Combating Terrorism: Action Taken but Considerable Risks Remain for
Forces Overseas (Letter Report, 07/19/2000, GAO/NSIAD-00-181).
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO evaluated the Department of
Defense's (DOD) efforts to protect U.S. forces stationed overseas from
terrorist attacks, focusing on: (1) the extent to which DOD has made
improvements to its antiterrorism/force protection program overseas; (2)
changes in DOD's process for assessing and reporting vulnerability at
overseas installations; and (3) the adequacy of antiterrorism/force
protection funding and staff.
GAO noted that: (1) overall, military forces stationed overseas are
better protected today than they were 3 years ago; (2) the Joint Chiefs
of Staff has developed DOD-wide construction standards to ensure that
antiterrorism/force protection measures are included in new
construction; (3) in addition, DOD has signed agreements with the
Department of State and U.S. ambassadors or chiefs of mission to protect
DOD personnel not under the jurisdiction of commanders; (4) geographic
combatant commands have created permanent antiterrorism/force protection
offices, hired permanent antiterrorism/force protection staff, and
developed systems to monitor progress to correct vulnerabilities; (5)
installation commanders are more aware of their responsibility to
protect their forces from terrorist attack, and, despite funding
constraints, have addressed many security vulnerabilities; (6) however,
significant security and procedural antiterrorism/force protection
problems continue at many installations; (7) for example, some
installations have not developed plans to deal with terrorist attacks,
others have no effective means of stopping unauthorized vehicles from
entering the installation, and some lack secure access to important
intelligence information; (8) commanders are better able to determine
their vulnerability to terrorist attacks than when GAO last reported;
(9) vulnerability assessments are now being conducted more routinely and
are based on a defined set of criteria; (10) however, vulnerability
assessment reports do not provide specific actions to rectify problems
mentioned in the reports; additionally, there is no comprehensive method
in place to share solutions to common problems among different
installations; (11) limited antiterrorist funding and trained staff have
affected the ability of commanders to correct known vulnerabilities;
(12) funding for antiterrorism protection has been, and will likely
continue to be, less than what installation and geographic combatant
commanders have determined they require, although senior DOD leaders
have designated antiterrorism/force protection as a high priority item;
(13) some overseas service commands have repeatedly received less than
50 percent of the money the commands believe they require to correct or
mitigate vulnerabilities; (14) without information on the types of
projects that need funding, Congress does not have an accurate picture
of the extent of the risk that U.S. forces face from terrorism; and (15)
installations GAO visited did not have adequately trained personnel
dedicated to managing and implementing antiterrorism solutions.
--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------
REPORTNUM: NSIAD-00-181
TITLE: Combating Terrorism: Action Taken but Considerable Risks
Remain for Forces Overseas
DATE: 07/19/2000
SUBJECT: Terrorism
Defense contingency planning
Budget reapportionment
Armed forces abroad
Defense budgets
Defense operations
Reporting requirements
IDENTIFIER: Riyadh (Saudi Arabia)
JCS Combating Terrorism Readiness Initiative Fund
JCS Integrated Vulnerability Assessment Program
DOD Antiterrorism/Force Protection Program
******************************************************************
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GAO/NSIAD-00-181
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
30
Appendix II: Comments From the Department of Defense
34
Appendix III: GAO Staff Acknowledgments
39
Table 1: Service AT/FP Requirement, Proposed Spending Plan,
Shortage, and Percentage of Requirement Fulfilled for
Fiscal Year 2001 18
Figure 1: DOD Program Objectives Memorandum Process 16
Figure 2: Percentage of Antiterrorism/Force Protection
Requirement the Services Plan to Fund in the European Command 20
Figure 3: Percentage of Antiterrorism/Force Protection Funding Requirement
the Services Plan to Fund in the Pacific
Command 21
DOD Department of Defense
AT/FP antiterrorism/force protection
National Security and
International Affairs Division
B-285538
July 19, 2000
The Honorable Ike Skelton
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives
Dear Mr. Skelton:
In November 1995, a car bomb exploded in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, killing five
Americans. In June 1996, terrorists attacked the U.S. military complex at
Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia, killing 19 Americans and wounding hundreds
more. In September of that year, the Secretary of Defense named the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as his principal advisor on antiterrorism/force
protection.1 The Chairman later announced his goal that the Department of
Defense (DOD) would become the recognized leader in antiterrorism/force
protection throughout the world. Even though a terrorist attack has not
occurred at a U.S. military installation since Khobar Towers, protecting
U.S. forces against terrorism remains a top DOD priority. In late 1996
through June 1997, we evaluated DOD's efforts to protect U.S. forces
stationed overseas from terrorist attacks. We reported that DOD had not
taken the steps necessary to promote a comprehensive, consistent approach to
antiterrorism that would give commanders at all levels the tools they needed
to fulfill their antiterrorism responsibilities.2 In addition, we noted that
(1) DOD lacked prescriptive, measurable physical security standards to
determine whether antiterrorism measures were sufficient; (2) DOD lacked
assurances that the antiterrorism programs implemented by local commanders
met a consistent minimum standard for all overseas personnel; and (3) many
U.S. military personnel stationed overseas were not specifically covered by
the antiterrorism plans
of either the geographic combatant commander3 or a country's State
Department representative (e.g., U.S. ambassador or chief of mission). We
made several recommendations to the Secretary of Defense that were directed
toward developing common standards and procedures and to ensuring that
security responsibility for all DOD personnel overseas was clear.
As you requested, we evaluated DOD's efforts since our last report to
improve its antiterrorism/force protection program. This report discusses
· the extent to which DOD has made improvements to its antiterrorism/force
protection program overseas,
· changes in DOD's process for assessing and reporting vulnerabilities at
overseas installations, and
· the adequacy of antiterrorism/force protection funding and staff.
To conduct this work, we visited 19 sites in Europe, the Middle East, and
the Pacific. We also visited four of the five geographic combatant commands
as well as most of the service commands in Europe, the Middle East, and the
Pacific. We are not discussing installation specific information in this
report for security reasons. Our scope and methodology are in appendix I.
Overall, military forces stationed overseas are better protected today than
they were 3 years ago. The Joint Staff has developed DOD-wide construction
standards to ensure that antiterrorism/force protection measures are
included in new construction. In addition, DOD has signed agreements with
the Department of State and U.S. ambassadors or chiefs of mission to protect
DOD personnel not under the jurisdiction of commanders. Geographic combatant
commands have created permanent antiterrorism/force protection offices,
hired permanent antiterrorism/force protection staff, and developed systems
to monitor progress to correct vulnerabilities. Installation commanders are
more aware of their responsibility to protect their forces from terrorist
attack and, despite funding constraints, have addressed many security
vulnerabilities. However, significant security and procedural
antiterrorism/force protection problems continue at many installations. For
example, some installations have not developed plans to deal with terrorist
attacks, others have no effective means of stopping unauthorized vehicles
from entering the installation, and some lack secure access to important
intelligence information.
