
May 16, 1998
PRESS BRIEFING BY AND NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR SANDY BERGER AND DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INTERNATIONAL CRIME, NARCOTICS, AND LAW ENFORCEMENT JONATHAN WINER
3:15 P.M. (L)
THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
(Birmingham, England)
______________________________________________________________
For Immediate Release May 16, 1998
PRESS BRIEFING BY
AND NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR SANDY BERGER
AND DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
INTERNATIONAL CRIME, NARCOTICS, AND LAW ENFORCEMENT
JONATHAN WINER
Metropole Hotel
Birmingham, England
3:15 P.M. (L)
MR. MCCURRY: Tony Blair is hoping that they carry goals to
Newcastle today. They don't get that. They don't even know what I'm talking
about. It's not summit, it's FA Cup Soccer.
Good afternoon, everybody. Our goal right now, since many
people have got early deadlines for Sunday, is to brief on today and then give
you, aside from the social color aspects of the summit this evening, pretty
much we'll give you what you need to complete your reporting for the day,
because we don't believe there's going to be much going on beyond what we tell
you now that we'll be able to share in any event.
National Security Advisor Sandy Berger will talk a little bit,
just kind of place the conversations today at the summit and look ahead a bit
to some of the things we'll be doing in the coming days. And I've asked the
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Crime, Narcotics, and
Law Enforcement, Jonathan Winer, who is probably our government's foremost
expert on international cooperation in the fight against drugs and the new
types of international crime that the President has talked about a lot -- he
is here with us to talk about one segment of the G-8 communique which is being
released today, which is the portion that is entitled, "Combatting Drugs and
International Crime." And we have that summit language, will be available
shortly, we believe -- correct? Shortly. So Sandy will start first, and then
Jon Winer.
MR. BERGER: Let me try to put the last few days in a little
bit of context and review it, including today, and then ask Jonathan to talk
about I think perhaps the central, or in many ways, the most important part of
the work today.
These summits, this now being our sixth, are always
a combination of both focusing on the immediate issues that are
at hand, as well as looking long-term at the challenges that are
down the road where the leaders can launch initiatives that later
come to fruition.
In terms of the immediate issues, obviously you got
some of this last night from Jim, but we were very pleased by the
political statement that was issued last night by the leaders.
If you saw a certain similarity between the language, for
example, on Indonesia and what the President had said earlier to
you all, it's not coincidental. I think it was an important step
in getting the leaders to say -- to call for President Soeharto
not only to stay on the path of economic reform, but also to
reach out in the political dialogue for political reform in order
to restore stability.
On Kosovo, we were pleased, obviously, by the
developments this week in which, for the first time, President
Milosevic and Mr. Rugova have met and have launched a process
which hopefully can lead to a end of the violence and a peaceful
resolution. It's obviously just a first step.
On Bosnia, I perhaps most vividly remember previous
summits happening almost invariably in the midst of an assault on
Sbrenica or Sarajevo, or some other location, and the summits
being dominated by Bosnia. I'm quite pleased that the summit
declaration was able today to welcome the extraordinary progress
that's taken place in Bosnia over the last year.
The Middle East peace process section of the
statement yesterday lends support to the efforts that are
underway under U.S. leadership. Secretary Albright and
Ambassador Ross continue to meet with Prime Minister Netanyahu in
Washington -- at least they were late into the night.
And on India, we are pleased that the strong
statement condemning the Indian tests and calling for restraint,
calling upon them to join the CTBT, and indicating that this
would have an effect on the dealings of each country with India.
So that's the short-term set of issues. The
longer-term set of issues previously -- more in the planning
stage than the immediate issues, where obviously one can't know
what's going to be swirling at the moment of a summit -- really
fall into three categories.
Larry Summers, Gene Sperling, I believe briefed you
yesterday on the steps taken on international financial
institution reform. Today, there is a discussion of integrating
all people and all nations and all areas of the world into the
global economy, with a particular emphasis on Africa. This is
something we pushed very hard, particularly since the President's
trip, with the support of President Chirac, to put Africa more
centrally on the radar screen of the G-8. And there's a
commitment, you'll see, in the communique of the G-8 to assist
Africa in 100 percent -- having all African children receive
primary education as a goal, and also dramatically decreasing
child and maternal mortality rates.
Third, there are what you might call -- I guess what
I call -- you can call it anything you want -- common challenges.
That is, things that are issues that these leaders face day to
day in their own context, but they're the same issue. This is
something the President has pushed for the last three or four
years -- to get the summit not only to talk about classic
foreign policy and international economic issues, but also things
where all of them from various vantage points are trying to come
to grips with the same set of issues. And what they'll be
talking about today is jobs, employability, how do you create
jobs in a mature industrial economy in the last part of the 20th
century.
There's obviously an enormous degree of interest in
how we have done it. And we'll be talking about the EITC and
welfare to work, which now is something, a program that is also
in place here in England.
Fourth, our global challenges, that is, those issues
which really can only be dealt with by common action. And Mr.
Winer is going to speak in a minute about the centerpiece of what
they are going to talk about today, which is international crime.
And, finally, under the area of global challenges is
climate change, and there will be a discussion later about how
you go from Kyoto to both implement the developed country
commitments and also draw the developing countries into a process
of global emissions control -- the last overlay here on this
verbal chart, verbal graph.
