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USIS Washington 
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08 January 1999

TRANSCRIPT: CROWE BRIEFING ON REPORT ABOUT EAST AFRICA BOMBINGS

(Administrations, Congress, shortchanged security issues) (7010)



Washington -- Decades of neglect to adequately address security issues
at US missions around the world contributed to the bombing disasters
last year at US Embassies in East Africa, according to State
Department-mandated report.


Admiral William Crowe chaired the two Accountability Review Boards
that studied the circumstances surrounding the nearly simultaneous
August 7 bombings by terrorists of the US Embassies in Dar Es Salaam
in Tanzania and in Nairobi, Kenya. The bombings killed more than 220
people and injured some 4,000 more.


At a January 8 press conference, the day the report was publicly
released, Crowe said "the boards were most disturbed by two
inter-connected issues: first, the inadequacy of resources to provide
protective measures against terrorist attacks; and second, the
relative low priority accorded security concerns throughout the US
government by the Congress, the (State) Department, other agencies in
general, and on the part of many employees -- both in Washington and
in the field."


The US government, he said, would need to devote some $1.5 billion per
year for the next decade to improve security at its embassies
worldwide.


US government employees, too, will have to devote much more individual
attention towards security to meet the growing challenges presented by
international terrorists, Crowe said.


In the case of the East Africa bombings, however, the boards "did not
find reasonable cause to believe that any employee of the United
States Government or member of the uniform services breached his or
her duty," Crowe said.


Following is the State Department transcript:



(begin transcript)



U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Office of the Spokesman



January 8, 1999



BRIEFING BY ADMIRAL WILLIAM J. CROWE, CHAIRMAN

OF THE ACCOUNTABILITY REVIEW BOARDS ON

REPORT OF THE ACCOUNTABILITY REVIEW BOARDS

ON THE EMBASSY BOMBINGS IN NAIROBI

AND DAR ES SALAAM



Washington, D.C.



ADMIRAL CROWE: Good morning. This is my first experience in a press
conference at the State Department; also an intimidating one, I might
say.


As the Secretary informed you, the two commissions which I head, which
investigated the Nairobi and Dar Es Salaam bombings, have submitted a
combined report today after some three months of deliberation. These
efforts include visits to Nairobi and Dar Es Salaam. We have
interviewed, in total, over 130 witnesses.


First I think it appropriate to make a few general comments about the
report, and then I will address any inquiries that you might have.


Please understand that today we are releasing an unclassified version
of a longer and more complete classified report. At the outset, I
should note that this was not a pleasant task. Throughout, we have
painfully aware of the human toll that was involved. I would like to
reflect, as the Secretary did, our heartfelt sympathies to the
families and friends of the victims; and I include in that the
Kenyans, Tanzanians, as well as Americans.


To recap, the two terrorist bombings resulted in the deaths of over
220 persons and injuries to more than 4,000 people. Twelve American US
Government employees and family members and 40 Kenyan and Tanzanian US
Government employees were among those killed. Both chanceries and
several other buildings were severely damaged or destroyed.


The security of our people has been the key focus of the boards' work.
That is, our primary concern was the future protection and security of
the thousands of Americans and foreign nationals who worked for the
United States in hundreds of overseas missions. The report should be
examined in this light.


The Accountability Review Boards, which I chaired, were a group of
distinguished Americans who withdrew from their normal occupations for
the last three months and devoted their considerable talents and
energy to this task. They represented a wide range of experience --
diplomatic, military, intelligence, legal and academic. I am
especially proud of their dedication and the study that they produced.
Perhaps most important, and I want to stress this, I am convinced that
their labor was completely devoid of pressure from any government
agency. I can testify from personal experience that they went to
exceptional lengths to reach sound, fair- minded and independent
judgments.


The boards did not find reasonable cause to believe that any employee
of the United States Government or member of the uniform services
breached his or her duty in connection with the August 7 bombings.
However, we found that security affairs in today's complex bureaucracy
are widely dispersed. Consequently, it is difficult to pinpoint
responsibility.
Nevertheless, we believe that there was a collective failure by
several Administrations and Congresses over the past decade to reduce
the vulnerability of US diplomatic missions adequately.


