19 October 1998
(Says regional security is the goal of Kurdish agreement) (8060) Washington -- The objectives of the U.S.-brokered power-sharing agreement between Jalal Talabani of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, and Masoud Barzani of the Kurdish Democratic Party, is to "ensure peace and stability in this area of northern Iraq which for many years has been plagued by factional disputes and by the interference of outside parties, and unfortunately by terrorist activity," says David Welch, Assistant Secretary of State for the Near East. The power-sharing accord, which was announced by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright last month, allows both Kurdish groups to work together in northern Iraq, Welch said October 15 in a USIA Worldnet "Dialogue" program with journalists in Ankara and London. "What we were able to do here was bring them together for the first time and set out a new process by which they ought to have accomplished certain things," Welch said. He noted that the Kurdish groups have not met with each other in four years. This new arrangement was an outgrowth of the Ankara Process, an agreement advanced by Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States to stop hostilities between the warring Kurdish groups, Welch said. He confirmed that the government of Turkey was consulted throughout the negotiation between the two Kurdish factions. "We made every effort to bring the other co-sponsors into this process," he said. "We do believe that the security of everyone in the area is better if there is a basic understanding between the two principal Kurdish parties in northern Iraq, and that includes the security of Turkey," Welch said. Welch acknowledged that the accord will not cure all of the problems in the area, but, he said, it is "an important building block ... and it was important to take this step forward." Following is the transcript of the Worldnet "Dialogue" program: (Begin transcript) MR. FOUCHEUX: Hello, I'm Rick Foucheux. Welcome to Worldnet's "Dialogue." Last month Secretary of State Madeleine Albright announced a U.S.-brokered accord which has allowed a power-sharing agreement between Jalal Talabani of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, and Masoud Barzani of the Kurdish Democratic Party. Many are hoping that this particular agreement will lead to a general election next year. On this edition of "Dialogue" we will discuss the northern Iraq accord and the impact this agreement will have in the area, and U.S.-Iraqi relations. Joining us to discuss these issues is David Welch, principal assistant deputy assistant secretary in the State Department's Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs. Mr. Welch, it's a pleasure to have you with us today. MR. WELCH: Thank you, Rick. MR. FOUCHEUX: Before we begin with our questioners overseas, can you tell us some of the highlights that have taken place since the agreement was announced? MR. WELCH: Certainly. When this agreement was put together it marked the first time the leaders of the two principal Kurdish parties in northern Iraq had met personally in some four years. It was a landmark event in that sense. Since then they have continued their own travels through the United States and Europe on their way back to their homes in northern Iraq. The agreement set out a calendar for its implementation, and we are in the very early stages of that. We hope that the next event will be another summit meeting of the two leaders, Mr. Barzani and Mr. Talabani, in Ankara toward the beginning of November. MR. FOUCHEUX: Great. Well, once again, we are glad you are here, and we are looking forward to your insights in today's program. MR. WELCH: Thank you. MR. FOUCHEUX: Our fellow participants are standing by in Ankara and London. We begin first with Ankara. Please go ahead with your first question or comment. Q: Good afternoon, this is -- (inaudible) -- from Turkish news channel and TV. My question is, you know, there's a big tension at the moment in the area between Turkey and Syria. How do you evaluate this tension? MR. WELCH: Well, I think -- first of all, I'm not in the best position to comment on the day-to-day development in the Turkish-Syrian situation, because unlike the joint statement between the Kurdish leaders in Washington, the United States does not play a mediating role in that dispute. The government of Egypt has. As I understand it, though, the tensions have calmed somewhat in recent days, thanks to the good efforts of Egypt. Now, I believe that the parties share an interest in seeing a solution to the problems between them, and I hope that they've embarked on a way to reconcile their differences. In terms of our own views -- that is, the United States' views of the issues that divide Turkey and Syria -- we have taken a position that no nation in that area should harbor terrorists, and that would include Syria. We have encouraged Egyptian mediation to resolve that matter. Q: Despite the U.S. government's official documents that is showing that Syria is one of the states that sponsors -- countries which is supporting terrorism, why don't you clearly support Turkey while it was trying to push Syria to end terrorist support for PKK? MR. WELCH: I'm not sure exactly what you are asking with that question. We have very different relationships with Syria and Turkey. On the one hand Syria as a U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism is subject to a variety of U.S. strictures and laws. On the other hand, Turkey is a long-standing ally of the United States, a member of NATO. There really isn't a comparison in that sense between the two relationships. What we support as an outcome here is a peaceful