Drug Control: Assets DOD Contributes to Reducing the Illegal Drug Supply
Have Declined (Letter Report, 12/21/1999, GAO/NSIAD-00-9).
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO examined the assets the
Department of Defense (DOD) has contributed to reducing the illegal drug
supply, focusing on: (1) DOD's plan for supporting U.S. counterdrug
efforts and how DOD measures its effectiveness; (2) changes in the level
of DOD support for counterdrug activities from fiscal year (FY) 1992
through FY 1999 and the reasons for the changes; and (3) obstacles DOD
faces in providing counterdrug assistance to foreign governments.
GAO noted that: (1) DOD has plans and strategies that support the goal
of reducing the nation's illegal drug supply by providing military
personnel, detection and monitoring equipment, intelligence support,
communication systems, and training; (2) however, DOD has not yet
developed a set of performance measures to assess its effectiveness in
contributing to this goal but has taken some initial steps to develop
such measures; (3) these steps include the development of a database to
capture information that can be used to assess the relative performance
of DOD's detection and monitoring assets; (4) DOD's level of support to
international drug control efforts has declined significantly since
1992; (5) some of the decline in air and maritime support has been
partially offset by increased support provided by the Coast Guard and
Customs Service; (6) nevertheless, DOD officials have stated that
coverage in key, high-threat drug-trafficking areas in the Caribbean and
in cocaine-producing countries is limited; (7) the decline in assets DOD
uses to carry out its counterdrug responsibilities is due to: (a) the
lower priority assigned to the counterdrug mission compared with that
assigned to other military missions that might involve contact with
hostile forces such as peacekeeping; and (b) overall reductions in
defense budgets and force levels; (8) DOD officials believe that their
operations are more efficient today than in the past and that this has
partially offset the decline in assets available for counterdrug
operations; (9) because of a lack of data, however, the impact of the
reduced level of DOD support on drug trafficking is unknown; (10) DOD
faces several challenges in providing counterdrug support to host-nation
military and law enforcement organizations; (11) these organizations
often lack the capability to operate and repair equipment and
effectively utilize training provided by the United States; and (12) in
addition, DOD faces restrictions on providing training support to some
foreign military units and sharing intelligence information with certain
host-nation counterdrug organizations because of past evidence of human
rights violations and corruption within these organizations.
--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------
REPORTNUM: NSIAD-00-9
TITLE: Drug Control: Assets DOD Contributes to Reducing the
Illegal Drug Supply Have Declined
DATE: 12/21/1999
SUBJECT: Narcotics
Drug trafficking
Law enforcement
International cooperation
Foreign policies
Foreign military assistance
Foreign military training
Foreign governments
Performance measures
IDENTIFIER: DOD Quadrennial Defense Review
DOD Relocatable Over-the-Horizon Radar System
Customs Service Airborne Early Warning System
Colombia
Peru
Boliva
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Rev-LG logo.eps GAO United States General Accounting Office
Report to Congressional Requesters
December 1999 DRUG CONTROL Assets DOD Contributes to Reducing the
Illegal Drug Supply Have Declined
GAO/NSIAD-00-9
GAO/NSIAD-00-9
Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-00-9 Drug Control
Contents Letter 3 Appendixes Appendix I: Framework of Strategies
Directs Department of
Defense's Counterdrug Efforts 29 Appendix II: Key DOD Counterdrug
Intelligence, Detection,
and Monitoring Assets 34 Appendix III: Objectives, Scope, and
Methodology 42 Appendix IV: Comments From the Department of
Defense 44 Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 47
Tables Table 1: Transshipment Area Flying Hours of Major DOD
Aircraft Used for Counterdrug Missions, Fiscal Years 1992- 99 15
Table 2: Inventory of Major DOD Equipment Available for
Counterdrug Missions, Fiscal Years 1992- 99 24
Table 3: Major DOD Airborne and Maritime Assets Used for
Counterdrug Operations 34 Table 4: DOD Radar Assets Used for
Counterdrug Operations 36
Figures Figure 1: Estimated 1998 Cocaine Flow to the United States
6 Figure 2: DOD's Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
Counterdrug Aircraft Support in Central and South America and the
Caribbean, Fiscal Years 1997- 99 12 Figure 3: DOD, U. S. Customs
Service, and U. S. Coast Guard Flight Hours Allocated to Tracking
Illegal Drug Shipments in
Transshipment Areas, Fiscal Years 1992- 99 14 Figure 4: DOD and U.
S. Coast Guard Counterdrug Ship Days, Fiscal Years 1992- 99 16
Figure 5: DOD Forward Operating Locations and Sites 19 Figure 6:
Major DOD and Interagency Counterdrug Strategies and
Plans 29 Figure 7: Location of DOD- supported Regional Counterdrug
Campaigns and Steady- state Operations 33 Figure 8: Relocatable
Over- The- Horizon Radar Coverage 37 Figure 9: DOD's Radar Network
Coverage on the U. S. Southern
Border and in the Caribbean and Central America and South America
38 Figure 10: DOD Counterdrug Assets 40
Contents Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-00-9 Drug Control Abbreviations
DOD Department of Defense
Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-00-9 Drug Control United States General
Accounting Office
Washington, D. C. 20548 National Security and International
Affairs Division
B-283733 Letter
December 21, 1999 The Honorable Charles E. Grassley Chairman,
Caucus on International Narcotics Control United States Senate
The Honorable John L. Mica Chairman, Subcommittee on Criminal
Justice,
Drug Policy and Human Resources Committee on Government Reform
House of Representatives
Illegal drugs, primarily cocaine and, increasingly, heroin from
South America, continue to threaten the health and well- being of
American citizens. The U. S. national counterdrug effort is
directed by the five goals of the National Drug Control Strategy
published by the Office of National Drug Control Policy. In 1998,
approximately $16.1 billion was spent to
support the strategy. The Department of Defense (DOD) plays an
important role in U. S. efforts to interdict drugs in transit to
the United States and to stop drugs at their source-two major
goals of the National Drug Control Strategy. In 1998, DOD spent
about $635 million to support these supply reduction efforts. 1
DOD is the lead federal agency for detecting and monitoring
maritime and
aerial shipments of illegal drugs and provides assistance and
training to foreign governments to combat drug- trafficking
activities. DOD's counterdrug activities are integrated with the
international activities of other U. S. agencies such as the
Customs Service, the Coast Guard, and the
Drug Enforcement Administration and with foreign governments.
These agencies and governments are largely responsible for the end
game -the arrest of traffickers and the seizure of illicit drugs.
Despite U. S. efforts to
stem the flow of illicit drugs into the United States, the Office
of National Drug Control Policy reported in 1999 that cocaine
usage and price have been relatively stable throughout the 1990s.
1 National Drug Control Strategy, Budget Summary, Office of
National Drug Control Policy (Washington, D. C.: Feb. 1999). The
amount excludes the value of excess defense articles,
international military education and training, and foreign
military sales programs DOD provides to foreign governments for
counterdrug purposes.
B-283733 Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-00-9 Drug Control
You expressed concerns as to how DOD carries out its counterdrug
mission. As requested, we examined (1) DOD's plan for supporting
U. S. counterdrug efforts and how DOD measures its effectiveness,
(2) changes in the level of DOD support for counterdrug activities
from fiscal year 1992 through fiscal year 1999 2 and the reasons
for the changes, and (3) obstacles DOD faces in providing
counterdrug assistance to foreign governments.
Results in Brief The Department of Defense has plans and
strategies that support the goal of reducing the nation's illegal
drug supply as specified in the National Drug Control Strategy.
DOD supports this goal by providing military personnel, detection
and monitoring equipment, intelligence support, communication
systems, and training. However, DOD has not yet developed a set of
performance measures to assess its effectiveness in contributing
to this goal but has taken some initial steps to develop such
measures. These steps include the development of a database to
capture information that can be used to assess the relative
performance of DOD's detection and monitoring assets.
DOD's level of support to international drug control efforts has
declined significantly since 1992. For example, the number of
flight hours dedicated to detecting and monitoring illicit drug
shipments declined from approximately 46, 000 to 15,000, or 68
percent, from 1992 through 1999. Likewise, the number of ship days
declined from about 4,800 to 1,800, or 62 percent, over the same
period. Some of the decline in air and maritime
support has been partially offset by increased support provided by
the U. S. Coast Guard and Customs Service. Nevertheless, DOD
officials have stated that coverage in key, high- threat drug-
trafficking areas in the Caribbean and in cocaine- producing
countries is limited. The decline in assets DOD uses to carry out
its counterdrug responsibilities is due to (1) the lower priority
assigned to the counterdrug mission compared with that assigned to
other
military missions that might involve contact with hostile forces
such as peacekeeping and (2) overall reductions in defense budgets
and force levels. DOD officials believe that their operations are
more efficient today than in the past and that this has partially
offset the decline in assets available for counterdrug operations.
