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DOD Force Mix Issues: Greater Reliance on Civilians in Support Roles Could Provide Significant Benefits

(Chapter Report, 10/19/94, GAO/NSIAD-95-5)

In the wake of the Defense Department's (DOD) continuing efforts to
downsize, this report identifies ways for the military services to
achieve operational efficiencies and budget savings through greater use
of civilian personnel in support positions. GAO concludes that by
replacing more military forces in support roles with civilians, DOD
could significantly reduce personnel costs--on average, each civilian
support employee costs $15,000 less per year than a comparably graded
military person--and release military personnel for combat duties. In
addition, this report addresses the need to include requirements for
civilian employees and contractors in contingency planning processes to
ensure that they will be fully prepared to deploy to future conflicts,
when needed. GAO also follows up on steps taken to correct problems
identified after DOD and the services assessed civilian deployments to
the Persian Gulf.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

     TITLE:  DOD Force Mix Issues: Greater Reliance on Civilians in 
             Support Roles Could Provide Significant Benefits
      DATE:  10/19/94
   SUBJECT:  Civilian employees
             Personnel management
             Human resources utilization
             Defense contingency planning
             Human resources training
             Military personnel
             Combat readiness
             Military operations
             Military cost control
IDENTIFIER:  DOD Total Force Policy
             Persian Gulf War
             Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Program
             Army Mobilization and Operations Planning and Execution 
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================================================================ COVER

Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Readiness, Committee on Armed
Services, House of Representatives

October 1994



DOD Force Mix Issues

=============================================================== ABBREV

  CONUS - Continental United States
  DMDC - Defense Manpower Data Center
  DOD - Department of Defense
  GAO - General Accounting Office
  JCS - Joint Chiefs of Staff
  OSD - Office of the Secretary of Defense
  RMC - Regular Military Compensation

=============================================================== LETTER


October 19, 1994

The Honorable Earl Hutto
Chairman, Subcommittee on Readiness
Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives

Dear Mr.  Chairman: 

In response to your request, this report identifies opportunities for
the services to achieve operational efficiencies and budget savings
through greater use of civilian personnel in support positions.  On
average, each civilian support employee costs about $15,000 less per
year than a comparably graded military person.  The report also
addresses the need to include requirements for civilian employees and
contractors in contingency planning processes to ensure that they
will be fully prepared to deploy to future conflicts, when needed. 
This report contains recommendations to the Secretary of Defense; the
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; and the secretaries of each of the
military services. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Chairmen, Senate and
House Committees on Appropriations and Senate Committee on Armed
Services; the Director, Office of Management and Budget; the
Secretaries of Defense, the Air Force, the Army, and the Navy; and
the Commandant, U.S.  Marine Corps.  Copies will also be made
available to other interested parties upon request. 

This report was prepared under the direction of Mark E.  Gebicke,
Director, Military Operations and Capabilities Issues, who may be
reached on (202) 512-5140 if you or your staff have any questions. 
Other major contributors are listed in appendix VI. 

Sincerely yours,

Frank C.  Conahan
Assistant Comptroller General

============================================================ Chapter 0

---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:1

As the Department of Defense (DOD) continues to downsize its work
forces, DOD officials increasingly express concern for maintaining
high operational requirements.  Using civilians in support positions
has been cited as a cost-effective way to help ensure that the best
use is made of military personnel. 

At the request of the Chairman, Subcommittee on Readiness, House
Armed Services Committee, GAO examined DOD's guidance and
decision-making processes for determining whether to use civilians or
uniformed personnel.  Specifically, GAO examined (1) DOD and the
military services' efforts to replace military personnel in support
positions with civilian employees and (2) the adequacy of planning
for the future use of civilian employees and contractor personnel to
support military operations in combat areas.  GAO also followed up on
actions taken to correct problems identified after DOD and the
services assessed civilian deployments to the Persian Gulf War. 

---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:2

The structure of the armed forces is based on the DOD Total Force
Policy, which recognizes that all elements of the structure--such as
active military personnel, reservists, civilian employees, defense
contractors, and host nation military and civilian
personnel--contribute to national defense.  Civilian employees have
been associated with the military establishment since the American
Revolution, and today remain a significant part of DOD.  Over time,
civilians have filled support positions that were previously held by
uniformed personnel.  In fiscal year 1994, civilian employees
constituted approximately one-third of DOD's active personnel,
performing functions such as airplane, ship, and tank repairs;
communications and logistical support; and operation and maintenance
of military installations.  Many civilian employees have agreed to
continue to perform these functions in foreign areas and to deploy to
armed conflicts, as needed, to support the military forces. 
Thousands of other civilians support DOD under contracting

---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:3

Although DOD and the military services have general policies to use
civilian personnel where possible, the services currently use
thousands of military personnel in support positions that, according
to DOD and service officials, could be civilian.  Replacing these
military personnel with civilian employees would reduce peacetime
personnel costs and could release military members for use in more
combat-specific duties. 

DOD and the services have made various efforts to use more civilians
by converting military positions to civilian ones in the past, but
the results have not been well documented.  The extent of change
appears limited, since the ratios of military and civilian personnel
have not changed significantly in recent years.  Managers are
reluctant to replace military personnel with civilian employees
because, with current downsizing, both positions might be lost. 
Budget allocations and civilian personnel requirements decisions
often have been made in isolation of each other, and sometimes have
prevented officials from receiving sufficient funds to support
civilian replacements. 

Some DOD and service officials have informally cited potential
deployability to a theater of conflict as a basis for maintaining
military incumbency.  As demonstrated in the Persian Gulf War,
however, deployability was not a basis for excluding civilians,
although problems occurred because of inadequate attention to
civilian deployment planning.  The services have taken actions to
correct some of the problems identified during the Persian Gulf
deployment, but they have not completely identified their future
potential wartime requirements for DOD civilian employees or
contractor personnel who perform combat-essential functions nor taken
adequate steps to ensure that these personnel will continue their
services during future crises. 

---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4

-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.1

The services have assigned many military personnel to support
functions, such as personnel management and data processing, that are
typically performed by civilian personnel and do not require skills
gained from military experience.  The services use military personnel
and civilian employees, in varying degrees, to perform similar
functions, which suggests that more support positions could be filled
by civilians.  For example, 17 percent of the Air Force's computer
operators are civilians, while about 68 percent of the Army's
computer operators are civilian, and about 53 percent of the Navy's
are civilian. 

Based on aggregate data for major job categories within each service,
GAO identified thousands of positions that seem to have potential for
civilian incumbency, but are instead now held by military personnel. 
Although using civilians has operational and budgetary advantages,
determining the appropriate mix of military and civilian personnel
requires judgment by DOD officials.  Operationally, civilians provide
more continuity in certain positions and release the military for
combat-specific functions; on the budget side, they are generally
less costly than military personnel.  Some DOD-sponsored cost studies
indicate that, on average, a civilian employee in a peacetime support
function costs the government about $15,000 less per year than a
military person of comparable pay grade. 

-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.2

According to several DOD and service officials, decisions to use
military or civilian personnel are often made by military leaders who
prefer to use military personnel because they believe they can
exercise greater control over such personnel.  DOD directives and
service regulations provide general guidance to help managers decide
when military or civilian personnel should be used; however, the
existing guidance allows for broad interpretations.  Managers who are
inclined to use military personnel can fill support positions with
military members for reasons such as training, discipline, rotation,
background, or even tradition. 

Service officials are reluctant to identify existing military
personnel in certain support positions to replace with civilian
employees, in part, because civilian requirements and budget
allocation decisions are often made independently of each other. 
Local commanders fear that, because of downsizing, they might not
receive adequate funds to hire civilian replacements, or that they
might even lose the replacement positions through civilian reduction
targets imposed from higher headquarters.  For example, at one
location GAO visited, 2,200 military positions were identified in
1991 for replacement by civilian employees.  A command official said
the command lost about 2,000 of these military personnel, but gained
only 800 civilians.  According to this official, the command's budget
was reduced, in part, due to downsizing, before civilians could be

When funds are allocated to replace military personnel with civilians
in support positions, the services may not have to use the funds for
that purpose.  Funds for civilian personnel are derived from several
accounts that may be used for a variety of purposes.  For example, in
addition to civilian personnel costs, the operation and maintenance
appropriation funds expenses such as the purchase of fuel, supplies,
and repair parts for weapons and training of military personnel. 

-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.3

Civilian employees and contractor personnel have historically
supported the military forces in wartime theaters of operations. 
While many opportunities exist for greater peacetime use of
civilians, a need also exists to better identify those who might have
to deploy to operational theaters and properly prepare for such
situations.  Available DOD reports show that over 5,000 DOD civilian
employees and nearly 9,200 contractor personnel voluntarily deployed
to the Persian Gulf area to support the military forces during the
Gulf War.  However, the services were not fully prepared to deploy
civilians to combat zones.  This lack of preparation resulted in many
problems; some--such as civilians deploying without gas masks and
without proper training in their use--could have had serious

Although DOD and the services are currently addressing many of the
administrative problems associated with civilian deployments that
were identified in the Gulf War, they have not adequately addressed
several important operational issues affecting future deployments. 
Requirements for civilian support functions in theaters of operations
have not been included in joint staff and service contingency
planning processes.  Civilian employees who perform essential
combat-support functions have not been completely identified,
screened for medical fitness, and trained in basic survival skills. 