Commanders are better able to determine their vulnerability to terrorist
attacks than when we last reported. Vulnerability assessments are now being
conducted more routinely and are based on a defined set of criteria.
However, vulnerability assessment reports do not provide specific actions to
rectify problems mentioned in the reports. Additionally, there is no
comprehensive method in place to share solutions to common problems among
different installations.
Limited antiterrorism funding and trained staff have affected the ability of
commanders to correct known vulnerabilities. Funding for antiterrorism
protection has been, and will likely continue to be, significantly less than
what installation and geographic combatant commanders have determined they
require, despite the fact that senior DOD leaders have designated
antiterrorism/force protection as a high priority item. For example, some
overseas service commands have repeatedly received less than 50 percent of
the money the commands believe they require to correct or mitigate
vulnerabilities. According to antiterrorism/force protection managers, this
level of funding has limited their ability to address vulnerabilities.
Congress requires DOD to provide information on proposed antiterrorism/force
protection funding and projects as part of its consolidated combating
terrorism budget submission; however, it does not require DOD to provide
information on the number of projects that remain to be funded. Without
information on the types of projects that need funding, Congress does not
have an accurate picture of the extent of the risk that U.S. forces face
from terrorism. In addition, installations we visited did not have
adequately trained personnel dedicated to managing and implementing
antiterrorism solutions.
We are making recommendations to improve the vulnerability assessment
reporting process, increase congressional visibility of unfunded
antiterrorism/force protection projects to correct or mitigate
vulnerabilities, and improve the training program for antiterrorism/force
protection managers. In written comments to our draft report, the Department
of Defense agreed with our recommendations to improve the vulnerability
assessment reporting process and the training program for
antiterrorism/force protection managers. The Department disagreed with our
recommendation to increase congressional visibility of unfunded projects
that would correct or mitigate vulnerabilities because it believes that the
current planning, programming, and budgeting system is effective and ensures
that high priority items are funded. Despite the Department's position, we
believe this information would enhance congressional oversight and make
Congress more aware of the types of risk that servicemembers face every day.
As a result, we have added a matter for congressional consideration that
would require the Department of Defense to provide Congress with detailed
information on the unfunded projects.
The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity
Conflict is the principal staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary of
Defense for antiterrorism/force protection (AT/FP) policy. While this office
focuses on policy, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the
Combating Terrorism directorate within the Joint Staff focus on implementing
DOD's AT/FP program. The Joint Staff's responsibilities include reviewing
the services' AT/FP budgets, developing standards, managing the Joint Staff
Integrated Vulnerability Assessment program, and representing the geographic
combatant commanders on AT/FP matters.
DOD policy makes commanders responsible for protecting their forces from
terrorist attacks. For forces overseas, the responsibility rests with the
geographic combatant commander and the installation commander, with the
support of the service headquarters. The geographic combatant commanders are
responsible for developing antiterrorism policies that apply at the
installations in their areas of responsibility and that take precedence over
service or other DOD component AT/FP policies. They are also responsible for
determining the threat levels for each country in their area of
responsibility, identifying the money and manpower needed to achieve
sufficient AT/FP, and working with the services to provide the resources
necessary. Finally, because all risks cannot be eliminated, the geographic
combatant commanders are responsible for determining the types of risks
their forces will face as they undertake their missions. Installation
commanders are responsible for protecting the people, assets, and facilities
under their command from terrorist attacks. The installation commander,
working with the installation AT/FP manager, is responsible for ensuring
that AT/FP standards established by DOD, the geographic combatant
commanders, the services, and the service headquarters are implemented.
Additionally, because DOD recognizes that not all vulnerabilities can be
addressed, installation commanders practice risk management?to decide what
risks can be accepted and what risks are too great to be accepted. When the
risk is unacceptable, the commander is responsible for taking action to
mitigate the risk.
Although geographic combatant commanders have overall responsibility to
protect forces assigned to them, individual services are responsible for
funding an installation's AT/FP needs and for providing the required number
of trained personnel. The majority of funds used for AT/FP activities
(excluding the cost of military personnel) are located in the services'
Operation and Maintenance appropriations. Operation and Maintenance
appropriations are generally used to fund readiness activities, equipment
maintenance, recruiting, pay for civilian employees (including contract
security guards), and the everyday costs of running an installation. A
number of subactivities within this appropriation fund specific expenses.
Examples of the subactivities include real property maintenance, depot
maintenance, and base operating support. The base operating support
subactivity pays for expenses such as utilities, communications, security,
building repair, and maintenance. Traditionally, the services have included
funds for AT/FP in the base operating support subactivity, and AT/FP
activities must compete against other activities for the same limited
funding.
Shortly after the Khobar Towers bombing, the Secretary of Defense
established the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's Combating Terrorism
Readiness Initiative Fund.4 The Fund, which is managed by the Joint Staff,
was not intended to relieve the services of their responsibility to fund
AT/FP projects; rather, it was intended to provide funding for emergency or
other unforeseen high-priority, combating terrorism needs. In fiscal year
2000, the Fund totaled $15 million?$10 million of Operation and Maintenance
funds and $5 million of procurement funds. This level of funding is
scheduled to continue through fiscal year 2002. In fiscal years 2003 through
2007, the Fund will be reduced to a total of $10 million a year according to
DOD.
Challenges Remain
Since we last reported in 1997, DOD has improved its AT/FP program.
Improvements have been made at the Joint Staff, the geographic combatant
command, and the installation levels. Specifically, more guidance is
available to help develop and implement programs; many physical security
vulnerabilities have been corrected; and in cases where vulnerabilities
cannot be corrected, commanders have taken actions to mitigate potential
damage. Such actions included adding fragment retention film to windows,
installing barriers, moving personnel into base housing, erecting fences,
and moving parking lots. Although improvements in AT/FP have been made,
physical security and procedural problems (i.e., a lack of personnel
alerting systems and access control and AT/FP plans) continue to put U.S.
forces at risk of terrorist attack.
Protection
The Joint Staff has taken significant actions to improve commanders' AT/FP
programs. First, in December 1999, DOD issued standards (developed under the
guidance of the Joint Staff) for new construction in the first volume of the
DOD Security Engineering document. The remaining two volumes are expected to
be completed by December 2002. The new construction standards are minimum
standards and provide guidance for design criteria, protective strategies,
and the costs for protective measures against higher threats. Second, the
Departments of Defense and State have signed a Memorandum of Understanding,
and over 90 country-level Memorandums of Agreement have been signed between
the geographic combatant commanders and their local U.S. ambassadors or
chiefs of mission. These agreements clarify who is responsible for providing
AT/FP to DOD personnel not under the direct command of the geographic
combatant commanders. These agreements cover 75 percent of these personnel
(about 7,400 people). The State Department has set a goal for completing the
remaining Memorandums of Agreement by summer 2000.
