Drug Control: DOD Allocates Fewer Assets to Drug Control Efforts
(Testimony, 01/27/2000, GAO/T-NSIAD-00-77).
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the role of the
Department of Defense (DOD) in reducing the supply of illegal drugs
entering the United States, focusing on: (1) the decline in DOD's aerial
and maritime support allocated to counterdrug activities from fiscal
years 1992 through 1999 and some of the consequences and reasons for the
decline; (2) the obstacles DOD faces in helping foreign governments
counter illegal drug activities; and (3) DOD's counterdrug strategy and
the need for performance measures to judge its counterdrug program
effectiveness.
GAO noted that: (1) DOD has lead responsibility for aerial and maritime
detection and monitoring of illegal drug shipments to the United States;
(2) it also provides assistance and training to foreign governments to
combat drug-trafficking activities; (3) DOD supplies the ships,
aircraft, and radar to detect drug shipments, and training, equipment,
and other assistance to foreign governments; (4) DOD's counterdrug
activities support the efforts of U.S. law enforcement agencies, such as
the Customs Service and Coast Guard, and foreign governments to stem the
flow of illegal narcotics to the United States; (5) in fiscal year (FY)
1998, DOD spent about $635 million to support these supply reduction
efforts; (6) since 1992, DOD's level of support to counter
drug-trafficking in Central and South America and the Caribbean has
significantly declined; (7) in FY 1999, U.S. Southern Command reported
that DOD was unable to meet 57 percent of the Command's requests for
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance flights to support its
detection and monitoring responsibilities; (8) according to the Southern
Command, the lack of assets hurts their ability to quickly respond to
changing drug-trafficking patterns; (9) as a result coverage in key
drug-trafficking routes to the United States is lower, leaving gaps in
detection areas; (10) DOD acknowledges that its coverage of key
drug-trafficking areas in South America and the Caribbean has gaps and
ascribes the decline in its support to the lower priority of the
counterdrug mission as compared to others such as war, peacekeeping, and
training, as well as decreases in its overall budget and force structure
during the 1990s; (11) DOD believes that despite the reduction in its
level of assets, its overall operations are more efficient, but DOD
lacks data to support this position; (12) DOD faces obstacles in
providing support to foreign government counterdrug efforts such as: (a)
the limited capabilities of foreign military and law enforcement
organizations to operate and repair the equipment and effectively use
the training provided by DOD; (b) training and intelligence restrictions
to some foreign military units and foreign counterdrug organizations
based on their record on human rights abuses and evidence of corruption
within these organizations; (13) DOD has plans and strategies that
directly support the goals of the U.S. National Drug Control Strategy to
reduce the demand and supply of illegal drugs; and (14) however, DOD
does not have a set of performance measures to evaluate its counterdrug
activities.
--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------
REPORTNUM: T-NSIAD-00-77
TITLE: Drug Control: DOD Allocates Fewer Assets to Drug Control
Efforts
DATE: 01/27/2000
SUBJECT: Narcotics
Drug trafficking
Law enforcement
International cooperation
Foreign policies
Foreign military assistance
Military aircraft
Military forces
Military operations
National policies
IDENTIFIER: Central America
South America
Caribbean
Mexico
National Drug Control Policy
E-2 Aircraft
National Drug Control Strategy
Bolivia
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Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy snd Human
Resources, Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives
For Release on Delivery
Expected at
10:00 a.m., EST
Thursday,
January 27, 2000
DRUG CONTROL
DOD Allocates Fewer Assets to Drug Control Efforts
Statement of Jess T. Ford, Associate Director, International Relations and
Trade Issues, National Security and International Affairs Division
GAO/T-NSIAD-00-77
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
I am pleased to be here today to discuss our work on the Department of
Defense's (DOD) contribution to reducing the supply of illegal drugs
entering the United States. My statement is based on our December 1999
report requested by your Subcommittee and the Senate Caucus on International
Narcotics Control.
My statement today covers three main points:
* First, I will discuss the decline in DOD's aerial and maritime support
allocated to counterdrug activities from fiscal years 1992 through 1999
and some of the consequences and the reasons for the declines.