I think one way to look at these summits is not as
snapshots as much as moving pictures, and that you begin in one
summit, you plant -- now I'm going to mix a metaphor, I guess
--you plant a tree in one summit and you then harvest it perhaps
in the next or later. And just to give you a sense of that, the
financial institutions' discussion that really is going to --
resulted in a number of steps that were taken here yesterday --
or discussed here yesterday -- really began in Naples and was the
centerpiece of a process that was begun in Halifax two years ago.
The international criminal cooperation, that
Jonathan is going to talk about really began in Lyon. If you
remember, the Lyon Summit came about two weeks after Oklahoma
City, and we made a decision at that point to try to sort of
hijack the summit and convert it into a terrorism crime summit,
or at least, if not exclusively, put that on the agenda. And out
of that came a set of 40 recommendations that we made and that
the summit adopted and which are now actually beginning to result
in things on the ground that make a difference in international
crime enforcement, as Jonathan will tell you.
And again, this idea of dealing with common
challenges -- domestic issues that are similar in all countries
-- is something the President began last year in Denver, also
around these issues, the economic issues that they're all
grappling with. So this is a process, as well as an event, and
forces decisions and I think causes the leaders to step up a
little bit beyond the day to day and look down the horizon.
I'll answer your questions about this or anything
else that I can, but let me ask Jonathan to talk more
specifically about the international criminal aspects of this.
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY WINER: Thank you very
much, Sandy. Historically, governments have not crossed borders,
at least not in times of peace. Criminals, of course, as a
result of globalization, are crossing borders all the time. What
began to happen in the Lyon Summit and what is being essentially
fulfilled in this summit is the eight setting up a series of
actions to create the ability for governments to transcend
borders to fight crime, through coming up with common approaches,
common rules, common standards to create law enforcement systems
that will be more nearly interoperable with one another than they
ever have been in the past.
Now, this morning the heads identified as the
principal threats posed by the globalization of crime the
following: First, the threat posed by crime to worldwide
computer systems and telecommunication systems; secondly, the
threat posted by money laundering and financial crime to
financial and political systems; third, the threat posed by
corruption to rule of law and governance; fourth, the impact of
firearms trafficking and trafficking in human beings on
societies. There was consensus that all of these problems needed
to be addressed by continued joint efforts by the eight. I would
emphasize continued, because there has been a series of actions
that have been undertaken over the last several years already.
Among the points made by the heads were the
following: First, governments need to have the technical
capabilities to respond to transnational high-tech crime. And
such capabilities need to be as universal as the criminal's
ability to use high-tech to commit crimes. Being able to collect
evidence of high-tech crimes and to share that evidence with one
another, regardless of where the evidence happens to be located,
and regardless of where the crime has taken place, and regardless
of where the victims are, is going to be essential. And this has
to be done in balance with respecting personal privacy.
Second, on the issue of money laundering, money
laundering and financial crime the heads said requires constant
updating of domestic legislation. It also requires combatting it
-- international standards and approaches, because of the trans
border and global nature of money laundering and financial crime.
This is especially true in the area and the growing potential
threat posed by off-shore financial centers. International
cooperation against transborder financial crime, asset forfeiture
of the proceeds of criminal activity, and a focus on eliminating
safe havens are all critical elements of a response.
On the issue of corruption, the heads noted that
criminals have the resources to corrupt law enforcement officials
in many countries. Too often, the bribes they offer dwarf the
official salaries of officials. Further international efforts to
develop regimes and implementation of strategies to combat
corruption are urgently needed.
Fourth, the smuggling of firearms and human beings
by criminal organizations has become an increased problem,
requiring increased cooperation and definitive international
standards.
Finally, on the issue of crime, the U.N. convention
under negotiation within the U.N. system with a goal of
completion by the year 2000 can provide an effective means of
combatting many of these problems. This convention will
criminalize many of these offenses and provide universal norms
for cooperating against them through agreed-upon tools. It
potentially has a value and impact of the 1988 convention against
psychotropic drugs that was negotiated in Vienna, which since has
become a universal standard for combatting narcotics.
On the issue of drugs, the heads took up the issue
of decriminalization and expressed their strong views against
moves towards decriminalization, their opposition to
decriminalization, and their desire to oppose that, if it is
raised in the context of the U.N. General Assembly Special
Session on drugs next month. They endorsed the notion of shared
responsibility for combatting narcotics, of the need for a global
strategy, and cooperative efforts focused on both eradication and
demand reduction.
That essentially summarizes the discussion that they
had this morning.
Now, within the communique itself, there are half a
dozen -- eight or nine different points which track more or less
the discussion they had this morning. And let me summarize them
for you, if I might.
The first agreement that they reached is to fully
support efforts to negotiate within the next two years an
effective U.N. convention against transnational organized crime
that will provide law enforcement authorities with the additional
tools they need. Again, I would compare this to the effort that
took place a decade ago, vis a vis drugs, which essentially
established for the first time a comprehensive international
regime involving all nations to begin to take a series of steps
to combat drugs.
The second thing they agreed to was to implement
rapidly the 10 principles and 10-point action plan agreed by our
Ministers in December -- justice and interior ministers in
Washington on high-tech crime. One very important aspect of this
is they call for close cooperation with industry to reach
agreement on a legal framework for obtaining, presenting, and
preserving electronic data as evidence, while maintaining
appropriate privacy protection; and agreements on sharing
evidence of those crimes with international partners.
Essentially what is contemplated is global agreement on standards
for capturing information, retaining information, and sharing
information to deal with transnational high-tech crime.
These principles, the heads will state in the
communique, will help us combat a wide range of crime, including
abuse of the Internet and other new techniques.
