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			     THE WHITE HOUSE
				     
		      Office of the Press Secretary
				     
				     
_________________________________________________________________________
For Immediate Release                                      April 10, 1995



     Attached is a memorandum from Anthony Lake, Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs, to Anthony S. Harrington,
Chairman of the Intelligence Oversight Board, on the terms of reference
for the government-wide review ordered by the President on March 30 of
the allegations surrounding the 1990 death of Michael DeVine and the 1992
disappearance of Efrain Bamaca Valasquez and related matters.

          
April 7, 1995

               




MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY S. HARRINGTON
		       Chairman
		       Intelligence Oversight Board
 
FROM:		       ANTHONY LAKE 
		       Assistant to the President for 
		       National Security Affairs

SUBJECT:	       Intelligence Oversight Board Terms of Reference:
		       Guatemala


On March 30, the President directed that the Intelligence Oversight Board
(IOB) conduct a government-wide review of any and all aspects of the
allegations surrounding the 1990 death of Michael DeVine and the 1992
disappearance of Efrain Bamaca Valasquez in Guatemala, as well as any
related matters.  Because a healthy and vigorous intelligence capability
is a critical element of our national power and influence, the President
has directed that the IOB be unsparing in uncovering all relevant facts
as well as make clear where allegations regarding these events are
unfounded.  He has further directed that the timing and scope of the
inquiry be consistent with law enforcement requirements.

To facilitate the IOB's review, this memorandum sets forth some of the
specific questions the IOB should consider during its review as well as
some of the procedural mechanisms for conducting its review.  The terms
of reference below, however, are intended to guide the Board's inquiry.
They are not intended to restrict the Board's inquiry if in your judgment
the facts warrant that additional subjects be considered.  Nor should the
terms of reference be read to require a duplication of effort between
your review and those ongoing by the Department of Justice and agency
inspectors general, if in the Board's judgment the questions presented
have been or are being satisfactorily addressed elsewhere.
 
Terms of Reference:

1.  Michael DeVine and Efrain Bamaca Valasquez.  The IOB should review
the circumstances surrounding the death of Michael DeVine and the
disappearance of Efrain Bamaca Valasquez.  Among other things:

	a.  The Board should determine whether any U.S. Government
employees and/or intelligenceassets were directly or indirectly involved
in these incidents.  The Board should review the manner in which any
intelligence assets so identified were validated and their suitability
reviewed.  Did this validation include a search of all relevant sources
of derogatory information?

	b.  The Board should determine what information, if any, the U.S.
Government obtained regarding these incidents before they took place and
after they took place.  When, to whom, and in what manner was this
information disseminated, including dissemination to the White House,
executive branch agencies, and the Congress?  Were possible links between
the two cases explored, and if so, were such links adequately explained
and brought to the attention of policymakers?

	c.  What information was provided to the families of Michael
DeVine and Efrain Bamaca Valasquez?  Was this information accurate?  To
the exent that some information was withheld from the families, on what
basis was it withheld?  Are procedures for clearing and disseminating
such information appropriate?

In considering these questions, the Board should determine whether any
intelligence regulations, procedures, or directives were violated;
possible violations of law should be referred to the Department of
Justice.

2.  Other Cases.  The Board is also requested to review, in light of the
questions presented above and below, any intelligence that may bear on
the facts surrounding the torture, disappearance, or death of any US
citizens in Guatemala since 1984.  In particular, the Board should review
the torture of Sister Diana Ortiz in 1989, the death of Griffith Davis in
1985 and the death of Nicholas Blake in 1985.

3.  Intelligence/Policy Coordination.  Was information involving the
DeVine, Bamaca, and any other cases identified above, disseminated in a
timely and accurate manner within the intelligence community and to
policymakers at the White House, State Department and Defense Department?
Are inter-agency and intra-agency procedures for disseminating such
information adequate?  Were there any patterns of human rights abuse by
U.S. intelligence assets, and if so, were these patterns identified
within the intelligence community and explained to policymakers?  Was
timely and accurate referral of the DeVine case and facts made to the
Department of Justice?  Did the Department of Justice respond in a timely
and appropriate manner to the CIA?  Within the United States mission in
Guatemala City was intelligence information shared with the Chief of
Mission in a timely and complete manner?   Was any information withheld
from the Chief of Mission, other senior embassy officers, policymakers in
Washington or the Congress?  Were U.S. Chiefs of Mission kept
appropriately informed about the intelligence community's liaison
relationships with the GOG?

4.  The U.S. Intelligence Relationship with Guatemala.  U.S. intelligence
support to the Government of Guatemala (GOG) has taken a number of
different forms.  For example, the United States Government has
cooperated with the GOG in the area counternarcotics.  In addition, the
USG has at various times had an intelligence liaison relationship with
the GOG.  Was intelligence support for the GOG by the intelligence
community and/or U.S. military consistent with Presidential directives
and decisions applicable since 1984?  Did our intelligence programs in
Guatemala focus sufficient resources on collecting information on human
rights violations by security forces?

5.  Asset Validation Process.  The Board should review regulations and
guidelines regarding the manner in which U.S. intelligence assets related
to Guatemala are validated, including the ongoing process of evaluating
the costs and benefits of continuing specific relationships.  How does
the Board evaluate their adequacy?  Does asset validation include a
mechanism for evaluating all- source information?

Process:

In conducting your review, the President fully anticipates that you will
rely on the expertise, assets and ongoing work of relevant agency
inspectors general.  In consulting with inspectors general the IOB should
ensure that the full scope of the President's questions are being
adequately addressed.  Where appropriate, and consistent with law
enforcement equities, the IOB may independently choose to validate any
facts or conclusions presented by agency inspectors general and
ultimately draw its own conclusions regarding the questions presented
above.

The Board should identify for the President any ``lessons learned'' in
the course of its review.  In addition, the Board should make
recommendations as to any changes to existing policies, regulations, and
directives governing United States intelligence activities the IOB
considers warranted.

The timing of your review should be dictated by the your ability to
adequately address the questions presented and law enforcement
considerations.  The President, through the Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs, should however be kept apprised of your
review on a continuing basis.
 
It is essential that the Board's review be conducted in a manner
consistent with national security.  While it is the President's intention
that all appropriate information about the events surrounding the death
of Michael DeVine and the disappearance of Efrain Bamaca Valasquez be
provided to the public, such dissemination should be done at the close of
the IOB's review, by the President or his designee.

Finally, I would note that it is because of the independence and
integrity of the Board's members and their record of fair and thorough
review of intelligence oversight issues, that the President has
specifically turned to the IOB to conduct this review.  Your willingness
to take on this assignment is appreciated.




cc:  Abner J. Mikva
     Counsel to the President



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