Combating Terrorism: Spending on Governmentwide Programs Requires Better
Management and Coordination (Letter Report, 12/01/97, GAO/NSIAD-98-39).
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed interagency processes
intended to ensure the efficient allocation of funding and resources for
the federal government's efforts to combat terrorism, focusing on: (1)
federal funding for unclassified programs and activities to combat
terrorism; (2) whether any agency or entity has been designated to
coordinate budget proposals, establish priorities, manage funding
requirements, and help ensure the efficient allocation of federal
resources for combating terrorism across federal agencies; (3)
opportunities for agencies to expand coordination of terrorism-related
programs and activities under the Government Performance and Results Act
principles and framework; and (4) issues concerning the reimbursement of
support provided to agencies with lead counterterrorism
responsibilities.
GAO noted that: (1) the amount of federal funds being spent on combating
terrorism is unknown and difficult to determine; (2) identifying and
tracking terrorism-related governmentwide spending with precision is
difficult for several reasons; (3) information from key agencies
involved in combating terrorism shows that nearly $7 billion was spent
for unclassified terrorism-related programs and activities during fiscal
year (FY) 1997; (4) the Department of Defense budgeted about $3.7
billion in FY 1997, or about 55 percent of the estimated spending; (5)
although the National Security Council (NSC) is to coordinate
counterterrorism policy issues and the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) is to assess competing funding demands, neither agency is required
to regularly collect, aggregate, and review funding and spending data
relative to combating terrorism on a crosscutting, governmentwide basis;
(6) neither agency establishes funding priorities for terrorism-related
programs across agencies' budgets or ensures that individual agencies'
stated requirements have been validated against threat and risk criteria
before budget requests are submitted to Congress; (7) because
governmentwide priorities for combating terrorism have not been
established and funding requirements have not necessarily been validated
based on an analytically sound assessment of the threat and risk of a
terrorist attack, there is no basis to have reasonable assurance that:
(a) agencies' requests are funded through a coordinated and focused
approach to implement national policy and strategy; (b) the highest
priority requirements are being met; (c) terrorism-related activities
and capabilities are not unnecessarily duplicative or redundant; and (d)
funding gaps or misallocations have not occurred; (8) the Results Act
principles and framework can provide guidance and opportunities for the
many federal agencies involved in the crosscutting program to combat
terrorism to develop coordinated goals, objectives and performance
measures, and to enhance the management of individual agency and overall
federal efforts; (9) Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 39 directs
that agencies will provide support for terrorism-related activities at
their own expense unless the President directs otherwise; (10) the
Economy Act generally requires reimbursement for goods and services
provided to another agency; and (11) the difference between PDD 39 and
the Economy Act concerning reimbursement has caused disagreements
between agencies in some cases.
--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------
REPORTNUM: NSIAD-98-39
TITLE: Combating Terrorism: Spending on Governmentwide Programs
Requires Better Management and Coordination
DATE: 12/01/97
SUBJECT: Interagency relations
Crime prevention
Terrorism
Law enforcement information systems
Intergovernmental fiscal relations
Strategic planning
Budget administration
Agency missions
Reimbursements to government
******************************************************************
** This file contains an ASCII representation of the text of a **
** GAO report. Delineations within the text indicating chapter **
** titles, headings, and bullets are preserved. Major **
** divisions and subdivisions of the text, such as Chapters, **
** Sections, and Appendixes, are identified by double and **
** single lines. The numbers on the right end of these lines **
** indicate the position of each of the subsections in the **
** document outline. These numbers do NOT correspond with the **
** page numbers of the printed product. **
** **
** No attempt has been made to display graphic images, although **
** figure captions are reproduced. Tables are included, but **
** may not resemble those in the printed version. **
** **
** Please see the PDF (Portable Document Format) file, when **
** available, for a complete electronic file of the printed **
** document's contents. **
** **
** A printed copy of this report may be obtained from the GAO **
** Document Distribution Center. For further details, please **
** send an e-mail message to: **
** **
** <info@www.gao.gov> **
** **
** with the message 'info' in the body. **
******************************************************************
Cover
================================================================ COVER
Report to Congressional Requesters
December 1997
COMBATING TERRORISM - SPENDING ON
GOVERNMENTWIDE PROGRAMS REQUIRES
BETTER MANAGEMENT AND COORDINATION
GAO/NSIAD-98-39
Combating Terrorism
(701122/701103)
Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV
DOD - Department of Defense
FAA - Federal Aviation Administration
FBI - Federal Bureau of Investigation
NSC - National Security Council
OMB - Office of Management and Budget
PDD - Presidential Decision Directive
Letter
=============================================================== LETTER
B-277824
December 1, 1997
The Honorable Ike Skelton
House of Representatives
The Honorable John Glenn
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Governmental Affairs
United States Senate
We recently reported to you on the U.S. efforts to combat
terrorism.\1 As noted in that report, we are reporting separately on
your request that we identify interagency processes intended to
ensure the efficient allocation of funding and resources for such
efforts across the federal government. Specifically, we (1)
identified federal funding for unclassified programs and activities
to combat terrorism\2 ; (2) determined whether any agency or entity
has been designated to coordinate budget proposals, establish
priorities, manage funding requirements, and help ensure the
efficient allocation of federal resources for combating terrorism
across federal agencies; (3) explored opportunities for agencies to
expand coordination of terrorism-related programs and activities
under the Government Performance and Results Act principles and
framework; and (4) assessed issues concerning the reimbursement of
support provided to agencies with lead counterterrorism
responsibilities.