Because of a lack of data, however,
the impact of the reduced level of DOD support on drug trafficking
is unknown.
2 This period was selected because data on DOD's support for
counterdrug activities was not available before 1992.
B-283733 Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-00-9 Drug Control
DOD faces several challenges in providing counterdrug support to
host- nation military and law enforcement organizations. These
organizations often lack the capability to operate and repair
equipment and effectively utilize training provided by the United
States. In addition, DOD faces restrictions on providing training
support to some foreign military units and sharing intelligence
information with certain host- nation counterdrug organizations
because of past evidence of human rights violations and corruption
within these organizations.
We are recommending that DOD develop measures to assess the
effectiveness of its counterdrug activities. Background According
to the Office of National Drug Control Policy, almost 14 million
Americans use illegal drugs regularly, and drug- related illness,
death, and crime cost the nation approximately $110 billion
annually. Between 1990
and 1997, there were more than 100,000 drug- induced deaths in the
United States. The United States consumes over 300 metric tons of
cocaine per year. Coca is grown for market distribution almost
exclusively in Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru (see fig. 1). Also,
over the last 4 years, Colombia has supplied an increasing
percentage of the heroin used in the United States.
B-283733 Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-00-9 Drug Control
Figure 1: Estimated 1998 Cocaine Flow to the United States
Note: Percentage figures refer to total cocaine shipped through
Central America, the Caribbean, or directly to the United States
from Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru.
Source: Office of National Drug Control Policy.
Mexico/ Central America corridor
Direct to the continental United States Caribbean corridor 59% 321
Metric tons
30% 161 Metric tons 11%
59 Metric tons
Colombia Peru
Bolivia
B-283733 Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-00-9 Drug Control
In response to the threat, in 1995 the Office of National Drug
Control Policy prepared a national drug control strategy that
established goals to reduce drug demand and supply. 3 The strategy
includes two supply reduction goals to reduce the flow of drugs
entering the United States by 20 percent by 2002. The two goals
are to shield America's air, land, and sea frontiers from the drug
threat and to break foreign and domestic drug sources of supply.
DOD initially became involved in counterdrug operations in the
early 1980s and in 1988 was formally tasked by Congress to take
the lead in detecting and monitoring illegal drug shipments and
assisting domestic and foreign law enforcement agencies in
interdicting them. 4 From fiscal year 1989 through 1999, DOD spent
over $10 billion for counterdrug activities. DOD
primarily provides support by using equipment such as ships,
patrol boats, aircraft, and radar to detect drug shipments in the
transshipment areas from South America to the United States. 5 3
The Office of National Drug Control Policy was created in 1989 to
establish a coherent national policy and to unify the more than 30
federal agencies and innumerable state and
local authorities involved in counterdrug activities. 4 National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1989 (P. L. 100- 456
[Sept. 29,1988]).
5 In 1981 Congress enacted legislation authorizing DOD to provide
certain types of assistance to civilian law enforcement agencies,
and in 1990 Congress enacted legislation specifically intended for
DOD support of drug interdiction and other law enforcement
activities. (See 10 U. S. C. 371- 382 and the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991, respectively.) The 1981
legislation states that DOD shall prescribe regulations as may be
necessary to ensure that any activity performed under this
legislation shall not include or permit direct participation by a
DOD member in a search, seizure, arrest, or similar activity,
unless participation in such activity is otherwise authorized by
law (10 U. S. C. 375). Also,
DOD personnel are prohibited, with certain exceptions, from
directly effecting an arrest in any foreign country as part of any
foreign police action with respect to narcotic control efforts (22
U. S. C. 2291 (c)).
B-283733 Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-00-9 Drug Control
The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low
Intensity Conflict has been designated as the DOD Coordinator for
Drug Enforcement Policy and Support. The Coordinator is the
principal staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary of Defense
for drug enforcement policy, requirements, priorities, systems,
resources, and programs and
serves as DOD's liaison to the Office of National Drug Control
Policy. DOD works closely with the other U. S. agencies involved
in interdiction activities, such as the Customs Service, the Coast
Guard, and the Drug Enforcement Administration. 6 U. S. embassies
are responsible for working with other federal agencies to
formulate a comprehensive strategy for U. S.
counterdrug activities within host nations that is consistent with
the U. S. national drug strategy.
DOD's Southern Command, one of DOD's five combatant commands, has
the lead role in counterdrug detection and monitoring in the area
that includes Central and South America and the Caribbean. DOD's
Atlantic and Pacific Commands also support DOD counterdrug
activities in their
respective regions. Two counterdrug joint interagency task forces,
East and West, come under the authority of the Southern and
Pacific Commands, respectively. These task forces, comprised of
personnel from the Army, the
Navy, the Air Force, the Marine Corps, the Coast Guard, the
Customs Service, the Drug Enforcement Administration, and the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, have primary responsibility for
implementing international counterdrug detection and monitoring
activities. Joint Interagency Task Force East takes the lead role
in the coordination of efforts against the
northward flow of drugs from South America, and Joint Interagency
Task Force West takes the lead in the flow of drugs from Asia.
DOD provides support to domestic and foreign counterdrug
organizations in the form of detection and monitoring,
intelligence, and communication assets. DOD provides these assets
from its existing inventory rather than purchasing new equipment.
DOD also provides counterdrug support to host nations by supplying
support services and training and allowing use of its facilities.
In 1997, DOD provided Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia with assistance
totaling about $44 million, $28 million, and $4 million,
respectively. 6 The U. S. Customs Service and Coast Guard also
conduct detection and monitoring activities.
B-283733 Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-00-9 Drug Control
DOD's Counterdrug Strategies Are Linked to the National Strategy,
but DOD
Lacks Measures of Effectiveness
A framework of strategies and plans linked to the National Drug
Control Strategy guides DOD's counterdrug activities. DOD has not
yet developed a set of performance measures to assess the impact
of its counterdrug operations but has taken some steps to improve
its ability to measure its performance. Without such measures, DOD
cannot clearly assess the
effectiveness of its strategy, operations, and limited counterdrug
assets. A Framework of Counterdrug Strategies and Plans Guides
DOD's Efforts
National, headquarters, and command- level strategies and plans,
all of which are linked to the National Drug Control Strategy,
provide guidance for DOD's counterdrug activities (see app. I for
a complete description of these strategies and plans). These
strategies and plans, drafted by various organizations within the
national security system and proceeding from the
President's office down to field commanders, guide DOD's
counterdrug operations. Each strategy or plan is crafted for a
specific purpose and supports the higher- level strategies above
it. The national security, military, and drug control strategies
describe the broad policy goals and objectives the nation wants to
achieve in combating illegal drugs. In addition, they place
counterdrug activities within the context of the nation's overall
national security concerns and provide a rationale for DOD's
involvement. DOD's Office for Drug Enforcement Policy and Support
has developed a
5- year counterdrug plan based on the goals of the National Drug
Control Strategy. The plan broadly describes the military
personnel, detection and monitoring assets, intelligence support,
communication systems, and training DOD will provide to domestic
law enforcement agencies and foreign counterdrug military and
police forces to implement the National Drug Control Strategy's
supply reduction goals. Regional commanders in
the field develop more detailed strategies and plans. For example,
the U. S. Southern Command's latest counterdrug campaign plan,
completed in August 1999, describes the illicit drug threat, the
command's counterdrug mission, objectives intended to counter the
threat, and some of the key resources available to achieve the
plan's objectives. In addition, the plan reflects changes that
have occurred in the illicit drug threat, the level of available
assets, and the command's location and geographic area of
responsibility since 1992 when the command's prior plan was
issued. According to a Southern Command official, a new plan was
needed to provide a framework for conducting operations over the
long term, to
B-283733 Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-00-9 Drug Control
better focus limited assets, to define future requirements, and to
improve interagency coordination.
The campaign plan is based on the assumption that the assets
required to achieve Southern Command's counterdrug objectives will
be available. However, DOD officials noted that the level of
counterdrug assets will continue to be constrained by DOD's
requirement to satisfy other higher priority missions;
consequently, the assets may not be available.
