Subject: Force Protection of American Forces in the Middle East

Senior Defense Official: As you know, Secretary Perry met this morning with a group of senators, to discuss the effort against terrorism and our efforts to increase force protection, both in Saudi Arabia, and CENTCOM generally, indeed world-wide. He will have a somewhat similar meeting with a group of members of the House of Representatives tomorrow. He asked me to come down and fill you in on what he said. So, that you have a context that help understand some of the actions that are under consideration at DOD. I should emphasize that this is by of being a progress as -- as you will hear many of the specific decisions are still in the process of being developed, but in a sense, this is an effort to give you a context. We have, of course, in the time since the attack on Khobar Towers, been working on the immediate consequences of that incident. With the establishment of a task force under General Downing, who is already on his way or has arrived. Now, you had a briefing, I think, on last Friday, at which there was a description of the specific measures that had been taken both before and after the attack.

We were also looking at this in the broader context. And the context is important, because the focus on the particulars of the Khobar Tower attack, although understandable, and in a sense, correct, run the risk of losing site of the broader reasons that we're in Saudi Arabia -- the reasons we're in the Gulf. The understandable outrage and concern at the attack and the mourning of the casualties and the determination to find out what happened and to prevent similar things from happening, to the extent we can -- runs a risk of becoming an overreaction that would corrode the U.S. reputation for steadiness in the face of terrorists actions, and undercut our policy of not appeasing terrorists. And indeed, it would leave the impression, in some people's mind perhaps, that one more bomb, or a few more bombs would drive us out. And that is not our intention. That is not our policy. And it -- the suggestion that this is a possibility -- distracts us from the real problem of dealing with force protection in a very tough environment that modern day terrorism presents to us.

Unfortunately, no matter what we do in the name of force protection, no matter how careful we are, no matter what resources we devote to it -- there will be further attempts. And in all probability, some of those attempts will succeed. In a sense, like the one at Khobar Towers, there impact may be reduced because of the measures that we have taken. But we have to expect that there will be further attacks. Anti-terrorism protection simply cannot be perfect. Perhaps the best, and in a sense, the most discouraging evidence of this, is that both Israel and the United Kingdom, who have lived with terrorists attacks for a long time, who had devoted immense resources to this, and who have had a -- a strong priority on it -- have, by no means, been fully successful in avoiding attacks. And, I also understood that their response is not to compromise critical national interests, but to take the protective measures that can be taken, and yet stand fast in protecting their interests.

From our point of view, there could be attacks in a number of places. In Saudi Arabia -- as -- as -- you probably have seen the Secretary said today that we receive on a daily basis, reports on impending attacks in a whole variety of places. We pay attention to those reports. We take each one seriously, but the fact is, fortunately, that the overwhelming majority of them are false positives. They're either misinformation -- disinformation -- or they report things which were true when reported, but, for one reason or another, the attack doesn't materialize.

The measure of significance that we attach to these -- we have a number of bases in Saudi Arabia, which are now at the critical alert, by the way, which is the very highest level. The threat, course is not just in Saudi Arabia. There can be attacks -- other places in CENTCOM. In the EUCOM area, there are two areas, Bosnia and Turkey that we regard as particularly -- warrants a particular level of attention -- is important. But in a broad sense, there are possibilities of attacks in a whole variety of place. One of the things, which has been done in the very recent past, is that the Secretary sent out instruction to all of the CINCS, and I think we'll have the text of this, to look at their force protection arrangements with respect to terrorism. It's important, therefore, that we react, but it's also important that we not be paralyzed. The perfect force protection measure -- for us to keep the forces in bunkers 24 hours a day, or to bring them home. Neither of those are in our interest.

The Secretary has referred to the threat as an increasing and I think it is clear that the scale of the terrorist threat, both in terms of it's sophistication -- in some cases, the fanaticism of the terrorists, so that they -- not in these two cases, but in others -- we're prepared to sacrifice their own lives in the attack -- makes it relevant and appropriate to talk about weapons of mass destruction scale -- threat from terrorists; not nuclear weapons, but the possibility of chemical and biological weapons, and the possibility of very large explosives in (inaudible) truck, or in another container -- the possibility, I guess, which is not weapons and mass destruction, but there's a possibility of attacks on vehicles as their moving. We have to be very careful in focusing on the particular kind of attack that took place in Dhahran that we not put -- we sort of put blinders on ourselves and imagine that that's the only kind of attack we have to deal with.