In this regard, the boards were most disturbed by two inter-connected
issues: First, the inadequacy of resources to provide protective
measures against terrorist attacks; and second, the relative low
priority accorded security concerns throughout the US Government by
the Congress, the Department, other agencies in general, and the part
of many employees -- both in Washington and in the field.


Saving lives and adequately addressing our security vulnerabilities on
a sustained basis must, in our judgment, be a given higher priority by
all those involved if we are to prevent such tragedies in the future.
Let me stress a clause in the last sentence: "by all those involved."
We discovered that many people want to continue to do their work as
always, but consider it the job of someone else to make them safe. In
today's world, I'm afraid it's not that simple. Security -- to use a
Navy expression -- is an "all-hands" proposition. All employees
serving overseas must adapt their lifestyles to make their workplace
and their residences more safe.


The security systems and procedures of both posts at the time of the
bombings were in general accord with current Department policy.
Alarmingly, those procedures and systems followed by the embassies
under the Department's direction did not speak to large vehicular
bombs with any specificity or transnational terrorism, nor the dire
consequences that would result from them. This gap existed throughout
the system.


Both embassies were located immediately adjacent or close to public
streets and were especially vulnerable to large vehicular bombs. The
boards found that too many of our overseas missions are similarly
situated. Unless these vulnerabilities are addressed on a sustained
and realistic basis, the lives and safety of US Government employees
and the public in many of our facilities abroad will continue to be at
risk from further terrorist bombings.


The boards further found that intelligence provided no immediate
tactical warning of the August 7 attacks. We understand the difficulty
-- in fact, more than we did when we started -- of monitoring
terrorist networks, and concluded that the current role or state or
play in the intelligence community and intelligence expertise offers
us no assurance that we will have tactical warning and that our
missions which are vulnerable will have such warning.


In any case, there are instances, of course, that we have tactical
warning, but they are more the exception than the rule. We must
consider that a bonus rather than a normal event. We found, however,
that both policy and intelligence officials have relied in the past on
warning intelligence to measure threats; whereas experience has shown,
that transnational terrorists often strike without warning at
vulnerable targets in areas where expectations of terrorist acts
against the United States are relatively low.


In our investigations of the bombings, the boards were struck by how
similar the lessons were to those drawn by the Inman Commission over
14 years ago. What is most troubling is the failure of the US
Government to take the necessary step to prevent such tragedies
through an unwillingness to give sustained priority and funding to
security improvements. We viewed as our primary and overriding
responsibility the submission of recommendations that will save lives
of personnel serving at US missions abroad in the future.


We are advancing, in this report, a number of proposals that deal with
a handling of terrorist threats and attacks; the review and revision
of standards, including a review of the Inman Report; also, a review
of procedures to improve security readiness and crisis management; the
size and composition of our missions; and the need to have adequate
and sustained funding for safe buildings and security programs in the
future.


Some of these recommendations are, of necessity, classified. We
recognize that the Department of State and other US Government
agencies are already making adjustments. In fact, we have cooperated
with that by, as our investigation proceeded, occasionally telling
various concerned departments of some of the things that we were
encountering and some of the measures that we might suggest. They are
in essence taking measures now to enhance the protection of our
personnel in facilities abroad. It is clear, however, that still much
more needs to be done.


While many of the recommendations in our report identify problems
which we found in various areas of security, none of this should
obscure the outstanding and often heroic efforts made by the
diplomatic and Marine security guard personnel in the field in the
wake of the horrific terrorist attacks. They often save lives and
acted in the highest traditions of government service. It was a very
moving experience to encounter this.


In closing, I would like to express both a warning and a plea. The
boards concluded early in their deliberations that the appearance of
large bomb attacks and the emergence of sophisticated and global
terrorist networks aimed at US interests abroad have dramatically and
irrevocably changed the threat environment. Old assumptions are no
longer valid. Today, US Government employees from many departments and
agencies overseas work and live in harm's way just as military people
do.