The Joint Staff also administers the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's
Combating Terrorism Readiness Initiatives Fund, which has allocated over $80
million to installations in the U.S. and abroad since 1997.5 At several
locations we visited, this Fund was the installation's primary source of
funding for AT/FP improvements. Some improvements provided by this Fund
include perimeter lighting, fences, road barriers, guard shacks, and
explosive detectors.
In addition, the Joint Staff has also sponsored vulnerability assessment
teams and educational initiatives. The Joint Staff Integrated Vulnerability
Assessment teams, which were initiated in September 1996, have completed 243
vulnerability assessments worldwide. As discussed in more detail below,
these assessments bring a level of expertise, a consistent level of quality,
and a standardized methodology not previously available to installation
commanders. These assessment teams have also provided educational
opportunities for local AT/FP managers by teaching them how to write AT/FP
and weapons of mass destruction response plans. The Joint Staff has also
been actively developing outreach programs, including
CD-ROMs and a quarterly newsletter designed to share good AT/FP ideas and to
help AT/FP managers improve their programs.
The geographic combatant commanders and overseas service headquarters have
also taken action to improve the management of their AT/FP programs. U.S.
Southern Command and U.S. Forces Korea have established full-time AT/FP
offices and designated full-time AT/FP staffs since our last review.
Military force structure limitations and continuity problems (due to
personnel rotations) are being addressed at U.S. Army Europe and the 8th
Army in Korea through the creation of full-time civilian AT/FP positions.
Three geographic combatant commands?U.S. European Command, U.S. Southern
Command, and U.S. Central Command?have developed vulnerability monitoring
systems that help commanders to be aware of vulnerabilities and to monitor
progress toward resolution of issues identified by vulnerability
assessments. In addition, recognizing a need for additional training for
AT/FP managers, U.S. European Command developed a 5-day course to introduce
AT/FP managers to a variety of aspects of the AT/FP program. Finally, all of
the geographic combatant commands we visited now have command-specific
construction standards. At the time of our last report, only the Central
Command had developed construction standards.
Installation commanders have made progress in institutionalizing AT/FP
programs, increasing AT/FP awareness, and reducing physical security
vulnerabilities. Commanders at all the installations we visited had
designated AT/FP program managers. Also, every installation we visited had
an AT/FP awareness program and in some cases, used the local armed forces
cable network to convey AT/FP messages. To assist in making decisions on
AT/FP priorities and funding issues, nearly all the installations we visited
had established AT/FP working groups or councils.
When funding was available, commanders addressed vulnerabilities. When
vulnerabilities could not be fully addressed, commanders took action to
mitigate the potential damage from a terrorist attack. Some of the actions
have included increasing surveillance of the road, closing gates, and better
protecting the people in buildings by applying fragment retention film to
the windows and moving people away from the vulnerable side of the building.
Notwithstanding improvements, significant physical security and procedural
AT/FP problems remain at many installations. The problems we observed during
our installation visits included physical security and procedural issues.
The Joint Staff's vulnerability assessments at
93 installations in 1999 found many of the same problems we observed. Some
of these problems are described below:
· Poor installation AT/FP planning. Some installations we visited in the
U.S. European Command and the U.S. Pacific Command had not completed their
AT/FP installation plans almost 3 years after DOD established this
requirement. The Joint Staff assessments identified poor or nonexistent
AT/FP planning at many installations and further noted that some
installations had AT/FP plans, but did not exercise them as required by DOD
instruction. Planning is imperative so that all personnel will know what to
do and how to react in any given situation. Recently, the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff reaffirmed the importance of AT/FP planning in a
message to the geographic combatant commanders and the service chiefs.
· Lack of access control. Some of the installations we visited in the U.S.
Pacific Command had no gates and/or no effective means of stopping
unauthorized vehicles from entering the facility. We were told of one
instance where a pizza delivery vehicle drove onto base without stopping
because the driver failed to realize he was entering the base. The AT/FP
manager at one large installation told us that a barrier system designed to
stop cars was broken and that there were no plans to fix it because it was
not cost-effective to keep it in working order in cold weather. The Joint
Staff compilation report also noted that barriers at installation main gates
were either nonexistent or poorly placed and that installation perimeter
gates did not have an effective means of preventing a high-speed vehicle
approach. The report also noted that vehicle access controls at the gates
were inefficient, inconsistent, or nonexistent; in many instances,
installations lacked vehicle inspection equipment and guards either were
unaware of control procedures or did not always follow them.
· Poorly maintained or overgrown perimeter fences. At one installation in
the U.S. European Command, the perimeter fence had been cut, presumably by
students, to create shortcuts on and off base. In the Pacific Command, we
found egregious examples of encroachment on perimeter fences in which host
nation housing leaned against the perimeter wall and drainage pipes were
inserted through the perimeter wall by local residents.
· Lack of personnel alerting systems. This equipment is designed to alert
all personnel in a given area to terrorism and other emergencies. At least
one expert believes that a properly functioning personnel alerting system
would have saved lives at Khobar Towers. Personnel alerting systems were
lacking at many installations we visited.
· Lack of access to timely intelligence information. Some installations were
not connected to intelligence databases via secure lines, which could delay
the transmission of intelligence information to AT/FP personnel. Some
installations possessed one secure computer for many users and other
installations had no secure computers available at the installation.
· Shortage of security forces. In one country we visited, a Navy base was
forced to use sailors without a security background to meet its basic every
day AT/FP responsibilities. One Air Force base we visited is routinely short
of experienced security personnel because it regularly deploys security
force personnel to the Middle East. Also, we found that in other countries
Army intelligence personnel often deploy, leaving installations without an
adequate local intelligence capability to meet AT/FP needs. This was a major
vulnerability issue noted in the Joint Staff assessments as well.
· Shortage of AT/FP staff. A majority of the installation AT/FP managers we
interviewed told us that they lacked sufficient AT/FP staff to complete the
myriad program requirements established by DOD and the geographic combatant
commanders. Approximately 66 percent of the AT/FP managers we met with have
other full-time jobs and have been assigned the responsibility for AT/FP as
an additional duty. One subordinate command official told us that the staff
was so busy with non-AT/FP matters that they had no time to do any AT/FP
planning?they simply put out AT/FP "fires." One manager believed that the
lack of full-time AT/FP managers indicated that the service did not really
place a high priority on AT/FP.
Since our last report in 1997, vulnerability assessments have been conducted
more routinely and have been based on a defined set of criteria. Through
vulnerability assessments, DOD, the geographic combatant commands, and the
services evaluate their ability to defend against a terrorist attack and
highlight security weaknesses that terrorists could exploit. In 1997,
vulnerability assessments differed in frequency, approach, and quality.