But the fundamental issue is why we stay in the face of challenges. And the first question is, should we remain in Saudi Arabia, and in the Gulf with a military presence. The Secretary's answer, the answer of the Department of Defense, and the answer of the administration -- and I must say, based on the meeting this morning with the senators, I -- no one can speak for the Senate as a body, except by their formal action -- I think there was broad sympathy for the proposition that leaving Saudi Arabia is simply not an option.

Why is it so important? We are not in Saudi Arabia primarily to defend the Saudis, but to protect our own vital national interests. The first of those, and I think we should not be, in any sense, apologetic for saying it; is the fact is that access to gulf oil is critical to the United States economic health, because it's critical for the world-wide economy. This is not a question of-- of gas lines, or rationing, or prices. This is a question of the consequence to the United States, and to the world economy, of which our prosperity depends, from seeing that resource fall under the control of a hostile state. And of the three major powers in the region, two of them, Iran and Iraq, are unremittingly hostile towards the United States and towards international stability.

The second reason is that our presence there, in that part of the world, as in a number of other parts of the world, is critical to stability. And specifically, it is critical to the prospect of moving forward with the Middle East peace process.

Thirdly, and related to the access issue, we have an interest in freedom of navigation and commercial access. They are critical crossroads in the world. These, and of course, the related point of resistance to naked aggression are the reasons that this country fought a war without coalition partners in Desert Storm. It's the reason that we deployed, very rapidly, very large forces, and we're ready to deploy others -- Vigilant Warrior in October 1994.

And the presence of military forces in Saudi Arabia is not simply a matter of strategic presence and showing the flag, or even of the important current operations we carry out there. Forward presence the Gulf is critical to our military strategy for defending the Gulf. And that presence does not depend on deployed ground forces. We have only very modest deployed ground forces. It does depend on having air capability and that means air defense and also naval forces in the region on a continuing basis. We also have three positions; ground equipment in the region. We have -- we've relied then on the lift capacity to rapidly bring forces forward. The facilities that are going to be available to us in a crises, to fall in on that equipment and to reinforce the forces that are there.

To this end, we have access agreements both for current operations and for contingency operations with a number of countries. Indeed, with all six, to one degree or another, in the Gulf Cooperation Counsel of States.

And we also have efforts underway with all of them to strengthen their own self-defense. These countries, although rich in resources, are poor in man power, who can make only a limited contribution to their own defense. But they all do make, in terms of their capabilities, a substantial contribution, and our presence is critical to that.

Saudi Arabia is the key to this whole equation because it is, not only the largest country in the region, it is the key country with the willingness and the infra structure and the financial capability to allow U.S. forces to be there. And it also provides a critical political and, in some cases, a financial key to our presence in other countries.

Therefore, to protect our vital interests, the United States forces have to remain in the kingdom. There's no question that sometimes the Saudis can be difficult. There's no doubt they think sometimes we can be difficult. But they do provide a lot of support -- financial support, access to their facilities, political and strategic support in the Gulf. The Kingdom has been a strong friend of the United States since the days of Franklin Roosevelt, and while we certainly will insist on Saudi cooperation, we don't expect that process be bump free, although we will insist on cooperation.

The fact is there record on cooperation is quite good. We've made the decision to stay because it is -- it is in our interests. We have to guard against the tendency to -- to put ourselves in the position by stirring up arguments with the Saudis -- or either the Saudis ask us to leave because the feel that the relationship has become impossible, which I think is extremely unlikely -- but it will probably be more likely, Americans -- the American public not understanding the reasons that we're there, and not be willing to continue to support the real risks that will be entailed.

And that issue of risks, then follows, because if we had decided to stay, we have to recognize the risks and recognize -- figure out ways to reduce those risks. There are a number of fronts on which we are moving. The first question is should we, and to what extent, and how, to move U.S. forces from urban areas. From the force protection standpoint, the answer to that question is simple: To the degree we can get our people out of downtown areas, it's easier to provide force protection against a whole variety of threats, not simply against truck bombs, but a lot of other things.

And from an operational standpoint, the feasibility of this depends on the mission. We've been starting the process now of looking very closely at this. This is something the Saudis support, indeed, in the sense that has been there suggestion that we explore this possibility. Most of the -- by the way, just to anticipate a question -- the story that some of you may have seen that the Saudis have said that they will not support moving U.S. forces from urban areas to more remote bases is simply wrong. The Saudis have put a statement to the effect. Reuter is running a story to that effect, and I think the Embassy, the Saudi Embassy here in Washington, will have the Saudi statement, which got misconstrued in the initial reports, available within the hour.