In the money laundering area, the communique will
welcome the decision by the financial action task force based in
Paris to continue and enlarge its work to combat money laundering
in partnership with regional groupings. We will consider
high-level meetings to discuss further efforts to combat
transnational crime with special emphasis on money laundering and
financial crime.
The communique also agrees on further principles and
actions to facilitate asset confiscation as a means of
transferring funds from the criminals to governments, disrupting
their criminal enterprises and increasing the resources of those
who are seeking to combat their illicit activities.
On the issue of trafficking in human beings, the
communique specifies the particular importance of combatting
trafficking in women and children, including the requirement that
the eight get together to develope a program to prevent
trafficking in women and children, to protect victims, and to
prosecute traffickers.
The eight, will, as a result, be developing a
multidisciplinary and comprehensive strategy to deal with
increasing global problems. This will include principles and an
action plan for future cooperation, not only among the eight, but
involving third countries, including countries of origin,
transit, and destination. The U.N. Convention on Transnational
Organized Crime will be one of the mechanisms by which this is
accomplished.
The communique endorses -- further endorses some
joint law enforcement activities that are already taking place
among the eight, which are focused on particular kinds of groups
and criminal targets and which we expect will show results in the
days, months, and years to come.
They also are endorsing the elaboration of a binding
international legal instrument in the context of the U.N.
International Organized Crime Convention to combat illegal
manufacturing and trafficking of firearms -- a binding
international instrument to deal with illicit smuggling of
firearms.
They welcomed the work of the environmental
ministers to combat environmental crime, and on drugs,
essentially emphasized the link between drugs, international
crime and domestic crime; welcomed the U.N. General Assembly
special session on drugs, and sought reinforced cooperation to
curb trafficking in drugs, chemical precursors, action to reduce
demand, and support for a global approach to eradicating illicit
drugs.
That is essentially what is in the communique
language.
Q With regard to the crime part of the
communique, there was supposed to be a 24-hour hotline linking
the law enforcement agencies of the eight. Is that in part of
this mix?
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY WINER: It was endorsed
by the ministers as being implemented already. There are points
of contact that have been established among the eight and
exchanged among the eight. Essentially, the commitment is to
have somebody available 24 hours a day, seven days a week, to be
able to respond to a case of high-tech crime.
So if you're in the United States or Russia or the
United Kingdom or Japan, you've got one number, you know who to
call; that person is available no matter what the time of day is,
with a beeper or something and can respond. That way each of the
countries will have in place the ability to immediately push for
the freezing of information, so the information does not get
destroyed. Or if there's money involved, the holding of assets
before they can be transferred from one country to another.
An important case on this was the Citibank case
several years ago, when a fellow named Vladimir Levin in St.
Petersburg, Russia, essentially got involved in moving millions
of dollars of Citibank's money around. Now, as a result of
cooperation between the United States, Russia and the United
Kingdom, among other countries, he was arrested, indicted,
prosecuted, convicted, and all but $400,000 of the money was
grabbed. But what's interesting is, is to this day, all those
governments involved, $400,000 of that money remains missing. It
moved so quickly that it was not, in fact, traceable. And that
reflects the fact that there have been gaps which still need to
be filled, and we are in the process of doing that through this
mechanism.
And this is not the only mechanism -- we're
cooperating with the Council of Europe which is trying to also
develop some standard rules. But the notion here is we have to
push very rapidly now to create an international network for
governments to be able to respond to high-tech crime that's as
comprehensive as the Net is and our international financial
systems are themselves.
We're making a lot of progress in that area. To get
all the way is going to be absolutely essential to have
cooperation with industry. And the communique language
explicitly calls for that. We've begun some of that already
informally; that's going to intensify rapidly over the next year.
Q Where does it leave Interpol?
WINER: We're working and talking with Interpol.
Interpol is a means of getting information in real time on
particular criminals. When you're trying to track down a
criminal or get information that is in somebody's law enforcement
database, that's what Interpol is used for. Now, we're not
necessarily talking here about a law enforcement database, we're
talking about the need to find information that's located
somewhere in a server in somebody's national territory.
Q You're talking about back-door to encryption
then?
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY WINER: No, we are not.
We certainly are not. What we are talking about is the ability
to trap and trace information, not to be able to read the
information without permission. We're talking about developing a
universal system where when a crime has taken place, a government
can ask another government for cooperation and industries have
agreed to retain information for a certain amount of time.
In the same way that today, if you were committing a
crime in the United States, you would be able to freeze that
information and get a search warrant and be able to go after it.
We're talking about trying to create an international system that
allows for legal searches in a reasonable way to preserve
evidence of a crime.
Q Sandy, Pakistan says that the G-8 response to
India's tests was very weak and they say that they're going to do
what is in their own national interest. How do you respond to
their complaints?
MR. BERGER: Well, I have not seen that -- I take it
there's a letter -- I have not seen it. First of all, I think
the statement of the eight is a strong statement, condemning
unequivocally, without any hesitation, India's testing, and
indicating that it has and will affect the dealings of every one
of these countries with India.
In addition, a number of countries have taken
actions beyond that -- Japan, Canada, the Dutch, Swedes, the
Danes, and I know several other countries, a number of other
countries are considering actions.
So, number one, I think this is a strong statement.
It is accompanied by actions that have been taken by a number of
governments, and hopefully, further actions will be taken.