Within DOD, commands did not have a common understanding of how to conduct a
vulnerability assessment or what constituted a high quality assessment. In
addition, some vulnerability assessment reports failed to provide specific
information on the vulnerabilities found at installations.
This situation has improved in the last 3 years. DOD guidance now requires
that all installations undergo a higher headquarters AT/FP vulnerability
assessment at least once every 3 years (individual commands may elect to
require more frequent assessments). At a minimum, according to DOD policy,
all of these higher headquarters assessments must assess the following
functional areas: (1) counterintelligence, law enforcement, and intelligence
support; (2) physical security; (3) vulnerability and response to a threat;
(4) force protection plans and programs; (5) host nation, local community,
interservice, and tenant support; and (6) activity-specific characteristics.
A Joint Staff, geographic combatant command, or service vulnerability
assessment can satisfy assessment requirements. In the following paragraphs,
we evaluate the vulnerability assessments conducted by these entities since
our last report.
In September 1996, the Joint Staff through the Defense Threat Reduction
Agency began to conduct Joint Staff Integrated Vulnerability Assessments at
installations.6 The teams conducting the assessments have since been working
to identify installation vulnerabilities and present options for commanders
to mitigate vulnerabilities with a focus on avoiding mass casualties. During
a week long on-site assessment, the team reviews site specific plans,
programs, and procedures. Areas they assess include physical security
systems, guard-force procedures, incident response, structural engineering,
infrastructure engineering, intelligence processes, and ability to manage
the consequences of an attack. The teams compile reports outlining the
various problems or vulnerabilities and make recommendations for ways to
improve AT/FP. Because AT/FP is a commander's program, DOD does not require
commanders to correct the vulnerabilities noted in the reports.
AT/FP personnel told us that the Joint Staff Integrated Vulnerability
Assessments served to educate the command to vulnerabilities and were useful
in planning projects and prioritizing them against available resources.
However, some changes could make this tool even more valuable. The
assessment teams have not been providing a commander with specific
directions on how to deal with vulnerabilities. For example, the report may
mention that the installation's windows need fragment retention film,7 but
it would not tell the commander if installing the film is more or less
important than fixing other vulnerabilities, or advise the commander as to
what type of film might be the best fix for the problem, nor would it
outline how other installations have dealt with similar issues. In addition,
some AT/FP personnel found that the reports could be more user-friendly. We
were told that the reports are difficult to read and understand, too long,
and poorly structured.
Additionally, other installations facing similar problems cannot take
advantage of the advice provided in the assessment team's report because DOD
has no formal, comprehensive mechanism to share best practices or lessons
learned. This condition is particularly unfortunate for installations that
are too small to receive Joint Staff-sponsored assessments or installations
that independently identify vulnerabilities between assessments and could
benefit from the teams' expertise secondhand.
The Joint Staff is responding to some of the commanders' and AT/FP
officials' concerns. For example, Joint Service Integrated Vulnerability
Assessment team leaders told us that the executive summary of future
assessment reports will highlight those vulnerabilities that the team
believes to be the most pressing. The vulnerabilities in the executive
summary, while not in priority order, will be segmented into two
categories?those that can be addressed with little or no money and those
that will require funding. This differentiation should make it easier for a
command to take immediate action on some vulnerabilities. Additionally, an
e-mail account has been established to allow (1) AT/FP managers to ask
questions and (2) assessment team members to provide potential solutions to
specific issues. Finally, according to Joint Staff officials, they have
started to list all observations with bullet points for improved
readability.
In addition to the Joint Staff-sponsored assessment teams, the geographic
combatant commands and the services sponsor a number of other vulnerability
assessment teams. For example, U.S. Central Command has formed the Joint
Rear Area Coordinator assessment team, and U.S. Army Europe has formed teams
to assess installations in their area of responsibility. Both the Air Force
and the Navy have established teams, as have the Air Forces' overseas
service headquarters such as the Pacific Air Force and U.S. Air Force
Europe. The service- and command-level teams generally assess installations
that the Joint Staff-sponsored teams do not assess.
These assessments differ in quality from the Joint Staff-sponsored
assessments since these teams generally do not have the same level of
expertise and tend to be inconsistent in their makeup. On the other hand,
these assessments can be helpful in that the teams visit even the smallest
installations and provide a unique local- or service-centered perspective.
Antiterrorism/Force Protection Program
Although DOD makes the geographic combatant commanders responsible for
protecting U.S. forces from terrorist attack, it is up to the services to
provide the necessary personnel and funding to correct vulnerabilities and
upgrade facilities. Notwithstanding AT/FP's high priority status within DOD,
funding for AT/FP has been, and will likely continue to be, significantly
less than what installation and geographic combatant commanders feel they
need to meet DOD's goals. Commanders and AT/FP program managers we met with
stated that insufficient service
funding had limited their ability to meet their AT/FP responsibilities.8
Although Congress has taken action to obtain more information about AT/FP
financing, DOD is not required to provide Congress with information about
unfunded AT/FP projects that would correct or mitigate vulnerabilities. In
addition, DOD has not provided AT/FP managers with the training necessary to
serve as AT/FP advisors to installation commanding officers.
Installations
Every 2 years, the services develop the Program Objectives Memorandums,9
which outline the services' spending plans for the following 6 years. The
Program Objectives Memorandums are the starting point for the budget
requests that are sent to Congress annually. Figure 1 details the steps in
this process.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD's Program Objectives Memorandum process.
As the figure shows, the process begins with an installation commander
providing a prioritized list of unfunded requirements, including AT/FP
requirements to the major service commands. At the services' major commands,
the installations' requirements are combined, prioritized (using guidance
from the service and geographic combatant commander), and forwarded to the
service headquarters for consideration. At the service headquarters, AT/FP
requirements compete against other requirements for funds. The service
secretary approves the Program Objectives Memorandum and submits it to the
Office of the Secretary of Defense for approval where subject matter
experts, such as those in the Joint Staff office responsible for AT/FP
issues, review them and develop alternative funding plans. If the Deputy
Secretary of Defense is convinced that the services' spending plans need to
be adjusted, he will direct the services to adjust their plans. After the
Program Objectives Memorandum process is completed, the budgeting phase
begins with the services developing detailed budget estimates. These
estimates are also reviewed by the subject matter experts, and are approved
or revised by the Deputy Secretary of Defense. The budget is then finalized
and sent to Congress. The Deputy Secretary of Defense has directed the
services to increase AT/FP funding every year since 1996.