Most of us -- we had something like 6000 military people in Saudi Arabia. Some 5000 of those are deployed forces with a (inaudible) support of the combat mission. Most of them deal with air operations. The bulk of those can be moved from the bases where they are operating out of (Inaudible). And they're all -- all of these are Saudi bases. Two more remote bases, particularly, as all of you know, the one we're looking at is Alkarg (phonetic sp.) which is about 130 kilometers from Riyadh. This movement can be accomplished -- obviously at the beginning, on a pretty bare bones basis -- but on a basis which will allow us to maintain operational capability -- within a matter of weeks, not months. Making this movement will reduce the footprint, which is actually helpful, in the Saudi context. It will reduce the vulnerability, which is important in everybody's interests, and it will maintain mission capability. CENTCOM has made it -- has brought back a preliminary concept of doing this. We're talking with the Saudis about it. The Secretary, through the Joint -- through the Chairman, has tasked CENTCOM to prepare a detailed plan. We expect that will be ready shortly. We will then consult with the Congress and with the Saudis; keep you informed, in a sense, with this appearance and other things we're doing in this period of time. As an effort to keep you all informed of the -- of our progress as we move forward.

There are other parts of the U.S. military presence which pose more difficult problems in terms of simply moving to remote areas. It's statistically small, but absolutely quite significantly number of people work with the Saudi National Guard, with the Saudi military, with the Defense Attaché's office. Some of them are associated with Patriot Defenses which have -- obviously have to be near the thing they're defending. Moving those units out of the middle of the desert is obviously not a practical option. There are, however, things which we are looking at in terms of looking at in terms of moving to different compounds, and moving out of downtown areas, which will reduce their vulnerability. But it is inevitably going to be the case that they will not be able to be moved simply to remote areas. I know there will be lots of questions about costs, about the logistics, about, well -- how this is going to work. There's very little I can -- more I can tell you about it today, than I have, because those are precisely the issues CENTCOM is looking at now. But, this is something we intend to do and to do it on a fast track.

We also have to pay attention to the problem of U.S civilians, particularly military dependents, in Saudi Arabia. That's one that which is very high on our list of taking appropriate measures. In all this, we have to recognize that force protection can never be an absolute. We have to balance it with mission accomplishment. We also have to take measures to improve our intelligence capability. In an important sense, intelligence is the key to being able to, both to defend ourselves -- take appropriate protective action when that's necessary -- and indeed, if worse comes to worse, and further attacks occur, to take retaliatory actions, because we would then have the evidence for doing it.

One of the things which happened in the meeting this morning, was that Director Deutch was present and he outlined for the senators some of the steps which are being taken. All of this requires cooperation with the Saudis. At one level, cooperation's made easier by their shock of the Khobar attack, not only because of their genuine sympathy and concern, but because they realize, in an important sense, that this campaign, wherever it's origins, is directed at them as much as it is at us. The acid test in our view would be cooperation on the cooperation -- on the -- the movement. We've had the strongest statements of support for that. Indeed, in a sense, it is an idea which has been developed jointly.

One point which the Secretary made in the course of his meeting with the Senate this morning, was that we need to have an ambassador in place, as soon as possible, to have the highest level possible, means a day to day interaction, with the Saudis.

This -- I've spoken, of course, mostly about Saudi Arabia, but this is a worldwide effort. A number of steps have already been taken. There is an anti-terrorism task force which was formed after the OPM SAN bombing, which has made detailed reports and recommendations, much of which has had an impact on attention to this issue. An anti-terrorism action team has been formed here in the department which, my talking point says it meets twice day. I think it meets almost all the time as we're getting -- getting started on this. CENTCOM and EUCOM have been instructed specifically to perform force -- force protection, reassessments, and, as I've said, we've looked at the issue -- we sent an instruction to all of the CINCS, world-wide, to look at their force protection requirements. Undoubtedly this will require money. We certainly expect the Saudis to continue, as they have in the past, to provide facilities, and to pay for the sort of things they which have paid for in the past. There will be some costs the United States will certainly have to bear. There maybe legislation to give us additional flexibility, both in using funds, and in some of the actions we take.

Terrorism is real and growing threat to our national interests, both in Saudi Arabia and the region, and world-wide. Countering terrorism requires a national and bipartisan commitment here at home, just as it requires cooperation and commitment with the Saudis and with other host nations, and indeed. to come degree or another, coalition partners and allies. Now this is important not simply because we cannot move in a world in which the terrorists win, or because it's a test of our steadfastment in staying and protecting our vital interests in a critical area.

Now, I'll be glad to try to can answer your questions.

