Background Investigations: Impediments to Consolidating Investigations
and Adjudicative Functions
(Letter Report, 03/24/95, GAO/NSIAD-95-101)
GAO concludes that it may be feasible to have one central agency conduct
all background investigations and adjudicative functions. However, most
of the nine key federal agencies that account for 95 percent of the
security clearances oppose consolidation. Moreover several impediments
would have to be resolved. Potential benefits of consolidation include
cost savings, fewer oversight agencies, standardized operating
procedures and information systems, and more consistency in the
application of standards. However, consolidation could also result in
less agency control over the process, potentially reducing the extent to
which an individual agency's requirements and priorities are met. GAO
found that federal agencies are complying with National Security
Directive 63 on single scope background investigations for top secret
clearances. The purpose of the directive was to eliminate redundant
investigative practices for granting persons access to top secret and
sensitive information. Consistent with the directive, some agencies now
require even more background information to meet their missions. For
example, the U.S. Secret Service conduct polygraph tests for its agents
and employees. In fiscal year 1993, executive branch agencies spent
$326 million on background investigations, $20 million of which sent to
private sector investigators.
--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------
REPORTNUM: NSIAD-95-101
TITLE: Background Investigations: Impediments to Consolidating
Investigations and Adjudicative Functions
DATE: 03/24/95
SUBJECT: Investigations by federal agencies
Hiring policies
Centralization
Federal employees
Federal intelligence agencies
Secret records
Executive agencies
Administrative costs
Cost effectiveness analysis
Security clearances
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Cover
================================================================ COVER
Report to Congressional Requesters
March 1995
BACKGROUND INVESTIGATIONS -
IMPEDIMENTS TO CONSOLIDATING
INVESTIGATIONS AND ADJUDICATIVE
FUNCTIONS
GAO/NSIAD-95-101
Background Investigations
Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV
Letter
=============================================================== LETTER
B-260504
March 24, 1995
The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate
The Honorable Frank R. Lautenberg
United States Senate
This report responds to your request that we review the federal
processes for conducting background investigations, deciding an
individual's suitability for government employment, and determining
whether an individual meets established criteria for access to
classified information. More specifically, we collected and analyzed
information on (1) the feasibility of one central agency conducting
all background investigations or adjudicative functions, (2) federal
agencies' compliance with National Security Directive 63 on single
scope background investigations for top secret clearances, and (3)
costs of background investigations and number of security clearances.
BACKGROUND
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :1
Title 5 of the U.S. Code, sections 3301 and 7301, authorizes the
President to establish standards for admission and conduct of federal
employees. Federal regulations authorize the Office of Personnel
Management to investigate and adjudicate the qualifications and
suitability of such employees consistent with protecting or promoting
government efficiency and the integrity of government service. These
background investigations are conducted to verify the qualifications
of the applicant and to enforce applicable federal laws, rules, and
regulations. Under the Federal Personnel Manual, the Office of
Personnel Management delegated suitability determinations to the
responsible federal agencies.
Executive Orders 10450 and 12356, as amended, establish uniform
requirements for personnel security programs in the federal
government. They require agency heads to (1) classify federal
positions for sensitivity in relation to national security and (2)
investigate each person as appropriate based on the position's level
of access to national security information. These background
investigations are used to determine whether an individual meets
established criteria for access to classified information.
Executive Order 10450, as amended, directs the Office of Personnel
Management to provide investigative services to federal agencies
except those authorized to conduct their own investigations such as
the Departments of Defense and State, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, and the Central Intelligence Agency. In addition, the
Office of Personnel Management has delegated to some agencies, such
as the Department of Commerce, authority to use departmental or
private sector investigators. The Office of Personnel Management
retains oversight authority and the right to rescind the delegations,
and conducts about 30 percent of all background investigations each
year. Other investigative agencies conduct about 70 percent of the
background investigations for the federal government. These agencies
include the Departments of Defense, State, and the Treasury; the
Agency for International Development; the Central Intelligence
Agency; the Federal Bureau of Investigation; and the U.S.
Information Agency.