--------------------
\1 Combating Terrorism: Federal Agencies' Efforts to Implement
National Policy and Strategy (GAO/NSIAD-97-254, Sept. 26, 1997). (A
list of related GAO products is on p. 39.)
\2 For purposes of this report, programs and activities to combat
terrorism include antiterrorism, or defensive activities such as
security measures and counterterrorism, or offensive activities and
countermeasures.
BACKGROUND
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :1
Under Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 39 (U.S. Policy on
Counterterrorism, June 1995), the National Security Council (NSC) is
to coordinate interagency terrorism policy issues and review ongoing
crisis operations and activities concerning foreign terrorism and
domestic terrorism with significant foreign involvement. An
NSC-chaired coordinating group is to ensure the PDD is implemented
but does not have authority to direct agencies' activities.
Among its general mission responsibilities, the Office of Management
and Budget (OMB) is to evaluate the effectiveness of agency programs,
policies, and procedures; assess competing funding demands among
agencies; set funding priorities; and develop better performance
measures and coordinating mechanisms. Further, according to PDD 39,
OMB is to analyze the adequacy of funding for terrorism-related
programs and ensure the adequacy of funding for research,
development, and acquisition of counterterrorism-related technology
and systems on an ongoing basis.
Under PDD 39, the State Department and the Department of Justice,
through the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), have lead federal
agency responsibility for dealing with terrorist incidents overseas
and domestically, respectively. Numerous federal departments,
agencies, bureaus, and offices also have terrorism-related programs
and activities that are funded through annual and supplemental
appropriations.
(See app. I for a list of federal entities with terrorism-related
programs and activities.) Terrorism-related funding requests include
nearly $290 million provided under the 1995 Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations Act (P.L. 104-19) in the aftermath of the domestic
terrorist attack in Oklahoma City and $1.1 billion proposed for
counterterrorism programs within a number of agencies in fiscal year
1996 supplemental appropriations and fiscal year 1997 budget
amendments.
The Government Performance and Results Act (Results Act) of 1993 is
intended to improve the management and accountability of federal
agencies.\3 The Results Act seeks to shift the focus of federal
management and decision-making from activities that are undertaken to
the results of activities as reflected in citizens' lives.
Specifically, it requires federal agencies to prepare multiyear
strategic plans and annual performance plans, establish program
performance measures and goals, and provide annual performance
reports to the Congress. Agencies submitted the first strategic
plans to OMB and the Congress by September 30, 1997; the first annual
performance plans, covering fiscal year 1999, are to be submitted to
the Congress after the President's budget submission in 1998.
In recent years, several efforts have been undertaken to coordinate
federal programs that cut across agencies to help ensure that
national needs are being effectively targeted. These efforts have
shown that coordinating crosscutting programs takes time and
sustained attention and, because of the statutory bases of
crosscutting programs, may require congressional involvement to
integrate the federal response to national needs. With the large
number of government entities involved, the federal effort to combat
terrorism is one example of a crosscutting program to which Results
Act principles and measures might be applied.
--------------------
\3 For a full discussion of the act and its implementation, see The
Government Performance and Results Act: 1997 Governmentwide
Implementation Will Be Uneven (GAO/GGD-97-109, June 2, 1997) and
Managing for Results: The Statutory Framework for Improving Federal
Management and Effectiveness (GAO/T-GGD/AIMD-97-144, June 24, 1997).
RESULTS IN BRIEF
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :2
The amount of federal funds being spent on programs and activities to
combat terrorism is unknown and difficult to determine. Identifying
and tracking terrorism-related governmentwide spending with precision
is difficult for several reasons, such as the lack of a uniform
definition of terrorism and the inclusion of these expenditures
within larger categories that do not readily allow separation. For
example, building security measures protect against criminals as well
as terrorists. Some agencies maintain data on their spending for
efforts to combat terrorism, while others have only fragmented
information or estimates. Information from key agencies involved in
combating terrorism shows that nearly $7 billion was spent for
unclassified terrorism-related programs and activities during fiscal
year 1997. The Department of Defense (DOD)--which plays a key
supporting role to the lead federal agencies in combating terrorism
and is also responsible for protecting its personnel and facilities
from terrorist attack worldwide--budgeted about $3.7 billion in
fiscal year 1997, or about 55 percent of the estimated spending.
Although NSC is to coordinate counterterrorism policy issues and OMB
is to assess competing funding demands, neither agency is required to
regularly collect, aggregate, and review funding and spending data
relative to combating terrorism on a crosscutting, governmentwide
basis. Further, neither agency establishes funding priorities for
terrorism-related programs across agencies' budgets or ensures that
individual agencies' stated requirements have been validated against
threat and risk criteria before budget requests are submitted to the
Congress. Because governmentwide priorities for combating terrorism
have not been established and funding requirements have not
necessarily been validated based on an analytically sound assessment
of the threat and risk of terrorist attack, there is no basis to have
reasonable assurance that
-- agencies' requests are funded through a coordinated and focused
approach to implement national policy and strategy,
-- the highest priority requirements are being met,
-- terrorism-related activities and capabilities are not
unnecessarily duplicative or redundant, and
-- funding gaps or misallocations have not occurred.
