19 November 1999
(Provides timeline and more details about EgyptAir investigation)
(2090)
"Over the last few days, we have witnessed a virtual cyclone of
speculation about the course of this investigation," said James E.
Hall, Chairman of the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB),
about the crash of EgyptAir 990.
"I'd like to address this issue for the benefit of the American
people, and for those around the world who might be wondering what's
going on," Hall said November 19 at a press briefing at NTSB
headquarters in Washington, D.C.
"I deeply regret the fact that some unidentified sources have led some
in the news media to speculate on undocumented information,
particularly from one of the most sensitive investigative tools at our
disposal, the cockpit voice recorder," said a frustrated Hall,
criticizing both U.S. and Egyptian media for irresponsible reporting.
"This has caused pain for the families, has not promoted the interests
of aviation safety, and has placed misinformation in the public
realm," he said.
"We have not released specific information from the cockpit voice
recorder, and any so-called verbatim information you have heard about
that recorder is unauthorized; second-, third- or fourth-hand; and, as
we saw in the morning newspapers, could be flat out wrong," he said.
Earlier in the day, Hall spoke by telephone with journalists in Cairo.
He also holds regular telephone conference calls with the families of
victims from the EgyptAir flight.
"Over the succeeding weeks, as we began gathering information from
radar data, the flight recorders, and the little wreckage that had
been retrieved, our investigators began to feel that this crash might,
and I emphasize might, be the result of a deliberate act," Hall said.
with members of the Egyptian investigation team attending the
briefing.
After consultations among the Egyptian authorities, the Safety Board
and the FBI, Hall said, it was agreed that more work needed to be done
before a decision would be made to turn over the investigation to the
FBI as a criminal matter. Hall also said that all international
aviation agreements would be observed and that Egypt is a full partner
in the investigative process.
Hall also noted that representatives from the Federal Aviation
Administration, Boeing Aircraft, Pratt & Whitney Engines and Egyptair,
as well as representatives for the Federal Bureau of Investigation and
the Government of Egypt are involved in preparing a verbatim, literal
Arabic transcript of the cockpit voice recorder.
"When that is completed, an English translation will be prepared. This
group will be working intensively until they complete their task," he
said.
The flight data recorder information is being used to program a Boeing
Aircraft simulator near Seattle so that the Airplane Performance Group
and the Operations Group can meet there in a couple of weeks to run
simulations to understand the behavior of the aircraft during the
final minutes of flight, Hall said. He also said the maintenance
records of the accident aircraft are now being reviewed.
Hall said the U.S. Navy has contracted for a salvage ship, the Smit
Pioneer, to be used in the recovery efforts. This is a multipurpose
offshore installation vessel now anchored in Lisbon and is expected to
be at the crash side near Quonset Point, R.I. by December 1, he said.
At that time, the vessel would be involved in recovery of victims and
aircraft wreckage.
"Weather will determine how many weeks the recovery will take," he
said, adding, "we will continue to update family members during this
period."
Hall also said that the ship the Carolyn Chouset is video-mapping the
wreckage at the bottom of the ocean.
Hall concluded the briefing by saying: "what is a bad thing is
misinformation based not on the facts, but on someone's uninformed
speculation. I realize that this is not a one-way street; it takes
someone to reveal information to you -- whether it is accurate or not
-- for you to report it."
"Nevertheless," he said, "it brings needless pain to those who have
suffered a personal loss in an aviation tragedy, and certainly does
not assist us toward our goal of finding out what caused flight 990 to
crash."
Hall noted that additional Egyptian experts have arrived to help in
reviewing the work that has been done and that there would be no
additional media briefings this weekend but they would resume next
week.
Following are the texts of Hall's statement and the timeline:
(begin Hall statement)
Statement by NTSB Chairman Jim Hall
On the EgyptAir Flight 990 Investigation
Washington, D.C.
November 19, 1999
Good afternoon. It has been a few days since I've had the opportunity
to talk to all of you about our investigation of the crash of Egyptair
flight 990. Let me update you on where we are on the investigation and
then I'll take a few questions.
Yesterday, three additional Egyptian representatives arrived from
Cairo to join the Egyptian delegation headed by General Abdel-Fatteh
Kato and immediately began reviewing the progress of the
investigation. As you know, representatives of Egyptair and the
Egyptian government have been working with us on this investigation
from the very beginning.
Right now, investigators from all of the parties to the investigation
-- the Federal Aviation Administration, Boeing Aircraft, Pratt &
Whitney Engines, and Egyptair -- and representatives from the
government of Egypt and the Federal Bureau of Investigation are
preparing a verbatim, literal Arabic transcript of the entire CVR
recording. When that is completed, an English translation will be
prepared. This group will be working intensively until they complete
their task.
Our maintenance records group has received the maintenance history of
the accident aircraft and is reviewing it.
The U.S. Navy has contracted for a salvage ship, the Smit Pioneer, to
be used in the recovery efforts. This is a multipurpose offshore
installation vessel. It has a large loading capacity and is suitable
for operations in remote areas, deep water and high seas. The vessel
is currently in Lisbon, Portugal, and should arrive at Quonset Point,
Rhode Island around the first of December. Recovery operations for
victims' remains and aircraft wreckage should begin shortly
thereafter. Weather will determine how many weeks the recovery will
take. We will continue to update family members during this period.
At the same time, the Carolyn Chouest, with the ROV Magnum aboard, is
video mapping the wreckage field. The weather window is projected to
last until late tonight or early tomorrow.