We must acknowledge this fact of life and bend every effort to
continually remind Congress and our citizenry of this reality. In
turn, I would vigorously argue that the nation must make greater
exertions to provide for their safety. Service abroad can never be
made completely safe; we fully understand that. But we can reduce some
of the risks to the survival and security of our men and women who
conduct the nation's business far from home. This will require a much
greater effort in terms of national commitment, resources and
procedures than in the past.


In fact, it involves a sea-change in the way we do our business. We
have a choice, of course: we can continue as we have been, we can
continue to see our embassies blown away, our people killed and our
nation's foreign reputation eroded. I would hope we would not take
that choice.


I would be happy to address questions that you may have.



QUESTION: Admiral Crowe, does your report deal with the contradiction
between an attempt to have absolute security and the need for
diplomats to reach out to the community and have the community
accepted by them? How do you square that circle?


ADMIRAL CROWE: Certainly it is a difficult question, we would be the
first to acknowledge that. The commissions had many spirited
discussions on that.


I think there are several things you've got to recognize. First of
all, when you talk about openness and your ability to conduct
business, the threat has already closed up many of our current
embassies in the middle of communities. When I was the Ambassador to
Great Britain, we were a very tight embassy because of security. You
just didn't walk into our embassy; you had to have business there.
Even an American citizen could not come in without business or a
contact. We were not an open embassy.


I think more important to understand -- now, take the case of Nairobi
where 4,000 people were wounded. There were very few Americans in that
total number. It's important to the host country that we be
invulnerable, that our embassies not be vulnerable. They don't enjoy
having their citizens killed or wounded, and they don't want an
embassy in the middle of their cities that's going to be that
vulnerable or that attractive a target.


So part of our foreign policy in this new age of new bombs, new ways
to look at things, is it's very important and symbolic and of
significance that we have embassies that are invulnerable and that can
deter this kind of attack. I think that this transcends some of the
old arguments that we must fly the flag in certain places; we must be
open; we must always be available and conveying an American image of
openness, et cetera. The fact is that we have to change our way of
looking at the world. When you talk about lives at stake, they should
assume a very, very high priority -- not only on our agenda, but also
on the agenda of the host country.


Q: There are two major embassies under construction -- one in Berlin
and one in Beijing. Did you look at those; and did you offer any
advice?


ADMIRAL CROWE: No, we did not. Our charter was not to look at those.
We were limited -- one of the problems in a commission like this -- we
were limited to the two instances which we were examining. On the
other hand, we were determined from the very outset to try and reach
conclusions that extended beyond just these two embassies.


Now, we were aware that a new embassy was being contemplated in
Berlin, and I actually did have an opportunity to mention to the
Secretary my concerns about just letting symbolic things control. I
was not familiar with the details, I'm not quite sure exactly what the
embassy's like and so forth; but I thought it was important that in
selecting that embassy and going forward, that security be very high
in the considerations of the State Department.


Q: Admiral Crowe, it's my understanding that among the many
recommendations that the board made, and that would reflect this sea
change in what you said, in the way that we do our business overseas
would be the recommendation to close some embassies in, for instance,
Africa and perhaps other regions as well and to consolidate some of
those embassies. Could you address that please? And could you explain
whether or not the board thinks that it's likely and realistic that
the US Government would do that?


ADMIRAL CROWE: Again, we didn't consider specific embassies because it
was not in our charter. We didn't have the time to go -- but we did
consider the general subject that you're talking about. There was
considerable experience on the board that have had embassies. We had
four ambassadors, I believe; and they all thought that two subjects
should be looked at: number one, the manning of our embassies --
whether they could be cut back with the use of modern technology and
so forth. We didn't say cut back a or b; we said the subject is an
important one, particularly if you're going to the Congress and ask
for more money, you should also say to the Congress that we have pared
down what we are doing.