RESULTS IN BRIEF
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :2
It may be feasible to have one central agency conduct all background
investigations and adjudicative functions. However, most of the nine
key agencies, accounting for more than 95 percent of the security
clearances, oppose consolidation; and several concerns and
impediments would have to be considered and resolved. Potential
consolidation benefits include cost savings, fewer oversight
agencies, standardized operating procedures and information systems,
and more consistency in the application of standards. However,
consolidation also could result in less agency control over the
process, potentially reducing the extent to which an individual
agency's requirements and priorities are met. For example, some
agency officials expressed concern that one central agency could not
adequately address their unique missions and needs, especially in
terms of adjudicating an individual's suitability for employment or
level of access to classified information. In addition, studies by
the Heritage Foundation and the Joint Security Commission support
consolidating investigative or adjudicative functions for some
federal agencies, but not for all. A study by the Defense Personnel
Security Research Center opposes consolidating adjudicative functions
in the Department of Defense. Also, the consolidation would be
inconsistent with the National Performance Review report,\1 and
federal statutes, executive orders, and government regulations would
have to be revised.
Our work shows that federal agencies are complying with the
investigative scope and standards of National Security Directive 63
on single scope background investigations for top secret clearances.
The purpose of the directive was to eliminate redundant investigative
practices for granting individuals access to top secret or sensitive
compartmental information. Consistent with directive 63, some
agencies have exceeded the minimum standards by requiring more
background information to address their unique foreign relation and
national security roles and missions. For example, because of its
Presidential protection mission, the U.S. Secret Service conducts
polygraph examinations of its agents and selected employees.
In fiscal year 1993, executive branch agencies spent $326 million on
background investigations, $20 million of which went to private
sector investigators. Appendix I lists costs by agency. More than
3.2 million people have federal security clearances, as shown in
appendix II.
--------------------
\1 From Red Tape to Results: Creating a Government That Works Better
and Costs Less, report of the National Performance Review, Vice
President Al Gore, Sept. 7, 1993.
AGENCIES' OPINIONS ABOUT
CONSOLIDATING INVESTIGATIVE
FUNCTIONS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :3
Federal officials differ in their support for one central agency
conducting all background investigations. Two-thirds of the key
agencies in the process oppose consolidating investigative functions
in one agency. Some believe that costs would increase, and that
timeliness and quality would suffer under a consolidated system. Of
the 51 agencies we polled, 37 percent do not support consolidating
investigative functions, and 41 percent support the 1-agency concept.
The remaining agencies are neutral or did not respond. A study by
the Heritage Foundation supports consolidating investigative
functions for selected federal agencies, but not for defense,
intelligence, and law enforcement agencies because they have
requirements that exceed those of other federal agencies. A study by
the Joint Security Commission recommended the Secretary of Defense
and the Director of Central Intelligence establish a joint
investigative service, but the recommendation was limited to the
Defense Department and intelligence agencies.
MOST KEY AGENCIES OPPOSE
CONSOLIDATION
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.1
Two-thirds of the key federal agencies involved in using background
investigations oppose consolidating investigative functions in one
central agency. Nine key agencies have investigative authority or
grant large numbers of security clearances, and represent more than
95 percent of the security clearances granted to government and
contractor employees during fiscal year 1993. For a variety of
reasons, six of these agencies oppose consolidation of background
investigations, as shown in table 1. For example, the Treasury
Department stated that costs and timeliness could suffer under a
consolidated system. The Department of State suggested that a
centralized investigative system could cause less responsive,
lower-quality investigations. In contrast, the Departments of
Defense and Energy and the Office of Personnel Management support
consolidation, stating that it could decrease costs and improve
timeliness of background investigations. The Department of Defense
added that consolidating the Defense Department's and the Office of
Personnel Management's investigative functions could standardize the
process and improve the quality of the investigations. It also
reported that while there would be legal and technical issues
associated with such a consolidation, none would be insurmountable.
Table 1
Key Agencies' Opinions About
Consolidating Investigative Functions
Executive department or
agency No Yes
---------------------------- -------------- --------------
Agency for International X
Development
Central Intelligence Agency X
Department of Defense X
Department of Energy X
Department of Justice X
Department of State X
Department of the Treasury X
Office of Personnel X
Management
U.S. Information Agency X
------------------------------------------------------------
In addition, four key agencies said that one central investigative
agency could not adequately address the many unique roles and
missions found in the federal government. For example, the
Departments of State and the Treasury said that a central agency
could not adequately address their unique roles and missions. Their
explanations follow.