Q: Senior Defense Officials, when you speak of retaliation, if it should be learned that another country is involved, either in the region, or elsewhere, are you talking about military retaliation, or economic, or some combination of both?

A: I don't think we've ruled out anything which is appropriate, in the context.

Q: Can you give us an idea, I know you can't have a detailed cost figure, but a range of what this might cost?

A: There's no question that doing a major movement of an operation like this will be costly. You know, small compared to the total defense budget, large compared to real money.

Q: Several billions, or tens of billions?

A: It won't be tens of billions, but where it is, that's a matter I think -- it's no point in my giving you a number now, which would be a sheer, a sheer guess, or at best, a very rough estimate. But there's no question, it will be a substantial amount of money. And I think we should also face that fact that we're going to pay part of it. We will certainly expect the Saudis to make -- make some contribution, but we pay part of the costs of what we do now. We pay part of the costs as we go forward. Yes?

Q: Yes, sir. Back to the point of, as far as large vehicle borne, conventional bombs are concerned, is it not possible, world-wide, to -- to protect American personnel from this kind of terrorists -- to the kind of access that a vehicle would have - - of proximity to do damage, to take casualties?

A: It's not possible to protect absolutely. We will do -- first of all, the focus of the effort at the Khobar was strongly on keeping the bomb from getting inside the compound. And that - - that would have been vastly more destructive than even the destruction that did happen. We can improve the ability to do that. One of the things you have to do in order to improve that ability is to get more space. That's the reason we are looking at moving operations from downtown areas into places you can get more space. But world-wide, you can't move everybody out into the countryside. Yes?

Q: Could you get a little more specific when you talk about exactly what will have to be done and will the costs come from the building of housing entire military bases? What does that envision?

A: I don't think -- we're not talking about a new run way -- I mean, air base, in that sense of the word. But, to move the scale of operations that we run there, to move to a -- to a base different -- you certainly have to move stuff from one place to another. And one of the things which the command will have to look at, is what facilities are available at [al] Kharj, and conceivably other places. What facilities are available at al- Kharj; how would we -- what we would have to build -- what could be modified, but the modifications obviously cost money. What is the infrastructure requirement? Generally speaking, the Saudis pay that, but it's a -- it's a cost to somebody. Housing is certainly an issue. Initially people would almost certainly leave, not in -- not in tents, in the normal sense of the word; but some of you have seen -- they've seen these, I've forgotten the technical terms for them, but they're fancy tents. They can be air-conditioned. They're not like living in an apartment building, but then, again, we're not talking about living in the desert in a pup tent. But that costs money too. So, the costs - - that -- it is exactly that question of what particular move -- what -- easy to move -- move to al-Kharj Air Base; what do you have to move. Who's going to move? What has to be there? What has to be there on day one so the operation continues? What has to be there in six months? That's what the CINC is working.

Q: And are you saying that all of these things that seem to be coming out of Saudi Arabia, are incorrect? The Saudis are not saying these (inaudible)?

A: I seldom do this, but I can honestly say that I talked to the ambassador. He gave us a running translation from Arabic, and the actual statements are approximately are the opposite of what was said to us. The Saudis are the experts on -- on Arabic translations. But the critical part was that -- Prince Sultan said that there was a complete understanding of the plan to relocate a few thousand of the military forces, and we're continuing to work on implementation of that That's my notes on Bandar's running translation of Saudi officials.

Q: You are being assured, yet again? That's there's no reservation so to speak?

A: There will certainly be, understandably, a lot of statements out of the Saudi government. But the Kingdom is safe. And there may even be statements which imply some Americans are over excited about this problem. It's entirely understandably that they should say that. Indeed, you might say that groups Americans are overexcited about this problem. That's very different from saying, "We're not going to help with the movement." And, indeed, to some degree, accomplishing the movement, and getting American military personnel out of downtown major Saudi cities, quite apart from the real benefits, in terms of force protection, it will also be benefit in terms of reducing the footprint and the visibility, which is something that both we and the Saudis have an interest in.

But I'm sure that there will be more -- more statements along this line. But -- and also, I also know, what the -- what the Saudi government is telling about this project. Yes?

Q: Yes, sir. Secretary Perry spoke extensively this morning about the chem-bio threat. You've sort of barely mentioned it here. Could you tell us a little more detail about what's involved in this force protection?

A: I'm wouldn't repeat exactly he said.

Q: What. What is the problem?