Although we could not obtain complete funding data for all the service
commands we visited, the data that is available reveals that funding for
AT/FP requirements in fiscal years 1999 and 2000 has been significantly less
than many commanders of overseas installations in the Pacific and Europe
required,10 as the following examples indicate:
· In fiscal years 1999 and 2000, the Pacific Air Forces received
approximately 4 percent and 2 percent, respectively, of funds needed to meet
their AT/FP requirements. In fiscal year 1999, $120,000 of the
$3.2 million AT/FP requirement was funded. For fiscal year 2000,
$52,000 was provided to meet $2.5 million of AT/FP requirements. Projects
that installations deferred included improving blast protection, applying
fragment retention film to windows to reduce the hazards of flying glass,
and developing new AT/FP training materials.
· For fiscal year 2000, the Army in Korea needed $44.6 million for civilian
gate guards and AT/FP physical security improvements and equipment. However,
the Army only provided 22 percent ($9.8 million) of the requirement.
According to the commanding general of the Army in Korea, without additional
funding the Command will have to divert funds, including unit training
money, to pay for the required guards. This diversion will result in reduced
readiness. Projects to improve communications, blast protection, and access
control remain undone due to a lack of funds.
· In fiscal year 1999, the U.S. Navy, Pacific Fleet received $30.3 million,
or about 60 percent, of its $50.4 million requirement. In fiscal year 2000,
it received $28.1 million, or 54 percent, of its $52 million requirement.
Projects to improve base access control, lighting, and communications
remained unfunded at the time of our visit.
· The Army Command in Europe was unable to provide us details about its
requirements for fiscal year 1999 or 2000. However, according to documents
from the Army in Europe, in both fiscal years the Army failed to provide
sufficient funds to contract for all of the civilian security guards
required to implement the geographic combatant commander's decision to limit
access to U.S. bases in Europe.
Again
The services' proposed AT/FP spending plans for fiscal year 2001 left every
command in the Pacific and in Europe with unfunded requirements. For
example, the Army's spending plan for its forces in Europe totaled only
54 percent of its requirement, while the Air Force budget for its command in
the Pacific totaled 3 percent of the requirement. Table 1 outlines the
services' requirements and proposed spending plans, the resulting shortage,
and the percentage of the requirement the spending plan fulfills for fiscal
year 2001.
Dollars in millions
Air Air
Army: Navy: Force: Army: Force: Navy: Army: Total
Pacific Pacific Korea Europe Europe
Pacific Europe
Required 6.8 53.6 2.2 35.5 19.6 24.5 132.3 274.5
Proposed
spending 6.3 27.0 0.06 12a 7.1a 17.6 71.2a 141.3
Shortage 0.5 26.6 2.1 23.5 12.5 6.9 61.1 133.2
Percent of
requirement 92 50 3 34 36 72 54 51
fulfilled
aData does not include increases made at the direction of the Deputy
Secretary of Defense after the service secretaries approved the budget
proposals.
Source: Command- and service-provided data.
In August 1999, the Deputy Secretary of Defense directed the Army and the
Air Force to increase the funding levels for AT/FP in fiscal year 2001. At
that time, the Deputy Secretary of Defense directed (1) the Army to add
$32.5 million to its AT/FP budget for Europe and $7 million to fund contract
security guards at installations in Korea and (2) the Air Force to add
$12.5 million to its AT/FP budget for the U.S. Air Forces in Europe. As a
result, the U.S. Air Forces in Europe's AT/FP requirements are fully funded
for fiscal year 2001. Also, according to an official from the U.S. Naval
Forces in Europe's AT/FP office, the AT/FP program is fully funded for
fiscal year 2001 because it received contingency funds and supplemental
funds in fiscal year 1999. These funds allowed the program to address some
fiscal year 2001 requirements in fiscal year 1999. The remaining overseas
service headquarters remain underfunded.
The services' current funding plans for fiscal years 2002 through 2005
continue the trend of under funding AT/FP requirements. According to a
document developed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense for use during
the 1999 review of the services' fiscal year 2001 to 2005 Program Objectives
Memorandums, the services did not provide
· funding for physical security improvements validated by vulnerability
assessments,
· full funding for investments arising from establishment of AT/FP
standards, or
· full funding for contract security guards.
As figures 2 and 3 show, the planned AT/FP funding for Army, Air Force, and
Navy forces in Europe and the Pacific is consistently below funding
requirements. The figures reflect current requirements and planned spending
levels.
Note: Data for Army and Navy does not include military manpower. Data for
the Air Force includes some military manpower.
Source: GAO's analysis of service and command data.
Note: Data includes operation and maintenance requirements only.
Source: GAO's analysis of service and command data.
At the time of our review, the services were updating their fiscal year 2002
through 2005 spending plans. The Joint Staff estimates that the services
will need to add an additional $700 million over the current levels of
spending to address AT/FP requirements. According to Joint Staff officials,
costs for AT/FP continue to rise because new requirements are continually
being identified as threat and terrorist tactics change.
According to an Army official, AT/FP requirements are the fastest growing
requirement in the Army budget today. He estimated that the Army's AT/FP
unfinanced requirement is growing at $80 million per year.11 Despite this,
the Army did not anticipate increasing AT/FP funding for fiscal years 2002
through 2007. According to an Army official responsible for developing the
Program Objectives Memorandum, the Army is reluctant to increase spending
until it can develop a model that can predict the level of protection
obtained for dollars spent. As a result, the Army in Europe has
significantly less money than it believes it needs to adequately secure its
installations. Specifically, the Army's proposed funding plan for fiscal
years 2002 through 2007 underfunds its forces in Europe by $44.2 million in
fiscal year 2002 alone, with a total of $226.5 million for fiscal years 2002
through 2007.
The Air Force had anticipated increasing AT/FP spending for fiscal
year 2002 when it updated its fiscal year 2002 to 2005 spending proposal
this year because requirements were growing as commanders identified
vulnerabilities and developed projects to correct them. However, ultimately,
the Air Force did not increase funding for its forces in Europe and the
Pacific. For fiscal years 2002 through 2007, these forces have unfunded
requirements of $37 million and $13 million, respectively.
The Navy hopes to be able to increase AT/FP in its fiscal year 2002 spending
plans, but plans beyond fiscal year 2002 are uncertain. A Navy official
responsible for making AT/FP funding recommendations for a small portion of
the Navy's AT/FP budget told us that he would recommend an increase in some
AT/FP spending for fiscal year 2002. The same official told us that it was
unlikely that the remaining years of the Program Objectives Memorandum
(fiscal years 2003 through fiscal year 2007) would be funded at the fiscal
year 2002 level.
Funding Information
During consideration of the fiscal year 2000 DOD budget, the Senate
Committee on Armed Services expressed concern over its inability to obtain
information about DOD's programs to combat terrorism. In its report, the
Committee said,
"With current budget submissions, it is difficult for the committee to
determine the scale of the Department's effort to combat terrorism, the
effectiveness of the effort, how well the Department's efforts respond to
the threat, and how the DOD programs fulfill the overall government policy
and strategy in this area."12
To improve its oversight of combating terrorism activities (which include
AT/FP), Congress directed the Secretary of Defense to provide it with a
consolidated combating terrorism budget justification (among other
things).13 Congress directed that the consolidated budget justification
provide details on how the services intend to spend the combating terrorism
funds they are requesting and to provide this information by appropriation
as well as by functional areas.14 Congress did not require DOD to supply any
information about unfunded AT/FP projects that would correct or mitigate
vulnerabilities. The first consolidated budget justification was submitted
in support of the fiscal year 2001 budget request in February 2000.