The Department of State reported that no other federal agency has
investigators stationed worldwide that can conduct background
investigations overseas.\2 Its investigators have established
liaisons with foreign police and security authorities that ease
records searches and enhance overseas investigative
capabilities. State Department investigators support other
diplomatic missions and functions abroad, as well as conducting
background investigations.
The Department of the Treasury said that its investigative
requirements vary to address specific issues related to each
bureau's unique missions. For example, background
investigations of (1) Internal Revenue Service employees contain
tax information and verification, (2) law enforcement employees
contain more stringent police checks and verification procedures
than investigations of other employees, and (3) financial
management employees contain more analysis of financial, credit,
and tax issues.
--------------------
\2 According to Department of Defense officials, the Defense
Department also has investigators stationed overseas that can conduct
background investigations.
SLIGHTLY MORE AGENCIES
SUPPORT CONSOLIDATING
INVESTIGATIVE FUNCTIONS THAN
OPPOSE IT
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.2
The number of federal agencies supporting the consolidation of
investigative functions is slightly more than the number of agencies
against consolidation, as shown in figure 1. Of the 51 federal
agencies polled, 21 (41 percent) agencies support consolidation,
while
19 (37 percent) agencies oppose it. Nine (18 percent) agencies are
neutral on the issue, and two did not respond.
Figure 1: Agencies' Opinions
About Consolidating
Investigative Functions
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Officials supporting consolidation said that it could save money and
result in more consistent application of standards. For example, the
Departments of Veterans Affairs and of Health and Human Services
believe consolidation could standardize the investigative process.
The Departments of Agriculture, the Interior, and Transportation; the
U.S. Postal Service; the Federal Emergency Management Agency; the
Federal Communications Commission and others also support a
single-agency concept for background investigations.
In contrast, some officials believe consolidation could increase the
costs, delay timeliness, or decrease the quality of background
investigations. For example, the Department of Commerce said that
the single-agency concept could cause a monopolistic bureaucracy
lacking incentives to provide timely, good-quality investigations at
low costs. The Peace Corps reported that there was no proof that
consolidation would increase economies and efficiencies and the Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency stated that consolidation could create
a large, unnecessary bureaucracy.
TWO STUDIES SUPPORT
CONSOLIDATION FOR SOME
AGENCIES, BUT NOT FOR ALL
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.3
Studies by the Heritage Foundation and the Joint Security Commission
support consolidation of investigative functions for selected federal
agencies, but not for all.
In 1983, the Heritage Foundation issued a report on the federal
personnel security program.\3 The foundation concluded that the
advantages of consolidating background investigations outweigh the
disadvantages, except for the Department of Defense, the intelligence
community, and law enforcement agencies, all of which have
requirements that differ and exceed those of other federal agencies.
The report stated that consolidating investigative functions could
save money, enhance the quality of investigations, maintain high
standards for investigators, and improve the application of uniform
investigative standards.
On February 28, 1994, the Joint Security Commission issued a report
describing the threats to the nation's security and proposing new
personnel security strategies for the Department of Defense and
intelligence agencies.\4 The commission recommended the Secretary of
Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence establish a joint
investigative service to standardize background investigations,
reduce costs, and improve timeliness. It also reported that
contracting for investigations in special circumstances, such as
priority cases, could enhance competitiveness, lower costs, and
prevent backlogs and delays. However, the review was limited only to
the Department of Defense and intelligence agencies.
--------------------
\3 Screening Federal Employees: A Neglected Security Priority, The
Heritage Foundation, 1983.
\4 Redefining Security, report to the Secretary of Defense and the
Director of Central Intelligence, Joint Security Commission, Feb.
28, 1994.
AGENCIES' OPINIONS ABOUT
CONSOLIDATING ADJUDICATIVE
FUNCTIONS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :4
All but one key agency oppose consolidating adjudicative functions.
In addition, most of the federal agencies we polled oppose
consolidating adjudicative functions in one agency, while 22 percent
support consolidation. The remaining agencies are neutral on the
issue or did not respond. The studies by the Heritage Foundation and
the Joint Security Commission support consolidating adjudicative
functions for some federal agencies, but not for all. A study by the
Defense Personnel Security Research Center opposes consolidating
adjudicative functions in the Department of Defense.