solution. We believe that Turkey has a legitimate grievance in this case. That is, we are quite concerned about Syria's harboring of terrorists and support for groups that advocate terrorism. Otherwise we would not have listed them as a state sponsor of terrorism. In that sense I think that we do support the grievances that Turkey has in this situation, while of course we advocate a peaceful resolution of the dispute. Q: Mr. Welch, does the U.S. administration have any idea where the PKK leader (Abdullah Ocalan ?) lives at the moment? MR. WELCH: I'm sorry, I can't comment on that. Frankly what I know is mostly from press accounts and from my own private diplomatic contacts principally with the government of Turkey. I would prefer not to go into detail on that. I would note some statements indicating a calming of the situation on the parts of certain members of the Turkish government. Q: Mr. Welch, do you believe a dialogue is a must as soon as possible between Turkey and Syria during that period unless Syria takes a positive step to clear its support for PKK? MR. WELCH: Well, it's hard to be against dialogue almost under any circumstances. I do believe that dialogue has to be matched with results. It's been our hope that the two parties would find some process to come together to discuss these differences in a way that not only are they resolved but each can be confident that the way to resolve them is verifiable. The alternative to doing so, that is that there should be some kind of escalation of the situation between the two, I think would cause us considerable concern. Q: Mr. Welch, as you know the Turkish government is not really happy with the last meeting between Mr. Barzani and Talabani in Washington. What is the main disagreement between Turkey and the U.S. administration concerning northern Iraq? MR. WELCH: Well, I am glad we have now focused on northern Iraq. Thank you for asking the question. Really I don't believe we have any significant differences between the parties who are the co-sponsors of the Ankara process -- that is, Turkey, the United States and the government of the United Kingdom. There are occasionally tactical differences or differences in interpretation, but those pale beside the fundamental agreement on the objectives. And what are the objectives here? The objectives are to ensure peace and stability in this area of northern Iraq which for many years has been plagued by factional disputes and by the interference of outside parties, and unfortunately by terrorist activity. The Ankara process was designed to repair that situation to the best extent possible. Over the years it faltered, largely because the two leaders could not come to an understanding on how to deal with each other over the very real problems that divide them. As I mentioned earlier, they haven't met together in four years until the event in Washington. What we were able to do here was bring them together for the first time and set out anew a process by which they could address their differences. This time it has a calendar attached, and in has in that sense a verifiable program of action by which they ought to have accomplished certain things, and the co-sponsors can monitor their doing so. Q: Mr. Welch, Ankara still says that the agreement between Barzani and Talabani that was signed in Washington is not being presented to Ankara, or Ankara has not been informed about the agreement before it was signed. What could you say about it? MR. WELCH: We have consulted with the government of Turkey throughout this process. The government of Turkey has consulted with us about its own efforts to promote stability in the north. We made every effort to bring the other co-sponsors into this process. But in the end the result was basically because the United States was able to broker a summit meeting between the two leaders. We felt that that meeting was sufficiently important in order to break the ice and lend momentum to forward progress that it should be held here in Washington. Our concern remains the same -- absolutely the same objectives as before: We do believe that the security of everyone in the area is better if there is a basic understanding between the two principal Kurdish parties in northern Iraq, and that includes the security of Turkey. If these two parties are able to cooperate, then the opportunities for outside meddling and terrorism and violations of the Turkish border we believe would decrease. Q: Mr. Welch, we have reports in Ankara that the support of the Baghdad administration to PKK rises day by day. Can you confirm it? MR. WELCH: This is yet another one of the U.N. obligations on Iraq that it is regularly violating. That is, the U.N. Security Council resolutions declare that Iraq should cease its support for terrorism. We have credible indications that that is not the case, that it remains in support of extremist groups, including unfortunately the PKK. Q: Mr. Welch, while they are talking about the future of Kurdish groups in the region under the agreement signed in Washington, what could you say about the future of Turkomen people in the area, in northern Iraq? MR. WELCH: Thank you for asking this important question. I believe -- and my duty in helping to mediate this process has been to achieve something better for all the people that live there. We think that the best way to do that is that they should take care of their own affairs and try and reach some understandings between them. By negotiating with the two principal armed groups there we did not mean or intend to exclude anyone. As you may know, I have myself personally visited northern Iraq twice in the last two years. That's sort of a rare trip for American officials to make. During those