The Results Act principles and framework can provide guidance and
opportunities for the many federal agencies involved in the
crosscutting program to combat terrorism to develop coordinated
goals, objectives, and performance measures and to enhance the
management of individual agency and overall federal efforts related
to combating terrorism. In the next phase of Results Act
implementation, agencies are to develop annual performance plans that
are linked to their strategic plans. These plans are to contain
annual performance goals, performance measures to gauge progress
toward achieving the goals, and the resources agencies will need to
meet their goals. The development of annual plans may provide the
many federal agencies involved in combating terrorism the next
opportunity to develop coordinated goals, objectives, and performance
measures for programs and activities that combat terrorism and to
articulate how they plan to manage this crosscutting program area.
Reimbursement of agencies' expenses for support activities related to
terrorist incidents has been a matter of concern to the FBI, the lead
agency for responding to a terrorist incident in the United States.
PDD 39 directs that agencies will provide support for
terrorism-related activities at their own expense unless the
President directs otherwise. However, the Economy Act generally
requires reimbursement for goods and services provided to another
agency.\4 The difference between the PDD and the Economy Act
concerning reimbursement has caused disagreements between agencies in
some cases. For example, the FBI has cited PDD 39 to seek DOD
support for counterterrorism activities on a nonreimbursable basis,
whereas DOD has cited the Economy Act as requiring reimbursement,
unless another statute specifically allows DOD to provide
nonreimbursable support. DOD's position is that PDD 39 is not
sufficient for this purpose. This issue remained unresolved at the
time of our review.
--------------------
\4 The Economy Act of 1932 (31 U.S.C. 1535, as amended) authorizes
federal agencies to order goods and services from other federal
agencies when funds are available, it is in the best interest of the
government, and the goods and services cannot be provided as
conveniently and cheaply by private industry.
TOTAL TERRORISM-RELATED
SPENDING IS UNCERTAIN
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :3
Federal agencies are not required to account separately for their
terrorism-related programs and activities. Because most federal
agencies do not isolate or account specifically for terrorism-related
funding, it is difficult to determine how much the government budgets
and spends to combat terrorism. Key agencies provided us their
estimates of terrorism-related spending, using their own definitions.
These estimates totaled nearly $7 billion for unclassified programs
and activities for fiscal year 1997, and should be considered a
minimum estimate of federal spending for unclassified
terrorism-related programs and activities.
The amounts for governmentwide terrorism-related funding and spending
are uncertain because (1) definitions of antiterrorism and
counterterrorism vary from agency to agency; (2) in most cases
agencies do not have separate budget line items for terrorism-related
activities; (3) some agency functions serve more than one purpose,
and it is difficult to allocate costs applicable to terrorism alone
(e.g., U.S. embassy security measures protect not only against
terrorism but also against theft, compromise of classified documents,
and violent demonstrations); (4) some agencies, such as the
Departments of Energy and Transportation, have decentralized
budgeting and accounting functions and do not aggregate
terrorism-related funding agencywide\5 ; (5) programs and activities
may receive funding from more than one appropriation within a given
agency, which makes it difficult to track collective totals; and (6)
appropriations legislation often is not clear regarding which amounts
are designated to combat terrorism.
At our request, the primary agencies leading or supporting
operational crisis response and management activities under PDD 39
provided spending data for fiscal years 1994 to 1996 (not all
agencies were able to provide historical data prior to fiscal year
1996) and estimates for fiscal year 1997 (see table 1).
Table 1
Estimated Spending for Key Agencies'
Unclassified Terrorism-related Programs
and Activities (fiscal years 1994-97)
(Current dollars in millions)
Fiscal year
------------------------------------------
Department/agency 1994 1995 1996 1997
-------------------------- --------- --------- --------- ---------
Defense \a \a $3,244.2 $3,671.1\
b
Energy \a \a 1,324.7\c 1,420.0\c
Justice $94.2 $171.0 332.0 451.0
(FBI) (79.3) (118.3) (287.0) (393.0)
Transportation (FAA)\d 98.3 95.9 115.6 296.8
State 166.5 169.4 161.5 162.5
Treasury \a 7.8\a 552.1 682.5
Health and Human Services \a \a 7.0 13.8
======================================================================
Total \a \a $5,737.1 $6,697.7
----------------------------------------------------------------------
\a Complete data on terrorism-related spending were not available for
fiscal years 1994 and 1995.
\b This amount comprises about 1.5 percent of the total DOD budget
and includes force protection and other security measures.
\c Includes security at Department of Energy facilities and
nonproliferation program costs.
\d Includes only the FAA. Totals represent estimates from three FAA
entities with programs to prevent terrorism.
Source: Data provided by selected departments and agencies.
Figure 1 indicates that DOD spent the largest share of estimated
terrorism-related funds for fiscal year 1997, followed by the
Department of Energy.
Figure 1: Estimated Spending
for Key Agencies' Unclassified
Terrorism-related Programs and
Activities (fiscal year 1997)
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Source: Data provided by departments and agencies included in table
1.
