07 July 1999
(Livermore National Laboratory focus of investigation) (870) Washington -- U.S. House of Representatives Commerce Committee Chairman Tom Bliley and Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee Chairman Fred Upton left a classified briefing seriously concerned about the results of a recent security inspection carried out at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, according to a committee press release issued 2 July 1999. In the joint press release, Bliley and Upton said the inspection, carried out by the Department of Energy's (DOE) chief security inspector at the nuclear weapons lab in May 1999, found "serious deficiencies that warrant prompt corrective action by Livermore in the areas of computer security, foreign visitor controls and clearances, and protection of nuclear materials." The congressmen also express doubts about the quality of the day-to-day management and oversight of security matters by the laboratory and its immediate DOE overseers, as well as the effectiveness of reforms and heightened security measures recently announced by the Clinton Administration. The congressmen said the inspection found that foreign nationals who do work for the lab but who reside in their native countries had unrestricted and unmonitored remote dial-up access to Livermore's entire unclassified computer server. The inspection, they said, also found that these foreign nationals had not received background checks or the appropriate clearances. "The American people should know that their nuclear secrets are not yet safe and secure," Bliley and Upton conclude in the press release, and they promise to "continue to keep the pressure on the Department (DOE) and its labs to implement the fundamental management and organizational changes necessary to achieve lasting security reforms." Following is the text of the press release: (begin text) Bliley, Upton React to Briefing on Livermore Security Inspection Washington (July 2) - Chairman Tom Bliley (R-VA), and Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee Chairman Fred Upton (R-MI) delivered the following joint statement today, after the Subcommittee's classified briefing last evening on the results of DOE's recent comprehensive security inspection at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory: "Yesterday, Members of the Commerce Committee's Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations received a detailed, classified briefing from the Department of Energy's chief security inspector, Mr. Glenn Podonsky, on the results of his team's recent comprehensive security inspection at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory -- one of the Department's three nuclear weapon labs. The briefing -- which had been delayed repeatedly by Secretary Richardson without any legitimate basis -- follows several Committee oversight hearings on the state of security at the Department's nuclear weapons complex, and is part of the Committee's plan, announced in March, to conduct a lab-by-lab review of the key sites to ensure that security reforms are being effectively implemented. The briefing provided Members with an opportunity to question the relevant laboratory and Department program officials about the recent inspection findings and their plans for reform. "The inspection found serious deficiencies that warrant prompt corrective action by Livermore in the areas of computer security, foreign visitor controls and clearances, and protection of nuclear materials. The inspection results also raise questions about the quality of the day-to-day management and oversight of security matters by the laboratory and its immediate Department overseers, who appear to be failing to detect some of these deficiencies on their own when conducting their mandated security assessments and evaluations. It should not take an inspection by the Department's independent oversight office to find some of these serious security problems, and we question why these problems were not uncovered and disclosed in the 1998 Department field office security survey or the February 1999 Report to the President on the Status of Safeguards and Security at the Department's Nuclear Weapon Sites. "We also are troubled by the formal response to some of the inspector's findings by the laboratory and Department program officials. For example, the inspection found that foreign nationals who do work for the lab but who reside in their native countries had unrestricted and unmonitored remote dial-up access to Livermore's entire unclassified server, which contains highly sensitive -- and, possibly, mishandled classified -- nuclear information. The inspection also found that these foreign nationals had not received background checks or the appropriate clearances. When questioned about these findings, the official laboratory and Department response was that Department policy did not require any restrictions on, or background checks, for foreign nationals that do not actually visit or reside at the labs -- a response that may or may not be technically correct, but nonetheless defies common sense. "The findings of this inspection -- which was conducted principally in May of this year -- also demonstrate that the Administration's announced reforms and heightened security measures have not yet achieved the success that Secretary Richardson has repeatedly told the American public they already have. The American people should know that their nuclear secrets are not yet safe and secure, but that the Committee will continue to keep the pressure on the Department and its labs to implement the fundamental management and organizational changes necessary to achieve lasting security reforms. Nuclear security is a top oversight priority for us, and we plan to hold additional hearings on this topic throughout the summer." (end text)