visits I met at length with various representatives of the Turkoman population there, and I have spoken to them in Turkey as well. We are gravely concerned for the future of all the people in that area, be they Kurds, be they Turkoman, be they Christians, Syrians -- anyone, frankly. We honestly believe that that future is better if they are able to protect themselves by greater unity and stability in that area, so that they are not victim to the interference of either Baghdad or Tehran or some other outside party that has a mind to upset the situation. The understanding that we brokered here in Washington provides for a political role for all people in the area. There are some differences as to how that would be exercised, but those differences are mainly in the area of rather basic data, such as how many people are in the population and what would be their voting apportionment within any assembly that would be elected. Those are areas which remain to be clarified in the negotiating process, probably with some help from outside so that a reliable census for example could be conducted and electoral rolls established. Q: Mr. Welch, as you know the Turkish government has recently decided to upgrade its political representation in Baghdad and decided to have an ambassador there. How do you evaluate this decision? Thank you. MR. WELCH: We think this is not the time to signal any change in the relationship with Baghdad, because at this moment the Iraqi regime remains significantly estranged from the obligations it must bear under the U.N. Security Council resolutions. It is not cooperating, for example, with the U.N. Special Commission, and hasn't been since early August. Therefore at a time when there is such a division between the regime in Baghdad and the international community we frankly felt it wasn't the right signal to suggest an upgrading of relations. Q: Mr. Welch, since the beginning of the Turkish-Syrian dispute there were some Arab countries which claimed that Israel is behind this Turkish policy by provocating Ankara. As one of the key diplomats of the State Department, how do you evaluate Turkish-Israeli ties, and also Turkish-Israeli ties are a threat for the region, changing the balances? Thank you. MR. WELCH: I'm afraid I don't agree with that hypothesis that some have that there is some Israeli involvement behind Turkish action in this regard. My own -- my government's views on this are very clear. It is quite natural for Turkey, a prominent and significant nation in that region and internationally, to have relations with whomever it wants. Israel is a good friend of the United States; so is Turkey. Naturally we would be pleased if their relationship matures and improves. We believe that's a healthy thing for the region, not a problem for the region. I don't consider it to be a threat to the region, and I certainly do not believe that Israel is in any respect behind Turkey's action vis-a-vis terrorists who threaten Turkey from the outside. The government of Turkey takes its own decisions on matters like this, and is I think quite capable of acting independently and bearing the responsibility for that. I think it's quite wrong to suggest that there is some kind of large plot here behind these moves. Q: I'm -- (inaudible) -- Los Angeles Times. Before traveling to Washington, Masoud Barzani said the reason he actually was going to Washington was because you, during your visit to northern Iraq last June, had for the first time expressed open support for the Kurds, that you had finally given the sort of guarantees that the Kurds were seeking. What sort of guarantees did you offer? MR. WELCH: Actually I think the most important assurance that we provide to the people -- all the people, not just the Kurds, but others as well -- in northern Iraq is an exemplar of international engagement. It is my belief that the United States should not remain indifferent to the fate of the people in this area. We have learned from terrible lessons in the past that if we are indifferent that tragedy will only repeat itself. Let's remember that the people in northern Iraq were victims of gross human rights abuses during the 1980s and early '90s. The international community rallied in the early '90s to support them. And I think the biggest problem they have had in the period since are their own political divisions. If we could lend some help to repair that, then the security and welfare of the people there, all of the people, would have been better. What I stressed to both leaders -- not just to Mr. Barzani, but also to Mr. Talabani -- and for that matter everybody else I met with there -- was that international engagement is available. That is, international attention is there, including for the United States -- but they have a responsibility to their own people to exercise leadership to help this situation get better, because if they don't the risks to their own people are much higher. I didn't provide any specific assurance. Once they came to Washington we made clear to them our view that in circumstances in which the two principal Kurdish parties were divided and fighting each other, and if they were then subjected to assault from the outside or from Baghdad it would be much more difficult as a practical matter for the United States or anyone to marshal international support to help them. The secretary of state made that explicitly clear to both Mr. Barzani and Mr. Talabani. But the converse of that is that if they are united, and if they are embarked on a process of peaceful reconciliation, then the United States will be there to help. And if another threat comes from Baghdad, we cannot remain indifferent to that, and we will be supportive. This the secretary