And secondly, we should look at the possibility of reducing the number
of embassies. Incidentally -- let me be very candid -- that's a tender
subject in the State Department, because it has always been an
American principle that we will fly the flag in as many locations as
possible overseas. But it was our view that given this new threat
environment, that if a host country cannot protect your embassy --
which, incidentally, is one of their responsibilities -- if the
embassy is inevitably at high threat, that we should look at some kind
of other arrangement where we consolidate embassies. We do have some
precedent for this -- I believe in the Caribbean, for example, where
we move to one embassy that is not such a threatened area, spend money
to make it safe and deter, and accredit the ambassador to satellite
posts, which are convenient, et cetera, and then he would have an
office in each of those places that's much smaller and not near as
appealing a target, et cetera, et cetera.


Now, we did not get into many of the specifics here because we didn't
feel it was our business nor were we confident to talk in great
detail. We strongly urged that this subject be examined and that these
possibilities be looked at very carefully with an open mind.


Q: Admiral, you've spoken about the global terrorist network and the
dramatic and the irrevocable impact that they've had on the threat
environment, but isn't it a fact that in this case there's a bin Laden
network and he's located in a specific country and you know where it
is and I don't know how many other terrorist networks there are -- I
mean, I'm not quite sure what this global threat really is, after the
bin Laden people are taken care of. Isn't there another way to take
care of them -- simply dealing with the Afghans or dealing with him
directly?


ADMIRAL CROWE: Well, it's not our charter nor am I going to get into
how we solve a terrorist problem around the world for the United
States. I'll be happy to talk about it as it concerns embassy security
and safety of our people, et cetera, et cetera. But you have really
opened up a very big subject; and one that, incidentally, is part of
the US Government is charged with addressing directly -- and I'm
talking about the Department of Justice and the FBI. The State
Department's involved, but the differences between our investigation
and the one that the FBI is currently doing is that they are looking
for people who are responsible with the idea of ultimately prosecuting
them. We did not go into that question at all.


Q: Secondly, you talked about creating invulnerable embassies. I'm not
quite sure how you're going to do that except for


ADMIRAL CROWE: I don't think I used the world invulnerable, but
certainly that we create embassies that are safer than they currently
are and that take advantage of some of the technology that is now in
the research lab. And it is possible to make buildings more safe. I
can't envision an invulnerable embassy; and certainly not an
invulnerable embassy that doesn't have large stand-off distances.


Q: What's the cost of it going to be? How many additional resources do
you think have to be brought to bear --


ADMIRAL CROWE: Well, we hit this subject very hard and we recommended
a couple of things. That is that the capital account for keeping
embassies current and solving these problems be separated and distinct
and that the State Department have a sustained program of over ten
year of about $1.5 billion a year for that period of time, apart from
the monies that are funded for political purposes and for their
regular functions. This should be over and above that. It shouldn't
come out of the funding that the State Department normally receives.


Now, I'm not naive; I've been around quite a while. I've served in the
US Government over 50 years. One of the questions you probably ask is,
is that realistic? That's not our problem. Our problem is what kinds
of threats are we facing, what can we do about it and to compare or
rather to present the dilemma, are lives worth that or not worth it?


Q: Admiral, although your team didn't look at specific other
embassies, did they come up with an estimate of the number of
embassies worldwide that maybe at "sub-par" security; and how
dangerous is that situation?


ADMIRAL CROWE: Well, there are quite a few figures on that and it's
certainly a matter of interpretation. About two-thirds of our
embassies have not met Inman standards and still require some kind of
improvement to reach the minimum level. It's a big job.


We have the Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security. Would you
like to speak to that, David?


Q: Yes, and if you could just respond when you have two-thirds that
are sub-par, how concerning is that to you, obviously?


ADMIRAL CROWE: Oh, very concerning; that's the thrust of the whole
report. That's the reason we stressed funding. Funding's not the only
thing we hit, but we stressed funding because when you track down
these various threats and so forth, you also end up somewhere spending
some kind of money. Do you have the money or don't you have the money
for it? But we made a very big issue out of funding, sustained over a
long period of time.