Number two, I hope the Pakistani government will decide that
their national interest is better served by not testing than by
testing. If they make that decision, I think, as the President
indicated, they will capture the high ground in the longstanding
regional struggle in South Asia. I think the nature of their
relationships with many governments will chance. I suspect the
attitude in our own Congress, which has been quite restrictive
with respect to Pakistan, would change, which would then free up
our capacity to cooperate with them more fully.
And on the other hand, India has isolated itself
clearly in the international community on this issue. So as
we've said all along, we very much hope the Paks will decide not
to take this step.
Q Sandy, Bhutto said that if there is a military
capability to eliminate India's nuclear capacity it should be
used. Does that exist, and is there any thought being given to
doing that?
MR. BERGER: Well, I'm not -- obviously, it would
not be appropriate to take military action in this situation.
Q Why not?
MR. BERGER: Why not? Because it would simply
escalate into a regional war which would have devastating
consequences for both countries. Neither side will win that.
Both sides will lose. The Pakistani people will lose and the
Indian people will lose. They've had three wars in the last 20
years and they've not gained from any one of them, it seems to
me. So I think that is not a wise course of action.
Q Is the reality that when it comes to nuclear
proliferation to India or Pakistan, or previously to China, that
there's just a limited amount of pressure that the rest of the
world can bring to bear, just a limited amount of things we can
do to --
MR. BERGER: I think that's not absolutely true.
Obviously, countries proceed on the basis of their own perceived
self-interest. I think this has much more to do with misguided
nationalism on the part of India than national security. But I
think that you have to look at this in a slightly wider time
frame.
The fact is the world has made enormous progress in
the past 10 years in controlling nuclear weapons. Let's start
with the principal nuclear relationship, that between the Former
Soviet Union, now Russia, and the United States. If the Duma
ratifies START II, as we hope it will, nuclear stockpiles will
have been reduced two-thirds from the Cold War. And if we get to
START III, as I hope we will, we hope to reduce them by 80
percent from where they were. We have had an extension of the
Non-Proliferation Treaty which expired and is now extended
indefinitely, and 149 nations have signed a treaty that was first
proposed by Dwight Eisenhower, which we were able to negotiate,
banning nuclear tests. And I think the more nations that sign
that treaty, the better, because it will isolate even further
those who feel compelled to test.
So, can we control everything that every country
does? Of course not. But I think that India is more isolated
today than it was before this test. And the general record of
nuclear deescalation over the last 10 or 15 years has been quite
strong. This is an unfortunate step backwards on that trend.
Q One assumes that this statement, no matter how
strong or weak, could have been agreed to by fax. Where is the
added value of these guys sitting down and going over this?
MR. BERGER: Well, I think there's been an enormous
added value by virtue of the President's conversations with
President Chirac, with Prime Minister Hashimoto, with Prime
Minister Blair, and others. Not everything is embodied in a
joint statement. I mean, I think that the President -- I don't
mean that there's a secret codicil here that we haven't shared
with you, but I think the strength and persuasiveness with which
the President has made the case to these leaders that this is a
dangerous step, that it is important to speak out against it,
that it's important to publicly and privately oppose it to stop
not only Pakistan from testing, but other nations from testing --
there's no question that the level of -- and I've been told this
by my counterparts from other delegations -- there is no question
that the sense of urgency and concern that is felt by the others
has been significantly enhanced by their conversations with the
President, who feels this very strongly.
Q The India tests would appear to have undercut
your efforts to get the Senate to ratify the Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty. Is that the way you read it?
MR. BERGER: Quite the contrary. I believe that the
India tests make all the more compelling the argument for
ratifying the treaty as soon as possible for two reasons. Number
one, as I said, the more states that sign and ratify this treaty,
the more isolated will be the countries, the more outside the
norm of international behavior will be countries that seek to
test. And our capacity to make that argument persuasively,
assigning and ratifying the CTB, is obviously is enhanced if
we've not only signed, but ratified.
Number two, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty has a
number of provisions in its verification provisions which will
enhance our capacity to detect activity of this sort. For
example, in addition to our own national technical means which we
have in any case, this will provide for international censors,
will provide for short notice on-site inspections, whether there
is suspicious activity. So we will have to verify -- we will
have to watch out for these things whether this treaty goes into
effect, or not, but this treaty gives us tools to do that which
we would not otherwise have.
And I think, third -- even though I said two --
third, there is a moment here in which we have your attention, we
have the American people's attention about the dangers of nuclear
testing. One thing happened when the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty was signed. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty said the
era of nuclear testing should be over. And backsliders, like
India, should understand that they are swimming against the tide.
Q Sandy, you talk about the political isolation.
Will you consider it a success if you leave Birmingham and all
you've got is political isolation and no one else joins to put
any additional economic pressure or force any other changes on
India's behavior?
MR. BERGER: Well, as I say, a number of -- I read a
list of a number of countries that have, including Japan --
Q -- to some extent?
MR. BERGER: To some extent. I hope others will.
And I think the strength of this statement is important. And the
fact that these countries will make this an issue in their
dealings with India is important. And the fact that it has
gotten this kind of attention is important. We would have
preferred India not to test. We made that clear to India
repeatedly since this new government took power. But having done
so, I think that it's important over the long-term that it reach
the judgment that further testing would be unwise.
Q Sandy, could you actually talk us through the
conversations they had today, particularly around crime? What
were they actually talking about? Were they just talking about
mechanisms and "we endorse this," "we endorse that," "organize
this," "organize that"?
MR. BERGER: I'm going to turn it over to my
criminal expert. (Laughter.)