MOST KEY AGENCIES OPPOSE
CONSOLIDATION
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.1
For a variety of reasons, eight of the nine key federal agencies
oppose consolidating adjudicative functions in one central agency.
(See table 2.) Officials expressed concern that one agency could not
adequately (1) adjudicate all federal suitability determinations and
security clearances nor (2) address the various agencies' missions
and needs in the adjudicative process. Some also express concerns
that consolidation could increase costs and delay the adjudication
process. In contrast, the Department of Energy supports
consolidation, stating that it could decrease costs and improve
timeliness of the process.
Table 2
Key Agencies' Opinions About
Consolidating Adjudicative Functions
Executive department or
agency No Yes
---------------------------- -------------- --------------
Agency for International X
Development
Central Intelligence Agency X
Department of Defense X
Department of Energy X
Department of Justice X
Department of State X
Department of the Treasury X
Office of Personnel X
Management
U.S. Information Agency X
------------------------------------------------------------
MOST AGENCIES OPPOSE
CONSOLIDATING ADJUDICATIVE
FUNCTIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.2
As shown in figure 2, 34 (67 percent) federal agencies of the 51
agencies polled oppose consolidating adjudicative functions and
procedures. Officials expressed concern that one agency could not
adequately adjudicate all federal suitability determinations and
classified information access levels. For example, the Department of
Education and the Environmental Protection Agency said that deciding
suitability is an integral part of their personnel systems. The
Department of Commerce and the National Archives and Records
Administration said that consolidating the adjudication function
could make it more difficult to defend denials and revocations of
security clearances. Eleven (22 percent) agencies support
consolidation, some responding that it could save money and
standardize the process. Four (8 percent) agencies are neutral on
consolidation, and two did not respond.
Figure 2: Agencies' Opinions
About Consolidating
Adjudicative Functions
(See figure in printed
edition.)
STUDIES VARY IN THEIR
SUPPORT FOR CONSOLIDATING
ADJUDICATIVE FUNCTIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.3
Studies by the Heritage Foundation, the Defense Personnel Security
Research Center, and the Joint Security Commission vary in their
support for consolidating adjudicative functions. The Heritage
Foundation supported consolidating adjudicative functions for some
federal agencies, but not for defense, intelligence, and law
enforcement agencies because they have requirements that exceed those
of other federal agencies. A study by the Defense Personnel Security
Research Center opposed consolidating adjudicative functions in the
Department of Defense. The Joint Security Commission recommended
consolidating adjudicative functions for most of the Defense
Department, but exempted the National Security Agency from the
consolidation because of its unique hiring practices.
The 1983 Heritage Foundation report concluded that the advantages of
consolidating adjudicative functions outweigh the disadvantages for
most federal agencies. The foundation reported that consolidating
adjudicative functions for most agencies could save money, improve
the quality of the adjudications, maintain high standards for
adjudicators, and provide for uniform standards. However, the
Heritage Foundation also concluded that the Department of Defense,
intelligence agencies, and law enforcement agencies have requirements
that differ and exceed those of other federal agencies and should
continue to operate their own adjudication programs.
In October 1991, the Defense Personnel Security Research and
Education Center reported on the potential benefits of consolidating
the Defense Department's adjudication facilities.\5
The center concluded that the increased risks to personnel security
from consolidation outweigh the potential benefits. The center
reported that one central adjudication agency could standardize
operating procedures and information systems and result in more
consistent application of standards. However, the center also
concluded that consolidation could result in less agency control over
the process, potentially reducing the extent to which any individual
agency's requirements and priorities are met.
The Joint Security Commission recommended consolidation of
adjudicative functions for the Department of Defense, except for the
National Security Agency. According to the commission, a
well-designed central agency could improve the efficiency,
effectiveness, and consistency of the department's adjudicative
system. However, the commission reported that the National Security
Agency should be exempt from the consolidation because of its unique
hiring practices. The commission's review was limited only to the
Defense Department and intelligence agencies.
--------------------
\5 Consolidation of Personnel Security Adjudication in DOD, Defense
Personnel Security Research and Education Center, Oct. 1991.
OTHER IMPEDIMENTS TO
CONSOLIDATING INVESTIGATIVE AND
ADJUDICATIVE FUNCTIONS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :5
The consolidation of background investigations and adjudicative
functions would be inconsistent with the National Performance Review
report and would require federal statutes, executive orders, and
government regulations to be revised.