Now, let's face it, we're not going to have new embassies in all those
places in very quick order. So we're going to have a high risk and a
lot of embassies in harm's way for quite some time. Now, we believe
that in recent technological advances and more that we know about
these attacks and so forth that there are things less costly than
building a new embassy that can upgrade the physical protection of
these places and save lives. I don't mean that they're going to
completely deter attacks or they're not totally invulnerable; but they
can avoid some of the things that we had in Nairobi and Dar Es Salaam
if we take advantage of those. We recommended a number of those.


They will cost money also, but it will be on a more modest scale than
a complete rebuilding.


Q: The Secretary, in her opening statement, said that the United
States must not hollow out our foreign policy. Do you have any doubts
about whether this Department and the Administration gets it when it
comes to adequate security, or has your message really gotten through?


ADMIRAL CROWE: Well, one of the purposes of this report is to raise
the sensitivity level, which we think has been historically very, very
low. We think the time, the window that is open to us to hit this
subject is very appropriate and right now it's timely. We hope that
those portions of the report that talk to this subject will have some
impact. And my discussions this morning with the Secretary before we
came here suggest that they are going to.


I would be the last one to say that there is no problem between the
old way of doing business and the new way of doing business and how
much are you going to impact of the traditional functions of the State
Department in order to improve the security here and so forth. That is
always an issue, and will be for quite some time.


On the other hand, we contend -- and I think the report speaks
straightforwardly to this -- that you've got to look at those
functions. There were several ambassadors on the commission who said
they said they thought there were areas where we could cut back in
other things that we do and functions that would generate less
vulnerability and also free up some funds for other purposes.


Now, we didn't advise exactly how to do that; we're not telling
Secretary of State how to run her business. But we're telling her it's
an appropriate area to look at. This attitude that I want to be able
to do my business as I've done it for the last 50 years and don't
bother me with security and somebody else should take care of me
without me having to change anything has got to go. Because of the
impacts of these bombs, and the things that they can do to you,
security's got to be a higher priority, and other things are going to
have to, in a certain sense, step aside a little bit -- maybe not down
the priority list -- but they've got to make some accommodations with
this new world.


I'm a military man by trade, and one of the big issues in the earlier
part of this century was whether tanks would replace cavalry. Many
people said, well, if we take tanks, the enemy will prevail because he
has them, and we don't want to let him prevail, we'll stick with
horses. We couldn't do that. The cavalry disappeared, and people had
to make a decision they didn't like to make. That's sort of the way
with security. We're going to have to accommodate security in a more
positive, and a more comprehensive way than we have in the past. It
will affect other functions. The question "how much" -- I don't know.
It's important to us and to the country that we do preserve our
foreign policy functions; that's what embassies are for. It's now
become a part of foreign policy and our impression and our reputation
overseas that our embassies be safe, and that our people be safe.


Q: Admiral, you said, in your opening statement, that there was no
immediate tactical warning of the attack. It's my understanding that
there was sort of some generalized intelligence regarding the threat
that had been discarded as not serious. Could you address that?


ADMIRAL CROWE: I enjoy your word, "generalized;" I think that is true.
Please bear in mind how many thousands of threats come through the
State Department system -- about 30,000 a year, or something like
that. All the embassies, when I was in, we constantly were dealing
with threats, whether they were credible or not.


There were some contacts made in 1997 in the Nairobi embassy that
suggested that perhaps an attack was aborning against the embassy.
This was followed up by some more information which was very general,
not specific, not tactical in any nature of the word, and was also
constantly changing. They said no, no, it's no longer a car attack,
it's going to be an assassination. Then, subsequently, no, no, it's
been put off until after elections, et cetera.


These threats were evaluated by the entire intelligence community,
which is our practice with all threats, and they were essentially
discredited. This view was reinforced by the fact that with the
passage of time, nothing did happen; that at the same time, some of
the non- governmental groups that we were really not in agreement with
and that we were concerned about in Kenya were taken down and the main
players were deported, leading our intelligence people to believe that
probably the main threat had gone away -- at least any real threat
against the American Embassy.