DOD does not have reasonable assurances that essential combat support
provided under commercial contracts during peacetime will continue to
be performed during future crises.  The services do not know how many
contractor personnel perform essential combat-support functions,
although a 1990 DOD instruction requires them to review existing
contracts and determine which functions are combat-essential.  While
some DOD officials dismiss the significance of this issue, stating
that contractor companies should be responsible for knowing how many
personnel might need to deploy, GAO believes that proper
identification of such civilians is a necessary first step to
ensuring that they are adequately trained and prepared to deploy, if

---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:5

GAO is making several recommendations to the Secretary of Defense and
the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff to (1) increase the use of
civilians in peacetime support positions and (2) ensure that
essential functions provided by DOD civilian employees and contractor
personnel will be continued in future contingencies. 

---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:6

DOD concurred with all of GAO's findings and recommendations and
agreed to take action to address the recommendations.  (DOD's
comments are presented in their entirety in app.  V.)

============================================================ Chapter 1

Civilians comprise a significant portion of the Department of
Defense's (DOD) personnel strength; civilian employees alone account
for one-third of DOD's full-time work force.  These civilians provide
important support to military combat forces in peacetime and in war. 
Some deploy and provide needed support within theaters of operation. 

With the transition to an all-volunteer active-duty military force,
DOD adopted the "Total Force" policy in 1973, which recognized that
the reserves, retired military members, civilian government workers,
and private contractor personnel could add to the active forces in
ensuring the national defense.  The objectives of DOD force
management policies are to (1) maintain, during peacetime, as small
an active-duty military force as possible and (2) use civilian
employees and contractor personnel wherever possible, to free the
military forces to perform military-specific functions.  In 1990, DOD
reported to the Congress that in implementing the Total Force policy,
it had, among other things, improved use of the DOD civilian
employee, contractor, and host nation support communities.\1

\1 "Host nation support" refers to civilian and/or military
assistance rendered in peace and war by a foreign nation to the U.S. 
military forces located on or in transit through the host nation's

---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:1

In fiscal year 1994, DOD's programmed civilian end strength was
estimated at 923,000 personnel, with an estimated cost of about $42
billion in salaries and benefits.  These civilians work for each of
the military services; in Defense agencies, such as the Defense
Logistics Agency or the Defense Finance and Accounting Service; and
in other organizations, such as the Offices of the Secretary of
Defense (OSD) or the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).  Civilian employees
currently represent over one-third of DOD's total full-time
equivalent force.  This ratio has remained relatively constant since
1987, as table 1.1 shows.  (App.  I shows the same information by
service and the Defense agencies.)

                          Table 1.1
            Active-Duty Military and Civilian End
           Strengths for Selected Fiscal Years, as
                       of January 1994

                    (Numbers in thousands)

Fiscal year     Military    Civilian       Total    civilian
------------  ----------  ----------  ==========  ----------
1987               2,174       1,133       3,307        34.3
1993               1,705         937       2,642        35.5
1994               1,611         923       2,534        36.4
1995               1,526         873       2,399        36.4
1996               1,496         846       2,342        36.1
1999               1,453         794       2,247        35.3
Source:  Office of the DOD Comptroller. 

Note:  Figures for prior years are actual; figures for the current
and future years are projected as of January 1994. 

As table 1.1 also shows, both military and civilian personnel end
strengths have declined since 1987, when DOD was at its peak
strength.  Based on its fiscal year 1995 budget, DOD estimates that,
by 1999, it will achieve a 33-percent reduction in its military end
strength and a 30-percent reduction in civilian end strength since

While most civilians support the military forces both at home and
abroad in peacetime and at home during times of war, some civilians
historically have deployed with and supported the military forces
within theaters of operations.  As far back as the American
Revolution, civilians served as wagoneers and drivers to tow
artillery and move supplies.  During the Persian Gulf War, DOD used
over 14,000 civilian employees and contractor personnel to support
its military forces. 

According to DOD's April 1992, final report to the Congress on the
Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, civilian expertise contributed
directly to the success achieved.  DOD and service officials also
generally recognize that during peacetime civilians cost less than
military members of comparable pay grades. 

---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:2

Responding to various legislative provisions over the past 20 years
requiring the use of the least costly form of personnel consistent
with military requirements, DOD has gone through periods of
concentrated efforts to replace military positions with civilian
ones.  For example, in the 1970s, the services replaced nearly 48,000
military personnel in support positions with 40,000 civilian
employees.  As shown in table 1.2, the services, in recent years,
targeted nearly 20,000 military positions for conversion to civilian
ones.  The services, however, did not maintain adequate records to
substantiate the achievement of the intended conversions or validate
the savings. 

                          Table 1.2
               Military Positions Targeted for
             Conversion to Civilian During Fiscal
                   Years 1991 through 1993

Service                FY 1991   FY 1992   FY 1993     Total
--------------------  --------  --------  --------  ========
Air Force                3,046     3,045     3,045     9,136
Army                     1,777     1,778     1,777     5,332
Navy                     1,670     1,669     1,668     5,007
Total                    6,493     6,492     6,490    19,475
Source:  Based on data provided by service comptroller officials. 

---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:3

Significant differences exist in the way military and civilian
positions are managed.  These differences affect DOD's costs and
control over its forces. 

The military personnel system is often described as a centrally
managed, "closed" system, meaning that persons recruited with no
prior military service are generally brought in at entry-level
positions and progress through the ranks, whether in the enlisted pay
grades or the officer corps.  Decisions pertaining to assignment,
promotion, rotation, and retention are centrally controlled at
service headquarters.  The military personnel management system
operates totally under policies and guidance established by DOD,
which helps ensure that military leaders have control over their

The civilian personnel system, on the other hand, is often described
as a more "open," or decentralized, system.  Such a system allows new
hires to enter an organization at various levels, depending on each
person's qualifications and experience.  Although most civilians
begin their government service at lower, entry-level pay grades,
managers are not restricted to hiring them at lower-graded entry
levels.  Civilian employees are also subject to the federal civilian
personnel regulatory framework that governs such issues as hiring
procedures, working hours, overtime, and job retention rights. 

Unlike their military counterparts, who are employed "globally" and
can be transferred anywhere, civilian employees are generally
employed at the local installation level.  Career opportunities are
generally identified at the local level.  While civilian personnel
management is described as being decentralized, local managers view
their control over civilian force management as limited because
budget guidance and downsizing goals, established at higher
organizational levels, can mandate reductions in end-strength levels
and constrain their hiring authority. 

Unlike funding for military personnel, funding for civilian personnel
is not aggregated into a single account that permits close
monitoring.  Rather, funding for civilian personnel is spread among
several accounts within the DOD budget.  For example, funding for
most civilian personnel is included in the operation and maintenance
appropriation in the DOD budget--an account that also includes spare
parts, fuel for equipment, and military training. 

---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:4

DOD's policy is to establish its total personnel requirements at (1)
the minimum level and least cost necessary to carry out assigned
peacetime missions aimed at deterring aggression and (2) a level
sufficient to retain capability to quickly respond to any combat
needs that develop.  The first priority is major combat forces such
as fighter pilots, tank crews, sailors, and submariners.  Combat
forces are exclusively military, whether active-duty or reserve. 

After combat forces are determined, remaining forces are to be
established to adequately support the combat forces.  Support forces
may include active-duty military, reserve military, civilian
employees, contractor employees, and host nation personnel. 

-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:4.1

Each service has implemented its own procedures for determining
peacetime personnel requirements in support positions.  These
procedures--labeled by the different services as efficiency reviews,
manpower surveys, or engineering studies--are intended to identify
the most efficient personnel mix for performing assigned missions and

Although some variations exist in service procedures, decisions on
peacetime personnel resources generally should include two major
considerations.  First, service officials are to identify a task to
be performed and establish the number of personnel needed, by
specific skill, to perform the task.  Second, they are to determine
whether civilian employees, contractor personnel, or military members
are the most appropriate source of the required skills, based upon
DOD and services policies. 

These policies generally state that civilians are to be used in
support positions that do not require military incumbency for reasons
of law, training, security, discipline, rotation, or combat
readiness, or that do not require military background for successful
performance of the duties involved.  When military incumbency is not
essential, yet the work must be done by government personnel,
civilian employees are to be used.  If the workload is not military
essential and not required to be done by government workers,
contractor personnel may be used; however, decisions to use
contractor personnel must be supported by cost comparisons. 