* Second, I will discuss the obstacles DOD faces in helping foreign
governments counter illegal drug activities.
* Third, I will also talk briefly about DOD's counterdrug strategy and
the need for performance measures to judge its counterdrug program
effectiveness.
SUMMARY
The Department of Defense has lead responsibility for aerial and maritime
detection and monitoring of illegal drug shipments to the United States. It
also provides assistance and training to foreign governments to combat
drug-trafficking activities. DOD supplies ships, aircraft, and radar to
detect drug shipments; and training, equipment, and other assistance to
foreign governments. DOD's counterdrug activities support the efforts of
U.S. law enforcement agencies, such as the Customs Service and Coast Guard,
and foreign governments to stem the flow of illegal narcotics to the United
States. In fiscal year 1998, DOD spent about $635 million to support these
supply reduction efforts.
Since 1992, DOD's level of support to counter drug-trafficking in Central
and South America and the Caribbean has significantly declined. For example,
the number of flight hours devoted to counterdrug missions declined 68
percent from 1992 through 1999. Likewise, the number of ship days fell 62
percent over the same period. In fiscal year 1999, U.S. Southern Command
reported that DOD was unable to meet 57 percent of the Command's requests
for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance flights to support its
detection and monitoring responsibilities. According to the Southern
Command, the lack of assets hurts their ability to quickly respond to
changing drug-trafficking patterns. As a result, coverage in key
drug-trafficking routes to the United States is lower, leaving gaps in
detection areas. For example, U.S. officials in Peru told us that, since
1997, there has been little to no aerial support to the air interdiction
operation between Peru and Colombia. In the Eastern Pacific, a key threat
area, DOD was unable to sustain its support in 1997 and 1998 to a successful
interdiction operation due to a lack of available assets.
DOD acknowledges that its coverage of key drug-trafficking areas in South
America and the Caribbean has gaps. DOD ascribes the decline in its support
to the lower priority of the counterdrug mission as compared to others such
as war, peacekeeping, and training, as well as decreases in its overall
budget and force structure during the 1990s. DOD believes that, while the
level of assets it provides has been reduced, its overall operations are
more efficient. However, data is lacking to back up this position.
DOD faces obstacles in providing support to foreign government counterdrug
efforts. Over the years, we have raised concerns about the limited
capabilities of foreign military and law enforcement organizations to
operate and repair the equipment and effectively use the training provided
by DOD. For example, one concern we raised in our December 1999 report
involved the capability of the Peruvian police to operate and maintain boats
to be used for counterdrug river operations. Other concerns include human
rights and intelligence sharing. DOD cannot give training support to some
foreign military units nor can it share intelligence information with
certain foreign counterdrug organizations because of their record on human
rights abuses and evidence of corruption within these organizations.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, DOD has a set of plans and strategies that directly
supports the goals of the U.S. National Drug Control Strategy to reduce the
demand and supply of illegal drugs. For example, DOD has developed a 5-year
counterdrug plan that broadly describes the military personnel and assets
that it will provide to further the national goals. At the regional level,
the U.S. Southern Command has a counterdrug campaign plan designed to
execute its counterdrug mission in Central and South America and the
Caribbean. However, DOD does not have a set of performance measures to
evaluate its counterdrug activities. In our 1999 report, we recommended that
DOD develop performance measures to determine the effectiveness of its
counterdrug operations and make better use of its limited resources. DOD
concurred with our recommendation and has initiated steps to develop
performance measures.
BACKGROUND
According to the Office of National Drug Control Policy, almost 14 million
Americans use illegal drugs regularly, and drug-related illness, death, and
crime cost the nation approximately $110 billion annually. The United States
consumes over 300 metric tons of cocaine per year. Coca is grown for market
distribution almost exclusively in Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru. In 1998, of
the estimated cocaine flow to the United States, about 89 percent transited
through the Caribbean corridor and the Mexico/Central America corridor. The
remaining 11 percent flowed directly to the United States from Bolivia,
Colombia, and Peru (see fig. 1).