While DOD and the Department of Energy estimated spending accounted
for 76 percent of the unclassified fiscal year 1997 terrorism-related
funds, other agencies' resources dedicated to combating terrorism
have significantly increased in recent years. For example, FAA
resources tripled (in current dollars) during fiscal years 1994-97,
and FBI resources increased five-fold. FAA increased equipment
purchases and aviation security operations, and the FBI nearly
tripled the authorized staffing level dedicated to combating
terrorism, with the largest staff increase occurring in fiscal year
1997.
--------------------
\5 For example, individual organizational units within the Department
of Transportation's modal administrations are responsible for their
own budgeting and accounting. Further, to obtain the Federal
Aviation Administration's (FAA) terrorism-related funding, we
requested and compiled estimates from three FAA entities.
KEY INTERAGENCY MANAGEMENT
FUNCTIONS ARE NOT CLEARLY
REQUIRED OR PERFORMED
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :4
There is no interagency mechanism to centrally manage funding
requirements and requests to ensure an efficient, focused
governmentwide application of federal funds to numerous agencies'
programs designed to combat terrorism. Given the high national
priority and magnitude of this nearly $7-billion federal effort,
sound management principles dictate that (1) governmentwide
requirements be prioritized to meet the objectives of national policy
and strategy and (2) spending and program data be collected from the
federal agencies involved to conduct annual, crosscutting evaluations
of their funding requests based on the threat and risk of terrorist
attack and to avoid duplicated efforts or serious funding gaps.
Neither NSC nor OMB currently performs these functions for the
governmentwide program to combat terrorism. Rather, each agency is
responsible for identifying and seeking funding for its priorities
within its own budget allocation, and OMB reviews the budget requests
on an agency-by-agency basis. Because individual agencies continue
to propose new programs, activities, and capabilities to combat
terrorism, annual crosscutting evaluations of agency budget requests
for such programs would be prudent to help avoid duplicated efforts.
Under PDD 39, NSC is to ensure the federal policy and strategy for
combating terrorism is implemented. Although PDD 39 establishes
interagency coordinating and working groups under the auspices of NSC
to handle policy and operational issues related to combating
terrorism, these groups operate on a consensus basis, do not have
decision-making authority, and do not establish governmentwide
resource priorities for combating terrorism. Moreover, PDD 39 does
not assign responsibility to NSC to ensure that terrorism-related
requirements and related funding proposals (1) are analyzed and
reviewed to ensure they are based on a validated assessment of the
terrorism threat and risks of terrorist attack, (2) provide a
measured and appropriate level of effort across the federal
government, (3) avoid duplicative efforts and capabilities, and (4)
are prioritized governmentwide in a comprehensive strategy to combat
the terrorist threat.
PDD 39 requires OMB to analyze the adequacy of funding for
terrorism-related programs, technology, and systems. Further, OMB's
general mission responsibilities include evaluating the effectiveness
of federal programs and policies, assessing competing funding
demands, and setting funding priorities. However, PDD 39 does not
specifically require OMB to prioritize terrorism-related requirements
governmentwide or to gather funding data across agencies and perform
the crosscutting analyses of agencies' funding proposals necessary to
ensure the efficient use of federal resources.
OMB examiners who review individual agencies' terrorism-related
funding requests explained that although they do not review
activities and programs to combat terrorism on a crosscutting basis
as such, they often discuss funding issues with each other during
their reviews. Further, they bring issues they identify during their
reviews to the attention of senior OMB officials. For example, OMB
said it reviewed the FBI's funding requests for a hazardous materials
laboratory capability and for increased staffing to combat terrorism.
However, because OMB did not provide evidence of its reviews, we
could not verify the extent to which OMB considered the capabilities
of other federal laboratories or analyzed the FBI's request for
increased staffing based on workload data and on the threat and risk
of terrorism. Further, because terrorism-related funding
requirements and proposals have not been prioritized across agencies,
OMB could not have fully considered tradeoffs among competing
demands. For this reason, it is unclear, for example, whether OMB's
denial of an FBI request for an aircraft that the FBI said was
required for counterterrorism and other operations was based on an
assessment of terrorism-related priorities across the government or
of only the FBI's funding requests.
OMB stated that in addition to its examination of agencies' funding
requests, it has met its responsibilities under PDD 39 by reviewing
DOD's counterterrorism program baseline funding and program
submission, participating in interagency meetings designed to better
identify terrorism-related budget functions that are imbedded in
broader funding accounts, and reviewing specific technology proposals
(such as FAA proposals for explosives detection technology). Also,
consistent with its role, OMB prepared the President's $1.1-billion
request for terrorism-related programs and activities. We submitted
a letter of inquiry to OMB to obtain information about OMB's role in
reviewing federal agencies' budget requests and spending to combat
terrorism. Our questions and OMB's written response appear in
appendixes II and III, respectively.
While OMB said that it analyzes individual agencies' funding
requests--and some examiners say they share information during their
examinations--OMB does not regularly perform crosscutting analyses of
requirements, priorities, and funding for the overall federal effort
to combat terrorism. Consequently, OMB cannot provide reasonable
assurance that specific federal activities and programs to combat
terrorism (1) are required based on a full assessment of the threat
and risk involved, (2) avoid unnecessary duplication of effort or
capability with other agencies, and (3) meet governmentwide
priorities for effectively and efficiently implementing the national
strategy on combating terrorism.