The Departments of Commerce, Education, and the Treasury and the
Office of Management and Budget believe a single-agency concept
counters the National Performance Review proposal to decentralize
federal personnel policy and to give managers more authority to hire,
promote, reward, and terminate employees. For example, the National
Performance Review recommended giving federal agencies authority to
recruit potential employees and to abolish the standard job
application form and central job registers. In addition, it reported
that agencies should be permitted to conduct their own background
investigations of job applicants. The Office of Personnel Management
has partially implemented the recommendations. For example, the
office has actions under way to revise the Federal Personnel Manual
and has abolished the standard job application form and its central
registers for entry-level professionals and administrative positions.
As of December 31, 1994, no action had occurred allowing other
federal agencies to conduct their own background investigations.
Federal statutes, executive orders, and regulations would have to be
revised to allow for the consolidation of security investigations and
related functions. For example, the Congress would have to amend the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, to replace the requirement
that the Office of Personnel Management and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation conduct background investigations for the Energy
Department and its contractors and licensees; and the Arms Control
and Disarmament Act of 1961, as amended, to revise the investigative
requirements for the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and its
contractors. The President would have to revise Executive Orders
10450 and 12356, as amended, to designate one central agency for all
background investigations and related functions. In addition,
federal agencies would have to revise their regulations and manuals
to reflect the one-agency concept. We did not estimate the costs to
make these revisions.
FEDERAL AGENCIES COMPLY WITH
NATIONAL SECURITY DIRECTIVE 63
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :6
Federal executive agencies are meeting the requirements of National
Security Directive 63 on single-scope background investigations for
top secret clearances. Based on our review, agencies' internal
standards and investigative results comply with the requirements
established in the directive. The purpose of the directive is to
eliminate redundant and costly investigative practices employed
throughout the executive branch. It establishes the minimum
investigative scope and standards for top secret security clearances.
The investigation consists of a personnel subject interview; law
enforcement and credit checks; public records searches; verification
of educational degree(s); and interviews with people knowledgeable of
the subject's employment, residence, activities, and lifestyle. The
investigation covers the subject's background during the previous 10
years.
Directive 63 also allows agencies to exceed the standards to resolve
or address issues and requirements unique to individual agencies.
Some agencies, such as the Central Intelligence Agency, the National
Security Agency, and the Treasury Department, have exceeded the
standards to address their unique foreign relation and national
security roles and missions. For example, the Central Intelligence
Agency and the National Security Agency use full-scope polygraphs to
screen employment applicants, because their employees have access to
a broad range of classified national security information. In
addition, because of its presidential protection mission, the U.S.
Secret Service conducts polygraph examinations of its agents and
selected employees.
COSTS OF INVESTIGATIONS AND
TYPES OF SECURITY CLEARANCES
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :7
In March 1994, we issued correspondence to the Chairman of the
Subcommittee on Defense, Senate Committee on Appropriations, on the
costs of background investigations and types of security
clearances.\6 Since our correspondence, executive agencies reported
to us that they spent an additional $1 million, for a total of $326
million, on background investigations in fiscal year 1993. More than
$20 million went to private sector investigators. In addition, as
shown in table 3, more than 3.2 million people have federal security
clearances. Executive federal employees and military personnel
account for almost 2.4 million clearances, and government
contractors' employees account for 852,711 clearances. The totals do
not include information from the Central Intelligence Agency.
Table 3
Number of Executive Federal and
Contractor Employees with Security
Clearances
(Figures in thousands)
Federal
employees, Contracto
including r
Clearance level military employees Total
---------------------- ---------------- --------- =======
Top secret 535 233 768
Secret 1,719 580 2,299
Confidential 114 40 154
============================================================
Total 2,368 853 3,221
------------------------------------------------------------
Note: In addition to these clearance levels, agencies also granted
256,399 federal and contractor employees access to Sensitive
Compartmental Information.
Source: Executive agencies' responses to our request for personnel
data.
--------------------
\6 Personnel Security Investigations (GAO/NSIAD-94-135R, Mar. 4,
1994).
SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :8
To assess the feasibility of consolidating background investigations
or adjudicative functions in 1 central agency, we sent letters, dated
May 31, 1994, to 51 federal agencies, offices, boards, commissions,
and councils requesting their opinions on the single-agency concept
and related legal issues. We received 45 written responses that
included opinions from all except 2 of the 51 organizations. For
example, the General Services Administration responded for the Board
for International Broadcasting and the Marine Mammal Commission. We
focused our analysis on responses from nine key departments and
agencies that have investigative authority or grant large numbers of
security clearances. They represent more than 95 percent of the
security clearances granted to government and contractor employees
during fiscal year 1993.\7 In addition, we interviewed and obtained
information from officials of the Departments of Defense, Energy,
Justice, State, and the Treasury; the Office of Personnel Management;
and other federal agencies. We also collected and analyzed studies,
policies, directives, and statutes on background investigations,
adjudication procedures, and security clearances. We did not
determine whether there would be any potential cost savings from
consolidating background investigations or adjudicative functions in
one agency.
To determine the level of compliance with National Security Directive
63, we compared agencies' internal standards and investigative
results with the requirements established in the directive. To
identify the costs and types of background investigations and
security clearances, we collected and analyzed pertinent information
from the organizations listed in appendixes I and II. The Central
Intelligence Agency did not respond to our request for cost and
security clearance data.
We conducted our review for this report from March 1994 to December
1994 according to generally accepted government auditing standards.
As requested, we did not obtain official agency comments. We
provided a fact sheet summarizing this report to the nine key
agencies in the process and included their comments where
appropriate.
--------------------
\7 These agencies are the Departments of Defense, Energy, Justice,
State, and the Treasury; the Office of Personnel Management; the
Agency for International Development; the Central Intelligence
Agency; and the U.S. Information Agency.
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :8.1
Unless you publicly announce this report's contents earlier, we plan
no further distribution until 30 days from its issue date. At that
time, we will send copies to the Chairmen of the Senate and House
Committees on Appropriations, the Senate Committee on Armed Services,
and the House Committee on National Security; the Secretary of
Defense; the Directors of the Office of Management and Budget and the
Office of Personnel Management; and other interested parties. We
will make copies available to others upon request.
Please contact me at (202) 512-8412 if you or your staff have any
questions. Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix
III.
Donna M. Heivilin
Director, Defense Management
and NASA Issues
COST TO CONDUCT BACKGROUND
INVESTIGATIONS AND RELATED
FUNCTIONS IN FISCAL YEAR 1993
=========================================================== Appendix I
(Dollars in thousands)
Executive agency or In- Reimbursement
office house \a Contract Total
---------------------- ------ ------------- --------- ======================
Agency for $686 $31 $644 $1,361
International
Development
Arms Control and 3 159 162
Disarmament Agency
Board for 17 2 19
International
Broadcasting
Central Intelligence
Agency\b
Council of Economic 0
Advisers
Department of 177 1,562 1,739
Agriculture
Department of Commerce 90 965 567 1,622
Department of Defense 180,56 9,957 2,120 192,642
5
Department of 5 5
Education
Department of Energy 5,116 57,289 6,663 69,068
Department of Health 53 348 401
and Human Services
Department of Housing 168 675 843
and Urban Development
Department of the 2 2
Interior
Department of Justice 11,349 23,142 3,987 38,478
Department of Labor 39 33 72
Department of State 2,055 151 4,190 6,396
Department of 1,885 1,226 3,111
Transportation
Department of the 473 398 781 1,652
Treasury
Department of Veterans 309 309
Affairs
Environmental 320 678 998
Protection Agency
Export-Import Bank 87 87
Farm Credit 8 36 44
Administration
Federal Communications 30 16 46
Commission
Federal Emergency 382 382
Management Agency
Federal Maritime 0
Commission\c
Federal Reserve System 104 104
General Services 249 307 556
Administration
International Trade 23 23
Commission
Interstate Commerce 44 44
Commission
Marine Mammal 17 1 18
Commission
Merit Systems 1 6 7
Protection Board
National Aeronautics 785 969 625 2,379
and Space
Administration
National Archives and 125 262 387
Records
Administration
National Science 35 35
Foundation
National Security 0
Council
Nuclear Regulatory 214 526 27 767
Commission
Office of 83 83
Administration
Office of Management 1 1
and Budget
Office of Personnel 35 35
Management
Office of Science and 0
Technology Policy
Office of the U.S. 8 8
Trade Representative
Office of the Vice 0
President
Overseas Private
Investment
Corporation\d
Peace Corps 48 14 128 190
Securities and 24 24
Exchange Commission
Selective Service 0
System\c
Small Business 69 69
Administration
Tennessee Valley 1 6 7
Authority
U.S. Information 1,205 157 465 1,827
Agency
U.S. Postal Service 77 3 80
================================================================================
Total $205,8 $100,011 $20,197 $326,083
75
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a Reimbursement cost to other federal agencies.