DOD Has Not Developed Performance Measures
DOD has not developed a set of performance measures to evaluate
its counterdrug activities as part of its counterdrug strategies;
however, it has taken steps that may help it develop performance
measures. Such measures could help DOD determine the effectiveness
of its counterdrug operations and make better use of limited
intelligence, detection, and monitoring assets. The 1993
Government Performance and Results Act incorporates performance
measurement as one of its most important features. 7 Under the
act, executive branch agencies are required to develop annual
performance plans that use performance measurement to reinforce
the connection between the long- term strategic goals outlined in
their strategic plans and their day- to- day activities. DOD
designated the 1997
Quadrennial Defense Review as its overall strategic planning
document for the purpose of satisfying the requirements of the
Results Act. The Quadrennial Review identifies DOD's support role
in reducing the production and flow of illegal drugs to the United
States as a subset of the overall DOD strategy of shaping the
international environment.
According to DOD, although the Department has not developed its
own performance measures, it supports the goals and measures of
the Office of National Drug Control Policy. However, we found that
the Office of National Drug Control Policy's measures are intended
to determine progress in achieving national counterdrug- related
goals, not to measure the performance of the individual federal
agencies that implement U. S. counterdrug activities. None of the
Office of National Drug Control Policy's measures relates directly
to DOD's current detection and monitoring
efforts. According to DOD officials, DOD is working with the joint
interagency task forces to help them develop performance measures
and that it will use its 7 P. L. 103- 62 (Aug. 3, 1993).
B-283733 Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-00-9 Drug Control
Consolidated Counterdrug Data Base to help judge the performance
of its detection and monitoring assets. DOD officials believe
these initial steps will enable them to begin the process of
establishing departmentwide counterdrug performance measures.
DOD's Support to Counterdrug Efforts Has Declined
DOD's support of U. S. intelligence, detection, and monitoring of
illegal drug shipments declined from fiscal years 1992 through
1999. Specifically, the number of flight hours and ship days DOD
dedicated to detecting and monitoring drug trafficking in primary
drug- trafficking routes to the United States dropped. In
addition, interdiction support in cocaine source
countries has also declined in recent years. Consequently,
coverage of key drug- trafficking routes to the United States is
limited. DOD attributes the decline to the low priority assigned
to the counterdrug mission compared with that assigned to other
missions, as well as to decreases in its overall budget. Although
they had not developed any supporting data, DOD officials believe
their operations are more efficient today than in the past and
that this has partially offset the decline in assets available for
counterdrug operations. The officials cited a better understanding
of the drug threat, the addition of Relocatable Over- The- Horizon
Radar systems that provide increased wide- area surveillance of
airborne targets, and enhanced cooperation with U. S. and host-
nation organizations as factors contributing to more efficient
operations.
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Flights Have
Declined
Effective intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
operations are critical to the U. S. international counterdrug
efforts. DOD uses intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
aircraft to provide timely and focused intelligence information to
forces involved in detection, monitoring, and
interdiction. The assets collect signals, imagery, and measurement
and signature intelligence. 8 DOD officials told us that without a
robust intelligence collection capability, the U. S. ' ability to
locate and identify drug production facilities, airfields, and
trafficking patterns is greatly reduced. As shown in figure 2, the
number of intelligence collection flights 8 Signals intelligence
comprises all communications, electronic, and foreign government
instrumentation intelligence, however transmitted. Imagery
intelligence involves the production of images from visual
photography, lasers, electro- optics, and infrared and radar
sensors. Measurement and signature intelligence is the scientific
and technical information obtained by quantitative and qualitative
analysis of data derived from sensors for the purpose of
identifying a target's features.
B-283733 Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-00-9 Drug Control
decreased by over 30 percent from fiscal years 1997 through 1999
in Central and South America and the Caribbean, while Southern
Command's requirements increased. DOD could only meet 43 percent
of U. S. Southern Command's requests for intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance flights in fiscal year 1999.
Figure 2: DOD's Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
Counterdrug Aircraft Support in Central and South America and the
Caribbean, Fiscal Years 1997- 99
Note: Data prior to 1997 was not available. Source: U. S. Southern
Command.
According to the Southern Command Commander, significant
deficiencies in the availability of required assets impede the
command's ability to react quickly and effectively to changes in
drug traffickers' patterns throughout
B-283733 Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-00-9 Drug Control
the region. For example, U. S. embassy officials in Peru told us
that shortages of intelligence assets are a problem there. The
United States uses reconnaissance assets to collect information
that helps analysts understand the drug- trafficking threat and
traffickers' trends. According to
embassy officials in Peru, reconnaissance assets have only been
used once in Peru in recent years. Results from this
reconnaissance activity were limited because of (1) the amount of
time the assets were available, (2) the
distraction of assisting ongoing humanitarian operations outside
of Peru, and (3) a scheduled maintenance period that occurred
during the time the assets were in Peru. Consequently, while the
information provided by the reconnaissance assets was useful, it
was of limited quantity. The embassy would like more frequent
deployments of longer duration in the future.
DOD Detection and Monitoring Support Has Been Reduced Early
detection and continuous tracking of air and surface vessels
suspected of drug trafficking are key aspects of U. S.
interdiction efforts. Although DOD has a lead role in this task,
its contribution in terms of flying hours and ship days has
decreased since its peak in fiscal year 1992. As shown in figure
3, flying hours dedicated to tracking suspect shipments in transit
to the United States declined from 46,264 to 14,770, or 68
percent, from fiscal years 1992 through 1999. Some of the
reduction in aerial support can be attributed to the shift in drug
trafficking from aerial to
maritime methods. 9 In addition, as shown in figure 3, increases
in the U. S. Customs Service and U. S. Coast Guard aircraft flight
hours have offset some of the decline in DOD's flight hours during
this period. 10 DOD officials stated that the Relocatable Over-
The- Horizon Radar systems, introduced in
1994 and 1995, improved their ability to detect airborne drug
trafficking by providing near 24- hour, wide- area surveillance.
However, the radar systems lack the capability to provide data on
the precise location of air targets and provide only limited
surveillance of maritime drug traffic. 9 Beginning in fiscal year
1993 and continuing through fiscal year 1998, cocaine traffickers
increased their reliance on maritime vessels rather than aircraft.
During this period, air drug- trafficking events decreased by 42
percent, while maritime events increased by 55 percent. 10 The
increase, due in part to congressional funding decisions to
enhance law enforcement interdiction capabilities, was not planned
as a direct response to DOD reductions.
B-283733 Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-00-9 Drug Control
Figure 3: DOD, U. S. Customs Service, and U. S. Coast Guard Flight
Hours Allocated to Tracking Illegal Drug Shipments in
Transshipment Areas, Fiscal Years 1992- 99
Note: U. S. Customs Service data prior to 1993 was not available.
Source: Joint Interagency Task Forces East and West, U. S. Customs
Service, and U. S. Coast Guard.
As shown in table 1, reductions in flight hours occurred in most
classes of aircraft. See appendix II for descriptions of DOD's
counterdrug detection and monitoring assets.
B-283733 Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-00-9 Drug Control
Table 1: Transshipment Area Flying Hours of Major DOD Aircraft
Used for Counterdrug Missions, Fiscal Years 1992- 99
Legend: AEW= Airborne Early Warning Note: Flight hours in the
table do not reflect all DOD assets included in figure 3. Source:
Joint Interagency Task Forces East and West.
Despite the shift in trafficking methods from primarily airborne
to maritime, the number of DOD ship days devoted to supporting
interdiction of suspected maritime illegal drug shipments declined
62 percent from 1992 through 1999 (see fig. 4). Declines occurred
in several key vessel types employed by DOD. For example, ship
days for DOD cruisers declined from
558 in fiscal year 1992 to 183 in fiscal year 1999. These declines
in maritime interdiction were partially offset by the increase in
U. S. Coast Guard ship days during the same period.
Aircraft 1992 1999 Percent change 1992- 99
Navy P- 3C 23, 254 8, 321 -64 Navy E- 2 (AEW) 7, 334 3, 154 -57
Air Force F- 15/ 16 574 638 +11 Air Force E- 3 2, 734 544 -80 Air
Force KC- 135 995 291 -71 Navy S- 3 1, 644 0 -100 Navy SH2F 2, 876
640 -78 Navy SH60B 4, 611 1182 -74
B-283733 Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-00-9 Drug Control
Figure 4: DOD and U. S. Coast Guard Counterdrug Ship Days, Fiscal
Years 1992- 99
Note: Ship Day refers to each day a ship was working on
counterdrug efforts. Source: Joint Interagency Task Forces East
and West and U. S. Coast Guard.