Section 1501 of the recently enacted National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 1998 requires OMB to establish a reporting system
for executive agencies on the budgeting and expenditure of funds for
counterterrorism and antiterrorism programs and activities. The
section also requires OMB, using the reporting system, to collect
agency budget and expenditure information on these programs and
activities. Further, the President is required to submit an annual
report to the Congress containing agency budget and expenditure
information on counterterrorism and antiterrorism programs and
activities. The report is also to identify any priorities and any
duplication of efforts with respect to such programs and activities.
RESULTS ACT PRINCIPLES PROVIDE
GUIDANCE FOR CROSSCUTTING
PROGRAMS TO COMBAT TERRORISM
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :5
The Results Act requires each executive branch agency to define its
mission and desired outcomes, measure performance, and use
performance information to ensure that programs meet intended goals.
However, the national policy, strategy, programs, and activities to
combat terrorism cut across agency lines. The act's emphasis on
results implies that federal programs contributing to the same or
similar outcomes should be closely coordinated to ensure that goals
are consistent and that program efforts are mutually reinforcing.
Effective implementation of the act governmentwide should eventually
help prevent uncoordinated crosscutting program efforts that can
waste funds and limit the overall effectiveness of the federal
effort.
The principles underlying the Results Act provide guidance that the
many federal agencies responsible for combating terrorism can use to
develop coordinated goals, objectives, and performance measures and
to improve the management of individual agency and overall federal
efforts to combat terrorism. For example, the act focuses on
clarifying missions, setting program goals, and measuring performance
toward achieving those goals. In our work examining implementation
of the Results Act, we identified several critical issues that need
to be addressed if the act is to succeed in improving management of
crosscutting program efforts by ensuring that those programs are
appropriately and substantively coordinated.\6 As their
implementation of the Results Act continues to evolve, agencies with
terrorism-related responsibilities may become more aware of the
potential for and desirability of coordinating performance plans,
goals, and measures for their crosscutting activities and programs.
The next phase of implementation of the Results Act requires agencies
to develop annual performance plans that are linked to their
strategic plans. These plans are to contain annual performance
goals, performance measures to gauge progress toward achieving the
goals, and the resources agencies will need to meet their goals. The
development of annual plans may provide the many federal agencies
responsible for combating terrorism the next opportunity to develop
coordinated goals, objectives, and performance measures for programs
and activities that combat terrorism and to articulate how they plan
to manage this crosscutting program area.
--------------------
\6 See, for example, Managing for Results: Critical Issues for
Improving Federal Agencies' Strategic Plans (GAO/GGD-97-180, Sept.
16, 1997); Managing for Results: Using the Results Act to Address
Mission Fragmentation and Program Overlap (GAO/AIMD-97-146, Aug. 29,
1997); and Managing for Results: Building on Agencies' Strategic
Plans to Improve Federal Management (GAO/T-GGD/AIMD-98-29, Oct. 30,
1997).
REIMBURSEMENT FOR AGENCY
SUPPORT IS A MATTER OF CONCERN
BETWEEN THE FBI AND DOD
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :6
The Economy Act of 1932 (31 U.S.C. 1535, as amended) generally
requires federal agencies to reimburse other federal agencies that
provide them with support. However, PDD 39 states that federal
agencies providing support to lead agencies' counterterrorist
operations or activities must bear the cost unless otherwise directed
by the President. Because the Economy Act and PDD 39 differ in their
treatment of reimbursement, DOD and the FBI have disagreed on whether
the FBI must reimburse DOD for its support of counterterrorist
operations. Primary examples of DOD support involve air
transportation to return terrorists from overseas locations or other
deployments of FBI personnel and equipment for special events or for
the investigation of terrorist incidents. DOD officials stated that
PDD 39 does not have the force of statutory authority regarding
whether or not DOD's support to another agency is reimbursable.
These officials believe the Economy Act requires DOD to provide the
requested support on a reimbursable basis unless another statute
allows for nonreimbursable support.\7 Every request for DOD support
requires a legal determination of which statutes are applicable and
whether the Economy Act applies. DOD believes that PDD 39 does not
control the legal determination of reimbursement.
The issue of reimbursement has caused two concerns within the FBI:
(1) the potential impairment of its operations under PDD 39 or other
authorities and (2) the availability of funding for operations under
PDD 39 if DOD does not provide nonreimbursable support. According to
the FBI, DOD ultimately provides nonreimbursable support in most
cases, but delays and uncertainties involved in DOD's decision
process on reimbursement frequently threaten timely FBI deployments.
DOD officials cited an example of the process it follows when the
FBI, through the Attorney General, requests support under PDD 39. In
response to an Attorney General request that DOD provide air
transportation for FBI personnel and equipment to prepare for the
June 1997 Summit of the Eight in Denver, Colorado, DOD identified a
statute that allowed nonreimbursable support regarding the provision
of security to foreign dignitaries. Otherwise, the Economy Act would
have required the FBI to reimburse DOD for the transportation costs.
In an attempt to alleviate concern and confusion over reimbursement
of support activities, NSC tasked a special working group on
interagency operations to explore solutions. According to NSC,
possible solutions include legislation to provide DOD with special
authority to provide nonreimbursable support or to set aside
contingency funds for domestic emergency support team activities.