Figure 1: Estimated 1998 Cocaine Flow to the United States
Note: Percentage figures refer to total cocaine shipped through Central
America, the Caribbean, or directly to the United States from Bolivia,
Colombia, and Peru.
Source: Office of National Drug Control Policy.
To address this threat, the Office of National Drug Control Policy has
established a national strategy with goals to reduce the demand and flow of
drugs entering the United States. Since 1988, DOD has been tasked by
Congress to lead the federal efforts to detect and monitor aerial and
maritime shipments of illegal drugs and provide support and training to
foreign governments to combat drug-trafficking activities.
DOD DEVOTED FEWER ASSETS
TO COUNTERDRUG ACTIVITIES
From fiscal years 1992 through 1999, there was a decline in the number of
flight hours and ship days DOD devoted to detect and monitor transshipments
of illegal drugs headed to the United States from Central and South America
and the Caribbean. DOD officials have indicated that there are detection
gaps in key drug-trafficking routes to the United States. DOD attributes the
decline in its support to the lower priority of this mission as compared to
others, such as war, peacekeeping, and training, as well as to decreases in
its overall budget and force structure. DOD officials state that the greater
efficiency of its operations and other efforts have made up for this
decline. However, DOD has not presented data to confirm this claim.
Flight Hours and Ship Days Have Declined
According to U.S. Southern Command data, the number of flights dedicated to
collecting intelligence, providing surveillance, and engaging in
reconnaissance decreased by over 30 percent from fiscal years 1997 through
1999 in Central and South America and the Caribbean (see fig. 2). As a
result, DOD could only meet 43 percent of U.S. Southern Command's requests
for these flights in fiscal year 1999. DOD uses intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance aircraft to provide timely, specific intelligence
information to forces involved in detecting, monitoring, and interdicting
illegal drug activities. Without this information, which includes signal and
imagery intelligence, forces cannot react quickly to changes in
drug-traffickers' patterns throughout the region that Southern Command
covers.
Figure 2: DOD's Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Counterdrug
Aircraft Support in Central and South America and the Caribbean, Fiscal
Years 1997-99
Note: Data prior to 1997 was not available.
Source: U.S. Southern Command.
In addition, the number of flying hours devoted to tracking suspect
shipments in transit to the United States declined 68 percent, from 46,264
to 14,770, from fiscal years 1992 through 1999. Some of this reduction is
attributed to drug-traffickers' shift from aerial to maritime methods.
Beginning in fiscal year 1993 and continuing through fiscal year 1998, air
drug-trafficking events decreased by 42 percent, while maritime events
increased by 55 percent. During this period, the U.S. Customs Service and
U.S. Coast Guard independently increased aircraft flight hours that, as
shown in figure 3, offset some of the decline in DOD's flight hours.
Figure 3: DOD, U.S. Customs Service, and U.S. Coast Guard Flight Hours
Allocated to Tracking Illegal Drug Shipments in Transshipment Areas, Fiscal
Years 1992-99
Note: U.S. Customs Service data prior to 1993 was not available.
Source: Joint Interagency Task Forces East and West, U.S. Customs Service,
and U.S. Coast Guard.
While drug traffickers have shifted from primarily airborne to mostly
maritime drug transshipment methods, DOD also reduced the number of ship
days devoted to interdiction efforts by 62 percent from 1992 through 1999.
These declines in maritime interdiction were partially offset by the
increase in U.S. Coast Guard ship days during the same period (see fig. 4).
Figure 4: DOD and U.S. Coast Guard Counterdrug Ship Days, Fiscal Years
1992-99
Source: Joint Interagency Task Forces East and West and U.S. Coast Guard.
Limited Coverage, Gaps in Monitoring Illegal Drug Activities Exist
As DOD's flight hours and ship days devoted to covering illegal drug
shipments have declined, DOD officials indicated that gaps in coverage of
high-threat, drug-trafficking routes in South America and transit routes to
the United States have occurred.