Limited Coverage in Key Drug- trafficking Areas
Although DOD's 5- year counterdrug plan states that DOD will
ensure that sufficient assets are allocated to support domestic
and foreign counterdrug agencies, DOD officials indicated that
there are gaps in coverage of highthreat drug- trafficking routes
in South America and transit routes to the United States.
According to the Southern Command Commander, the command can only
detect and monitor 15 percent of key routes in the overall drug-
trafficking area about 15 percent of the time. This has been a
continuing problem. Consequently, illegal drug shipments to the
United
B-283733 Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-00-9 Drug Control
States can go largely undetected. Further exacerbating DOD's
declining support was the closure of Howard Air Force Base in
Panama in May 1999. The base provided the logistical and tactical
infrastructure for launching counterdrug flight missions to South
and Central America and the Caribbean.
Gaps in Monitoring Illegal Drug Production and Shipment in Source
Countries
Reductions have occurred in DOD's air coverage to support the
interdiction of drugs in the source countries of Bolivia,
Colombia, and Peru. Between fiscal years 1998 and 1999, detection
and monitoring flight hours over these source countries declined
from 2,092 to 1,090, or 48 percent. 11 According to embassy
officials, reduced aerial support to monitor and
track cocaine shipments within the source countries has hurt U. S.
efforts to sustain a previously successful interdiction program
focused on transshipment routes between Peru and Colombia. In
1995, the Peruvian Air Force began a program to disrupt air
shipments of cocaine base 12 from Peru to Colombia. The program,
the Air Bridge Denial Program, used DOD
and other U. S. intelligence and radar data to locate suspect
aircraft, which were then intercepted and either shot down or
grounded by the Peruvian Air Force. As air trafficking dropped, a
surplus of cocaine base developed; consequently, cultivation
dropped as coca base prices declined. According to a State
Department report, 13 the interception of aircraft was a major
factor in suppressing cocaine base prices to levels below farmers'
production costs. The report further states that as a consequence,
farmers abandoned coca fields because they found coca farming no
longer profitable. However, since late 1997, U. S. aerial support
for the program has declined. U. S. officials in Peru told us that
there has been little or no U. S. airborne intelligence or
surveillance of air traffic routes between Peru and Colombia since
1997, even though recent changes in smuggling tactics and
communications have made sophisticated airborne surveillance
increasingly important. The U. S. Ambassador to Peru warned in an
October 1998 letter to the State Department that the reduction in
air support could 11 Data prior to fiscal year 1998 was not
available. 12 Cocaine base is partially refined cocaine. Final
refinement of cocaine base occurs in Colombia. 13 International
Narcotics Control Strategy Report (Washington, D. C.: U. S.
Department of State, 1997- 98).
B-283733 Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-00-9 Drug Control
have a serious impact on the price of coca. According to the
Office of National Drug Control Policy, coca cultivation and price
in Peru have risen over the past year. With the runway closed at
Howard Air Force Base in Panama on May 1, 1999, DOD said that its
and other U. S. counterdrug agencies' aerial detection and
monitoring coverage would be significantly reduced if not
replicated by other means. Howard Air Force Base provided a
position close to cocaine- producing countries for launching U. S.
counterdrug aircraft. To offset the loss of Howard, DOD is
establishing three forward operating locations for U. S. aerial
detection and interdiction assets in
Aruba/ Curacao, Netherlands Antilles; Manta, Ecuador; and a third
location in Central America. The forward operating locations were
established through temporary agreements with the governments of
Ecuador and the Netherlands. The United States signed a long- term
agreement (10- year
initial term) with Ecuador in November 1999 and is negotiating a
long- term agreement with the Netherlands for continuous
operations from these locations. The forward operating locations
will provide a 24- hour, 7- day operational capability, including
runways, ramp space, maintenance
facilities, refueling and service capability, force protection,
and support services for personnel and aircrews. DOD also has
other forward operating sites throughout the Caribbean and in
Central and South America that supplement the three forward
operating locations by providing refueling,
logistical services, and emergency landing rights (see fig. 5 for
site locations).
B-283733 Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-00-9 Drug Control
Figure 5: DOD Forward Operating Locations and Sites
Source: DOD.
Belize Cayman
San Jose, Costa Rica Chiclayo
Lima Curacao/ Aruba
Central America
(to be determined)
Manta, Ecuador
Guantanamo, Cuba
Forward operating site Forward operating location
Venezuela Colombia
Peru Bolivia
Howard Air Force Base
Howard Air Force Base, Panama
B-283733 Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-00-9 Drug Control
DOD conducts regular detection and monitoring flights over transit
routes from Aruba/ Curacao and Manta, but it is not currently
conducting as many flights in source countries from these
locations as it historically conducted from Howard Air Force Base.
The main contributing factor is that Manta currently accommodates
only one P- 3 aircraft. Safety upgrades to Manta's facilities
scheduled over the next 5 months will allow for multi- aircraft
operations, to include U. S. Customs Service Airborne Early
Warning and
other aircraft. Additional upgrades to Manta during fiscal year
2001 will allow larger U. S. Air Force Airborne Early Warning and
Control Systems aircraft to operate throughout cocaine- producing
countries. DOD stated that once Congress appropriates the funds,
it would take 2 years to fully upgrade Manta. DOD officials told
us that a Relocatable Over- The- Horizon Radar system in Puerto
Rico, scheduled to be operational by February 2000, would extend
into the source region, allowing for more efficient use of limited
airborne surveillance assets by providing information on specific
targets and identifying drug- trafficking trends. 14 In addition,
while agreements between the United States and Venezuela for
overflight exist,
since June 1999 the Venezuelan government has only allowed a very
limited number of U. S. counterdrug aircraft to fly over its
territory. DOD officials told us that unless overflights are
allowed, its aerial surveillance support would be reduced for
cocaine source countries. Gaps in the Transit Zone DOD has been
unable to sustain operational support in a key threat area in
the Eastern Pacific. The Office of National Drug Control Policy
estimated in 1998 that 33 percent of the illegal drugs shipped to
the United States transits this area. In 1996, DOD supported a
successful operation, called Caper Focus, but was unable to
sustain the effort due to a lack of available assets. During the
operation, Joint Interagency Task Force East temporarily shifted
about 200 flight hours and two ships per month from
the Caribbean to the Eastern Pacific. As a result of the temporary
operation, 27 metric tons of cocaine were seized or jettisoned.
Prior to the operation, few seizures had been made. However,
according to DOD, it was unable to sustain the operation during
1997 and 1998 because of insufficient flight hours. In fiscal year
1999, Congress provided $6 million in additional funds to DOD for
renewed operational support to the Eastern 14 DOD operates two
Relocatable Over- The- Horizon Radar, located in Virginia and
Texas, which provide wide- area coverage to detect suspect
aircraft (mostly in the Caribbean). The radar sites do not provide
coverage into key trafficking areas in cocaine producing
countries. Appendix II provides additional information on DOD's
counterdrug radar facilities.
B-283733 Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-00-9 Drug Control
Pacific. The funds were used to gather intelligence to assess the
threat and modes of transportation and to design operations to
interdict illegal drug shipments. In June and August 1999, DOD and
U. S. agencies helped host- nation authorities seize over 16
metric tons of cocaine.
Better Understanding of Drug Threat and Cooperation Cited
DOD officials stated that its reduced support to the counterdrug
effort has hampered coverage in key drug- trafficking routes.
However, they also believe that DOD's counterdrug efforts are more
efficient today than in the
past. The officials cited a better understanding of the drug
threat by U. S. counterdrug organizations and improved
coordination between U. S. and host nations' counterdrug
organizations as factors that have contributed to increased
efficiency. For example, host nations have cooperated with Joint
Interagency Task Force East in planning and conducting regional
counterdrug operations.
Joint Interagency Task Force East officials told us their work
with host governments in Central America and the Caribbean
resulted in several drug seizures in 1999. For example, Panama
supported the United States in the seizure of 27 kilograms of
cocaine off the Panamanian coast. In addition, Panamanian and
Nicaraguan law enforcement officials eradicated 1.7 million
marijuana plants in 1999. DOD did not provide any data to
demonstrate the degree to which DOD detection and monitoring
support had contributed to these improvements. See appendix I for
the locations of the Joint Interagency Task Force East/ DOD-
supported operations.