The Department of Justice commented that DOD-provided transportation
services and assistance provided in response to terrorist activities
involving a weapon of mass destruction should be exempt from the
requirements of the Economy Act. DOD commented that it is also
considering various legislative options to permit nonreimbursable
support for counterterrorism operations. At the time of our review,
the issue remained unresolved.
--------------------
\7 For example, 10 U.S.C. 377 requires reimbursement for any DOD
assistance provided under 10 U.S.C. 371 and 372 unless the support
is provided in the normal course of military training or operations
or results in a benefit to the DOD element providing the support that
is substantially equivalent to that which would otherwise be obtained
from military operations or training. Also, DOD may provide
nonreimbursable support under certain circumstances to the Secret
Service under the 1976 Presidential Assistance Act.
CONCLUSIONS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :7
Billions of dollars are being spent by numerous agencies with roles
or potential roles in combating terrorism, but because no federal
entity has been tasked to collect such information across the
government, the specific amount is unknown. Further, no
governmentwide spending priorities for the various aspects of
combating terrorism have been set, and no federal entity manages the
crosscutting program to channel resources where they are most needed
in consideration of the threat and the risk of terrorist attack and
to prevent wasteful spending that might occur from unnecessary
duplication of effort. Recent legislation requires that OMB
establish a reporting system for executive agencies on the budgeting
and expenditure of funds for counterterrorism and antiterrorism
programs and activities and that the President report this
information annually to the Congress, along with program priorities
and any duplication of effort.
RECOMMENDATIONS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :8
We recommend that consistent with the responsibility for coordinating
efforts to combat terrorism, the Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs, NSC, in consultation with the Director,
OMB, and the heads of other executive branch agencies, take steps to
ensure that (1) governmentwide priorities to implement the national
counterterrorism policy and strategy are established; (2) agencies'
programs, projects, activities, and requirements for combating
terrorism are analyzed in relation to established governmentwide
priorities; and (3) resources are allocated based on the established
priorities and assessments of the threat and risk of terrorist
attack.
To ensure that federal expenditures for terrorism-related activities
are well-coordinated and focused on efficiently meeting the goals of
U.S. policy under PDD 39, we recommend that the Director, OMB, use
data on funds budgeted and spent by executive departments and
agencies to evaluate and coordinate projects and recommend resource
allocation annually on a crosscutting basis to ensure that
governmentwide priorities for combating terrorism are met and
programs are based on analytically sound threat and risk assessments
and avoid unnecessary duplication.
In a draft of this report we also recommended that the Director, OMB,
establish a governmentwide mechanism for reporting expenditures to
combat terrorism. We deleted that recommendation in view of the
requirements of the recently enacted legislation. Our remaining
recommendations are consistent with and complement this legislation.
AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR
EVALUATION
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :9
In written comments on a draft of this report, the Department of
Defense concurred with our findings. DOD noted that we identified a
significant issue involving reimbursement for and providing DOD
support to other federal agencies under PDD 39. DOD commented that
although PDD 39 states that support provided by a federal agency to
the lead federal agency in support of counterterrorist operations is
borne by the providing agency, PDD 39 is not a statute, and does not
provide authority to waive reimbursement that is required by the
Economy Act. DOD also discussed in its comments specific legislative
options it is considering to resolve the issue. (DOD's comments and
our response are in app. IV.)
In its written comments, the State Department pointed out that,
although interagency funding requirements for combating terrorism are
not managed by any single mechanism, overall counterterrorism and
antiterrorism spending is discussed by NSC's Coordinating Sub-Group
and interagency coordination occurs in other contexts. We agree that
interagency coordination occurs at various forums in the
counterterrorism community but such coordination mechanisms do not
perform the functions we are recommending to NSC and OMB. State also
highlighted the difficulties of determining the amount of funds spent
to combat terrorism with a certain level of precision. We agree that
it would be difficult and possibly not cost-effective to account for
programs and activities that combat terrorism with a high degree of
precision. Nevertheless, at the time of our review, information on
federal spending to combat terrorism had not been gathered in any
form or at any level of specificity, and we believe that a reasonable
methodology could be devised to allow OMB to capture this data
governmentwide. State also noted that efforts to coordinate programs
and activities and prevent duplication are further complicated by the
authorization and appropriations process in the Congress, because
various committees have jurisdiction over the federal agencies
involved in combating terrorism. State finally noted that it is
important to have good working relations with other countries to
effectively counter international terrorism. (State's comments and
our response are in app. V.)
OMB noted in its written comments that although our recommendations
are consistent with policies and responsibilities established by
statute and the President, the budget process would not be improved
by mandating annual, formal crosscutting reviews of budget requests
and spending for federal programs that combat terrorism. OMB also
stated that, because of the significant investment in combating
terrorism over the past few years, it will include a crosscutting
review of these programs in the formulation of the fiscal year 1999
budget. We are encouraged by OMB's crosscutting evaluation of
programs to combat terrorism for the fiscal year 1999 budget
submission. Because of the high national priority, the significant
federal resources allocated, and the numerous federal agencies,
bureaus, and programs involved, we continue to believe that annual
crosscutting reviews would provide a mechanism for OMB to better
assure that federal resources are aligned with governmentwide program
priorities and that funds are not allocated to duplicative activities
and functions to combat terrorism. Annual reviews would be
particularly important because federal agencies continue to propose
funding of new programs, activities, and capabilities to combat
terrorism.