Reductions in DOD's air coverage to interdict drug traffickers have
particularly affected the cocaine source countries of Bolivia, Colombia, and
Peru. Between fiscal years 1998 and 1999, detection and monitoring flight
hours over these countries declined from 2,092 to 1,090, or 48 percent. U.S.
officials in Peru told us that there has been little or no U.S. airborne
intelligence or surveillance of air traffic routes between Peru and Colombia
since 1997. And, in an October 1998 letter to the State Department from the
U.S. Ambassador in Peru, the Ambassador warned that the reduction in air
support could have a serious impact on coca price. DOD's difficulty in
maintaining aerial detection capabilities was further exacerbated by the
closure of Howard Air Force Base in Panama in May 1999. The base provided a
position close to cocaine-producing countries for launching U.S. counterdrug
aircraft. To offset this loss, DOD has established two forward operating
locations in the Caribbean and South America. The Department is seeking to
establish a third location in Central America.
Low Priority, Reduced Funding of Counterdrug Missions
DOD sets priorities for the use of its aircraft, weapons systems, and
personnel that are in continual high demand worldwide. The counterdrug
mission, according to DOD, is the fourth priority, after (1) war, (2) other
military operations that might involve contact with hostile forces such as
peacekeeping, and (3) training. In addition, DOD does not purchase major
equipment such as aircraft and ships especially for the counterdrug mission.
Instead, it carries out counterdrug activities using assets that are
purchased mainly for other missions.
DOD's budget for counterdrug activities has generally declined since 1993 as
well. From fiscal years 1993 through 1999, DOD's overall counterdrug budget
fell from $1.3 billion to $975 million, or 24 percent. At the same time,
DOD's overall budget declined by approximately 14 percent during this
period, from $300 billion in fiscal year 1993 to about $260 billion in
fiscal year 1999.
Further, DOD made corresponding force structure reductions which included
reductions in military personnel and equipment levels. The number of ships
and aircraft frequently used for counterdrug missions also declined. For
example, from 1992 through 1999, the inventory of Navy P-3C and E-2 airborne
early warning aircraft by four percent and 38 percent, respectively.
DOD Cites Greater Efficiency, Other Efforts
as Mitigating These Declines
DOD officials acknowledge that reducing support to the counterdrug effort
has hampered its coverage of key drug-trafficking routes. However, they note
that their activities are more efficient today because U.S. counterdrug
organizations better understand the drug threat. They also say that U.S. and
host nations' antidrug organizations are improving their coordination in
planning and conducting regional counterdrug operations. For example, Panama
supported the United States in the seizure of 27 kilograms of cocaine off
the Panamanian coast in 1999. In addition, Panamanian and Nicaraguan law
enforcement officials eradicated 1.7 million marijuana plants during that
same year.
DOD FACES CHALLENGES IN SUPPORTING
HOST-NATIONS' COUNTERDRUG EFFORTS
DOD supports host-nations' counterdrug activities in many ways but has
encountered a number of challenges in doing so. DOD provides a variety of
support, such as detection and monitoring, intelligence, training,
logistics, and equipment. Among the challenges to supplying this assistance
are (1) host-nations' limited capability to operate and repair U.S.-supplied
equipment or to effectively utilize U.S. training, (2) host-nations'
difficulties in meeting U.S. eligibility conditions for providing training
aid to military units, and (3) U.S. restrictions on sharing intelligence
with some host-nation counterdrug organizations.
Equipment Maintenance, Human Rights Concerns, and
Information-sharing Are Challenges
A number of counterdrug organizations in host nations have not always been
able to use the equipment and training DOD provides. For example, Congress
has appropriated $89 million over 5 years (1998-2002) for a program to
interdict drug shipments on the rivers of Colombia and Peru. However,
according to U.S. embassy officials in Peru, the Peruvian police (the lead
agency for counterdrug enforcement) does not have maintenance capabilities
or adequately trained staff to manage its own or U.S.-provided boats
designed for river operations. For example, in 1998, boats purchased by the
Peruvian police were accidentally beached because of lowered water levels.
The Peruvian police lacked adequately trained staff and/or parts to repair
the boats. DOD officials told us that they are working with the Peruvian
police to improve the situation.