of state announced publicly at the time the joint statement was put before the world. Q: Mr. Welch, if we look at the agreement between Barzani and Talabani we see some interesting points in this agreement. We see that the agreement includes an idea of federation between the Kurdish groups in the future. This federation idea will cause or will lead to a real state in the future in the area -- do you think that? MR. WELCH: I'm glad you asked this question, because I know from talking to my friends in the government of Turkey that this has caused some concern in Turkey. Let me answer this in several ways. First, with respect to what is stated in the agreement, it is explicitly stated in the first part of the joint statement that the aspiration of the people of Iraq is for a united, pluralistic, and democratic Iraq. In terms of what the two Kurdish parties aspire to, they would like some sort of federative solution within a united Iraq. In terms of the United States' position on that aspiration -- that is, on that desire of the two Kurdish parties -- we respect their desire, but we respect the desire of all the Iraqi people to have a united, pluralistic and democratic country. Frankly, they'd be a lot better off if they did. In that sense this is a statement of respect for the right of people to decide their own future within their country -- something that most Americans would readily agree is part of our own national patrimony. We are, after all, a federal nation ourselves. It does not mean that the United States proposes any specific solution for that -- for the nation of Iraq -- that's up to the Iraqi people to decide, of whom the Kurds are a large part. Second, what is the position of the United States with respect to an independent Kurdistan, because I know this is an area where people have asked some questions. Let me make it clear here, as I have before, the United States does not support an independent Kurdistan -- be it in northern Iraq, be it any other place. We support a united Iraq. We believe that Iraq has territorial integrity as a nation in its own right, and we are not seeking to change its formation. That is our view on what should happen within Iraq. Q: During your talks with Mr. Barzani and Mr. Talabani, did the issue of the Iraqi opposition come up? And what role, if any, did they declare themselves willing to play in such a movement? And given the failure of your previous experiment with an opposition, what new model or players if any are you looking at? And what's your reaction to Dr. Ahmed Talabi's (sp) proposal that the crowd prince of Jordan, Hassan, be the new leader of Iraq? MR. WELCH: Well, there are several questions there. Let me try and answer the most important one -- that is, what aspect of the discussions with Barzani and Talabani dealt with the opposition. I repeat what I said earlier. The purpose of the effort we launched here in September was to improve the situation in the north. We didn't set as an objective that these two leaders should declare themselves as leaders of the opposition or form any sort of united front against Baghdad. Frankly, I don't think that is necessary or appropriate under the circumstances. Let's remember, after all, that these two political leaders have a substantial experience with Saddam Hussein's regime. They don't need to be taught lessons by anybody by what it means to be victims of that regime. In that sense they are like most Iraqis: they suffer at his hands and have learned the results. We don't need to encourage them to realize that history. They are self-declared leaders of the opposition, because they do not want the authority and control of Saddam Hussein within their area. They would consider themselves to be worse off if that is the case. And it is our shared responsibility, frankly, as members of the international community to assure that that doesn't happen again. Q: Mr. Welch, as you know Turkey sometimes carries out military operations in northern Iraq to sweep out the PKK terrorists. Those operations drew some reactions from some countries in the region or in the world. But, as you know, you support it. You have been supporting Turkey for such operations because they were against terrorism. Under changing balances in the future, will the U.S. continue to look warmly on such operations by Turkey? Thank you. MR. WELCH: Well, let me be clear about our position. First, Turkey is a friend and ally. Second, we respect and support Turkey's right to defend itself, including against terrorism. Third, Turkey does not consult with us in advance on any such operations, and we do not support or preapprove them in advance. Fourth, when Turkey feels it necessary to conduct such operations, our reaction is that they should be limited in scope and duration, and scrupulous with respect to the effect on the human rights of the people in the area. So that is slightly different from supporting the operations per se. Other countries obviously take a different position, but then I would point out that many of those who denounce such operations are themselves responsible for the circumstances that lead to those operations or for actual support of the terrorist group the PKK involved. Our -- we have a good dialogue with the government of Turkey on these matters. It is my belief that the joint statement concluded in Washington includes some of the most important security assurances for the safety and protection of Turkey of any of these agreements so far. Am I concerned that they should be implemented? Absolutely. I will monitor this very diligently, together with my colleagues in the government of the Turkey and the United Kingdom. It's very important that that aspect of the agreement be firmly