Low Priority of the Counterdrug Mission Limits DOD Assets
Available for Detection and Monitoring
The lower priority assigned by DOD to the counterdrug mission in
comparison to other missions reduces the availability of detection
and monitoring assets for counterdrug operations. In 1989, the
Secretary of Defense issued guidance stating that:
the detection and countering of the production, trafficking and
use of illegal drugs is a high priority national security mission[
and] the Department of Defense will work to advance substantially
the national objective of reducing the flow of illegal drugs to
the United States through the effective application of available
resources.
B-283733 Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-00-9 Drug Control
DOD does not purchase major equipment such as aircraft and ships
specifically for the counterdrug mission. Rather, it carries out
counterdrug operations using assets that are purchased primarily
for other missions. DOD categorizes some of the assets that it
uses for counterdrug operations as low- density, high- demand
assets. 15 DOD policy that sets priorities for the use of its low-
density, high- demand assets states that the counterdrug mission
is the fourth priority after war, other military operations that
might involve contact with hostile forces such as peacekeeping,
and training.
Due to the lower priority assigned to the counterdrug mission, DOD
allocates assets to counterdrug detection and monitoring
operations after it meets the requirements for higher- priority
missions. DOD develops
standing orders that specify the number and types of equipment it
expects to be available for counterdrug operations on a continuous
basis. However, commands that provide counterdrug assets can
request relief from standing counterdrug orders when higher-
priority missions arise. For
example, although DOD usually commits two airborne warning and
control systems aircraft to the counterdrug mission, one aircraft
was reassigned in January 1999 to support the Iraqi no- fly zone
(Operation Southern Watch) and then in April 1999 for the Kosovo
crisis. The aircraft has not yet returned to the counterdrug
mission. Further, although Southern Command's new counterdrug
campaign plan defines detection and monitoring resource
requirements, according to a Southern Command official, the DOD
resource requirements contained in the plan are constrained by the
level of assets DOD has determined are available for the
counterdrug effort after considering other requirements. Joint
Chiefs of Staff officials told us that the level of assets DOD
commits to counterdrug
activities is unlikely to change because DOD's inventory of assets
for detection and monitoring is not growing, and the priority of
the counterdrug mission in comparison to other missions is
unlikely to change.
15 According to DOD policy, low- density, high- demand assets are
major platforms, weapons systems, units, and/ or personnel that
possess unique mission capabilities and are in continual high
demand to support worldwide joint military operations.
B-283733 Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-00-9 Drug Control
Funding and Equipment Levels Have Declined Since the Early 1990s
DOD's counterdrug budget has generally declined since 1993. At the
same time, the inventory of important counterdrug assets has also
declined. DOD experienced initial funding increases in the early
1990s. However, from fiscal years 1993 through 1999, DOD's
counterdrug budget declined from $1. 3 billion to $975 million, or
24 percent. The funds are used to support military training
deployments, radar systems, aircraft, ships, and command
and communications systems. DOD's overall budget declined by
approximately 14 percent during this period, from $300 billion in
fiscal year 1993 to about $260 billion in fiscal year 1999. 16 DOD
spends about 75 percent of its counterdrug funds on drug supply
reduction goals to support the interdiction of drugs in cocaine
source countries and in transit to the United States. The
remaining 25 percent are spent on the domestic and demand
reduction goals of the National Drug Control Strategy. 17 The
funds support law enforcement interdiction efforts in the United
States through the use of active duty military and reserve
components for intelligence, transportation, and training. Funds
are also used for education and awareness programs and drug
testing.
In addition to decreases in the budget, DOD officials told us that
the overall inventory of defense equipment that can be used for
counterdrug purposes has declined as a result of the post- Cold
War drawdown of U. S. forces. Between 1989 and 1999, DOD made
force reductions that included an active military personnel
reduction of about 35 percent and corresponding reductions in
equipment levels. For example, DOD reduced the number of naval
ships by 44 percent from 562 in fiscal year 1989 to 317 ships in
fiscal year 1999. As shown in table 2, the inventory of some of
DOD's important
detection and monitoring assets also declined from fiscal years
1992 through 1999.
16 All figures are in 1999 constant dollars. 17 Data on the budget
for reducing the drug supply was only available from fiscal years
1996 through 1999.
B-283733 Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-00-9 Drug Control
Table 2: Inventory of Major DOD Equipment Available for
Counterdrug Missions, Fiscal Years 1992- 99
Legend: AEW= Airborne Early Warning a Data is through June 1999.
Source: DOD.
Challenges to DOD's Support of HostNations' Counterdrug Efforts
DOD provides a variety of support, such as detection and
monitoring, training, logistics, and equipment, to assist host
nations' counterdrug efforts. In 1997, DOD spent over $459 million
on this type of assistance worldwide. In doing so, it faces
several challenges, including (1) the limited capability of host
nations to operate and repair equipment or to effectively utilize
training provided by the United States, (2) host- nation
difficulties in meeting U. S. eligibility conditions for providing
training aid to military
units, and (3) U. S. restrictions on sharing intelligence with
some hostnation counterdrug organizations.
Maintenance of Equipment and Utilization of Training Although DOD
has provided equipment and training to a number of hostnation
counterdrug organizations, these organizations have not always
been able to utilize this assistance. For example, Congress has
appropriated $89 million over 5 years (1998- 2002) for a program
to interdict drug shipments on the rivers of Colombia and Peru.
The program is designed to develop counterdrug forces dedicated to
operations on
Colombian and Peruvian rivers and includes provisions for
training, boats, and floating maintenance facilities and support
bases. However, according to U. S. embassy officials in Peru, the
Peruvian police (the lead agency for counterdrug enforcement) does
not have maintenance capabilities or adequately trained staff to
manage its own or U. S.- provided boats designed for river
operations. Embassy officials told us that 8 of 16 boats the
police purchased with its own funds in 1998 quickly became
inoperable because the boats were accidentally beached when water
levels dropped, and
Peruvian police lacked the knowledge and/ or parts to repair them.
Asset type 1992 1999 a Percent change 1992- 99
Navy P- 3C 255 244 -04 Navy E- 2 AEW 115 71 -38 Air Force F- 15/
16 974 735 -25
B-283733 Page 25 GAO/NSIAD-00-9 Drug Control
A February 1999 DOD memorandum on support to the Peruvian police
stated that the police lacked the will and skills to maintain the
boats. Peruvian police officials told us they do not have the
budget resources to assume responsibility for spare parts and
maintenance by January 2000, as required by the program agreement
between the United States and Peru. Further, Drug Enforcement
Administration officials told us that the Peruvian police force
does not traditionally dedicate officers to specific tasks or
missions and concluded that the objectives of the program may not
be met. DOD officials told us that they are working with the
Peruvian police to improve the situation.
Restrictions on Assistance Human rights concerns also limit DOD's
counterdrug assistance to foreign governments. U. S. law prohibits
U. S. counterdrug assistance to personnel or units in foreign
countries that have credible evidence against them of gross human
rights violations. 18 We previously reported that U. S. officials
had raised concerns about human rights problems with Colombian and
Peruvian military and police units and that efforts were underway
to overcome the problems. 19 According to State Department
officials, these concerns have since increased. U. S. embassy
personnel in Colombia told us that it would be difficult to
provide support for counterdrug efforts to the Colombian military
unless its units pass State Department screening for human rights
abuses. However, only three of six army brigades operating in
drug- trafficking areas passed the screening. 20 Limitations on
Intelligence
Sharing Concerns over evidence of corruption within foreign
government counternarcotics units have caused the United States to
limit the amount of
intelligence information it will share with other governments.
Consequently, although DOD may develop information on suspected
drugtrafficking targets, it cannot always provide the information
to the host nation. Intelligence obtained by the United States is
a crucial element in counterdrug operations in Colombia, Mexico,
and Peru. Some cooperation
18 22 U. S. C. 2304 (a)( 2) 19 Drug War: Observations on
Counternarcotics Aid to Colombia (GAO/NSIAD-91-296, Sept. 30,
1991) and Drug War: Counternarcotics Programs in Colombia and Peru
(GAO/ T/ NSIAD- 92- 9, Feb. 20, 1992).
20 Drug Control: Narcotics Threat From Colombia Continues to Grow
(GAO/NSIAD-99-136, June 22, 1999).