-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:4.2

The execution of military operations may require the use of
additional military and civilian personnel to bring the peacetime
force structure to required wartime levels.  The buildup of forces to
sustain a contingency operation is called mobilization; contingency
planning, or mobilization planning, is the broad umbrella under which
the services determine their wartime personnel and materiel

Military requirements are determined through analyses of numerous
strategies and assumptions about how to fight a war and the need for
a range of phased, incremental increases in force capability. 
Military forces needed immediately are programmed into the peacetime
active-duty military.  Other military forces needed for later
deployment can be programmed into the reserves. 

Requirements for civilians in theaters of operations will depend on
the nature of the contingency and the types of military units
involved.  To ensure that DOD civilian employees would perform
critical support functions in-theater during a conflict, DOD
established the emergency-essential civilian employee program in
1985.  One objective of this program is to obtain written statements
from combat-essential employees affirming that they understand the
commitments of their positions and that they will continue to perform
their functions while other civilians are being evacuated from combat
areas.  In 1990, after criticism from our office and the DOD
Inspector General,\2 DOD required the services to implement
procedures to ensure that contractor personnel who perform
combat-essential support functions will continue their services
in-theater during conflicts. 

\2 Ensuring Retention of Essential Civilians Overseas During
Hostilities (GAO/NSIAD-84-73, Mar.  14, 1984) and Retention of
Emergency-Essential Civilians Overseas During Hostilities, Office of
the Inspector General, DOD (Report No.  89-026, Nov.  7, 1988). 

---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:5

Concerned about the extent to which DOD is addressing civilian
personnel requirements as it downsizes and restructures its total
force, the Chairman of the House Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Readiness asked us to review the decision-making
processes the services use to determine whether a position should be
military or civilian.  In response to this request we examined (1)
DOD and service efforts to replace military personnel in peacetime
support positions with DOD civilian employees and (2) the adequacy of
planning for the future use of DOD civilian employees and contractor
personnel to support military forces in theaters of contingency
operations.  We were also asked to follow up on actions taken to
correct problems identified by DOD and the services that were
associated with the deployment of civilians to the Persian Gulf War. 

To identify trends and opportunities for replacing military personnel
in support positions with civilian employees, we reviewed DOD and
service criteria for determining when a position should be military
or civilian.  We obtained perspectives from personnel management
officials on efforts to identify functions that civilians can
perform.  We also obtained available data on the number and types of
military positions converted to civilian under a 1989 Defense
Management Review Decision and interviewed DOD officials to identify
reasons for not achieving the intended conversions.  In addition, we
obtained data from the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) on the
number of military personnel in support positions and identified
potential opportunities to replace military personnel in such
positions with civilians. 

We validated the potential for significant cost savings by reviewing
(1) several studies comparing the cost of military and civilian
personnel and (2) the differences in ranks or pay grades for
previously made conversions, when data were available.  We did not
identify the full range of military positions that might be
candidates for conversion to civilian, or the specific pay grades of
the civilian replacements.  Our analysis with respect to this issue
was limited to comparisons between military personnel and DOD
civilian employees.  We did not evaluate potential cost savings that
might result from replacing military members with contractor

To determine the extent to which DOD and the services are identifying
the need and properly planning for the use of civilian employees and
contractor personnel in future operational contingencies, we reviewed
DOD and service regulations.  We interviewed officials in service
headquarters' requirements and operations directorates, comparable
officials at various installations we visited, and officials of the
Joint Staff.  We obtained statistical information from DMDC on the
number and occupational series of emergency-essential civilians in
each of the services for the last 5 years.  We compared these data
across the services to identify patterns and followed up with
officials at the locations we visited to validate the data. 

To determine the number of DOD civilian employees and contractor
personnel who deployed to the Gulf War, the functions they performed,
and problems associated with their deployment, we reviewed DOD's
April 1992 final report to the Congress, Conduct of the Persian Gulf
War, with a particular focus on the "Civilian Support" appendix.  We
also reviewed "lessons learned" reports prepared by various service
components and special studies performed by outside organizations
under contract to the services.  We conducted a group interview with
representatives of several defense contractors who provided civilian
support in the Persian Gulf.  We also interviewed officials in the
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Personnel and

We performed our work at the following service headquarters, major
commands, and installations: 

  Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Personnel and Readiness,
     Washington, D.C.;

  Office of the DOD Comptroller, Washington, D.C.;

  Joint Staff Directorates for Force Structure, Resources, and
     Assessments; Operational Plans and Interoperability; and
     Manpower and Personnel, Washington, D.C.;

  U.S.  Pacific Command, Camp H.  M.  Smith, Hawaii;

  U.S.  Transportation Command, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois;

  Army Deputy Chiefs of Staff for Personnel and Logistics,
     Washington, D.C.; Total Army Personnel Command, Alexandria,
     Virginia; Headquarters Army Materiel Command, Alexandria,
     Virginia; Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe,
     Virginia; Army Combined Arms Support Command, Fort Lee,
     Virginia; Army Combined Arms Command, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas;
     Army Pacific Command, Fort Shafter, Hawaii; Headquarters, 4th
     Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Carson, Colorado; and
     Headquarters U.S.  Forces Command, Fort McPherson, Georgia;

  Air Force Headquarters Directorates for Civilian Personnel,
     Programs and Evaluations, and Plans and Operations, Washington,
     D.C.; Air Combat Command, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia; Air
     Force Materiel Command, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio;
     and Pacific Air Forces, Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii; and

  Offices of the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations and Bureau of
     Personnel, Washington, D.C.; Navy Atlantic Fleet, Norfolk,
     Virginia; Navy Pacific Fleet, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, and
     subordinate commands in San Diego, California. 

We conducted our review between January 1993 and June 1994 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  We
obtained DOD comments on a draft of this report.  The comments have
been summarized in chapters 2 and 3 and are presented in their
entirety in appendix V. 

============================================================ Chapter 2

Although DOD policy is to use civilians wherever possible, large
numbers of military personnel perform technical, management,
administrative, and other functions that civilians typically do.  The
services vary in the degree to which they use military or civilian
personnel to perform similar functions.  Opportunities exist for DOD
to replace thousands of military personnel with civilian employees
and, in so doing, save personnel costs and achieve operational
benefits.  In some instances, valid reasons exist for not replacing
military support personnel with civilians.  In other instances,
replacements that should be made are impeded by a variety of factors. 
Some factors, such as current practice or broad directives and
regulations, permit the continued use of military personnel.  Other
factors, such as downsizing and funding, limit the number of civilian

---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:1

The 1994 DOD Manpower Requirements Report indicated that more than
245,000 military personnel throughout the services and defense
agencies were serving in noncombat program areas such as service
management headquarters, training and personnel, research and
development, central logistics, and support activities.  Appendix II
defines each of the program areas and shows the percentage of
civilians in each area for fiscal years 1987 and 1994. 

Many job categories, such as finance, administration, data
processing, and personnel, within broad DOD programming areas,
generally do not require knowledge or experience acquired through
military service; skills to perform such functions are available in
the civilian labor sector.  Some DOD and service officials believe
that a great majority of such positions should be civilian.  Yet,
DMDC data indicate that many of these job categories are filled more
by military members than civilian employees.  Table 2.1 shows, for
example, that enlisted personnel and civilian employees of equivalent
pay grades occupy 66 percent and 34 percent of the positions in data
processing, respectively. 

                          Table 2.1
           Enlisted Military Personnel and Civilian
           Equivalents Occupying Support Positions
                DOD-wide, as of November 1993

General job category                    Enlisted    Civilian
------------------------------------  ----------  ----------
Data processing                               66          34
Personnel and recruiting                      64          36
Administration                                31          69
Accounting and finance                        26          74
Source:  Occupational data from DMDC. 

\a These general job categories are composites of specific
occupational specialties.  For example, the data-processing category
includes the occupational specialties of computer programmers and
computer operators/analysts. 

DMDC also maintains data on officer personnel, but the data do not
clearly reveal the extent to which officers perform civilian
functions.  Many officers assigned to headquarters organizations and
staff offices are classified as operational, even though they might
primarily perform administrative functions.  For example, an aircraft
pilot assigned to manage personnel requirements functions at a local
command would still be classified as a pilot in the DMDC database. 
However, our analysis of other data in DOD's 1994 Manpower
Requirements Report indicates that nearly 48,000 active-duty military
officers, about 20 percent of the services' total officers, were
allocated to organizations outside of the services to perform a wide
range of noncombat functions. 

Service officials stated that many officer positions are needed in
DOD-wide activities because of career progression requirements.  For
officers to be promoted to senior levels, they need experience in a
"joint" activity.  In many instances, however, these joint
experiences may not occur within the officer's military specialty and
may have limited applicability to developing joint battle staff
experience.  Further, such assignments often last only 2 years, which
may not provide enough time to develop the expertise to perform the
duties proficiently.  These frequent reassignments may also disrupt
the continuity of key operations.  At one joint command we visited,
for example, about one-third of the management staff, including all
of the directorate chiefs, rotated in 1 year alone.  A command
official said stability of the workforce and continuity of operations
are important reasons for them to use more civilians. 