adhered to, and it is fundamental to the involvement of the United States in this process that there should be a security benefit for Turkey. Q: Sir, I'd like to repeat my question about the Iraqi opposition and what new sort of formula you are working on for that opposition. Can we expect to see such a movement being based anew in northern Iraq? MR. WELCH: We support the idea of an Iraqi opposition. I think we all know there is an Iraqi opposition, and it consists of most of the people of Iraq. The issue before us all is to give it a voice and a coherence so that it over time will show itself as a meaningful alternative. This is a long-term effort. It is unfortunately a characteristic of the Baghdad regime that the superlative authoritarianism of that government has been extremely successful in controlling internal dissent -- not in all areas of the country, but certainly in the center. What we are suggesting from the United States' side is support for the opposition's efforts to organize itself and project its voice internationally and inside Iraq. That has several elements. First, for support of radio broadcasts that would offer a different voice and view to the Iraqi people. Second, support for efforts of the opposition to organize itself and bring various members of the Iraqi opposition together for dialogue and understanding. Third, we also support an organized and coherent effort to gather the data about Saddam Hussein's human rights violations and war crimes, so that over time this can all be put in one place, studied and analyzed, and perhaps be the basis for some further international action against him. Q: Mr. Welch, as you know Barzani and Talabani have been planning to come to Turkey to get together again in Ankara. Will you join them during their trip to Ankara, or do you have any plan to come to Ankara to ease Turkish officials' concerns about the agreement signed in Washington? MR. WELCH: Actually I have spent quite a bit of time with officials of the government of Turkey in recent weeks. And I hope to continue that. We suggested that the next step in the reconciliation process be a meeting at the summit level between Barzani and Talabani with Turkey, the U.K. and the U.S. in attendance in Ankara. And let me point out with respect to that meeting its agenda could cover anything. We had suggested that it must focus on the issue of security. Why did we do that? We did that because, as I said earlier, this is the principal element of our involvement here, and a fundamental of our mediation effort. We didn't mean by suggesting that that the other issues wouldn't be on the table -- of course they would be. Now, it is up to the government of Turkey to invite us all. I hope they will do so. If they should do so, then I personally will be very glad to attend. My boss, Secretary Albright, expects me to go there for that purpose, if such a meeting is held. In recent days I will tell you that I have spoken to Mr. Barzani and to Mr. Talabani, who are in Europe and the Persian Gulf respectively, and they have both indicated their willingness to go if they should be welcomed there. It's up to the government of Turkey of course to extend that welcome. MR. FOUCHEUX: Thank you in Ankara. Now we turn to London for their questions. Please go ahead in London. Q: Hello, this is -- (inaudible) -- newspaper. I have two questions. The first one: There are some reports that Mrs. Albright promised Mr. Talabani and Barzani when they were meeting in Washington that the U.S. -- it will defend them in case of the Iraqi troops go to the north of Iraq, like it defends Kuwait. Can you confirm that? My second question is that you said that the U.S. aid policy is against the disintegration of Iraq. But from the Arab world view we see that there is de facto in northern Iraq which makes the basis for a Kurdish independent state. Thank you. MR. WELCH: With regard to your first question, Mr. Ibrahim, at the time the joint statement was agreed, Secretary Albright said publicly two things -- that the United States cannot countenance a repetition of the events of the late 1980s early 1990s in northern Iraq in which many, many thousands of Iraqis, mainly Kurds, died. And, as you may recall, this was one of the first uses of chemical weapons against innocent civilians -- by their own government. A second thing that she said in her statement was that the United States would include the people of Iraq, and especially those in the north, as among the concerns to which it would react were Iraq to make a move. I think this is a warning that Saddam Hussein should not ever attempt this again, because it would have a price. With respect to the breakup of Iraq, we have declared until, as the Americans say, we are "blue in the face" that we favor a unified Iraq. As a practical matter, the government of Iraq has not controlled certain parts of its own country for many, many years, including before the United States was actually involved in this matter. I don't know if you mean that is the breakup of Iraq. I consider that to be a failure of the regime in Baghdad; that is, a failure to its own people. We do not advocate in any respect the severance of a part of Iraq from itself, and the de facto creation of an independent state in any part of it; nor, I believe, do the two Kurdish leaders advocate such a thing. Read carefully their own statements: they want a united, pluralistic, democratic Iraq. Within that Iraq they would propose that they have a federative system. Well, that's up to all Iraqis to decide. We hope that the day will come in which the Iraqis are given such a choice. Q: Mr. Welch, my name is -- (inaudible) -- newspaper. And it's well and good to say that obviously you don't