Then, we went through a very long period of no information whatsoever.
Now, the question would arise in your mind, when you get a warning,
how long do you keep that warning -- one year, ten years, 20 years? We
just had a silent, black hole there. So we did come to the conclusion,
after interviewing everybody involved in the process, that there was
not a legitimate or genuine tactical warning. To this day, after the
explosion, we still have no evidence that those particular warnings
were connected in any way with the actual attack.


But the more significant conclusion we came to -- which, incidentally,
so did the Inman Report, but we just reinforced that -- is that this
is not a matter of intelligence failure. I don't like that term. The
fact is that in the state of intelligence today, and in the state of
how complex these organizations, are and the difficulty of deriving
what they're doing, that it's just not within our reach to have
tactical warning. We may have it sometimes, but that's a bonus, not
something we can depend on. We've got to assume that we will be
without tactical warning and proceed on other bases. That's not a new
conclusion; that's not unique to us. It's been drawn by many people,
and we just reinforce it.


MR. RUBIN: Thank you, Admiral Crowe. I know the Assistant Secretary
would like to say a few words and answer some of your questions.


ASSISTANT SECRETARY CARPENTER: If I may start by saying, I was sworn
in on August 11: that's four days after the bombings. But that is not
to say that, had I been in this capacity prior to the bombings, this
would have been prevented.


I was drawn to the one question about sub-par security. We do have --
we found out after the bombings -- that 88 percent of our embassies
did not meet set-back standards that were established following the
Inman Commission. That's not to say that we have sub-par security at
any of these facilities; we're simply lacking in that one element.


I'd also like to -- I feel compelled to second both everything the
Secretary said, and the things that the Admiral has most recently said
here in his statement. This Department takes very seriously what
happened in Nairobi and Dar Es Salaam. There has been no lack of will
or spine to go forward and establish the best security possible for
our people out there.


But one of the things that I have to mention, and one word that I've
become, over my career, very frustrated with is "risk management." As
you see risk increase and funds decrease, you're no longer managing
risk; you're taking risk. That's the position that some of our
facilities found themselves in -- making decisions on where best to
put their efforts and their money, when their efforts and money needed
to be spent in a lot of different arenas.


So I, quite frankly, since I've been here, have been very proud of the
efforts at not only this Department, but other government agencies in
supporting our efforts, as well as host governments in supporting our
efforts, have provided to keep us safe to date. We have a lot more to
do. We're continuing being very aggressive; we're continuing to be
proactive.


In reference to the Admiral's last comments about intelligence:
Intelligence is nice when you've got it. But when it's not provided to
you, you have to be prepared, 24 hours a day, for some sort of
eventuality as occurred in Dar Es Salaam and Nairobi. That's the
approach we've taken to secure our facilities the best we can for all
eventualities, not only car bombings, but other assaults, in the light
of today's environment, and what we're facing in that environment.


Q: Can you say whether you have done an evaluation of all of our
embassies; and those that do not meet Inman standards, where you have
made a determination as to the number that should be relocated --
those that are (under) the greatest threat?


ASSISTANT SECRETARY CARPENTER: I can say we've made an evaluation of
every embassy, and our potential vulnerabilities to car bombs and
other types of attacks, and are working closely with our ambassadors
and our regional security officers at each of these embassies, asking
their input into what is needed.


Again, the one major problem that we have against a car bomb -- or, we
found to have --
is set-back. Clearly, in some instances, we cannot obtain that
set-back. But there are other alternatives to set-back, and we're
exploring those very vigorously.


Q: You can't help but notice that steps that have been taken here
around the State Department as far as set-back goes. Does this
building now meet Inman standards as far as set- back goes?


ASSISTANT SECRETARY CARPENTER: I'm glad you noticed our enhancements;
that's encouraging. Yes, we have taken steps here at the Department of
State. The standards as set forth by Inman ideally call for 100 feet
of set-back. You can go out and look around the building and in some
locations, there's not. We are trying, or working with DC Government
to try to increase our set-back here at State. By putting the barriers
that you see out there, we have, in some locations, increased our
set-back dramatically, in other cases, not quite as much as we like.