---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:2

According to DMDC data, the services vary significantly in the degree
to which they use military and civilian personnel to perform similar
functions.  For example, the services collectively employ more than
21,000 enlisted military and civilian equivalent personnel whose
primary occupational specialty is computer operator.  Only 17 percent
of computer operators in the Air Force are civilian, whereas in the
Navy more than 53 percent are civilian, and in the Army about 68
percent are civilian.  Table 2.2 shows the occupational specialties
with the greatest variations. 

                                    Table 2.2
                      Variations Among the Services in Using
                       Enlisted Military Personnel to Fill
                          Civilian Equivalent Positions

specialt                 Percent                 Percent                 Percent
y             Number    civilian      Number    civilian      Number    civilian
--------  ----------  ----------  ----------  ----------  ----------  ----------
Administ      39,154        59.6      55,518        76.9      34,445        67.7
Auditing       4,370        42.7       5,332        88.5       4,396       100.0
Computer      11,279        16.7       4,663        67.5       5,639        53.4
Construc       1,919        57.5      11,247        78.9       2,277        44.3
Electric       3,615        41.9       1,906        86.5       7,111        81.9
Electron      20,027        44.2       8,059        82.7       8,223        77.4
Fire           8,164        34.5       2,934        92.1       3,880       100.0
Food           6,322        14.1      14,986        18.4      14,198         6.6
Informat       5,038        52.9       5,309        88.7       2,553        76.2
 ion and
Law           10,229         4.6      17,191         6.4       3,509        72.6
Mechanic       4,590       100.0       5,043        75.0      12,033        85.9
 al and
Medical        6,108        19.8       6,626        50.6       1,468       100.0
Motor          5,491        43.3      14,280        23.4       1,929       100.0
Personne      12,082        27.1      21,770        40.0       8,842        44.8
Recruiti       1,328         9.0       3,934         5.3       1,592        27.5
 ng and
Security      16,782         2.2       1,896       100.0       1,496        57.8
Supply        25,109        40.7      42,206        32.3      24,390        45.7
Transpor       9,255        16.0       3,656        59.1       1,894        82.4
Utilitie      10,428        42.9       8,604        88.8      13,052        73.4
Warehous       9,026        49.5       9,645        86.6       7,904       100.0
 ing and
Total       91,419 2       7.1 6    74,843 2       8.2 6    03,177 2         7.3
 and 4
Source:  Occupational specialty data provided by DMDC. 

Some service officials attribute much of the variations to the unique
missions of each service that require them to use personnel
differently.  For example, some Air Force officials explained that
they have broad responsibilities to safeguard U.S.  nuclear weapons
and believe military security guards are more appropriate for this
mission.  Other DOD and service officials in the civilian personnel
and manpower requirements offices attribute the differences to the
existing military culture, in which officials prefer to use military
personnel instead of civilians.  These officials state that there is
no reason why the services cannot be more consistent. 

Some DOD and service manpower officials explained that some of the
military positions, which otherwise could be civilian, are needed to
provide adequate time in the continental United States (CONUS) for
service members rotating from tours abroad.  They said that, as the
United States continues to reduce it forces overseas, the need to
maintain large numbers of rotation positions will also decline. 
Requirements officials said the Army and the Air Force are reducing
their number of positions held for rotation purposes.  They said the
Navy is also adjusting, to some extent, the number of positions held
for rotation downward. 

We also observed differences within the services.  For example, the
Navy uses civilians in the Pacific Fleet to perform its shore
personnel staffing analyses (called efficiency reviews), while the
Atlantic Fleet uses many military personnel for the same function. 
According to service officials, the Atlantic Fleet is substantially
behind the Pacific Fleet in reviewing all of its shore facilities. 
Atlantic Fleet officials attribute the delays to the frequent
turnover of military personnel.  Such turnover, the officials said,
prevents military members from developing the level of expertise
needed to efficiently perform the reviews.  Atlantic Fleet officials
explained that they currently do not have adequate funds to hire
civilians to do their efficiency reviews and are forced to rely on
available military personnel, who are always going through a learning
curve.  The Pacific Fleet, on the other hand, uses civilians who,
because of longer tenures, have become more proficient in completing
the studies. 

---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:3

Significant differences exist between the compensation costs for
comparable military and civilian pay grades; replacing the thousands
of military personnel who perform civilian functions with civilian
employees of comparable ranks can offer significant potential to save
personnel costs.  Using civilians in certain support positions also
provides operational advantages for DOD because a greater proportion
of military strength can be devoted more directly to combat-related
functions.  Some civilians already have technical expertise that
would require additional training for military personnel to acquire,
especially in areas such as high-technology communications. 
Civilians also provide continuity in their positions and provide
institutional memory, since they are less subject to the frequent
assignment rotations associated with military personnel. 

Increasing the percentage of civilians in specific occupations will
free up military positions to be used for other purposes.  If, for
example, all the services adopted a 50-to-50 ratio between military
members and civilians in personnel management--a function DOD
officials describe as primarily civilian--about 5,200 military
positions would be available for conversion to civilian ones. 
Similar patterns exist in the areas of data processing and
disbursing.  Using the 50-to-50 ratio, table 2.3 shows over 14,000
positions within four occupational specialties where large numbers of
military personnel perform functions that civilians potentially could

                                    Table 2.3
                      Number of Military Positions That Can
                      Potentially Be Replaced With Civilians

Job                                                                that could be
special  Curren   50-to-50  Curren   50-to-50  Curren   50-to-50   replaced with
ty            t      Ratio       t      Ratio       t      Ratio   civilian ones
-------  ------  ---------  ------  ---------  ------  ---------  --------------
Personn   8,810      6,041  13,063     10,885   4,884      4,634           5,197
Analyst   9,401      5,640   1,518      1,518   3,519      3,386           3,894
Program   3,246      1,623   1,602        801   1,139        570           2,993
Disburs   1,283        990   2,737      1,986   3,306      2,210           2,140
Total    22,740     14,294  18,920     15,190  12,848     10,800          14,224
Differe              8,446              3,730              2,048          14,224
 t and
Source:  Occupational specialty data from DMDC. 

Some of our reports and other DOD-sponsored studies show that
civilian employees generally cost the government less than military
personnel.  The differences vary by pay grade, but, as table 2.4
shows, the average difference is about $15,000 per person per year
for peacetime support functions performed in CONUS.\1 (App.  III
provides more detail on the components of military and civilian
compensation by pay grade.)

                          Table 2.4
            Differences Between Annual Government
               Costs for Military and Civilian
              Personnel Stationed in CONUS, for
            Selected Comparable Pay Grades, as of
                         January 1994

Grade               Pay  Grade               Pay  Difference
-------------  --------  -------------  --------  ----------
O-5             $92,277  GS-14           $79,824     $12,453
                          GS-13           66,887      25,390
O-4              76,116  GS-12            55,524      20,591
O-3              60,871  GS-11            47,837      15,034
                          GS-10           42,824      18,047
E-8              53,313  GS-6             28,370      24,943
 E-7             46,144                               17,774
E-6              39,815  GS-5             25,507      14,308
Source:  Based on grade comparability tables in DOD Directive 1000.1
and cost data from DOD's Office of Compensation. 

Savings to be achieved from military-to-civilian conversions will
depend on whether DOD eliminates a position from its military end
strength or retains the position and reassigns the military member to
another unfilled military-specific position.  The savings may be even
greater than they first appear from table 2.4 because civilian
replacements, in the past, have sometimes been made at lower grades
than the comparability table suggests.  For example, at one command
we visited, two supply management officers at the O-3 level were
replaced with GS-9 civilians, even though comparison studies show
that the comparable civilian pay grade for an O-3 officer is GS-11. 
On average, the replacement of just two military O-3 personnel with
two civilian GS-9 personnel would result in a potential cost savings
to the government of more than $46,000 in 1 year alone, if the
military positions were eliminated from the service's end strength. 
(Even if the two military O-3 personnel were replaced with civilian
GS-11 personnel, the government would still save more than $30,000.)

DOD officials said civilian employees can be paid at grades lower
than their military counterparts because civilians either enter
government service with specific expertise or they develop more
expertise at an earlier stage in their careers since they do not
rotate as frequently.  DOD officials also told us that, for similar
reasons, there have been cases where one civilian replaced more than
one military member, thus resulting in greater savings than a
one-for-one replacement would suggest. 

\1 Several reasons account for these differences.  Military personnel
do not contribute to their retirement systems or health insurance;
civilians pay a portion of such expenses.  Military personnel
routinely receive allowances for housing and subsistence, while
civilians do not.  Many service members receive special financial
incentives according to occupational specialty.  Although training
costs are not included in most comparisons of military and civilian
costs, they are a major factor in the cost of using military or
civilian personnel. 

---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:4

DOD and service officials recognize that opportunities exist to
replace military personnel with civilian employees.  In fact, DOD
requirements officials have recently initiated a study that will, in
part, examine the potential for replacing military personnel with
civilians within OSD, JCS, and all defense agencies and field
activities.  This study, to be completed in late 1994, was initiated
after a DOD task force determined that the "military essentiality" of
some positions was not always apparent. 