set out to carve out part of Iraq and try to make it independent or federative, as the two Turkish leaders would say. But in terms of action this is precisely what is happening. A, you are starting a broadcasting station for the opposition; B, there was an attempt by CIA elements in the north not long ago when Talabani attacked Barzani in Sulaymaniyah, and all the indications are that you are heading towards that -- you want a larger international involvement in the north. But you know actions are different from statements. What would you say to that? MR. WELCH: Well, I don't agree with most of it. I mean, there are many opposition radio broadcasts. Why is it that our broadcast is singled out as the cause of the disintegration of Iraq? What we want is a different voice for the Iraqi people. We are delighted to support that, wherever it comes from. We believe that the Iraqi people deserve a different future. That's our intention here. Again, my feeling is that there is a nation of Iraq. It has been very poorly led over the last 20 to 30 years. All you have to do is look at the comparisons in the region. Iraq has great natural resources, it has a bright and vibrant population. And what has been done with that nation? It has been ruined by one regime, and one regime is responsible for most of the history of the last 25 years. I think we all know this. Notwithstanding that fundamental challenge presented by the regime itself in Baghdad, this nation has remained unified. I believe its coherence, that is what draws it together, has a greater sense of destiny than what might draw it apart. It is not our intention to carve it up again; nor, I have to tell you quite honestly, do I think we would be able to even if we wanted to. After all, this country fought an eight-year war in which many people predicted that perhaps one part of its sectarian population -- what one sectarian part of its population would break away to go to the other side. Well, that didn't happen, did it? It didn't happen because I think most Iraqis think of themselves as Iraqis. And if an immediate neighbor couldn't carve it up, I'm not sure the United States could, even if we wanted to. Now, I think at the end of the day, sir, I think there is probably no way I can reduce to zero the suspicions that may be out there that that is our intention. But all I can do is reaffirm once again that that is not the case. And let me put it to you this way: If tomorrow we all wake up and there is a different regime in Baghdad, and Mr. Saddam Hussein has retired, then the United States will be prepared for a different relationship with that regime. Secretary Albright declared that in a speech at the beginning of 1997, which I would ask you to go back and read, because this shows that our problem is with the regime; it is not with the people or with the country. Q: And how would you, Mr. Welch, then interpret the move by Ankara to elevate diplomatic relations with Baghdad to an ambassadorial level immediately following the agreement in Washington? Don't you sense that the Turks are afraid that in case there is a separate entity in the north of Iraq the same example would be copied in Southeastern Turkey? MR. WELCH: I believe I have answered and can't answer any concerns on the part of the government of Turkey with respect to the joint statement between the two Kurdish leaders. With regard to Turkey's decisions on relations with Baghdad, I was asked this question earlier by a Turkish journalist, and my answer is the same: this is a decision up to Turkey. It caused us some concern. We believe at a time when Baghdad is divided from the international community it frankly is not a good idea to change one's relationship with that government. I will watch to see how this decision is implemented. Q: Hello, this is Ali Ibrahim (sp) again. In the agreement between Barzani and Mr. Talabani which the United States sponsored in Washington, there is a timetable for going to an election next June. Some critics say that the agreement is not realistic and there are lots of things about -- I mean, it will be -- there will be a lot of problems, like sharing the revenues and all these things, and also that the United States has committed itself to something which it can't afford. Thank you. MR. WELCH: Well, sir, I think this region of the world is unfortunately littered with many well-intentioned agreements that have suffered in the implementation. I am hopeful with respect to this one. I am hopeful because I think I have the personal commitment of both leaders, as expressed directly to the most senior levels of the American government of their own leadership and responsibility in this endeavor. Obviously that alone is not good enough. It remains their obligation to try and fix their own situation. What we have shown is that we can help. We can help to bring them together, but we cannot help them or push them to a solution -- they must do that themselves. We will monitor, we will cajole, we will encourage, we will push them to take those steps which are necessary to complete this process. The end result I think is a great benefit to their people. And if they don't get there they will have to ask themselves, Have they exercised their responsibility has leaders of their people to provide them for -- with a better future? Q: How do you see the Arab reaction -- I mean the moderate Arab states towards the Kurdish agreement from your point of view? Did they welcome it or they are little bit critical of it? MR. WELCH: Actually I think the reaction has been pretty good. We briefed many of our Arab friends during this negotiation and after it, and we found the reaction quite good. I think they see our purpose as clear, and that is