right and it is not in our interest.
What we want is a steady march to the top that leaves no one behind.

In the years ahead, we will face many other fundamental questions, and
challenges we can hardly foresee, whether tragedies or hopeful
breakthroughs.

But, as a result of the last several years, we look to that distant
horizon from higher and more hopeful ground. We have done much already
to help shape the character of the 21st century world, and the terms
of debate about America's involvement in it. Think of it: the world's
great powers still disagree on many things, but for the first time
they do not see one another as military adversaries. A decade after
the Cold War ended, our alliances are not weaker, but stronger, with
new, more enduring purpose. Half the world enjoys democratic
government, and the democracies that emerged with the end of the Cold
War have survived and in many cases thrived. Bitter regional conflicts
that once defied resolution are bending to international mediation.
There is a growing recognition that war crimes and massive violations
of human rights are the world's concern, even if they happen within
sovereign borders. The central phenomenon of our time, globalization,
plays to America's greatest strengths - to our creative and
entrepreneurial spirit -- and spreads our most cherished ideals of
openness and freedom. Trade is more open today than ever before,
raising standards of living for many, though not all, and the world's
economic architecture is being adapted to a new economy. People are
thinking freshly about the relationship between promoting global
growth and protecting the global environment. Perhaps most important,
eight years after Time Magazine, echoed by countless other
commentators, asked "Is the U.S. in an irreversible decline as the
world's premier power?" America has arrived at a moment when our
strength and prosperity are unparalleled.

That is a very good place to begin a new era.

(end text)

(Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S.
Department of State.)