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY WINER: They literally
talked through the six points that I went through a little bit
earlier. That is, they themselves focused on the need for
governments to be able to have trans-border capabilities to deal
with high-tech crime, the need to push through with the
development of common standards to combat high-tech crime common
mechanisms, and the need to get the private sector to work out
with governments ways to get information retained, and so on.
In the area of money laundering and financial crime,
they themselves literally talked about the importance of dealing
with off-shore havens, making sure that there was no place that
was capable of holding on to the proceeds of illicit activity in
a nontransparent way that couldn't be reached, and of the need to
have some common approaches to it.
On corruption, they talked at some length about the
problem of the disparity between the resources available to
criminals and the salaries paid officials in a number of
countries, and the need to think further about particular steps
to take.
Indeed, earlier this week, in the President's
international crime strategy, he announced, among other things, a
conference within six months headed up by Vice President Gore on
precisely this point. But there were a number of other heads who
raised this issue and thought that it's a very important issue
for further work to be done.
On smuggling of firearms, they specifically agreed
there has to be a binding international instrument to deal with
the smuggling of firearms. That means obligations of all states
to one another, of steps to take against firearms trafficking.
Now, this happened last October in the Americas, when the
countries who are members of the Organization of American States
agreed that no one would export weapons, import weapons, or let
weapons transit through their countries unless it was with the
permission of all countries involved.
The countries also agreed that they would mark all
firearms at import and at manufacture in order that weapons could
better be traced. They also agreed to cooperation with one
another on tracing firearms. So that kind of system, which
literally did not exist anywhere, it has been our domestic law
for some time, but didn't exist anywhere -- was endorsed by the
OAS and signed by President Zedillo and President Clinton
among others, last October is now effectively in the
process of being globalized as a result of the action of the
eight today.
The communique language basically articulates
specific steps that are going to be taken. One of the most
important steps that will be taken is the negotiation of a
convention against transnational organized crime within the U.N.
system in which a number of things that we're doing in our
country already, a number of tools that we use to fight organized
crime will become universalized.
For example, very few countries have racketeering
influenced corrupt organizations laws or conspiracy laws directed
against organized crime. Over the past year the European Union
has said that EU members must have that. The U.N. instrument to
fight organized crime will very likely, certainly, contain the
same kind of a requirement for criminalization.
In the area of high-tech, the commitment to work
together with the private sector to develop universal rules for
retaining information and for being sure that information can be
accessed in cases of crime is very important new work.
Q Has President Clinton contacted President
Soeharto, and is there anything the United States can do to help
bring his government to some kind of better dialogue?
MR. BERGER: Well, I think that President Clinton
has spoken to President Soeharto on a number of occasions over
the last -- since the financial crisis -- not since this latest
political turmoil. I think that -- we started two days ago
talking about not only the necessity for President Soeharto to
remain on the path of economic reform, but for him to open a
dialogue with all his people and engage in political reform so
that his people have a sense of buy-in to the kind of economic
decisions and circumstances they're going to face.
I think this language now has been embraced by the
G-8 so this now becomes more than simply the President's view, it
becomes the view of the G-8. And we will continue -- there will
be -- I believe, Prime Minister Hashimoto told us that he has an
emissary going to Indonesia. We had a long talk with him. So we
will continue to stay in contact. We have an extraordinary
Ambassador there, Stape Roy, and continue to encourage the
Indonesian government at this stage, when the problem is no
longer simply economic, but also political, to open up lines of
dialogue and engage various elements of their society in a
conversation about its future.
Q Are you evacuating dependents?
MR. BERGER: We have a ordered departure of
Americans which means nonessential Americans are leaving. I
think there will be over the weekend about eight chartered
flights with roughly 3,200 Americans leaving. But we will
continue, obviously, to operate. There have been no, as far as
I'm aware of, no particular incidents involving Americans, but
the situation is sufficiently turbulent that Ambassador Roy
sought that authority, and Secretary Albright approved it.
Q Sandy, how dangerous a situation will it be if
Pakistan follows India's lead and conducts a nuclear test?
What's the -- when they let the genie out of the bottle, what
happens?
MR. BERGER: Well, it will further escalate the
situation that is already tense and has been for some time,
really since the beginning of the -- for 50 years in some ways,
but certainly in the last 25. There are two arms races that we
have been concerned about in the South Asian peninsula -- one is
the nuclear arms race; the other is the missile proliferation
race. And these things heighten capabilities and with heightened
capabilities and heightened tensions you have greater danger.
I would hope that the two countries would realize,
whatever their capabilities might be, that any further conflict
between them would be a disaster.
Q Quickly on Indonesia. As you know, Soeharto is
back-pedaling on many of the key aspects of the course of action
for economic policies that have been recommended by the IMF,
particularly dual cost. Is the U.S. of the view that that's
prudent at this point, or does the U.S. think that he should be
sticking to the IMF plan, despite upheaval and evidence of
unrest?
MR. BERGER: Let me answer it in two ways. Number
one, with respect to any particular action that he might take,
it's really a matter for the IMF to evaluate. I would say in the
connection with fuel prices, for example, that the IMF -- let's
go back and blend my two answers here.
The IMF didn't create the Indonesian economic and
political crisis. Indonesia created the economic and political
crisis, starting with an economic crisis. The Indonesian economy
was collapsing. The International Monetary Fund came in to try
to help restore stability and put it on a path back towards
growth, but that had to be accompanied with reform. You can't
get one without the other. You can't have the candy without some
of the medicine.