to try and restore peace and stability in that area. The governments, the moderate American governments who are American friends, do not have a conspiratorial view of what we are trying to achieve. They don't think that we are trying to break up Iraq. I would point out that in the aftermath of the agreement one of the leaders has been making a trip to the Arab world. I hardly think he would be welcome in these places if they didn't like the agreement. Q: Mr. Welch, let's presume that the agreement has advanced along the way, and many of its parts have been implemented and then Baghdad was in a position to see when there is an attempt of them to separate. And then they cracked on the Kurds. What would then be the position of the United States? Would it send troops to be on the ground there? MR. WELCH: Look, I'm not going to answer a hypothetical question like that. But the message here should be very clear. There is a resolution, Resolution 688, which obliges the Iraqi government not to repress its own people. Iraq has never observed that resolution, and continues to this very day to conduct acts of repression against its own people. As we all focus on the arms control provisions of the sanctions regime on Iraq, we should remember that one as well that is the important human rights dimension to this issue. What we have established with this joint statement and the public U.S. remarks made at the time is that there is a warning there, that the international community led by the United States will not be indifferent if Iraq tries something again like it did in the 1980s and early '90s. Q: Do you see any connection between the accord between Mr. Talabani and Barzani in Washington and the escalation or the tension between Syria and Turkey? MR. WELCH: I don't personally, but I mean inevitably there is some sort of connection in that I think at the root of the problem between Turkey and Syria is the issue of the PKK. But you would have to ask the government of Turkey this question. Q: Finally, Mr. Welch, you said that you are not seeking to see an independent Kurdish state. And I don't actually believe that this will be accepted in the area given the balance of the regional powers -- Turkey on the one hand, Iraq and then Iran. But I mean you are in a sense encouraging the emergence of an entity in which the international community will be more and more involved in helping. Doesn't this sound to you like the beginning of a new state? MR. WELCH: Well, it sounds to me like ensuring the protection and security of a group of people who want the right to determine their own future within their own country; and who in the past, because they haven't had this kind of international attention, have been victims themselves. I don't believe, and I could not myself countenance remaining indifferent to their fate. And, yes, by their example we seek to show to all Iraqis that there is an alternative choice. But this means an alternative choice for all Iraqis -- not just for those in the northern part of Iraq. Let's remember that the people in the north are not the only victims of this situation. There are as we speak ongoing counter-insurgency operations by the government against people in the south. And you know unfortunately the situation in Iraq is such that people don't pay a lot of attention to these things. There are gross human rights violations committed in the center of Iraq as we speak. Last year the special U.N. rapporteur for Iraq reported on hundreds of executions that have been carried out by the regime. And we should all ask ourselves, Isn't it better to show to any Iraqi who is watching that the international community knows about this and believes that there should be a better future for them? This is what we are trying to do. We are not trying to create an independent state-let in the north or in the south for that matter -- or carve up this country. We are simply trying to show that there is an alternative available for people in which they'd have a better future. Q: I have one more question. Would the Iraqi opposition use the northern Iraq again as a base, like what happened before and ended in catastrophe? MR. WELCH: I am not sure what their intentions would be. You refer to "the" Iraqi opposition. The Iraqi opposition is somewhat divided now, and I don't know around what principles or actions they will organize themselves. And let me say this too: there are shades of difference between the KDP and the PUK over how they will deal with the opposition. So you must ask them these questions. But from the point of view of the United States, we are not trying by this process to encourage a platform or base for opposition activity. Quite the contrary. We thought that it was worthwhile in itself to have a process of reconciliation between the KDP and the PUK, that that would lead to a better situation in the north and protect the people there. Now, if in the future they should decide that they want to pursue some kind of opposition activity vis-a-vis Baghdad, that's up to them. But that was not an objective of our involvement in this process, and we are not proposing that they should do so. MR. FOUCHEUX: Mr. Welch, we've talked a lot about what the accord will mean in the Turkish and northern Iraq region. Could we broaden it a bit? Do you see this impacting in any way on the larger question of stability in the Middle East? MR. WELCH: Well, yes I do. Let's remember that this is a very volatile area generally, and some of the most severe challenges to international peace and security in this decade have evolved around Iraq, principally caused by the Saddam Hussein regime. And at times those have involved the people of northern Iraq. For example, I referred earlier