Each installation is required to have an AT/FP manager who serves as the
"subject matter expert and advisor" to the commander. In general, the AT/FP
managers we met were not adequately trained to manage their installations'
programs and to complete the tasks assigned by the geographic combatant
commanders and services.
DOD has not established specific qualifications for these managers. There
are, however, specific tasks that are required of the commanders by DOD
directive. Insight can thus be gained into the capabilities required of the
AT/FP program managers in support of an installation commander. Based on
these tasks, a manager must be able to adequately plan and exercise an AT/FP
program, advise the commander on setting threat conditions, perform physical
security vulnerability assessments, coordinate AT/FP response plans for
subordinate and tenant organizations on the installation, routinely review
the effectiveness of daily security measures, conduct residential security
assessments of off-base housing, provide base engineers with military
construction requirements, train base personnel, and conduct ongoing
awareness programs.
The only formal training DOD offers for these managers, which can be waived
by a commander, is designed to teach managers how to provide basic terrorism
awareness training to installation personnel. It does not emphasize how to
develop or manage an AT/FP program. No formal AT/FP program management
training that instructs personnel on how to manage an AT/FP office, garner
funding, or that teaches best practices exists. At some installations we
visited, the primary method of developing AT/FP expertise was through
on-the-job training. As a result, nearly all of the AT/FP managers we
interviewed believed they were unprepared to do their jobs:
· Many of the AT/FP managers were not aware of all DOD and geographic
combatant command AT/FP requirements. For example, DOD requires that all
installations undertake a physical security vulnerability assessment once
every 3 years. This requirement was not met at most installations?some AT/FP
managers were not familiar with this requirement and others did not know how
to conduct a physical security vulnerability assessment.
· Many installations did not have AT/FP plans or had poor ones. These plans
are supposed to include procedures to (1) collect and analyze terrorist
threat information, threat capabilities, and vulnerabilities to terrorist
attacks; (2) enhance AT/FP protection; and (3) respond to terrorism
incidents. The plans we reviewed at installations we visited varied in size
and scope, from just a few pages to 15 volumes. It was clear that the AT/FP
managers had no uniform understanding of what was expected of them in this
regard.
· Many installations have never practiced using the AT/FP plans. The plan
helps to determine their ability to protect personnel and assets against
terrorist attack. If a plan is written, but not workable, it is of little
use in an emergency.
· One AT/FP manager we interviewed did not understand the difference between
the concepts of THREATCONS and threat levels,15 despite the fact that his
position requires that he act as an advisor to the commander on these
topics.
Changes are planned for the AT/FP manager training as a result of a recently
completed Joint Staff study of the training. The study found that the
current training fulfills current standards but does not teach an AT/FP
manager how to be a force protection manager. To make improvements, the
Joint Staff (1) reviewed the applicable directive; (2) surveyed the
geographic combatant commands, the services, and the defense agencies; and
(3) observed current service AT/FP manager training courses. As a result,
the Joint Staff drafted a new standard outlining a curriculum that would
include training on installation AT/FP manager duties, how to write plans,
and how to conduct assessments. While DOD would set the standards for what
is taught, each service would still be responsible for independently
developing the course of study and completing the training for its own
personnel. This could lead to differences in the training from one service
to another. For example, one service has already mentioned that it would
like to implement a 2-week training course, rather than the current 1-week
course. The new standard is currently under review, and it is unclear when
it will be implemented.
While all risks cannot be eliminated, they have been reduced through the
improvements DOD has made in its ability to protect U.S. forces located
outside the United States from terrorist attack. Commanders have used
vulnerability assessments to determine the vulnerabilities they face and
have developed strategies for correcting those vulnerabilities. The
vulnerability assessment reports issued by the Joint Staff do not, however,
contain all the information that could be useful to the commander. Also, the
Joint Staff has not developed a system to share assessment results, which
represents a lost opportunity to learn from the mistakes and lessons of
other installations and which could reduce the risks that servicemembers
face. As a result of these weaknesses, significant vulnerabilities that
place U.S. forces at risk will remain until the services provide the funds
and trained personnel that commanders, who are charged with protecting the
forces, have determined are needed. Congress does not receive information
about the unfunded antiterrorism/force protection projects designed to
correct or mitigate vulnerabilities, leaving it unaware of the level of risk
that U.S. military members overseas are facing, which limits its ability to
provide effective oversight of DOD's efforts and determine appropriate
funding levels. Furthermore, while no amount of money or number of personnel
can completely eliminate the risk of a terrorist attack, not providing the
necessary resources to address identified antiterrorism/force protection
program requirements will leave U.S. military personnel unnecessarily
vulnerable to terrorist attacks.
To improve the effectiveness and increase the impact of the vulnerability
assessments and the vulnerability assessment reports, we recommend that the
Secretary of Defense direct the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to
improve the vulnerability assessment reports provided to installations.
Although the Joint Staff is planning to take some action to improve the
value of these reports, we believe the vulnerability assessment reports
should recommend specific actions to overcome identified vulnerabilities. In
addition, the Joint Staff should develop an antiterrorism/force protection
best practices or lessons learned program that would share recommendations
for both physical and process-oriented improvements. The program would
assist installations in finding answers to common problems?particularly
those installations that do not receive Joint Staff Integrated Vulnerability
Assessment reports or others who have found vulnerabilities through their
own vulnerability assessments.
To provide Congress with the most complete information on the risks that
U.S. forces overseas are facing from terrorism, we recommend that the
Secretary of Defense direct the services to include in their next
consolidated combating terrorism budget submission information on the number
and types of antiterrorism/force protection projects that have not been
addressed by the budget request and the estimated cost to complete these
projects. Information on the backlog of projects should be presented by
geographic combatant command.
To ensure that antiterrorism/force protection managers have the knowledge
and skills needed to develop and implement effective antiterrorism/force
protection programs, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity
Conflict to expeditiously implement the Joint Staff's draft
antiterrorism/force protection manager training standard and formulate a
timetable for the services to develop and implement a new course that meets
the revised standards. Additionally, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict should review the course
content to ensure that the course has consistency of emphasis across the
services.
To improve congressional oversight of the risks that U.S. forces overseas
are facing from terrorism, Congress may wish to consider requiring the
Department of Defense to provide, as part of its Combating Terrorism Budget
Justification documentation, information on the number and type of
antiterrorism/force protection projects that have not been addressed by the
budget request and the estimated cost to complete these projects.