The Air Force has recently initiated an internal study that will
examine, among other things, opportunities to replace officers with
civilians.  During our review, data were not available to suggest how
many positions might be affected, and a time frame for completing the
study was not provided. 

However, we believe that making these replacements will be difficult
without special attention by DOD officials to overcome existing
barriers, such as military culture, downsizing, and funding. 

-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:4.1

Although DOD's and the services' general policies call for the use of
civilian personnel where possible, they also allow service managers
wide latitude in filling positions with military personnel.  No
single directive explains how DOD's "Total Force" policy should be
implemented or the specific criteria to use in determining the
appropriate mix of personnel.  Therefore, because of the broad nature
of the guidance, tradition, and cultural preferences, DOD and the
services often merely maintain the status quo on military incumbency. 

Guidance on the mix of personnel needed to perform DOD functions is
contained in several DOD directives--some dating back to 1954--and in
service regulations.  For example, DOD Directive 1100.4, "Guidance
for Manpower Programs," August 20, 1954, states that civilian
employees shall be used in positions that do not require military
incumbency for reasons of law, training, security, discipline,
rotation, or combat readiness, or that do not require military
background for successful performance of the duties involved and that
do not entail unusual hours not normally associated or compatible
with civilian employment.  DOD Directive 1400.5, "DOD Policy for
Civilian Personnel," March 21, 1983, provides little specificity on
civilian functions or positions. 

Service implementing regulations expand the requirements for military
incumbency outlined in the DOD directive.  These regulations clearly
define personnel requirements for combat functions, since only
military personnel are expected to perform such roles.  For example,
the Manual of Navy Total Force Manpower Policies and Procedures, June
11, 1990, requires military members if the person must engage in or
be prepared to engage in combat. 

In the case of support positions, which may be appropriate for
civilians to fill, the service regulations still tend to give greater
emphasis to military incumbency.  Army Regulation 570-4, "Manpower
Management," September 25, 1989, for example, states that all support
positions will be military if they have tasks that, if not performed,
could cause direct impairment of combat capability.  However, this
does not reflect current Army operations, since civilians routinely
perform equipment maintenance functions that are important to
maintaining combat capability.\2

Service regulations enable officials to use military members in
certain administrative, security, and supply personnel positions
simply because they have traditionally done so.  In addition, a
preference for using military personnel has often existed because the
military personnel system provides a high degree of management

Informally, DOD and service officials have often cited probable
deployability to theaters of operations in wartime as a basis for
maintaining military incumbency.  However, this position does not
reflect current practice, since thousands of civilians were deployed
to the Persian Gulf War. 

DOD and service officials told us they are in the process of updating
and consolidating some of these policies.  They did not, however,
have firm dates for completing the updates. 

\2 Army Maintenance:  Strategy Needed to Integrate Military and
Civilian Personnel Into Wartime Plans (GAO/NSIAD-93-95, Apr.  29,

-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:4.2

Due to changes in the world security environment and budget
constraints, DOD is reducing the size of its military and civilian
workforces.  By fiscal year 1999, active-duty military end strengths
are to be reduced by 33 percent from the 1987 peak strength. 
Approximately 73,000 active-duty military personnel reductions are
currently planned in the end strength between the beginning of fiscal
year 1995 and the end of fiscal year 1999, based on DOD's 1995

In theory, DOD could achieve many of its military reductions by
replacing military personnel with civilian employees.  However, the
simultaneous downsizing of civilian employees works against such
replacements.  Civilian end strengths, by fiscal year 1999, are to be
reduced by 30 percent from the 1987 peak strength.  Over 79,000
civilians are programmed for reduction from the DOD workforce between
fiscal years 1995 and 1999, based on DOD's 1995 budget.  In addition,
executive branch efforts to reduce the number of high-graded (GS-14
equivalent and above) civilian positions throughout the federal
government impairs attempts to reduce or replace officers.  Many
officer positions, if converted, may likely be replaced with
high-graded civilians. 

DOD officials explained that, especially during this period of
downsizing, their civilian personnel end strengths have been driven
more by available dollars than by requirements.  Local officials said
they have little, if any, incentive to identify military-to-civilian
replacements during the drawdown.  Officials see little opportunity
to obtain the necessary funding to support new civilian positions,
particularly in the wake of what they sometimes view as arbitrary
cuts in end strengths and budgets.  Likewise, they expressed concern
that while funding might be provided at one point, this would not
preclude subsequent reductions as part of broad guidance to meet
other reduction targets. 

-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:4.3

Many DOD and service personnel managers identified the inadequate
integration between the process for determining civilian requirements
and the budget process that funds these requirements as a barrier
against replacing military personnel with civilians.  Although local
commanders determine their civilian requirements based on estimated
workloads and request budgets to cover the costs of such
requirements, budgets are allocated from higher levels and often do
not support the identified requirements.  According to some DOD and
service officials, constant pressures to reduce the defense budget
and personnel strengths compel them to allocate anticipated
reductions across all defense programs on a proportional basis. 
According to local officials, the reductions are perceived as having
been made arbitrarily, without fully considering civilian

As a result, local officials have become reluctant to identify
military positions for conversion to civilian ones because they fear
they will ultimately lose both positions.  From a commander's
perspective, the military position will be deleted from the
installation's military end strength because this process is
centrally managed.  Before civilians can be hired, the budget may be
reduced by service headquarters and the installation will be unable
to hire the civilians. 

For example, at one command we visited, 2,200 military members were
identified in 1991 for replacement with civilian personnel.  These
replacements were to be achieved in stages between 1991 and 1995.  A
command official told us that they lost approximately 2,000 military
members, but gained no more than 800 civilians even though the
command had no change in workload.  This result was attributed to the
fact that higher command levels significantly reduced this
installation's budget before the civilian positions could be filled. 
This official said hiring civilians often takes 6 months because of
the required lengthy processes of advertising vacancies and reviewing

Even when funds are allocated to replace military personnel in
support positions with civilians, the services may not be required to
use the funds for that purpose.  Funds for civilian personnel are
derived from several accounts that may be used for a variety of
purposes.  For example, the operation and maintenance appropriation
funds the purchase of fuel, supplies, and repair parts for weapons
and equipment, and training of military personnel, in addition to
civilian personnel. 

---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:5

Although DOD and the military services have general policies
requiring them to use civilian personnel where possible, the services
currently vary in the extent to which they use thousands of military
personnel in support positions that, according to DOD and service
officials, could be civilian.  No single answer is apt to be found to
precisely identify the appropriate mix of military and civilian
personnel.  However, achieving greater consistency among the services
by increasing the proportion of civilians performing data processing,
personnel management, and other similar functions could free up
thousands of military personnel for reassignment. 

Eliminating military positions and replacing them with civilians can
save significant personnel costs, since some cost analyses estimate
that, during peacetime, each civilian costs about $15,000 per year
less than a military person of comparable pay grade.  The high degree
of variation among the services in how they use military or civilian
personnel to perform similar functions suggests a need for high-level
oversight by OSD and/or the JCS to ensure balanced consideration of
personnel requirements across the services. 

However, various interrelated factors discourage commanders from
pursuing military-to-civilian conversions or replacements.  These
factors range from a traditional preference for military personnel
where possible, to concerns over retaining civilian positions in the
current downsizing environment. 

---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:6

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense establish a joint review
board and provide it with a mandate to work with the services to
ensure a thorough and consistent review of military support positions
that may have potential for conversion to civilian. 

We also recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the services
to identify military positions that should be replaced with civilians
and eliminate, to the extent possible, existing impediments to using
civilians when they would be less costly. 

---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:7

In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with our
findings and recommendations.  DOD stated that it will review the
military essentiality of positions in its support structure and
report its results to the Congress by April 30, 1995, in accordance
with requirements of the fiscal year 1995 National Defense
Authorization Act.  This review will entail recommendations by the
military services for converting military positions to civilian.  DOD
is also aware that various cost analyses acknowledge a less costly
civilian substitute for military personnel performing similar type
work.  However, DOD policies governing military versus civilian
manpower mix are not predicated upon the comparative cost factor
alone, nor modified based on a single conflict experience. 

============================================================ Chapter 3

Thousands of civilians deployed to the theater of operation in
support of U.S.  military forces during the Persian Gulf War. 
Civilian deployments for that operation revealed important
administrative weaknesses related to the use of civilians in such
circumstances; many of those weaknesses are now being addressed by
DOD or one or more of the services.  That deployment also
demonstrated up-front operational planning problems with the
deployment of civilians that have not been completely resolved. 