Now, there have been three revisions of that IMF
agreement; each case trying to deal with some of the consequences
on the Indonesian people, and it's been accompanied by a good
deal of World Bank social safety net loan lending and bilateral
aid -- for example, from the United States -- to try to mitigate
the impact of this on the Indonesian people. But obviously,
there has to be -- the criteria here needs to be what is in the
best interest of the Indonesian people, and the best interest of
the Indonesian people in our judgment at this stage lies in a
combination of a more open political process, political reform,
so that they can have a voice in and have some ownership over the
decisions that shape these very hard economic choices and
decisions that have been brought about by the prior loss of
confidence in the Indonesian economy by the international
community.
Q You say these hard decisions are unavoidable,
but they have to plow ahead with them --
MR. BERGER: I don't want to comment on any
particular -- in the fuel area, for example, I know that the
there was a much lower increase in kerosene prices which are used
by ordinary Indonesians than in fuel oil prices that are used by
more wealthy Indonesians. So there's been sensitivity on the
part of the IMF to these consequences.
I can't comment knowledgeably on one particular
piece of this. I think that there will not be economic reform --
successful economic reform -- without political dialogue, and
there will not be long-term political stability unless there is
an economic recovery that's going to require some reform
measures.
Q Back to India and the statement from last
night, you made the argument yourself today repeatedly that as a
result of the leaders getting together there is a greater sense
of consciousness about it, a greater willingness to at least
think that this is a terrible problem. But can you point to
anything that any country has done since arriving here, any
signals that they have given you in a concrete way that they are
prepared to take any further steps that they had not already done
before they came to Birmingham?
MR. BERGER: Japan has taken some further steps
since it has arrived here and there have been statements made by
others indicating that they will go home and look at this very
seriously. And Prime Minister Blair called Prime Minister
Vajpayee after this and spoke of the dismay of the international
community. Your question goes to specific actions and there have
been leaders who have indicated that they will go back and look
at this more seriously. I mean, obviously, this happened as they
are arriving; these are things that one usually does in
consultation with your legislature, your parliament, and so it
would not have surprised me if there were further actions.
Q Sandy, where has Yeltsin been in all of this?
This was finally the G-8, he got the title he wanted. Has he
been involved in many of these discussions? Can you go over his
performance?
MR. BERGER: My understanding has been that he was
supportive of the strong language -- explicitly supportive of the
strong language that was used last night condemning the action.
Q Sandy, could you talk about President --
Q Could I just ask another question on Yeltsin?
To what extent will the dynamics between Clinton and Yeltsin
tomorrow change as a result of this nuclear showdown in South
Asia? Do they have more pressure to deliver something on the
nuclear front despite being tied up with the Duma and the
ratification?
MR. BERGER: No, I don't think -- I'm sure it will
be discussed, although -- I mean, they have discussed it,
obviously, last night. But there are a number of issues on the
agenda between President Yeltsin and President Clinton. There's
not much more to say about it, I think, than was said last night,
but issues involving the new Russian government, what its
direction is, what its priorities are, questions of START II
ratification, START III. We have concerns we want to talk to the
President about in terms of missile proliferation, or missile
technology proliferation. So there's a pretty heavy agenda.
This may come up some more, but they have discussed it.
Q Sandy, Congress so far has refused to give
Clinton fast track, it's not voting U.N. dues, it's not voting
IMF money. The Republicans are saying they're not going to give
you ratification of the Test Ban Treaty. How often can Clinton
come to these summits or deal with crises like India nuclear
testing and not have the tools, the leverage, to deal with these
situations?
MR. BERGER: I guess I would say two things. I
don't see or sense any diminution either in Santiago or here of
the President's authority with these leaders. These leaders
clearly see the United States as the dominant economy in the
world and as a key leader. And the President's personal
partnership with these particular leaders now is very -- quite
close and deep. So I don't see any -- in these contexts, I have
not seen any evidence of that.
However, having said that, obviously, we need the
IMF money, not so much because of the President's authority to
persuade someone to use a different adjective on India, but
because if this Asian problem spreads, as it well might, we're
going to need those resources. And at that point, I think we
would look pretty darn foolish if we have not stepped up to the
plate.
Similarly on the U.N., if we get to the end of the
year, and we wind up having to sit out on Dag Hammarskjold Avenue
under a pup tent instead of having our seat in the General
Assembly, I think that would be unfortunate. (Laughter.)
Q That might be good pictures, though, we could
use. (Laughter.)
Q Sandy, on Northern Ireland --
MR. BERGER: There was a statement on that. I think
they issued an additional paragraph -- is that right -- an
additional statement on Northern Ireland, which, if you don't
have, you should get.
Q It seemed like Prime Minister Blair was trying
to go beyond a typical statement of support to some sort of
statement that the North would be a more viable investment
opportunity. Did he get that done, or can you characterize that
--
MR. BERGER: I'm not aware of the statement. I'm
actually just heard as I was coming in that there was a
statement. I have not read it.
Q Sandy, when do you expect to get a readout from
Strobe Talbott on his trip to Pakistan, and when will the
President be getting that briefing?
MR. BERGER: Well, we've had reports from the
traveling party periodically, last night. And I have generally
briefed the President on those reports. An unidentified senior
official traveling with Deputy Secretary Talbott had a press
conference yesterday, I think, before he left in which he said
that the talks have been very good, that he believed that the
Pakistani government had not made a decision as of that point,
but they had made no commitments.