OMB expressed concern that our report suggests that there currently
is no effective process to review spending for combating terrorism.
We acknowledge OMB's reviews of individual agencies' funding
requests, but as noted in our report, OMB did not provide evidence of
its reviews, in particular of the $1.1- billion fiscal year 1997
amended budget request for combating terrorism. OMB also commented
that it carefully considers funding levels for activities to combat
terrorism. During the course of our review, OMB could not provide
data on funding levels across the federal government for combating
terrorism. During the agency comment period on a draft of this
report, officials from the Treasury and Justice Departments noted
that OMB recently issued a budget data request to gather budgetary
and expenditure data from executive agencies for fiscal years
1996-99, which in part satisfies our recommendation to OMB. OMB
would not provide a copy of the budget data request because we are
not part of the executive branch and it was in the process of being
implemented. As a result, we could not verify that the request was
issued or determine its content. (OMB's written comments are in app.
VI.)
The Departments of Treasury; Justice, including the FBI; and
Transportation provided technical comments, which we have reflected
in our report, as appropriate. NSC and the Departments of Energy and
Health and Human Services did not comment on the draft report.
SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
----------------------------------------------------------- Letter :10
We reviewed PDD 39 to determine agencies' roles and responsibilities
in managing and coordinating resources for combating terrorism.
Because data on agencies' spending for U.S. efforts to combat
terrorism are not available from a central source, we obtained from
the Departments of Defense; Energy; Justice, including the FBI;
State; Transportation (FAA); Treasury; and Health and Human Services
data on spending that the agencies categorized as related to their
unclassified efforts to combat terrorism. We did not verify the data
for accuracy, completeness, or consistency. We discussed with NSC
and OMB their respective roles in managing the crosscutting federal
effort to combat terrorism, and we also submitted questions to the
Director, OMB, on OMB's role under PDD 39. We discussed
reimbursement issues with the FBI and DOD.
We conducted our work from November 1996 to October 1997 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
--------------------------------------------------------- Letter :10.1
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the
contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution of
this report until
7 days after its issue date. At that time, we will send copies to
the appropriate congressional committees; the Director, Office of
Management and Budget; other federal agencies discussed in the
report; and other interested parties. If you have any questions
about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-3504. Major
contributors to this report were Davi M. D'Agostino, Richard A.
McGeary, H. Lee Purdy, and
Raymond J. Wyrsch.
Richard Davis
Director, National Security
Analysis
FEDERAL ENTITIES WITH
TERRORISM-RELATED PROGRAMS AND
ACTIVITIES
=========================================================== Appendix I
Department of State
Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Immigration and Naturalization Service
U.S. Marshals Service
Drug Enforcement Agency
Department of Defense (DOD)
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Joint Chiefs of Staff
U.S. Army
U.S. Navy
U.S. Marine Corps
U.S. Air Force
U.S. Special Operations Command
U.S. Central Command
Defense Intelligence Agency
Advanced Research Projects Agency
Defense Information Systems Agency
Defense Special Weapons Agency
Department of Energy
Department of Health and Human Services
Department of Treasury
U.S. Customs Service
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms
U.S. Secret Service
Department of Transportation
Federal Aviation Administration
U.S. Coast Guard
Department of Commerce
Environmental Protection Agency
Federal Emergency Management Agency
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
U.S. Postal Service
White House Military Office
White House Communications Agency
U.S. Supreme Court Marshal's Office
U.S. Capitol Police
Office of the Vice President
U.S. Information Agency
National Security Council (NSC)
Central Intelligence Agency
National Security Agency
National Reconnaissance Office
(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix II
LETTER OF INQUIRY FROM GAO TO THE
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
=========================================================== Appendix I
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix III
OMB RESPONSE TO GAO LETTER OF
INQUIRY
=========================================================== Appendix I
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix IV
COMMENTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
=========================================================== Appendix I
Now on pp. 11-12.
See comment 1.
(See figure in printed edition.)
The following is GAO's comment on DOD's letter dated November 7,
1997.
GAO COMMENT
1. We did not evaluate DOD's options for proposed legislative
changes that would permit nonreimbursable support to law enforcement
agencies.
(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix V
COMMENTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF
STATE
=========================================================== Appendix I
Now on p. 7.
(See figure in printed edition.)
See comment 1.
Now on p. 8
See comment 2.
(See figure in printed edition.)
See comment 3.
See comment 4.
See comment 5.
(See figure in printed edition.)
See comment 5.
The following are GAO's comments on the Department of State's letter
dated November 3, 1997.
GAO COMMENTS
1. While we acknowledge the existence of various interagency
coordinating mechanisms within the NSC structure, these mechanisms do
not perform the functions we are recommending to NSC and OMB. For
example, the interagency Technical Support Working Group coordinates
only certain terrorism-related research and development projects, and
it does not function to eliminate duplicative or redundant
terrorism-related research and development across government
agencies.
2. We modified the text to reflect the Department's point that
embassy guards help protect against a variety of threats.
3. We agree that it would be difficult and possibly not
cost-effective to account for spending to combat terrorism with a
high degree of precision. Our report discusses this matter on p.
14.
4. The Department's concern about reimbursement for the cost of
facilities security in U.S. missions abroad was not brought to our
attention during our review of funding issues for combating
terrorism. As a result, we are not in a position to comment on this
matter.