---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:1

During the Gulf War, the United States deployed over 14,000
civilians, both government employees and contractor personnel,\1

to the theater of operations.  (About 500,000 military personnel
deployed to the Persian Gulf War.) According to DOD's April 1992
report to the Congress on the Persian Gulf War, civilians worked
aboard Navy ships, at Air Force bases, and with virtually every Army
unit.  Only the Marine Corps did not employ significant numbers of
civilians in-theater.  Civilians served in a wide variety of support
positions, including transportation, maintenance and repair, and
other weapon system support roles.  (App.  IV provides a more
detailed account of the types of civilian specialists deployed in
support of the Gulf War.) DOD's April 1992 report to the Congress on
the Conduct of the Persian Gulf War acknowledges that civilian
expertise was invaluable and contributed directly to the success

The services acknowledge that they did not have good data systems to
track civilians in-theater during the Gulf War, particularly for
contractor personnel.  Given these limitations, table 3.1 shows how
the numbers break down among the services and between DOD civilian
employees and contractor personnel. 

                          Table 3.1
            DOD Civilians and Contractor Personnel
              Deployed for the Persian Gulf War

Type of civilian               Force    Army    Navy   Total
--------------------------  --------  ------  ------  ======
DOD government employees         213   2,000   3,000   5,213
Contractor personnel             154   3,898   5,126   9,178
Total                            367   5,898   8,126  14,391
Source:  DOD and service after-action reports on the Persian Gulf War
and studies by outside organizations under contract to the services. 

Historically, DOD civilians and contractor personnel have served in
theaters of operations during wartime; however, the Persian Gulf War
deployment was somewhat different from scenarios expected during the
Cold War.  U.S.  defense planning for the threat of war in Europe
during the Cold War era relied upon host nation support, augmented by
U.S.  reserve forces, to help meet support requirements.  Defense
planning also relied partly on the assumption that some civilians
working for DOD in Europe would continue to perform their functions
in time of conflict.  These employees were designated as emergency
essential; as such, they were expected to remain in the area when
combat began. 

U.S.  military leaders now expect that, with the collapse of the
Soviet Union, future conflicts will more likely occur against
regional powers, similar to the Persian Gulf War against Iraq.  U.S. 
forces will be expected to operate in areas that have little or no
military support infrastructure.  Therefore, DOD officials expect
that they will have to deploy more support capability from the United
States, some of which will be provided by civilian employees and
contractor personnel. 

\1 DOD and service data systems did not systematically keep track of
all civilian employees and contractor personnel who deployed to
support the Gulf War.  The estimate is drawn from available service
data and contractor studies. 

---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2

DOD and service officials acknowledge that they were not adequately
prepared to process, deploy, or support civilians in the Persian Gulf
theater of operations, although a 1990 DOD directive required that
emergency-essential civilians be identified and prepared for
potential deployment.  Specifically, this directive required
emergency-essential employees to sign agreements stating that they
accept certain conditions of employment, including relocating to
foreign areas during crisis situations to perform their duties.  The
directive also required the services to provide emergency-essential
civilians with protective equipment and work-related training. 

According to the services' after-action reports on the Persian Gulf
War, a number of problems arose in deploying civilians to the Gulf
War and caring for them in the theater.  Some problems, including
those described below, could have had serious consequences.  Many of
these problems were attributed to poor planning. 

  Most of the civilian employees had not been previously designated
     as emergency essential. 

  Many civilians were not screened to ensure that they were medically
     fit to serve in desert conditions.  Some arrived in the desert
     with medical and physical limitations, such as severe heart
     problems and kidney disorders, that precluded them from
     effectively performing their duties.\2

  Some deploying civilians did not initially receive protective gear,
     such as gas masks, because civilians were not included on
     military equipment and supply lists.  Nor were adequate efforts
     made to ensure that civilians were trained in the use of such

  Dental records, which are an important source of identification,
     were not available for deploying civilians because dental
     screenings had not been done. 

  Some civilians did not receive identification cards, provided under
     terms of the Geneva Convention, to identify them as

Other problems, while not as grave, also indicated a lack of
preparation for civilians in-theater. 

  Clear procedures did not exist to ensure that civilians received
     medical care, housing, or transportation comparable to that
     received by military members. 

  Procedures were not in place to provide for overtime or danger pay
     in this environment. 

  Questions existed concerning whether civilian life insurance
     policies contained war exclusion clauses that would have
     precluded their survivors from receiving accidental death
     benefits had the civilians been killed while there.\3

  Unlike military personnel, civilians were not entitled to free
     mailing privileges.\4

Our discussion with representatives of several contractors who
deployed personnel to the Persian Gulf War indicated they were
delayed in getting personnel and equipment to the theater of
operations.  They reported having to arrange for their own
transportation.  They also reported receiving little assistance from
DOD in helping them prepare their employees for deployment. 

\2 Army Maintenance:  Strategy Needed to Integrate Military and
Civilian Personnel Into Wartime Plans (GAO/NSIAD-93-95, Apr.  29,

\3 In a July 1993 letter interpreting existing regulations for the
Federal Employees Group Life Insurance program, the Office of
Personnel Management--which has regulatory oversight over
government-sponsored life insurance--determined that civilians who
deploy with the military are not considered in "actual combat."
Therefore, they are entitled to accidental death and dismemberment
benefits if covered by the Federal Employees Group Life Insurance. 
This letter did not discuss civilian employees covered by other
insurance policies or contractor personnel regardless of their
insurance coverage. 

\4 The Congress, in Public Law 103-160, Nov.  30, 1993, extended free
mail privileges to civilian employees of DOD while assigned to
overseas areas during armed conflicts. 

---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:3

Each service has modified some of its regulations to respond to the
problems identified during the Persian Gulf War.  The definition of
emergency-essential civilian employees has been clarified, and
requirements for training, identification cards, and medical
evaluations, among other things, have been defined.  However, these
changes have not yet been fully implemented. 

The Army, in particular, has responded very extensively.  For
example, the Army issued an extensive annex to the Army Mobilization
and Operations Planning and Execution System and revised its civilian
mobilization planning regulations.  The Army Materiel Command has
published a guide for deploying and processing its civilians.  The
guide addresses the key problems identified during the Gulf War.  DOD
officials indicate that they would like to use the Army's deployment
guide as a prototype for the other services. 

Some problems identified during the Gulf War are only partially
solvable by DOD and will require coordinated action with other
agencies.  For example, DOD officials acknowledge that civilians
should be entitled to danger pay when serving in hostile areas;
however, specific designation of foreign areas subject to danger pay
requires a formal determination by the Secretary of State.  The
Army's Civilian Deployment Guide outlines how such pay is to be
provided and its relationship to other pay and allowances. 

Similarly, rules governing overtime pay limits are controlled by the
Office of Personnel Management.  Waivers to the pay caps may be
granted by the Office of Personnel Management when appropriate forms
are completed by the civilian employees.  According to DOD and
service civilian mobilization officials, steps will be taken during
future civilian deployment processing to ensure that DOD employees
are aware of the forms and waiver request procedures. 

The above actions are oriented to DOD civilians, not civilian
contractor personnel.  Some officials said they believe contractor
companies should be responsible for ensuring that their employees are
ready for potential deployment, as well as caring for them while
in-theater.  These officials believe, however, that DOD should be
responsible for ensuring the noncombatant status of civilian
contractor personnel by issuing them Geneva Convention identity

---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:4

DOD and the services have not fully integrated into their wartime
planning systems requirements for essential wartime support that
civilian employees and contractor personnel will perform in-theater
during future conflicts.  Such planning includes identifying civilian
personnel requirements, designating emergency-essential employees,
and ensuring the availability of contractor personnel for potential

-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:4.1

Officials in DOD, JCS, and service contingency planning offices
acknowledge the importance of DOD civilian employees and civilian
contractor support to war-fighting efforts.  To some extent, each
also acknowledged that adequate planning is not currently being done,
and sometimes pointed to each other's office to take the lead in this

For example, DOD and some service personnel officials told us that
requirements for wartime civilian support should be identified during
the service-level operational planning for potential contingencies. 
During such planning, the services examine the requirements outlined
by regional war-fighting commanders in chief in their various
contingency plans, and develop time-phased force deployment plans for
meeting the regional commanders' needs. 

Service operational planners told us that civilians were not included
in prior operational plans or force deployment plans, nor are they
anticipated to be in the future, in part, because service policies
for these functions deal only with military personnel.  Moreover,
these officials believe civilian deployment issues are the
responsibility of civilian mobilization planners, not operational

On the other hand, some service civilian mobilization planners told
us that civilian requirements should be included in the operational
and deployment plans to ensure that civilians will have the proper
equipment, such as gas masks.  According to these officials, the
major barrier to effective planning for civilian support in military
operations is a hesitation by military leaders to fully accept (1)
civilian wartime roles and (2) their responsibility for such
civilians in the combat area. 

DOD mobilization officials expressed the view that civilian
requirements should be integrated in joint staff and service
contingency planning processes.  They do not believe civilians should
be included in the military-oriented deployment plans because these
plans cover units, rather than individuals.  These officials believe
that civilians should be handled like some reservists who deploy as
individuals rather than with units.  They also believe current
mobilization and contingency planning policies do not adequately
address civilian deployment issues.  These officials told us they
plan to consolidate DOD mobilization policies into a single
directive, rather than continuing with multiple directives that
address only certain aspects of the issue.  These officials would
like to assign responsibility to the Chairman, JCS, to ensure that
war-fighting commanders in chief recognize civilian wartime support
functions in their planning processes, but provided no time frame to
complete this action. 