I suspect that I will see Strobe tonight because of
the dinner. I would not expect the President to see him until
tomorrow.
Q On Africa, was there any discussion of
accelerating or expanding the debt relief initiative? And on the
health and education things that you mentioned in the communique,
is there any specific commitment to money or aid to that --
MR. BERGER: We have, in the connection with our
visit, made specific monetary commitments of fairly significant
proportions. I don't think there are dollar figures -- there are
not dollar figures associated with the communique, except a
commitment to these goals and to take actions necessary to meet
them with the Africans.
In terms of the debt, I honestly don't know the
answer to that. I would be enormously surprised if it had not
come up because I know it was something the President wanted to
discuss and others. But I have not gotten -- they're up in the
Manor country, and I have not gotten a readout on that.
Q Back to Russia, could you tell us whether
there's any stress put on the relationship between the United
States and Russia because all the different times when they've
taken different views on very important regional issues like Iraq
and Kosovo and now sanctions on India? What does this do to the
relationship?
MR. BERGER: Well, I think you have to take this
into perspective -- that is, here we have in 1998 a democratic
Russia undergoing an economic transformation to a market economy
with all that entails. It's a remarkable development and we
ought not -- just because it happened last week, we ought to not
minimize probably the most significant fact of our lifetime.
The President has worked assiduously for almost six
years to try to promote that course, democracy -- and President
Yeltsin most recently changed his government and put -- which was
we thought quite a good government -- but put in its place a
group of very young, reform-oriented, pragmatic individuals who
clearly are going to move that process even further. So, big
picture.
Second of all, there are a lot of things in which we
cooperate very well with Russia. Who would have thought that we
would be actually serving side-by-side in Bosnia? Who would have
thought, including many of you, that we would have been able to
enlarge NATO and not somehow destroy our relationship with
Russia? We have an arms control agenda with Russia. There are a
lot of things -- a lot of business that we do which is of
profound significance to the American people.
Now, there are things that we disagree on. We
disagree on Saddam Hussein and the extent to which he poses a
threat. We disagree on Kosovo to some degree and the extent to
which sanctions or harsh measures should be placed on Milosevic.
I don't think, certainly I don't expect the Russians to impose
sanctions on India.
But I think you have to look at a relationship
between two countries such as this, whether it's the United
States and Russia, or the United States and Britain, or the
United States and France, and see it as a balance sheet that
hopefully has more pluses than minuses.
Q So there's no stress on the relationship from
these disagreements?
MR. BERGER: National relationships are not
psychiatric confrontations, I think, in terms of stress.
(Laughter.) I think it is in our national interest to pursue the
relationship with Russia. There are a number of places where
they see their national interest differently than we do, in part
because of where they are, and in part because of their history,
in part because of their geostrategic situation. There are areas
where we fundamentally disagree with Russia and we will continue
-- as we do with China, for example -- but we will continue to
maintain the relationship so long as we can make progress on the
areas that we agree on and deal candidly with them on the areas
we disagree on.
Q Sandy, -- the President's proposed trip to
India and Pakistan, has any of it -- on the trip to India and
Pakistan, is there any thought of definitively not going or
changing that --
MR. BERGER: We have not made any decision to change
our plans at this point, but we'll see how that -- I think it's
something we just have to consider over a period of time.
Q Was there any discussion among the leaders, or
among their senior aides -- someone like yourself -- over whether
this group of eight is the right group of eight, whether there
are other countries that should be properly represented here?
MR. BERGER: I read my friend, Dan Tarullo, in the
Post this morning on the subject. I think the answer is there's
an ongoing discussion of the G-7/G-8. I think its role has
changed, and I think, actually, President Clinton deserves a good
deal of credit for changing its role. It was a meeting that
dealt with macroeconomic issues and crises, and we have pushed it
towards global issues. We've pushed it to the kinds of issues
that Jonathan was talking about, and we've pushed it to deal with
what used to be called -- what are domestic issues, but where
these seven or eight guys who have the same -- who are dealing
every day with the same problems can share information.
So I think substantively, it's changed. There has
been discussion over the years as to why these seven, or why
these eight. To some degree, it's historical and it goes back
now 20 years and a lot of things have changed, but it's one of
those Pandora's boxes -- once you open it up, it's a little hard
to figure where you draw the line or how you define. And there
are plenty of other forums. You know, we meet with nations in
the NATO context, we meet with nations in a bilateral context
--APEC, the U.S.-EU summit. The only thing I'm against is adding
any more summits to the agenda -- any more annual summits.
(Laughter.)
Q Sandy, to follow on that, Yeltsin asked
Hashimoto yesterday if Moscow could host the G-8 in the year
2000. Did he make that request of the President, and what would
be the U.S. response?
MR. BERGER: I think there was some discussion of
this last night. As I understand it, Japan, which was already
scheduled to be the host for 2000, will, in fact, be the
host. But I think there was some desire to find some way to -- I
mean, obviously Russia has to get in this rotation, and maybe
there are other ways to recognize that. There was, as I will
remind you, a special summit in Moscow in '96 on nuclear safety
-- better check '96.
Q -- would Russia going into the regular
rotation?
MR. BERGER: Yes. But when is hard to -- there's no
answer to.
Q A couple of days ago the British environmental
minister made some very harsh criticism of the U.S. position on
the Kyoto treaty, saying the United States really doesn't want to
change its energy behavior and it's going to meet the criteria of
the treaty by simply buying up pollution permits from other
countries, and that the EU --- and wants at least a 50-percent
rule that you've got to change your domestic practices and you
can't -- buying up these permits. Did that come up here?