Q:  Are you considering closing C Street?



ASSISTANT SECRETARY CARPENTER: That is a part of our ongoing
evaluation.


Q: Mr. Carpenter, what is your bureau's current resources? How much
money do you have available annually?


ASSISTANT SECRETARY CARPENTER: The current budget is around $300
million.


Q: And so then, under the Crowe proposals, that would go up by $1.5
billion per year or what --


ASSISTANT SECRETARY CARPENTER: The $1.4 billion is money allotted in
an emergency supplemental, not only for State Department but for other
agencies to deal with the aftermath of the bombings.


ADMIRAL CROWE:  But our continuing proposal would be an additional  



Q:  $1 billion a year over ten years is what you said, right?



ADMIRAL CROWE: That would be more than operational; it would be also
capitalization.


Q: Come back to the question about the terrorist threat, because there
seems to be kind of a worse case scenario that you've developed as
part of your whole report, which is the assumption that there will be
more networks developed parallel or similar to the bin Laden one. I'm
wondering if that is really a realistic assessment?


And secondly, whether it also impinges -- and this is a twist on an
earlier question -- that people who work for the State Department
abroad -- there's so many names in the lobby on the charts there of
people who were killed -- they know that they're going out and taking
a risk as much as a military person does. But they accept it as the
price of doing business as diplomats today. I'm just wondering whether
you're not accepting that yourselves in going the worst-case scenario
route and trying to, basically, close off the embassies, reduce them
in size, and so on.


ASSISTANT SECRETARY CARPENTER: Well, I think you speak to a number of
issues in that statement. I would only say that as a security
professional, it's my job to look at the worst case scenario. It's my
job to prepare against the worst case scenario, taking into account
that this is a building that the public has to feel free to access. We
don't want to be off- putting in our security measures, but we do have
to look at all eventualities. Admiral, I don't know if you wanted to
comment on that?


ADMIRAL CROWE: Well, I think by implication I did comment on it when I
said that we're in a new environment, and we do anticipate -- and I
don't know any section that deals with this that doesn't agree with
this -- we do anticipate more and more frequent attempts. And we even
are afraid of other developments: not only larger bombs, but going to
other methods of attacking us.


Q:  You mean like rockets or stand-off type weapons?



ADMIRAL CROWE: No, weapons of mass destruction -- not nuclear, but
biological, chemical, et cetera, et cetera.


Q: It comes back to my point, isn't there a price of doing business,
and that there are some things that you cannot defend against, you can
only respond to when they happen? I mean, Pearl Harbor, there's some
things that occur like that.


ADMIRAL CROWE: I don't agree with that. That has certainly been the
attitude. That's the traditional and the historical, but given today's
research and some of the things we know about -- as we've said, we're
not going to make them totally invulnerable, but we think we can save
more lives and that we can preserve people if we're smart.


May I say just one more word about David's business. I noticed in the
papers this morning what was, to my commissions, a very disturbing
trend -- that several of the articles were quick to lay the blame
totally on the State Department, and to have found a villain, and go
after it pretty heavy: That everything that happened was the State
Department's fault.


That is certainly not the view of the commission. As I said, we have
come to the opinion that a collective fault for the US Government,
including the people that appropriate funds in this country, and that
terrorism is now threatening to grow to the point where it's
everybody's business, and everybody's got to accept a role and
responsibility. We would never say that it was totally the State
Department's fault, as I saw in some of the articles.


Q: Okay, this question is for Assistant Secretary Carpenter. You've
heard Admiral Crowe, and I'm sure you've read his report, and among
the recommendations to shut down or consolidate some of the embassies.
Would that make your job easier, and is that a recommendation that you
might have as well?