-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:4.2

Two military exercises, one before the Persian Gulf War and one more
recently completed, have pointed out civilian deployment problems and
the need for improved planning.  The military exercise Proud Eagle 90
was the first major DOD-wide exercise to recognize civilian
mobilization as a significant element.  The exercise was designed to
include all command levels in testing how well plans, policies, and
procedures would work in responding to a world crisis.  Many of the
problems that subsequently surfaced in the Persian Gulf War were
identified during this exercise, including vagueness in defining what
constitutes an emergency-essential civilian, absence of an accurate
civilian personnel data system, lack of clear understanding of
civilian entitlements, and inadequate processing procedures. 

According to DOD officials, no DOD-wide exercise with a specific
objective of evaluating mobilization issues has been held since Proud
Eagle 90, due to the constraints of ongoing contingency operations. 
However, civilian deployment-related issues did surface in a recent
U.S.  military exercise in Egypt.  An after-action report noted that
emergency-essential civilian employees were not trained in accordance
with DOD directives. 

-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:4.3

Once requirements for potential civilian deployments to theaters of
operations have been identified, action is then required to formally
designate such personnel as emergency essential, to better facilitate
deployment action, if and when it is required.  The services have
varied in the extent to which they have identified
emergency-essential personnel and the extent to which such
designations pertained either to the potential for overseas
deployments or to peacetime contingencies in the United States. 

Data available from DMDC shows fluctuations over time in the numbers
of civilian employees designated as emergency essential by the
services.  During fiscal year 1987, for example, over 1,100 civilians
were designated as emergency essential.  This number rose to about
2,700 emergency-essential civilians in 1990 and declined to nearly
1,900 in fiscal year 1993.  The Army has consistently maintained the
largest number of such designations and the Navy the least.  The data
do not show any emergency-essential designations for the Navy until

Our review of the data showed that many administrative personnel were
designated as emergency essential, despite policy guidance
stipulating that such designations include only those civilians who
perform critical combat-support functions.  Many secretaries, clerks,
and other administrative personnel were designated emergency
essential because they were stationed in overseas areas and had a key
role in base operations.  Service officials told us they realize
these types of personnel generally will not remain in an area during
a conflict or deploy elsewhere to a combat area to support military

Other variations in emergency-essential designations also reveal some
confusion over the definition.  For example, the services designated
as emergency essential many employees who were required to work in
the United States during emergencies with no likelihood of
deployment.  In other cases, emergency-essential designations were
given to employees who were required to report to work in the United
States when other personnel were excused for such reasons as

According to DOD and DMDC officials, the emergency-essential
designations in their database are understated because many commands
are still implementing the 1992 guidance for identifying and
reporting emergency-essential information.  Although these officials
did not provide a time frame for updating the database, they said
they are working with the services to ensure that personnel not
expected to deploy to combat areas are removed from the lists.  We
believe such data are likely to remain understated until DOD and the
services fully assess civilian deployment requirements as part of
contingency planning efforts. 

-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:4.4

Various DOD and service officials, and published studies, recognize a
growing dependence on contractor personnel to support high-technology
military systems.  In November 1990, DOD issued a policy instruction
intended to ensure the continuation of essential contractor services
during hostilities.  Yet, little has been done to develop data on
persons who perform combat-essential functions under contracts or to
ensure the continuity of such contracts.  Disagreement exists among
DOD, the services, and contractors as to who should be responsible
for the readiness and safety of contractor personnel performing
essential wartime support. 

The 1990 instruction directs the services to develop and implement
plans and procedures that would reasonably assure the continuation of
essential services during crisis situations.  Requirements of the
directive include, among other things, the following: 

  The services must review all contracts annually to determine which
     functions will be essential during crisis situations. 

  The services must maintain a current, generic description of the
     essential contractor service, the number of contractor
     employees, and equivalent staff years required to perform the
     essential services. 

The directive does not specify what assistance contractors can expect
to receive from DOD, other than the issuance of Geneva Convention
identity cards.  Representatives of several contractors that deployed
personnel to the Persian Gulf War said they received little
assistance from DOD to help them prepare their employees for
deployment, and said such assistance might have prevented deployment

One mechanism the services use to ensure continuation of services has
been the inclusion of a "crisis clause" in contracts.  At some
locations we visited, boilerplate language had been included in some
of the contracts related to essential functions.  In general, this
language states that the contractor shall be responsible for
performing all requirements of the contract notwithstanding the
existence of any state of war or emergency and states that failure to
perform may subject the contractor to a termination of the contract
for default. 

However, mobilization and operational planners at local commands
could not tell us whether all of the command's contracts had been
reviewed for their wartime essentiality.  Neither local commands,
service headquarters, nor DOD officials could provide summary data on
contractor employees performing essential combat-support functions as
required by DOD, or verify whether all contracts had been reviewed. 
Some officials said they did not need to know the number of personnel
because contractor companies are responsible for deploying and
protecting their employees. 

The DOD Inspector General reported in 1988 and 1991 that no major
command could provide data concerning all contracts vital to combat
or crisis operations.\5 According to the reports, a contributing
factor was the absence of a central DOD activity with oversight over
contractors with wartime essential functions.  During our review,
officials in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Personnel and Readiness, who must monitor the implementation of the
DOD directive, said that oversight is still decentralized, and, while
several organizations have some responsibility, no single
headquarters organization wants to assume full control.  For example,
contracting for logistics support of major weapon systems is
delegated to the managers of individual weapon programs in the
systems acquisition chain, while war planning associated with using
these systems rests with operational support personnel.  According to
the Personnel and Readiness officials, such decentralization slows
efforts to address contractor deployability. 

\5 Civilian Contractor Overseas Support During Hostilities, Office of
the Inspector General, Department of Defense (Report No.  91-105,
June 26, 1991) and Ensuring Retention of Emergency-Essential
Civilians Overseas During Hostilities, Office of the Inspector
General, Department of Defense (Report No.  89-026, Nov.  7, 1988). 

---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:5

Although DOD officials have informally cited potential deployment to
theaters of operations as reasons for retaining military incumbents
in selected support positions, civilians have historically deployed
to combat areas to support the military forces.  The recent Persian
Gulf War showed that, to the extent civilians are to be used in
combat areas, improved up-front contingency planning is needed. 

The services are making progress in developing and implementing
policies to prevent problems that arose during the deployment of
civilian employees and contractor personnel to the Persian Gulf War. 
However, they still have not adequately addressed civilian support
requirements in their existing war-planning processes.  They have not
fully identified civilian employees or contractor personnel who
perform combat essential functions and who might be called to deploy. 
Some confusion exists among organizations involved with contractor
support for military operations on what assistance DOD should provide
and who should be responsible for the readiness and safety of these

Proper identification of civilian employees and contractors would
help ensure that deploying individuals are properly trained and
prepared to enter combat areas.  Many personnel officials believe
recognition of wartime requirements for civilians must come from the
JCS before service planners will include civilians in their
operational plans. 

---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:6

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman, JCS
clarify organizational responsibility for ensuring that civilian
support to military operations is considered during contingency
planning processes.  These officials should direct operational
planners to integrate civilian requirements for DOD civilian
employees and contractor personnel into appropriate plans for
deploying forces to combat areas. 

We also recommend that the service secretaries direct commanders of
major support organizations to establish time frames for reassessing
their needs for emergency-essential civilian employees.  The
commanders should expeditiously purge existing lists of
administrative persons to prevent unnecessary spending on training
for persons who will not deploy to theaters of operation.  The
commanders should ensure that emergency-essential civilians (1)
receive appropriate training, including basic survival skills; (2)
participate in job-related DOD-wide training exercises; and (3) are
otherwise prepared to deploy to combat areas when needed. 

We further recommend that the Secretary of Defense clarify the type
of assistance, such as deployment processing, training,
transportation, housing, or care in-theater, that DOD will provide to
contractors who perform essential, combat-support functions.  The
Secretary should also direct the service secretaries to establish
time frames for identifying contractors and the personnel who provide
essential combat-support services, and initiate actions to ensure
that such personnel will be prepared to deploy to combat areas, if

---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:7

DOD concurred with our recommendations and agreed to pursue, in
fiscal year 1995, initiatives to ensure that military operational
planning includes necessary civilian support.  DOD also agreed to
request all subordinate organizations to validate their requirements
for emergency-essential civilian employees and contractor personnel
and provide for required training.  DOD noted, however, that
deployment-related issues affecting contractors are complex and will
probably not be resolved over the next fiscal year. 

=========================================================== Appendix I

Fiscal year     Military    Civilian       Total    civilian
------------  ----------  ----------  ==========  ----------
1987             780,800     412,200   1,193,000        34.6
1990             750,600     380,400   1,131,000        33.6
1993             572,400     294,200     866,600        33.9
1994             540,000     293,500     833,500        35.2
1995             510,000     281,000     791,000        35.5
1999             495,000     268,800     763,800        35.2
Source:  The Department of Defense (DOD) Manpower Requirements
Reports and data from the Office of the DOD Comptroller. 