The flight data recorder information is being used to program a Boeing
Aircraft simulator near Seattle so that the Airplane Performance Group
and the Operations Group can assemble out there in a couple weeks to
run simulations using that data to understand the behavior of that
aircraft during the final minutes of flight.
Over the last few days, we have witnessed a virtual cyclone of
speculation about the course of this investigation. I'd like to
address this issue for the benefit of the American people, and for
those around the world who might be wondering what's going on.
On October 31, the day EgyptAir flight 990 crashed, the government of
Egypt asked the United States -- specifically the National
Transportation Safety Board -- to conduct the civil investigation of
the accident, as called for under Annex 13 of the standards of the
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). Both Egypt and the
United States are signatories to this treaty.
Over the succeeding weeks, as we began gathering information from
radar data, the flight recorders, and the little wreckage that had
been retrieved, our investigators began to feel that this crash might,
and I emphasize might, be the result of a deliberate act.
Under paragraph 5.11 of ICAO's Annex 13, we are directed as follows:
"If, in the course of an investigation it becomes known, or it is
suspected, that an act of unlawful interference was involved, the
investigator-in-charge shall immediately initiate action to ensure
that the aviation security authorities of the State concerned are so
informed."
In accordance with our responsibilities under the ICAO standards and
our own procedures, on Monday I met with FBI Director Louis Freeh to
inform him that this accident might be the result of a deliberate act.
We also so informed our Egyptian partners in this investigation.
However, under our procedures, as spelled out in our aviation accident
investigation manual, "In obvious cases of sabotage, murder, or other
crimes, the criminal investigation will take precedence over the
NTSB's investigation."
After consultations among the Egyptian authorities, the Safety Board
and the FBI, we agreed that more work needed to be done before we
could reach the threshold of asking the FBI to take the leadership of
this investigation.
As I've been explaining to you this week, that work continues. Both
the NTSB's and the FBI's on-going investigations continue to move
forward.
I deeply regret the fact that some unidentified sources have led some
in the news media to speculate on undocumented information,
particularly from one of the most sensitive investigative tools at our
disposal, the cockpit voice recorder. This has caused pain for the
families, has not promoted the interests of aviation safety, and has
placed misinformation in the public realm.
Documenting the CVR in any crash investigation is a painstaking
process. This is compounded in this case by the fact that the CVR is
almost entirely in Arabic.
I hope you agree that the Safety Board has been open with this
investigation, releasing factual information as it becomes available.
Since the aircraft wreckage remains at the bottom of the ocean, this
factual information has by necessity been limited to radar data and
flight data recorder information.
We have not released specific information from the cockpit voice
recorder, and any so-called verbatim information you have heard about
that recorder is unauthorized; second-, third- or fourth-hand; and as
we saw in the morning newspapers, could be flat out wrong.
No one wants to get to the bottom of this mystery quicker than those
investigating this accident -- both here and in Egypt -- but we won't
get there on a road paved with leaks, supposition, speculation and
spin. That road does not lead to the truth, and the truth is what both
the American people and the Egyptian people seek.
As I mentioned in my speech to the International Society of Air Safety
Investigators on August 24, this is a challenge that faces all of us.
Every time we embark on a major investigation, we do it under the
instantaneous scrutiny of the whole world. This in itself is not a bad
thing. The Safety Board prides itself on being an open, public agency.
But what is a bad thing is misinformation based not on the facts, but
on someone's uninformed speculation. I realize that this is not a
one-way street; it takes someone to reveal information to you --
whether it is accurate or not -- for you to report it. Nevertheless,
it brings needless pain to those who have suffered a personal loss in
an aviation tragedy, and certainly does not assist us toward our goal
of finding out what caused flight 990 to crash.
We do not plan to have any press briefings over the weekend. I'll be
happy to take some of your questions.
(end Hall statement)
(begin timeline)
PRELIMINARY TIMELINE EGYPTAIR FLIGHT 990 RELEASED NOVEMBER 19
TIME EST ELAPSED FLIGHT REMARK
H:M:S H:M:S LEVEL
01:49:46 00:00:00 330 Autopilot disconnect
1240
01:49:54 00:00:08 330 Nose-down elevator
1248 Throttles retarded
Engine thrust reduced
01:49:55 00:00:09 329 Zero-g pitch over under way
1249 Increasingly steep descent
01:50:08 00:00:22 303 Mach 0.86 exceeded
1262 Master warning
Engine oil pressures low
(consistent with zero-g)
01:50:14 00:00:28 270 End of zero-g
1268 Maximum nose-down pitch of
1269 40 degrees
40 degrees lasted about 4 seconds
01:50:21 00:00:35 217 Elevator split begins,
remains to end of data
1275 Left nose-up; right nose-down
Maximum difference 7 degrees
at 00:43
01:50:22 00:00:36 210 Engine start lever moves from "run"
1276 to "cutoff"
01:50:23 00:00:37 205 Area of maximum Mach number M=0.94
1277
01:50:26 00:00:40 192 Speed brake handle moves to deployed
1280 position
01:50:31 00:00:45 172 Area of maximum airspeed=586 kts.
1285
01:50:M 00:00:49 166 Elevator split lessening
1289
01:50:37 00:00:51 164 End of DFDR, CVR, transponder
1291 Nose-down angle decreased to
1292 10 degrees
574 KTAS, Mach 0.91
01:50:40 00:00:54 171*
01:50:52 00:01:06 192*
01:51:02 00:01:16 221*
01:51:16 00:01:30 240*
-- Based on Air Force radar
(end timeline)
(Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S.
Department of State.)