B-283733 Page 26 GAO/NSIAD-00-9 Drug Control
is occurring. For example, in 1999 the United States signed an
agreement with Mexico to increase intelligence sharing on law
enforcement activities. Joint Interagency Task Force West
officials told us that there have been some improvements in the
way they share information with Mexico on the eastern Pacific
area. Mexican counterdrug forces now receive more timely data on
the presence and movement of vessels suspected of carrying illicit
drugs.
In Peru, U. S. officials collect intelligence, analyze it, and
pass it on to the Peruvian military. However, U. S. officials
there told us they are not sufficiently staffed to carry out this
task and have therefore been unable to build a sufficient base of
intelligence information needed for effective operations. In
Colombia, where DOD can share information on insurgent activity if
it is directly related to an approved counterdrug operation, U. S.
embassy officials sometimes have difficulty distinguishing
insurgents from drug traffickers.
Conclusions Due to reductions in budgets, force structure, and the
lower priority accorded to the counterdrug mission, the assets DOD
provides to the
interagency counterdrug effort have declined. After a decade of
effort, DOD has not developed counterdrug performance measures.
Without such measures, DOD cannot clearly assess the effectiveness
of its strategy, operations, and the assets it contributes to the
national drug control effort.
Recommendation In order for DOD to analyze and report on the
relative effectiveness of its counterdrug detection and monitoring
efforts on a consistent basis, we recommend that the Secretary of
Defense direct that DOD's Office for Drug Enforcement Policy and
Support coordinate with the joint interagency task forces and the
Office of National Drug Control Policy to develop a set of
performance measures for assessing DOD's contributions to U. S.
counterdrug operations.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
DOD provided written comments on a draft of this report. DOD
partially concurred with the report, and agreed that the
Department needs to develop measures of effectiveness for its
counterdrug operations. DOD has taken some initial steps to
improve its ability to measure its performance
that we discuss in our report. However, DOD has not yet developed
specific measures of effectiveness. Our recommendation is intended
to encourage
B-283733 Page 27 GAO/NSIAD-00-9 Drug Control
DOD to take further steps to develop a set of performance measures
as part of its counterdrug strategies. For example, one
performance measure might be to determine how often DOD detects
known cocaine shipments and the percentage of detected shipments
successfully handed off to law enforcement organizations.
Analyzing trends in such measures could help
DOD better evaluate the effectiveness of its contributions to the
national drug control effort. DOD stated that it has taken
aggressive action to meet its detection and monitoring
responsibilities but that it has no law enforcement role in the U.
S. counterdrug effort. DOD stated that its mission is to support
the efforts of law enforcement agencies and that it should not be
evaluated
based on the success or failure of these agencies' arrests or drug
seizures. DOD noted that it has consistently applied available
assets to detect and monitor illegal drug shipments. However, DOD
pointed out that the number of available assets for counterdrug
operations was affected by significant reductions in force
structure, including the 44- percent decline in naval
vessels from 1989 through1999. Further, DOD stated that the
introduction of the Relocatable Over- The- Horizon Radar system
and the efforts of other U. S. agencies have partially offset the
decline in available assets.
Our report clearly defines DOD's counterdrug support role and does
not attempt to evaluate DOD's contributions based on the level of
arrests or drug seizures. Our analysis focuses on the unique
detection, monitoring, and intelligence assets DOD contributes to
the law enforcement community. The report accurately describes the
decline in the level of
assets DOD has made available to the U. S. counterdrug effort, the
reasons for the decline, the capabilities of the Relocatable Over-
The- Horizon Radar, and the involvement of other agencies. While
DOD states that it has
consistently applied available resources in areas where drugs are
produced and shipped, our report clearly demonstrates that gaps in
detection, monitoring, and intelligence coverage exist in these
areas. For example, as we note in the report, DOD was unable to
sustain operations in two high
threat areas, the Eastern Pacific and the transshipment area
between Peru and Colombia, due to a lack of resources devoted to
the counterdrug mission.
DOD also stated that our discussion of the lack of intelligence
assets in cocaine- producing areas is not supported by empirical
evidence. Further, DOD questioned whether the intelligence
community would agree that there is a need for additional airborne
intelligence assets in cocaineproducing
areas and Peru, specifically. Our discussion of DOD intelligence
B-283733 Page 28 GAO/NSIAD-00-9 Drug Control
support in the region is based on documents from DOD, Department
of State, and other agencies. We corroborated the information with
a wide range of officials from the U. S. Mission in Peru and the
U. S. Southern Command. Further, we note that in congressional
testimony the
Commander of the U. S. Southern Command stated that significant
deficiencies in the availability of intelligence assets impede the
command's ability to react to the drug threat. Therefore, we
believe the report is accurate and we have made no changes.
The comments provided by DOD are reprinted in appendix IV. DOD
officials also provided technical comments, which we have
incorporated in the report as appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to the Honorable William S.
Cohen, the Secretary of Defense, and to interested congressional
committees. Copies will also be made available to others upon
request. If you or your staff have any questions concerning this
report, please call me at (202) 512- 4128. Other GAO contacts and
staff acknowledgments are listed in appendix V. Jess T. Ford
Associate Director, International Relations and Trade Issues
Page 29 GAO/NSIAD-00-9 Drug Control
Appendix I
Appendi xes Framework of Strategies Directs Department of
Defense's Counterdrug Efforts Appendi x I
A framework of national; U. S. embassy; Department of Defense
(DOD); and command- level strategic, operational, and tactical
plans and strategies exist to guide DOD's counterdrug activities.
Figure 6 provides a schematic of the hierarchy of these strategies
and plans. Figure 6: Major DOD and Interagency Counterdrug
Strategies and Plans
Source: Office of the President, DOD, Office of National Drug
Control Policy, and Joint Interagency Task Force East.
Appendix I Framework of Strategies Directs Department of Defense's
Counterdrug Efforts
Page 30 GAO/NSIAD-00-9 Drug Control
National Strategies The national security strategy presents the
core national security objectives of the United States and
includes counterdrug activities as one of a wide range of
initiatives. The national military strategy provides direction to
the military in its efforts to implement the national security
strategy. The strategy treats trafficking in illicit drugs as one
of several transnational dangers that threaten U. S. national
interests. The 1999
National Drug Control Strategy and its classified annex identify 5
strategic goals and 31 objectives as part of a comprehensive
effort to reduce drug use (demand), lower drug availability
(supply), and reduce the adverse consequences of drug use. 1 The
five goals are to
educate and enable America's youth to reject illegal drugs, as
well as alcohol and tobacco; increase the safety of America's
citizens by substantially reducing drugrelated crime and violence;
reduce the health and social costs to the public of illegal drug
use; shield America's air, land, and sea frontiers from the drug
threat; and break foreign and domestic sources of drug supply.
The majority of DOD's counterdrug activities focus on the last two
goals. The strategy's annex presents strategic concepts, specific
agency tasks, desired conditions, and impact targets for these two
goals. Each of the specific agency tasks is assigned to multiple
agencies and describes in broad terms what is to be done to reach
the goal's desired condition. For
example, under the fourth goal, one of the tasks is to Support
expanding and enhancing dedicated, vetted, foreign drug law
enforcement units in key source and transit countries. Facilitate
sharing of intelligence and law enforcement information, and the
conduct of cooperative investigations and law enforcement
operations. This task is assigned to six U. S. government
organizations, including the Drug Enforcement Administration, the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Customs Service, the Coast
Guard, and the Departments of Defense and State. The specific
actions that each agency must take to accomplish the
1 A National Security Strategy for a New Century (Washington, D.
C.: The White House, Oct. 1998); National Military Strategy of the
United States of America, Shape, Respond, Prepare Now: A Military
Strategy for a New Era (Washington, D. C.: The Joint Chiefs of
Staff, 1997); and The National Drug Control Strategy (Washington,
D. C.: Office of National Drug Control Strategy, Feb. 1999). All
of these strategies are broad in scope and do not provide
any specifics of how their objectives are to be achieved.
Appendix I Framework of Strategies Directs Department of Defense's
Counterdrug Efforts
Page 31 GAO/NSIAD-00-9 Drug Control
tasks are not articulated in the strategy. Instead, each agency,
on its own and in consultation with other agencies, must design
and implement activities that will contribute to the
accomplishment of the task and the desired objective.