MR. BERGER: There is a discussion this afternoon of
climate change. I don't think the British environmental minister
will be there, but we'll see whether the Prime Minister raises
it.
But let me just say generally that under Kyoto, we
are, of course, the largest emitter of greenhouse gases; we are
also undertaking the most Draconian cuts. The Europeans are in a
kind of privileged position because there's a bubble over the EU.
They're dealt with as a unit. And so there are a lot of -- like
Eastern Germany, for example, there are a lot of parts of the EU
where levels are very low and it's easier for them to meet what
is nominally a larger percentage reduction.
So, number one, I think we've bitten the bullet on
this. Number two, the idea of engaging the developing world has
two purposes from the President's point of view. Number one,
this is a global problem, and it requires a global solution. If
we cut out all of our global emissions, all of our greenhouse gas
emissions, China is growing at such a rate, it will simply be the
number one greenhouse gas emitter by 2020 or 2030. The
environment -- I mean the globe, the planet -- doesn't really
understand where these gases are coming from. They're just going
to know that they're increasing. So you have to have some kind
of way of getting the developing world to buy in.
The President's view has always been that a trading
mechanism, where American industry is essentially able to swap in
credits, is a way to get the gasses down -- doesn't matter
whether that unit of greenhouse gas is diminished in Thailand or
Toledo, from an environmental standpoint -- and at the same time
from the developing world's point of view, allows them to take an
energy development path towards less polluting energy sources,
which is a lot better than the rest of us took in the last 50
years. So I just think he's wrong -- long answer.
Q Sandy, is there any solution that's been made
to the F-16 problem for the Pakistanis? And what kind of
incentive can you give them besides just saying that they be
"good guys," not to blow up a bomb?
MR. BERGER: I think, first of all, the F-16s -- we
have been trying for some time to resolve this issue with the
Congress. This is a complicated issue where they paid for the
F-16s; we still have them. There is reasons for that cutoff,
this was not capricious on the part of the Bush administration by
any means. But it has resulted in what seems to be an
unfairness. We're now making money off the interest on this.
When Ambassador Richardson was in Pakistan in the first half of
April, he did raise with the Pakistanis some ideas that we have
that we think that we could accomplish with the Congress that
would resolve this issue. I don't want to discuss them,
particularly, publicly.
I do think -- the larger question -- one of the
problems we've had in expanding our relationship with Pakistan is
the so-called Pressler Amendment, which has cut off virtually all
U.S. assistance to Pakistan. A few years ago, with our
cooperation, Senator Hank Brown of Colorado amended that to open
up some areas of cooperation, but not many. I would have to
believe -- and based on some conversations I've had with senators
in the last few days -- that if Pakistan were not to test, that
we would have a far greater chance to make inroads on the
Pressler Amendment in the Congress, in a bipartisan way, than we
have had before. And I think that would be a welcomed
development.
Q To the end of delivering planes, perhaps?
MR. BERGER: To the end of resolving the plane issue
in a way that is satisfactory to Pakistan and the United States.
Q Which could include delivery?
MR. BERGER: Let me leave it where it is. There are
a lot of ways to skin the cat and what's important here is it's
resolved in a way that they are satisfied with and a way we're
satisfied with.
Q Have you found a third country buyer
then, Sandy?
MR. BERGER: I don't want to thwart something by
speculating on it.
Q Is there anything else beyond rolling back
Pressler that you can do for the Pakistanis? Apparently, one
editorial in Pakistan said today that they wanted some kind of
security guarantees from the U.S.
MR. BERGER: Well, we have a security treaty with
Pakistan. Or a security alliance, I guess, it's not a security
treaty.
It's not been my sense here that the Paks put a
price tag on not testing. This is going to be a decision that
they make based upon their own judgment of their national
interest. And as I say, I hope that they will do that -- I hope
that they will decide that it is in their national interest as we
head to the future to be part of the tide of history that is
giving up nuclear testing rather than the undercurrent of history
reflected by the Indians that seeks to go backwards.
Q Sandy, you said no decision had been made on
whether the President will go to India later this year, but could
you imagine the President going if India had not yet disavowed
any further nuclear testing?
MR. BERGER: I don't want to really speculate beyond
what I said. We have not -- in time, we will look at the issue,
but no new decision has been made on that.
Q You noted that this was President Clinton's
sixth economic summit --
MR. BERGER: Fifth or sixth.
Q I'm not saying that's wrong. I assume that's
right.
MR. BERGER: I thought I was wrong when I said it.
(Laughter.) Six, yes.
Q I guess that makes him senior to everybody
except Kohl. Can you talk about how his role has changed and
evolved over those six summits, and kind of how you would express
or assess his role --
MR. BERGER: Let me answer it in two ways. I pretty
vividly remember the first summit in '93 in Japan when,
basically, the international community saw the United States as
the international economic problem. We had $200 billion debt;
there were no prospects of changing it. We were basically being
blamed for all of the economic problems in the world. Today, I
think the United States is an economic model. And you see
leaders around the world, in many respects, reflecting the
President's policies, his approach, his politics.
I think that he is -- in these summits, I've noticed
that he's rarely the first to talk unless he asked to. He is
listened to, I think, very attentively. He tries to listen to
others. And I think he clearly has emerged the dominant figure
on the world stage.
THE PRESS: Thank you.
END 4:28 P.M. (L)