\b Did not provide cost data.
\c Cost is less than $500.
\d Cost is included in the Agency for International Development's
total.
Source: Executive agencies' responses to our request for cost data.
Not all costs are actual, some agencies provided estimates only.
CLEARANCE LEVELS FOR FEDERAL,
MILITARY, AND CONTRACTOR EMPLOYEES
IN FISCAL YEAR 1993
========================================================== Appendix II
Confidenti
Executive agency or office Top secret Secret al Total
---------------------------- -------------- ---------- ---------- ==========
Agency for International 2,402 906 3,308
Development
Arms Control and Disarmament 255 255
Agency
Board for International 14 14
Broadcasting
Central Intelligence
Agency\a
Council of Economic Advisers 23 23
Department of Agriculture 848 1,358 461 2,667
Department of Commerce 850 4,440 90 5,380
Department of Defense 449,506 1,652,360 111,806 2,213,672
Department of Education 39 15 6 60
Department of Energy 7,862 1,458 9,320
Department of Health and 300 385 40 725
Human Services
Department of Housing and 83 128 211
Urban Development
Department of the Interior 1,110 500 1,610
Department of Justice 34,207 6,034 236 40,477
Department of Labor 270 160 430
Department of State 16,154 773 16,927
Department of Transportation 2,569 24,041 297 26,907
Department of the Treasury 9,199 6,839 147 16,185
Department of Veterans 595 1,232 1,827
Affairs
Environmental Protection 164 860 1,024
Agency
Export-Import Bank 16 240 256
Farm Credit Administration 2 2 4
Federal Communications 127 260 387
Commission
Federal Emergency Management 1,557 355 1,912
Agency
Federal Maritime Commission 3 54 57
Federal Reserve System 113 38 151
General Services 1,210 734 8 1,952
Administration
International Trade 8 440 448
Commission
Interstate Commerce 11 44 55
Commission
Marine Mammal Commission 2 6 8
Merit Systems Protection 49 14 63
Board
National Aeronautics and 483 5,759 55 6,297
Space Administration
National Archives and 507 114 2 623
Records Administration
National Science Foundation 10 118 128
National Security Council 15 15
Nuclear Regulatory 1,841 1,734 3,575
Commission
Office of Administration 82 53 2 137
Office of Management and 181 273 454
Budget
Office of Personnel 43 133 176
Management
Office of Science and 34 2 36
Technology Policy
Office of the U.S. Trade 73 43 12 128
Representative
Office of the Vice President 32 8 40
Overseas Private Investment
Corporation\b
Peace Corps 297 128 425
Securities and Exchange 13 30 43
Commission
Selective Service System 9 15 4 28
Small Business 33 205 1 239
Administration
Tennessee Valley Authority 22 199 10 231
U.S. Information Agency 1,896 1,193 408 3,497
U.S. Postal Service 4,955 4,955
================================================================================
Subtotal 535,119 1,718,638 113,585 2,367,342
Contractor\c 232,970 580,149 39,592 852,711
================================================================================
Total 768,089 2,298,787 153,177 3,220,053
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: In addition to these clearance levels, agencies granted
256,399 federal and contractor employees access to Sensitive
Compartmental Information. Some agencies also grant L and Q access
authorizations, which are not included in this table.
\a Did not provide data on clearance levels.
\b Clearance levels are included in the Agency for International
Development's total.
\c Includes totals for all executive agencies.
Source: Executive agencies' responses to our request for personnel
data. Not all figures are actual, some agencies provided estimates
only.
MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT
========================================================= Appendix III
NATIONAL SECURITY AND
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION,
WASHINGTON, D.C.
David R. Warren, Associate Director
Thomas J. Howard, Assistant Director
Leo G. Clarke III, Evaluator-in-Charge
Claude T. Adrien, Evaluator
Jacqueline E. Snead, Evaluator