to the human rights violations that occurred in the late 1980s, including the use of chemical weapons against an innocent civilian population. I think now ten years later the international community would not tolerate such a situation again. Second, to the extent there is greater peace and stability in the north of Iraq, the chances of a disruption there that some outside party might take advantage of, with consequences throughout the region, are lessened. And another example too is if that area is more secure and these two parties are cooperating, they have committed themselves to controlling the movement of terrorists and barring them from operating in that area -- the PKK specifically. That will reduce the problems that Turkey has from border violations and terrorist operations against Turkey, and there will be less disruption as a result if they feel compelled to -- they will feel less compelled to respond. MR. FOUCHEUX: So this could be a very optimistic step forward in a very general sense? MR. WELCH: Certainly it's an important building block. Look, there are many problems in that area -- this isn't going to cure them all. But this has been one which has caused particular pain and suffering over the years, and it was important to take this step forward. MR. FOUCHEUX: All right, Mr. Welch, let's return to Ankara once again for another question from them. Please go ahead again in Ankara. Q: You've repeatedly expressed your concern for the rights of the Kurds in Iraq, and their right to choose the form of government they want to live under in Iraq. Can we anticipate you showing the same concern of the Kurds of Turkey? MR. WELCH: Turkey is a democratic country. I think people there should enjoy democratic rights. That's an issue for Turkey. My concern right now is the lack of any such rights for the people of Iraq. And you will recall that whenever I was asked the question about what we support for Kurds, I made clear that we support similar rights for any Iraqi. I wish that other Iraqis were in a position to exercise such rights. I wish that other Iraqis had at least the minimum thing that the people in northern Iraq do, is some freedom from the authority and control of Saddam Hussein. Q: John Hemming (sp) from Reuters. What is your attitude to the continued diesel trade between northern Iraq and Turkey, which is against United Nations resolutions on trade with Iraq? And secondly, this has been one of the main divisive issues between the Kurds and is being supported by the Turkish government, which is an ally of America, and goes against the sanctions regime. MR. WELCH: Well, I think the Turkish government is actually trying to take some steps to control this trade. This is -- there are two areas in which the government in Baghdad is able to violate the sanctions regime. One is by the gas-oil trade across that border and the other is by gas-oil petroleum products trade out of the northern Gulf region, and that is smuggled to ports in the Gulf. We are trying to control both of these outflows. They are different in the ways in which this might happen. These are sources of revenue for the Iraqi government -- I would not exaggerate their importance. They pale in comparison for example beside the pre-war oil earnings of the Iraqi regime. But they are nonetheless important, and we believe they should be brought under control and regularized according to the sanctions regime. We have made some proposals as to how that might be accomplished to the Turkish government, and we are in a discussion about those proposals with them right now. MR. FOUCHEUX: Mr. Welch, again we have talked generally about some of the problems with the Iraqi government. What do you see as major current specific dangers in the region coming out of Baghdad? MR. WELCH: Well, we believe that Iraq under Saddam Hussein remains a significant threat to peace and stability in the area. The principal problem right now is that Iraq has divorced itself from cooperation with the U.N. Special Commission and the IAEA in the disarmament process envisaged by the resolutions at the end of the Gulf War. What that has done is that it has interrupted the ability of the international community to verify that Iraq has disclosed and destroyed all these prohibited weapons. And unfortunately there are large remaining uncertainties in that process that cannot be reduced unless Iraq brings itself back into compliance. Presently the Special Commission and IAEA are operating only on a limited, truncated basis. Until they are able to restore full operation, I don't think anyone in the international community can have any confidence about the status of their weapons programs. And until they have that confidence there isn't any prospect whatsoever that Iraq can get out from under the sanctions regime. So unless they bring themselves back into compliance we are going to see that this sanctions regime continues. I believe that the alternative is gravely threatening to regional peace and stability. What is that alternative? It is that we would accept that there is some potential there that Iraq might rearm itself or some practical ability actually to use these weapons of mass destruction. That is simply not going to happen. The international community decided in Resolution 687 that Iraq shall not have these weapons of mass destruction, and that is the standard by which Iraq must live. MR. FOUCHEUX: And with that our discussion comes to a close. Mr. David Welch of the U.S. State Department, thank you very much for being in our studios today. Our thanks as well to our participants in London and Ankara. In Washington, I'm Rick Foucheux for Worldnet's "Dialogue." 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