5. The report discusses the State Department position on p. 14.
(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix VI
COMMENTS FROM THE OFFICE OF
MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
=========================================================== Appendix I
See comment 1.
See comment 2.
(See figure in printed edition.)
See comment 3.
The following are GAO's comments on OMB's letter dated November 18,
1997.
GAO COMMENTS
1. The report acknowledges that OMB reviews agencies' individual
budget requests, and suggests that this process would be enhanced if
federal funding proposals were reviewed on a crosscutting,
governmentwide basis. The report also points out that additional
steps could be taken to prioritize federal programs and activities to
combat terrorism at a strategic level to better ensure priority
programs are funded and avoid duplicative and overlapping activities.
2. As discussed on p. 14 of the final report, we are encouraged by
OMB's crosscutting review of programs to combat terrorism as part of
the fiscal year 1999 budget process.
3. As discussed on pp. 14-15, in view of the national importance
and priority, the significant federal resources allocated, and the
numerous federal agencies, bureaus, and programs involved, we
continue to believe that governmentwide priorities should be set and
annual crosscutting reviews be performed on programs to combat
terrorism. As agencies continue to propose new programs, activities,
and capabilities, priorities and annual crosscutting reviews are
particularly important to better assure that funds are not allocated
to duplicative activities and functions to combat terrorism.
RELATED GAO PRODUCTS
============================================================ Chapter 0
Combating Terrorism: Federal Agencies' Efforts to Implement National
Policy and Strategy (GAO/NSIAD-97-254, Sept. 26, 1997).
Combating Terrorism: Status of DOD Efforts to Protect Its Forces
Overseas (GAO/NSIAD-97-207, July 21, 1997).
Chemical Weapons Stockpile: Changes Needed in the Management
Structure of Emergency Preparedness Program (GAO/NSIAD-97-91, June
11, 1997).
State Department: Efforts to Reduce Visa Fraud (GAO/T-NSIAD-97-167,
May 20, 1997).
Aviation Security: FAA's Procurement of Explosives Detection Devices
(GAO/RCED-97-111R, May 1, 1997).
Aviation Security: Commercially Available Advanced Explosives
Detection Devices (GAO/RCED-97-119R, Apr. 24, 1997).
Terrorism and Drug Trafficking: Responsibilities for Developing
Explosives and Narcotics Detection Technologies (GAO/NSIAD-97-95,
Apr. 15, 1997).
Federal Law Enforcement: Investigative Authority and Personnel at 13
Agencies (GAO/GGD-96-154, Sept. 30, 1996).
Aviation Security: Urgent Issues Need to Be Addressed
(GAO/T-RCED/NSIAD-96-151, Sept. 11, 1996).
Terrorism and Drug Trafficking: Technologies for Detecting
Explosives and Narcotics (GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-252, Sept. 4, 1996).
Aviation Security: Immediate Action Needed to Improve Security
(GAO/T-RCED/NSIAD-96-237, Aug. 1, 1996).
Passports and Visas: Status of Efforts to Reduce Fraud
(GAO/NSIAD-96-99, May 9, 1996).
Terrorism and Drug Trafficking: Threats and Roles of Explosives and
Narcotics Detection Technology (GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-76BR, Mar. 27,
1996).
Nuclear Nonproliferation: Status of U.S. Efforts to Improve Nuclear
Material Controls in Newly Independent States (GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-89,
Mar. 8, 1996).
Aviation Security: Additional Actions Needed to Meet Domestic and
International Challenges (GAO/RCED-94-38, Jan. 27, 1994).
Nuclear Security: Improving Correction of Security Deficiencies at
DOE's Weapons Facilities (GAO/RCED-93-10, Nov. 16, 1992).
Nuclear Security: Weak Internal Controls Hamper Oversight of DOE's
Security Program (GAO/RCED-92-146, June 29, 1992).
Electricity Supply: Efforts Underway to Improve Federal Electrical
Disruption Preparedness (GAO/RCED-92-125, Apr. 20, 1992).
Economic Sanctions: Effectiveness as Tools of Foreign Policy
(GAO/NSIAD-92-106, Feb. 19, 1992).
State Department: Management Weaknesses in the Security Construction
Program (GAO/NSIAD-92-2, Nov. 29, 1991).
Chemical Weapons: Physical Security for the U.S. Chemical Stockpile
(GAO/NSIAD-91-200, May 15, 1991).
State Department: Status of the Diplomatic Security Construction
Program (GAO/NSIAD-91-143BR, Feb. 20, 1991).
International Terrorism: FBI Investigates Domestic Activities to
Identify Terrorists (GAO/GGD-90-112, Sept. 9, l990).
International Terrorism: Status of GAO's Review of the FBI's
International Terrorism Program (GAO/T-GGD-89-31, June 22, 1989).
Embassy Security: Background Investigations of Foreign Employees
(GAO/NSIAD-89-76, Jan. 5, 1989).
Aviation Security: FAA's Assessments of Foreign Airports
(GAO/RCED-89-45, Dec. 7, 1988).
Domestic Terrorism: Prevention Efforts in Selected Federal Courts
and Mass Transit Systems (GAO/PEMD-88-22, June 23, 1988).
*** End of document. ***