Embassy Counterdrug Plans To implement the national strategies at
the host- nation level, U. S. embassies, located in countries
where drug trafficking is a problem, include counterdrug- related
sections in their program plans. These counterdrug sections
identify the needs of host- nation military and civilian
counterdrug organizations and are the basis for the counterdrug
assistance DOD provides to host nations.
Department of Defense Counterdrug Plan
DOD has developed a 5- year counterdrug plan, based on the goals
of the National Drug Control Strategy. The plan broadly describes
the military personnel, detection and monitoring assets,
intelligence support, communication systems, and training DOD
provides to domestic law
enforcement agencies and foreign counterdrug military and police
forces. According to the plan, DOD will ensure that sufficient
forces and resources are allocated to the counterdrug mission to
support domestic and foreign
counterdrug agencies in achieving high- impact results. However,
DOD is legally prohibited from actively participating in the
apprehension or arrest of drug traffickers or the seizure of their
assets. Moreover, DOD's plan states that personnel will not
accompany participating nation forces on field operations.
Southern Command Strategies
Southern Command counterdrug strategies include the Southern
Command Commander in Chief's theater strategy and theater
engagement plan. The theater strategy presents Southern Command's
vision, mission, goals, and strategic concepts necessary for
developing engagement and counterdrug plans for its geographic
area of responsibility. The theater engagement plan identifies all
military activities involving other nations and details the
command's concept for achieving national and theater engagement
objectives. The plan is organized around three goals. The plan's
second goal directs the command to develop an effective capability
and will to respond to theater challenges and support counterdrug
operations. This goal is supported by a number of counterdrug-
related aims, the most prominent being to assist in reducing
illicit source zone activities and flow of illegal drugs through
the transit zone. This aim is, in
Appendix I Framework of Strategies Directs Department of Defense's
Counterdrug Efforts
Page 32 GAO/NSIAD-00-9 Drug Control
turn, supported by three objectives that directly support the last
two goals of the National Drug Control Strategy. The three
objectives are to provide effective, cooperative support to U. S.
and participating nations' efforts to
interdict shipments of illicit drugs, reduce the supply of
illicit drugs, and disrupt and dismantle drug- trafficking
organizations.
Southern Command Counterdrug Campaign Plan Southern Command's
counterdrug campaign plan is a 10- year plan
designed to support interagency efforts that diminish the economic
viability of the illicit drug trade through the disruption of
growth, production, and movement of illicit drugs, especially the
shipment of
cocaine into, within, and out of major production areas of the
Andean Ridge region of South America. The plan is intended to
better focus counterdrug resources and coordinate the command's
efforts with other
U. S. counterdrug agencies and participating nations. To that end,
the plan defines the drug threat, the objectives to counter the
threat, and the resources necessary to achieve the plan's
objectives. In addition to the campaign plan, the command is
developing a functional plan and an annual operations order. The
functional plan, to be completed in January 2000, will describe
the tasks that Southern Command's subordinate commands, such
as U. S. Army South and Joint Interagency Task Force East, will
implement to achieve the campaign plan's goals and objectives. The
operations order will identify the time and location of operations
and the forces that will execute the operations. Joint Interagency
Task Force Level Strategies and Plans
Joint Interagency Task Force East's regional counterdrug campaign
plan defines the task force's mission and objectives for
supporting the Southern Command's counterdrug campaign plan. The
task force is executing its counterdrug campaign plan through a
number of regional, land- based counterdrug campaigns and air- and
sea- based, steady- state counterdrug operations such as Central
Skies and Caper Focus. Each campaign is comprised of a number of
sequenced operations designed to achieve the
goals of the campaign. For example, the Central Skies' campaign
goal is to develop a seamless regional counterdrug architecture in
Central America. Joint Interagency Task Force East is attempting
to achieve this goal by
conducting operations that, among other things, enhance
intelligence and information exchange between the United States
and countries in the region; establish command, control,
communication, computer, and intelligence systems between U. S.
embassy country teams and host- nation
Appendix I Framework of Strategies Directs Department of Defense's
Counterdrug Efforts
Page 33 GAO/NSIAD-00-9 Drug Control
law enforcement organizations; support U. S. embassy counterdrug
plans; provide regional planning assistance; and enhance host-
nation counterdrug forces' capabilities. Each operation is
implemented through individual plans and orders. The operational
plans and orders move beyond broad statements of policy, mission,
and objectives and provide details such as date, location, assets,
entities involved, and counterdrug targets. Figure 7 illustrates
the geographic areas where the campaigns and steady state
operations are being implemented.
Figure 7: Location of DOD- supported Regional Counterdrug
Campaigns and Steady- state Operations
Source: Joint Interagency Task Force East.
Inca Gold
Air- and sea- based steady- state operations Land- based campaigns
Carib Ceiling Close Corridor Central Skies
Guyana Suriname
French Guiana
Caper Focus Carib Shield
Cuba Florida Texas
Mexico
Page 34 GAO/NSIAD-00-9 Drug Control
Appendix II Key DOD Counterdrug Intelligence, Detection, and
Monitoring Assets Appendi x II
Through its standing counterdrug order, DOD has committed seven
Navy P- 3 tracker aircraft for maritime patrols, two E- 3 Airborne
Warning and Control System surveillance aircraft, four E- 2
Airborne Early Warning
aircraft, four F- 15/ 16 interceptor aircraft, several naval
combatant ships, and three radar picket ships to the counterdrug
mission. Table 3 provides a description of the key assets DOD
uses.
Table 3: Major DOD Airborne and Maritime Assets Used for
Counterdrug Operations Asset Capability
E- 2 Hawkeye aircraft -Fixed- wing airborne early warning aircraft
with air and maritime radar detection, search and surveillance
capabilities. -Maximum endurance of 6 hours.
E- 3 Sentry Airborne Warning and Control Systems aircraft -
Airborne early warning system with command and control
capabilities.
-Air and maritime radar surveillance, detection, and tracking of
suspect targets. -Data link to ground sites, naval vessels, and
aircraft.
-Endurance of over 9 hours, which can be extended with aerial
refueling. P- 3 Counterdrug Upgrade Orion aircraft -Fixed- wing
surveillance aircraft with maritime surface radar search,
electronic surveillance, and
communications. -Maximum endurance of over 11 hours.
F- 15 Eagle aircraft -Single engine air- to- air search and
tracking radar with identification of friend or foe capability. -
Operated by U. S. Air Force and Air National Guard as an
interceptor aircraft for counternarcotics purposes.
F- 16 Fighting Falcon aircraft -Single engine air- to- air or air-
to- ground fighter -Equipped with air- to- air search and track
radar with identification of friend or foe capability. -Operated
by U. S. Air Force and Air National Guard as an interceptor
aircraft for counternarcotics purposes.
S- 3 Viking -Fixed- wing, twin- turbofan antisubmarine warfare
aircraft used in a maritime patrol aircraft role. -Operated by the
U. S. Navy and has surface radar
search, electronic surveillance, and communications capabilities.
SH- 60B Seahawk -Twin- engine helicopter used for antisubmarine
warfare, search and rescue, drug interdiction, antiship warfare,
cargo lift, and special operations.
-Operated by the navy as an airborne tracking platform based
aboard cruisers, destroyers, and frigates.
Appendix II Key DOD Counterdrug Intelligence, Detection, and
Monitoring Assets
Page 35 GAO/NSIAD-00-9 Drug Control
Source: DOD.
DOD also operates two Relocatable Over- The- Horizon Radar sites
in the United States for aircraft detection and various radar
sites throughout South and Central America and the Caribbean. 11
A third Relocatable Over- The- Horizon Radar site, located in
Puerto Rico, is expected to be operational in February 2000. Table
4 provides a description of the radar assets, figure 8 is a map of
the coverage provided by the Relocatable Over- the- Horizon Radar
system, figure 9 is a map of DOD's other radar systems, and figure
10 contains pictures of DOD's assets. SH2F -Ship- based, medium,
and antisurface warfare
helicopter. Air Reconnaissance Low -U. S. Army multisensor, fixed-
wing surveillance
aircraft. -Collects image and signals intelligence
Picket ships (cruisers, destroyers, and frigates) -Used as radar
ships for air and maritime search and surveillance to support
detection, monitoring, and tracking.
-Capable of supporting a helicopter. -When law enforcement
detachment is embarked, ships can support maritime intercept and
apprehension. Modified Tactical- Auxiliary General Ocean
Surveillance
ships -Equipped with air search radar capability and deployed in
lieu of navy combatants. -Capable of data linking with other
platforms and have
extensive communications equipment. Patrol craft -Special
operations surface vessel equipped with surface search radar and
communications equipment.