Information on the backlog of projects should be presented by geographic
combatant command.
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD agreed with two of our
recommendations and disagreed with one. The Department's comments are
reprinted in appendix II. In addition, the Department also provided
technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.
Although DOD agreed with our recommendation regarding improvements to the
vulnerability assessment reports and the need to develop an AT/FP best
practices and lessons learned program, it did not agree to include in its
vulnerability assessment reports specific solutions for identified
vulnerabilities. As we noted in our report, providing information on
solutions would make the reports more useful to AT/FP managers. DOD also
stated that it is currently sharing best practices through the Joint Staff's
quarterly AT/FP publication and believes that two computer-based systems now
in development will also share best practices. While the quarterly
newsletter and the computer-based systems are improvements, they are not a
best practices program. An effective AT/FP best practices program requires
the systematic analysis and cataloguing of problems and proven solutions and
thus would be dependent upon DOD's willingness to identify specific fixes to
AT/FP problems.
DOD also agreed with our recommendation to improve AT/FP manager training
and stated that revised training standards are being coordinated throughout
DOD and that the services are revising their courses to meet the new
standards. However, DOD's response did not specifically address a timetable
for implementing the training program or indicate that course content would
be reviewed for consistency across all the services. Such steps would
provide greater assurance that DOD will implement an effective AT/FP manager
training program.
DOD disagreed with our recommendation that the services provide Congress
with detailed information on unfunded AT/FP projects that would correct or
mitigate vulnerabilities. DOD noted that vulnerabilities may be corrected
through procedural changes that do not require funding. The Department
stated that AT/FP requirements compete against other "critical mission
essential" requirements and that it believes that the current planning,
programming, and budgeting system is effective. We acknowledged in our
report that AT/FP requirements are in competition with other activities. We
did not comment on the effectiveness of the planning, programming, and
budgeting system except to note that the services had not provided
sufficient funds for the AT/FP program in every year since 1996. In
addition, AT/FP managers told us that the existing levels of funding limited
their ability to address vulnerabilities. Our recommendation that DOD
provide Congress with this additional information would not change DOD's
current budgeting process. In the past, Congress has required DOD to provide
detailed information on unfunded depot maintenance projects and on the
backlog of real property maintenance projects to improve its oversight of
programs. Since DOD did not agree with our recommendation, we have added a
matter for congressional consideration suggesting that Congress require this
information.
If you have any questions regarding this letter, please contact me at
(202) 512-5140. Key contributors to this assignment are listed in
appendix III.
Sincerely yours,
Norman Rabkin
Director, National Security Preparedness Issues
Scope and Methodology
To determine the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) has made
improvements to its antiterrorism/force protection (AT/FP) program overseas,
we visited installations in the European, Pacific, and Central Commands and
met with commanders and AT/FP managers and discussed AT/FP improvements as
well as problems. We toured the installations to inspect current
vulnerabilities and actions taken to correct past vulnerabilities. We also
met with AT/FP managers at four geographic combatant commands (European,
Central, Pacific, and Southern), U.S. Transportation Command, and the
services' major commands to discuss improvements that they had made in their
. programs since 1997 and to obtain their views on continuing problems. At
the installation and geographic combatant commands and the services' major
commands, we reviewed funding documents, AT/FP plans and orders, project
lists, minutes of working group meetings, and letters and memorandums
documenting command positions on AT/FP. We also reviewed classified Internet
resources available from the U.S. Central Command, U.S. European Command,
U.S. Southern Command, and the U.S. Army Europe. We interviewed key members
of the Joint Staff Directorate for Combating Terrorism, the Assistant
Secretary of Defense (Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict), the
Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), and the Department of State to
obtain information on AT/FP improvements since 1997 and on plans for future
improvements. We also obtained their views on problems at the installation,
command, and service levels. We reviewed pertinent DOD and service
documents, including directives, regulations, and guidance on combating
terrorism.
To determine if changes in DOD's process for assessing and reporting
vulnerabilities at overseas locations have enhanced the commander's ability
to determine the AT/FP vulnerabilities at installations in their area of
responsibility, we reviewed and evaluated vulnerability assessments
conducted by the Joint staff Integrated Vulnerability Assessment teams and
the service teams for the facilities we visited, and discussed the value of
vulnerability assessments with installation commanders, AT/FP managers,
geographic combatant commanders' AT/FP officers, and AT/FP managers at the
services' major commands overseas. We obtained their views on vulnerability
assessment problems and potential solutions as well. We also met with the
program manager and deputy program manager of the AT/FP program at the Joint
Staff Integrated Vulnerability Assessment office to obtain their views on
the problems we learned about during our installation visits. Finally, we
attended several AT/FP conferences and trainings held by the Joint Staff and
the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations and Low-Intensity
Conflict) to obtain additional information from installation and service
AT/FP managers, commanders, and civilian leaders.
To examine the adequacy of AT/FP funding and staff, we interviewed service
AT/FP managers and those officials responsible for funding AT/FP from the
Departments of the Army, the Air Force, and the Navy and Headquarters, U.S.
Marine Corps, to obtain information on prior year funding as well as
proposed levels of funding. At each installation and command visited, we met
with resource managers or others responsible for determining AT/FP
requirements and obtained documents on previous levels of funding and
requirements as well as documents that outline future funding requirements
and programmed levels of funding. We also reviewed program decision
memorandums and program budget decisions relating to AT/FP funding, but we
did not attempt to validate the requirements identified by the installations
or the commands. We also reviewed Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's
Combating Terrorism Readiness Initiatives Fund submissions for fiscal years
1998, 1999, and 2000 to determine what types of projects were funded by the
Joint Staff. We discussed the adequacy of AT/FP training with
representatives of the Joint Staff, reviewed the proposed changes to the
AT/FP standards for training and discussed training shortcomings with
installation AT/FP managers and the AT/FP staff of the geographic combatant
commands.
The geographic combatant commands and the component commands we visited or
contacted were:
· U.S. Central Command, U.S. Central Command Air Forces, U.S. Naval Forces
Central Command, U.S. Army Forces Central Command;
· U.S. European Command, U.S. Army Europe, U.S. Naval Forces Europe, U.S.
Air Forces in Europe;
· U.S. Pacific Command, U.S. Pacific Air Forces, Commander in Chief, Pacific
Fleet, U.S. Army Pacific, Marine Forces Pacific, U.S. Forces Japan,
Commander Naval Forces Japan, U.S. Army Japan, 5th Air Force Japan;
· U.S. Forces Korea, Commander Naval Forces Korea, 8th U.S. Army Korea, 19th
Theater Army Area Command, Korea, 7th Air Force Korea; and
· U.S. Southern Command.