ASSISTANT SECRETARY CARPENTER: I think one can assume that if you have
fewer targets out there, that your job will be easier. That's not
something that -- we're looking at the number of embassies that we
have now, and doing the best job we can to secure them. I think that
there are groups that are meeting to discuss the viability, the
practicality of having smaller embassies, or larger embassies that
service different parts of different countries. The security will be
factored into those decisions as they go through them.


I did want to make one statement if I may, too, about acceptable risk.
The State Department personnel that goes overseas, they do accept a
certain amount of risk, but they're not suicidal. They're given a
certain amount of training relative to security awareness. Once they
arrive at their post, they get continued training. This is an ongoing
process here. So sometimes a problem appears so large that there may
not be a readily available solution. That doesn't mean that we don't
continue to work on it.


We are working with a number of agencies. This is not just a State
Department effort to come up with a silver bullet that keeps this from
happening. We're looking to other agencies for assistance, guidance,
looking at technology, how it can be used to best protect these
people, so that when they go out there, that risk that they're
accepting -- and they are accepting a certain amount of risk,
certainly -- is reduced to an absolute minimum.


Q: The Admiral evoked the possibility of chemical and biological
attacks on US embassies. I wondered whether either the commission or
your bureau had considered countermeasures to prevent such attacks,
and what conclusions did you come to. If you hadn't come to any
conclusions, whether perhaps it would be better to spend some of that
money, or most of that money, on dealing directly with groups likely
to do that, whether you've considered that might be a better way to
spend the money. And also, can we have a copy of the non- classified
report?


MR. RUBIN:  We're giving you that after the briefing.



ASSISTANT SECRETARY CARPENTER: I'll take this first. Of course we are,
as the Admiral mentioned, when we talk about worst-case scenario, one
cannot look at worst-case scenario without looking at how you counter,
or propose to counter, chemical, biological attack and/or nuclear.


There are a number of entities within the US Government -- this is a
government-wide coordinated effort to look at how do we deal with this
phenomenon. This is something relatively new -- relatively new in the
last five or six years. There are a number of groups that are meeting,
trying to discuss this. The State Department is an active part of it.
We feel that we're sort of on the tip of the javelin when it comes to
this. We feel that perhaps we may be as vulnerable as anyone else, and
want to participate in the solution to that, and are working very hard
to that end.


Q: There was a public announcement issued earlier this week, I believe
it was, for Egypt -- a warning to Americans there. It sounded like it
was not only official Americans, but it was also Americans who may be
traveling there -- civilian Americans. Is there anything else that you
can tell us about that threat? My understanding is that you all were
also going to be doing some security training for American civilians
in that community. Is that a new part, a new duty that you're taking
over under this?


ASSISTANT SECRETARY CARPENTER: No, this is a part of an ongoing
program. There are parts of the world who continue to get what I would
consider a very, very high number of threats, both towards the
embassies and/or the American community at large. Our embassies are
very active, which is why, I guess, maybe speaks back to a little bit
about going with the regional embassies. We need representation out
there to work with our American citizens on a continuing basis, to
make sure that they're safe, they feel safe and they are in touch with
the latest information.


These travel warnings in Egypt are nothing new. You can be assured
that our people in the embassies are, in fact, working directly with
the community.


Q: Since you raised it, you talked about these extraordinary measures
you're considering to protect the embassies and the diplomatic
personnel. How exposed are American business people, and how can they
-- they don't have those types of resources, or anywhere near those
types of resources. What should they do? Should they just close up
shop and forget about it?


ASSISTANT SECRETARY CARPENTER: Absolutely not. I think what your
question gets to -- a much larger issue on how do you do security
worldwide, and it's not cookie-cutter. One size does not fit all here.
We've got to adapt measures taken to the community and the threat and
the number of American personnel there -- where are they located;
where are their businesses; what security is currently in place? A lot
of American companies operating overseas have very, very professional
security in and around their facilities.


We are -- the State Department, and specifically Diplomatic Security
-- involved in the overseas OSAC, Overseas Security Advisory Council,
which deals with the communities in most of our posts overseas,
relaying information back and forth, receiving information from them,
and working on a monthly basis to make sure that everyone stays in
touch.


(end transcript)