A: First of all, let me be clear. We do not have specific evidence that "such and such a group" is going to attack "such and such" a place with "such and such" chemical weapon. Among these reports that we get -- fortunately, so far none of them so far is directed against American -- have been true. Our reports of activity that some terrorist group is going to use chemical weapons. Terrorists groups have used chemical weapons in (inaudible) and Paris. So that's a threat we have to be prepared to deal with. It's also the case that while we are not at this stage in the position to say all about possible foreign involvement in the (inaudible) attack, there are countries who support terrorism and almost all of them have a chemical program of their own. Most, indeed, I think all of them, have some kind of CW program. So, the -- the point is -- and this goes a little bit to the point about -- you can lock everybody up in compound. You're still -- the compound is then vulnerable to some other things. (Inaudible). I would think --

Q: My question really goes to, in... this force protection initiative that you're announcing, what are you studying about the chem/bio threat, and what protective measures are you taking against the chem/bio threat?

A: One of the things various protection measures can take, against the chem/bio threat -- it varies depending upon the character of the threat. By making -- by putting this emphasis, one of the things that we want to make sure that we do, is that as the local commanders assess their situation, they don't just focus on any one of the part of the threat spectrum. They consider what have you done; what can you do about the chemical threat; what can you do -- what were the measures you're taking to (inaudible) to deal with that threat, as well as with some other kinds of threats.

Q: And is that pretty much it? Are there any specifics?

A: Remember -- remember that this building does not go out to an air base and say, "You do this. You do that. And you're going to send people or experts -- but, basically the responsibility is in the services and in the command. But the kind of direction which it is important to come from the top -- from the center -- is to say, "in your thinking about terrorism, Don't think just about big bombs. Bare in mind that you may be subject to other kinds of threats." There are people who, no doubt, can arrange, for someone to come down who's technically qualified to talk about some of the things you can do to deal with the chemical/biological attacks. (Inaudible) that's something we're looking a lot at the question of some -- of vaccines and -- yes?

Q: Understanding that you represent the people in uniform -- there are 30,000 American civilians that are in the Saudi Kingdom.

A: I believe there are 40,000.

Q: Thirty thousand or forty thousand, take your choice. Can you address whether or not any of your contingent planning extends, in any way, to an extremely large, very vulnerable population?

A: Obviously the Department of Defense gives the first priority of military people and their families. But you're absolutely right. We cannot do our planning for -- for military dependents without recognizing that what we do has an impact (inaudible). Roughly, the same number of other official Americans with the state and other government agencies. There are a lot of people who are -- who are DOD contracted American citizens who are the employees of companies who whom DOD has contracted. And then, of course, there are thousands, and thousands of American citizens who work in Saudi Arabia for other reasons. We will be working with State. State formerly has that responsibility for -- for the issue of that -- well, obviously for their own employees, but also for other American citizens.

All that said, our first responsibility is to the military.

Q: Do your threat assessments include them?

A: Not in principle, but yes, certainly it is true that Americans as citizens are, in some sense, potential targets of terrorists. I mean, it's also true that -- from the point of view of making a political statement, attacks on official Americans, and particularly American military people, are probably more of a -- probably more like more of the problem.

But, you know, as a matter of principle, we -- we do not have a -- what we do about dependents and families will be entirely transparent. What -- as a matter of principle, we don't have one set of rules and advisories for official people, and another for the general citizenry. To answer the question, it is also true that, in an important sense, what private citizens do about a situation like this is up to them, and their employers, not the Saudi government question, except in the most extreme cases. Yes?

Q: What is it about -- what has really changed to warrant such a broad effort? I mean, I understand what has changed in Saudi Arabia -- a bigger bomb than we expected to go off -- and there were some fatalities. But the Secretary here in Washington initiative is talking about drastic changes in the way we configure and deploy our forces not just in Saudi Arabia -- suggests that perhaps not was being done in appreciating a much broader threat against our forces in a lot of different (inaudible)?

A: I -- I think what's happened in the last 10 years is that we have seen, in a lot of different countries in the world, a level of sophistication, a level of fanaticism, of level of willingness to take on risks by terrorists, that we did not see in the past. And we need to respond to that, just as we need to respond to other changes in threat conditions. Part of that's because of international support of terrorism and I'll emphasize that that remark is not, at the present time, directed against any of the specific incidents. That's one reason that the threat has grown. Another is a spread of technology -- a spread of... None of this is precision guided munitions, so far, but it is really a level of knowledge of how to make bombs, how to make -- as I said -- there are actual examples of terrorists using chemicals. I think -- we have to respond to changing circumstances. It's not -- it is not a level of threat which it makes it impossible to do our jobs. But it is a level of threat that requires that we respond.