The overseas sites we visited, by country, were:
Bahrain
· Naval Support Activity Bahrain
Germany
· Ramstein Air Base
· 104th Area Support Group
Italy
· Aviano Air Base
· 22nd Area Support Group, U.S. Army
· Naval Support Activity Naples
Japan
· Fleet Activity Yokosuka
· Yokota Air Base
· Camp Zama
Korea
· Osan Air Base
· 20th Support Group, U.S. Army
· 34th Support Group, U.S. Army
Kuwait
· Camp Doha, U.S. Army
Saudi Arabia
· Eskan Village
· Office of the Program Manager-Saudi Arabian National Guard Modernization
Program
· Prince Sultan Air Base
· U.S. Military Training Mission
Spain
· Naval Support Activity, Rota
Turkey
· Incirlik Air Base
We conducted our review from June 1999 through May 2000 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.
Comments From the Department of Defense
The following are GAO's comments on the Department of Defense's letter dated
June 30, 2000.
1. We disagree with DOD's implication that the requirements (the funds the
installations need to correct or mitigate vulnerabilities) as highlighted in
this report have not been validated and therefore should not be reported to
Congress. These requirements reflect the judgment of senior flag officers in
the Pacific and European commands who are responsible for protecting U.S.
forces from terrorist attack and are in the best position to validate
requirements. We also disagree that the report does not acknowledge that
commanders are ultimately responsible for determining and prioritizing
requirements and resources to reduce physical security vulnerabilities. In
our report, we clearly state that commanders are responsible for determining
what actions to take to correct or mitigate vulnerabilities and that
commanders believe that they have not received sufficient funds to correct
the vulnerabilities they have determined need attention. Similarly, we have
noted that AT/FP needs must compete against other service needs and that
this competition begins at the installation level. Additionally, we have, at
the request of DOD, included additional information about the Department's
budget process to provide a more in-depth picture of the funding process.
2. The dollar figures in our draft report were provided by the service
elements of the geographic combatant commands. During a meeting with service
representatives to discuss our report, some concerns were raised as to the
currency and accuracy of the funding data. While our draft report was at DOD
for comment, we again met with service AT/FP staffs and resource managers to
discuss the figures and the services provided new data with the necessary
documentation. This new data has been incorporated into our report and does
not alter our conclusions.
3. We do not assume that all vulnerabilities are validated requirements.
This report discusses only those AT/FP requirements that overseas commanders
have validated and forwarded to the services for funding.16
It should be noted that DOD's planned funding for AT/FP projects for fiscal
years 2002 to 2007 is $700 million less than required. This level of funding
challenges DOD's stated commitment to combating terrorism.
GAO Staff Acknowledgments
Raymond Decker, Carole F. Coffey, Jim Reid, and Tracy A. McCaffery Brown
made key contributions to this report.
In memory of Donald L. Patton (1942-2000) under whose skilled leadership
this review was conducted.
(702013)
Table 1: Service AT/FP Requirement, Proposed Spending Plan,
Shortage, and Percentage of Requirement Fulfilled for
Fiscal Year 2001 18
Figure 1: DOD Program Objectives Memorandum Process 16
Figure 2: Percentage of Antiterrorism/Force Protection
Requirement the Services Plan to Fund in the European Command 20
Figure 3: Percentage of Antiterrorism/Force Protection Funding Requirement
the Services Plan to Fund in the Pacific
Command 21
1. DOD's antiterrorism/force protection program seeks to (1) reduce the
likelihood that DOD-affiliated personnel, their families, facilities, and
materiel will be subject to a terrorist attack and (2) mitigate the effects
of such attacks should they occur.
2. Combating Terrorism: Status of DOD Efforts to Protect Its Forces Overseas
(GAO/NSIAD-97-207 , July 21, 1997).
3. Operational control of the U.S. combat forces is assigned to the nation's
Unified Combatant Commands. A Unified Combatant Command is composed of
forces from two or more services, has a broad and continuing mission, and is
normally organized on a geographical basis. The five geographic combatant
commands are the Central Command, European Command, Pacific Command,
Southern Command, and Joint Forces Command.
4. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 5261.01A, Aug. 1, 1998,
Combating Terrorism Readiness Initiative Fund.
5. The Joint Staff allocated $23.94 million (including $10 million in money
that became available at the end of the fiscal year) in fiscal year 1997,
$35.098 million (including
$20 million in money that became available at the end of the fiscal year) in
fiscal year 1998, and $14.942 million in fiscal year 1999. As of March 2000,
the Joint Staff had allocated
$8.5 million in fiscal year 2000.
6. At the time, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency was known as the Defense
Special Weapons Agency. The name change, the result of a merger of four
organizations, took place in October 1998.
7. Fragment retention film is a thin, optically clear film that is applied
to glass to minimize the spread of glass fragments when the glass is
shattered.
8. We have only included data for the Pacific and European Commands because
this report focuses on protecting troops overseas and the majority of U.S.
troops stationed overseas are located in these two commands. The Central
Command is not included because the Army and the Air Force provide no AT/FP
funds for their installations in the Central Command. At those
installations, AT/FP requirements are funded by host nations or funds
provided by Congress for contingency operations. The Navy provides AT/FP
funds for its installations in Bahrain. According to Navy Central Command
officials, AT/FP funding has been sufficient to meet their AT/FP
requirements. The Southern Command was excluded because of the limited
number of troops it has located outside of the United States.
9. The Program Objectives Memorandums are developed in even numbered years.
At the time of our report, the services were developing the fiscal year 2002
through 2007 Program Objectives Memorandums. In the odd years, the services
review the previously developed Program Objectives Memorandums to ensure
that they still address the needs of the services. For example, in fiscal
year 2001 the services will review their spending plans for fiscal years
2003 through 2007. In fiscal year 2001, the services will also review the
fiscal year 2002 spending plan to make any necessary adjustments before
submitting the plan as its budget request to Congress.
10. We did not validate the AT/FP requirements provided to us by the
commands. The requirements presented in this report represent the funding
that the commands believe they need to address their AT/FP vulnerabilities.
11. This is an estimate for the Army-wide program, not just the AT/FP
programs in Korea, Europe, and the Pacific.
12. S.Rept. 106-50, at p. 353 (1999).
13. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, P.L.106-65,
section 932 (1999), adding a new section 229 to chapter 9 of title 10,
United States Code.
14. DOD has determined that its AT/FP program consists of seven functional
areas: physical security equipment, physical security site improvements,
physical security management and planning, security forces/technicians, law
enforcement, security and investigative matters, and research, development,
test and evaluation.
15. According to DOD, threat level classification is a set of standardized
terms used to quantify the level of terrorism threat on a country-by-country
basis. Threat levels are estimates with no direct relationship to specific
threat conditions [THREATCONS]. Threat levels should not be confused with
threat conditions.
16. At the suggestion of the Joint Staff, we have clarified this point in
our report.
*** End of document. ***