-Used for detection and monitoring and interdiction when law
enforcement detachment is embarked.
11 The systems, located in Texas and Virginia, provide radar
coverage in the Caribbean.
Appendix II Key DOD Counterdrug Intelligence, Detection, and
Monitoring Assets
Page 36 GAO/NSIAD-00-9 Drug Control
Table 4: DOD Radar Assets Used for Counterdrug Operations
Source: DOD.
Radar Capability
Relocatable Over- the- Horizon Radar -Provides wide- area
detection and surveillance of air targets, with real reporting of
targets of interest.
-Lacks capacity to provide data on precise location of track or to
engage in intercept operations.
Ground Mobile Radar -Provides primary or augments existing radar
coverage and is capable of long- range searches up to 95,000 feet.
Tethered Aerostat Radar System -Static, tethered balloons that
carry radar sets to an altitude of 10, 000- 15, 000 feet. -Covers
the major drug- smuggling routes along the U. S. southern border
into the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean. Counterdrug
Surveillance and Control System -A series of linked U. S. or host-
nation- owned radar sites. -Provides air surveillance information
indirectly to the North American Aerospace Defense Command, and
directly to the U. S. Southern Command, Joint Interagency Task
Force East, and host nations.
Appendix II Key DOD Counterdrug Intelligence, Detection, and
Monitoring Assets
Page 37 GAO/NSIAD-00-9 Drug Control
Figure 8: Relocatable Over- The- Horizon Radar Coverage
Legend: ROTHR = Relocatable Over- The- Horizon Radar Coverage
Source: DOD.
Mexico Bermuda
Cuba Jamaica Haiti
Dominican Republic
Belize Guatemala
El Salvador Pacific Ocean
Panama Costa Rica
Nicaragua Suriname Venezuela
Brazil Atlantic Ocean
Peru Ecuador
Bolivia Colombia
French Guiana ROTHR
Puerto Rico Honduras
ROTHR Virginia
ROTHR Texas
Guyana
February 2000 coverage Current coverage
Appendix II Key DOD Counterdrug Intelligence, Detection, and
Monitoring Assets
Page 38 GAO/NSIAD-00-9 Drug Control
Figure 9: DOD's Radar Network Coverage on the U. S. Southern
Border and in the Caribbean and Central America and South America
Source: DOD.
Legend: Tethered Aerostat
U. S. Counterdrug Surveillance and Control System Host- nation
Ground Mobil Radar U. S. Ground Mobil Radar
Puerto Rico
Host- nation Counterdrug Surveillance and Control System
Peru Bolivia
Brazil Suriname
French Guiana Guyana
Ecuador Colombia Panama
Costa Rica Nicaragua
Honduras Belize
Cuba Jamaica
Haiti Dominican Republic
Guatemala Mexico
El Salvador Venezuela Pacific Ocean
Atlantic Ocean
Page 39 GAO/NSIAD-00-9 Drug Control
Appendix II Key DOD Counterdrug Intelligence, Detection, and
Monitoring Assets
Page 40 GAO/NSIAD-00-9 Drug Control
Figure 10: DOD Counterdrug Assets
Appendix II Key DOD Counterdrug Intelligence, Detection, and
Monitoring Assets
Page 41 GAO/NSIAD-00-9 Drug Control
Source: DOD.
Page 42 GAO/NSIAD-00-9 Drug Control
Appendix III Objectives, Scope, and Methodology Appendi x III
At the request of the Chairman of the Senate Caucus on
International Narcotics Control and the Chairman of the House
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources,
Committee on Government Reform, we examined (1) DOD's plan for
supporting U. S. counterdrug efforts and how DOD measures its
effectiveness, (2) changes in the level of DOD support for
counterdrug activities from fiscal year 1992 through fiscal year
1999 and the reasons for the changes, and (3) obstacles DOD faces
in providing counterdrug assistance to foreign governments.
Our work focused on the U. S. Southern Command's counterdrug
intelligence, detection, and monitoring operations because of the
Command's central role in the DOD's counterdrug activities and the
importance and cost of these operations. We used fiscal year 1992
through 1999 DOD counterdrug flight hour and ship day data because
earlier data was not available.
To address whether DOD has a plan for supporting U. S.
international counterdrug efforts, we examined the national
security, military, and drug control strategies, as well as plans
and strategies developed by DOD's Office for Drug Enforcement
Policy and Support, U. S. Southern Command, and joint interagency
task forces. In addition, we reviewed military planning guidance
and counterdrug- related planning studies published by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D. C.; the Foreign Military Studies
Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; and the National Defense
University,
Washington, D. C. We interviewed officials responsible for the
development and implementation of the strategies and plans at the
Office of National Drug Control Policy and DOD, Washington, D. C.;
the U. S. Southern Command, Miami, Florida; the Joint Interagency
Task Force East, Key West, Florida; the Joint Interagency Task
Force West, Alameda, California; and the U. S. embassy, Lima,
Peru.
To determine whether DOD has a system for measuring the
effectiveness of its counterdrug activities, we examined related
documents prepared by DOD, the Office of National Drug Control
Policy, U. S. Southern Command, and Joint Interagency Task Forces
East and South. We also examined the operation of and data
generated by the Consolidated Counterdrug Data Base used by DOD to
compare the relative performance of its detection and
monitoring assets. In addition, we interviewed officials from
DOD's Office for Drug Enforcement Policy and Support and Office of
National Drug Control Policy, Washington, D. C.; U. S. Southern
Command, Miami, Florida; Joint Interagency Task Force East, Key
West, Florida; Joint Interagency
Appendix III Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Page 43 GAO/NSIAD-00-9 Drug Control
Task Force South, Howard Air Force Base, Panama; and Joint
Interagency Task Force West, Alameda, California. To determine the
changes in DOD's counterdrug support levels and the challenges DOD
faces in providing counterdrug assistance to foreign governments,
we analyzed DOD counterdrug budgets and interviewed officials from
agencies involved in counterdrug activities in Washington, D. C.;
Key West, Miami, and Tampa, Florida; Chesapeake and Norfolk,
Virginia; Alameda, California; Lima and Iquitos, Peru; and Panama.
In
Washington, D. C., we interviewed officials and reviewed planning,
budget, implementation, and related documents and reports
concerning counterdrug activities at the Offices of National Drug
Control Policy, the
U. S. Interdiction Coordinator, and the Departments of State and
Defense. At the Florida locations, we interviewed officials at
Southern Command, Joint Interagency Task Force East, and the
Special Operations Command and reviewed plans and other documents
related to counterdrug activities. In Chesapeake, Virginia, we
interviewed officials at the Fleet Surveillance Support Command
and reviewed documents related to the Relocatable Over- The-
Horizon Radar's role in counterdrug surveillance. In Norfolk, we
interviewed officials at the Atlantic Command to obtain
information on the resources the command provides to support DOD's
counterdrug mission.
In Alameda, we interviewed officials at Joint Interagency Task
Force West and reviewed plans and other documents related to its
role in counterdrugs. In Lima, we interviewed the U. S. Ambassador
and Deputy Chief of Mission and officials from the Drug
Enforcement Administration and the Military Advisory and
Assistance Group. We also interviewed officials from the Peruvian
Air Force, the National Police, and the Coast Guard. In Iquitos,
we visited the Ground Mobile Radar site and the Joint Peruvian
Riverine Training Center. In Panama, we interviewed the U. S.
Deputy Chief of Mission and Drug Enforcement Administration
officials. We were also briefed on counterdrug operations at
Howard Air Force Base and Joint Interagency Task Force South and
reviewed plans and other documents related to their counterdrug
operations.
We conducted our review from September 1998 through September 1999
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards.
Page 44 GAO/NSIAD-00-9 Drug Control
Appendix IV Comments From the Department of Defense Appendi x IV
Appendix IV Comments From the Department of Defense
Page 45 GAO/NSIAD-00-9 Drug Control
Appendix IV Comments From the Department of Defense
Page 46 GAO/NSIAD-00-9 Drug Control
Now on p. 26.
Page 47 GAO/NSIAD-00-9 Drug Control
Appendix V GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments Appendi x V
GAO Contact Lawrence L. Suda (202) 512- 5380 Acknowledgments In
addition to Mr. Suda, Joseph C. Brown, David M. Bruno, and Janice
V. Morrison made key contributions to this report.
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