In addition, human rights concerns also limit DOD's counterdrug assistance
to foreign governments. U.S. law prohibits giving such assistance to
personnel or units in foreign countries that have credible evidence against
them of having committed gross human rights violations. U.S. officials have
raised concerns about human rights problems with Colombian and Peruvian
military and police units. Indeed, U.S. embassy personnel in Colombia told
us that it would be difficult to provide support for counterdrug efforts to
the Colombian military unless its units pass State Department screening for
human rights abuses. So far, only three of six army brigades operating in
drug-trafficking areas have passed the screening.
Furthermore, concerns over evidence of corruption within foreign government
counternarcotics units have caused the United States to limit the amount of
intelligence information it will share with other governments. Thus,
although DOD may have such information, it cannot always provide it to the
host nation. Another problem arises from internal situations in host
nations. For example, in Colombia, where DOD can share information on
insurgent activity if it is directly related to an approved counterdrug
operation, U.S. embassy officials sometimes have difficulty distinguishing
insurgents from drug traffickers.
DOD HAS COUNTERDRUG PLANS AND STRATEGIES
BUT NO PERFORMANCE MEASURES
Although DOD has designed counterdrug plans and strategies that are linked
to the National Drug Control Strategy, DOD has not yet developed a set of
performance measures to assess the impact of its counterdrug operations.
Without such measures, DOD cannot clearly evaluate the effectiveness of its
strategy, operations, and limited counterdrug assets. DOD is aware of this
problem and has taken some steps to improve its ability to judge its
performance.
DOD's Counterdrug Plans and Strategies
DOD's Office for Drug Enforcement Policy and Support has developed a 5-year
counterdrug plan that is based on the goals of the National Drug Control
Strategy. The plan broadly describes the military personnel, detection and
monitoring assets, intelligence support, communication systems, and training
DOD will provide to domestic law enforcement agencies and foreign
counterdrug military and policy forces to help reduce drug-trafficking
activities. Regional commanders in the field develop more detailed plans and
strategies that are crafted for a specific purpose and that support the
high-level strategies. For example, the U.S. Southern Command's August 1999
counterdrug campaign plan describes the illicit drug threat, the command's
counterdrug mission, objectives intended to counter the threat, and some of
the key resources available to achieve the plan's objectives. While the
campaign plan assumes that these resources will be available, DOD told us
that assets for counterdrug purposes would continue to be constrained by
other DOD requirements.
No Performance Measures Developed; Initial Steps Taken
While DOD has not yet developed performance measures to evaluate the
effectiveness of its counterdrug activites, the 1993 Government Performance
and Results Act incorporates performance measurement as one of its most
important features. Under the act, executive branch agencies are required to
develop annual performance plans that use performance measurement to
reinforce the connection between the long-term strategic goals outlined in
their strategic plans and their day-to-day activities. According to DOD, the
Department supports the goals and measures of the Office of National Drug
Control Policy. However, we found that the Office's measures are intended to
determine progress in achieving national counterdrug-related goals, not to
measure the performance of individual federal agencies. None of the Office's
measures relates directly to DOD's current detection and monitoring efforts.
We recommended in our report that DOD develop performance measures to assess
its counterdrug operations. DOD concurred with our recommendation and told
us that it is currently working with groups within its agency to help
develop performance measures and that it will use its Consolidated
Counterdrug Data Base to help judge the performance of its detection and
monitoring assets. The data base tracks information on the detection,
monitoring, and interdiction of illegal drug traffic. DOD officials believe
these initial steps will enable them to begin the process of establishing
Departmentwide counterdrug performance measures.
__ __ __ __ __
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes my prepared
remarks. I would be happy to respond to any questions you may have.
Contact and Acknowledgments
For future contacts regarding this testimony, please call Jess Ford at (202)
512-4268. Individuals making key contributions to this testimony included
Lawrence Suda, Janice V. Morrison, David Bruno, and Rona Mendelsohn.
(711489)
*** End of document. *** Morrison, David Bruno, and Rona Mendelsohn.