Note:  All figures are rounded.  Figures for 1987-1993 are actuals;
those for 1994-1995 are projections, as of July 1994. 

Fiscal year     Military    Civilian       Total    civilian
------------  ----------  ----------  ==========  ----------
1987             607,000     264,300     871,300        30.3
1990             539,300     248,900     788,200        31.6
1993             444,400     201,700     646,100        31.2
1994             425,700     201,500     627,200        32.1
1995             400,100     195,400     595,500        32.8
1999             388,800     175,700     564,500        31.1
Source:  DOD Manpower Requirements Reports and data from the Office
of the DOD Comptroller. 

Note:  All figures are rounded.  Figures for 1987-1993 are actuals;
those for 1994-1999 are projections, as of July 1994. 

Fiscal year     Military    Civilian       Total    civilian
------------  ----------  ----------  ==========  ----------
1987             586,800     331,500     918,300        36.1
1990             582,900     320,500     903,400        35.5
1993             510,000     267,000     777,000        34.4
1994             471,500     250,500     722,000        34.7
1995             441,600     227,300     668,900        34.0
1999             393,900     202,400     596,300        33.9
Source:  DOD Manpower Requirements Reports and Data from the Office
of the DOD Comptroller. 

Note:  All figures are rounded.  Figures for 1987-1993 are actuals;
those for 1994-1999 are projections, as of July 1994. 

Fiscal year     Military    Civilian       Total    civilian
------------  ----------  ----------  ==========  ----------
1987             199,500      21,600     221,100         9.8
1990             196,700      20,500     217,200         9.4
1993             178,400      18,200     196,600         9.3
1994             174,000      17,900     191,900         9.3
1995             174,000      18,000     192,000         9.4
1999             174,000      17,000     191,000         8.9
Source:  DOD Manpower Requirements Reports and data from the Office
of the DOD Comptroller. 

Note:  All figures are rounded.  Figures for 1987-1993 are actuals;
those for 1994-1999 are projections, as of July 1994. 

Fiscal year     Military    Civilian       Total    civilian
------------  ----------  ----------  ==========  ----------
1987               9,200      97,800     107,000        91.4
1990              10,000     102,500     112,500        91.1
1993             176,900     155,800     332,700        46.8
1994             175,600     159,600     335,200        47.6
1995             171,300     151,700     323,000        47.0
1999                 Not         Not         Not         Not
               available   available   available   available
Source:  DOD Manpower Requirements Reports and data from the Office
of the DOD Comptroller. 

Notes:  All figures are rounded.  Figures for 1987-1993 are actuals;
those for 1994-95 are projections, as of July 1994. 

Military end strengths include personnel accounted for in the

The decrease in the percentage of civilian personnel in the Defense
agencies results primarily from the transfer of common functions from
the military services to Defense-wide agencies and the accompanying
reassignment of military personnel performing such functions. 
Examples include the transfer of various medical personnel to the
Defense Health Program and the transfer of DOD's common
transportation mission to the U.S.  Transportation Command. 

========================================================== Appendix II

                          Table II.1
            Civilians Within the Military Services
               as a Percentage of Personnel by
            Programming Categories for Fiscal Year

                               Air                      DOD-
Programming category         Force    Army    Navy      wide
------------------------  --------  ------  ------  --------
Central logistics             94.2    92.2    96.5      95.2
Combat installations          31.0    76.0    57.7      50.6
Communications/               17.1    18.6    17.2      22.9
Force support training         6.7    28.2    10.5      10.0
Joint activities              17.7    25.0    36.1      24.4
Medical support               18.3    44.6    27.5      32.9
Research and development      44.7    79.4    84.5      71.9
Service management            35.1    66.8    65.7      54.4
Strategic forces              10.4    25.0    13.6      11.3
Support activities            55.3    76.3    52.8      65.0
Tactical/mobility             16.2     6.1     2.3       6.1
Training and personnel        24.7    28.8    13.4      27.6
Aggregate of above            30.3    34.6    36.1      34.3
Source:  DOD Manpower Requirements Reports for selected fiscal years. 

Note:  DOD-wide data includes civilian personnel assigned to Defense
agencies, such as the Defense Logistics Agency. 

                          Table II.1
            Civilians Within the Military Services
               as a Percentage of Personnel by
            Programming Categories for Fiscal Year

                               Air                      DOD-
Program category             Force    Army    Navy      wide
------------------------  --------  ------  ------  --------
Central logistics             86.9    96.2    94.7      94.1
Combat installations          30.9    78.0    44.0      50.1
Communications/               21.9    32.0    20.0      29.9
Force support training         8.4    25.9     9.9       9.5
Joint activities               7.5    16.2    22.4      25.3
Medical support               19.9    52.5    27.6      35.3
Research and development      46.5    84.6    89.4      80.7
Service management            39.5    66.9    54.7      53.0
Strategic forces              22.9    40.0    24.7      24.3
Support activities            47.9    77.4    58.2      66.8
Tactical/mobility             24.8     3.5     4.5       7.7
Training and personnel        36.8    35.2    19.4      38.0
Aggregate of above            31.8    35.0    34.3      36.2
Source:  DOD Manpower Requirements Reports for selected fiscal years. 

Note:  DOD-wide data includes civilian personnel assigned to Defense
agencies, such as the Defense Logistics Agency. 

-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:1

Central logistics covers program elements for the operation of supply
depots and centers, inventory control points, and centralized
procurement offices.  It also includes centralized repair,
modification, maintenance, and overhaul of equipment, and activities
such as industrial preparedness. 

Combat installations contain elements for the operation and
maintenance of installations of the strategic, tactical, airlift, and
sealift commands.  Functions include real property maintenance, base
communications, housekeeping, and installation administration. 

Communications and intelligence include centrally managed
communications and intelligence-gathering activities. 

Force support training covers advanced flight training conducted by
combat commands, Navy training conducted at sea and ashore in direct
support of combat units, and certain Army and Marine Corps unit
training activities. 

Joint activities cover billets that are outside the control of each
service.  They includes requirements for the Joint Staff, unified
commands, the staff of the Secretary of Defense, Defense agencies,
and those personnel assigned to support other federal agencies. 

Medical support includes medical care in regional medical centers and
related research and development programs in support of medical
research, equipment, and clinics. 

Research and development includes major defense-wide activities
conducted under centralized control of the Office of the Secretary of
Defense.  Specific areas include meteorological, topographic,
oceanographic, and navigational activities. 

Service management headquarters includes organizations to support
service combat and support commands, such as U.S.  Army, Europe and
U.S.  Navy, Pacific Fleet. 

Strategic forces include nuclear offensive, defensive, and control
and surveillance forces that have as their fundamental objective
deterrence of and defense against nuclear attack upon the United
States, our military forces and bases overseas, and our allies. 

Support activities include operation and maintenance of installations
of the auxiliary forces, research and development, logistics, and
training and administrative commands. 

Tactical/mobility forces include (1) land forces of the Army and
Marine Corps; (2) air components of the Air Force, Navy, and Marine
Corps such as fighter, attack, reconnaissance, and special operations
squadrons, direct support aircraft, armament and electronics
maintenance units, and operational headquarters for these forces; and
(3) Naval forces such as forces aboard warships, antisubmarine
warfare vessels, amphibious forces, and forward logistical supporting
forces, intermediate maintenance activities and telecommunications
units.  Mobility forces of the Air Force, Army, and Navy include
airlift, sealift, and land movement of passengers and cargo.  They
also include sea port systems, traffic management, and aerospace
rescue and recovery.  Special operations forces are also embedded in
this category. 

Training and personnel includes staff and faculty for formal military
and technical training conducted under centralized control of service
training commands.  It also includes personnel-related activities
such as recruiting, centrally funded welfare and morale programs, and
civilian career training. 

========================================================= Appendix III

This appendix sets forth the principal definitions and methodology
underlying the cost estimates presented in chapter 2 and shows cost
differentials by pay grade between military and civilian personnel
(see table III.1).  The methodology is based in part on a 1988 RAND
Note, prepared for the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Force Management and Personnel.\1 Except where otherwise
indicated, the estimates are based on unpublished data obtained from
the Department of Defense (DOD); figures used here represent
defense-wide averages, and all costs are in 1994 dollars. 

                         Table III.1
            1994 Average Cost Comparison of Annual
              Military and Civilian Compensation
            Between Comparable Pay Grades in CONUS

Grade             Pay  Grade                 Pay  Difference
-----------  --------  -------------  ----------  ----------
O-10                   ES-6 through     $141,047     $29,789
 through     $170,836   ES-1             through     through
 O-7          through                   $113,257     $17,277
O-6           110,663  GS-15              95,853      14,810
O-5            92,277  GS-14              79,824      12,453
                        GS-13             66,887      25,390
O-4            76,116  GS-12              55,524      20,591
O-3            60,871  GS-11              45,837      15,034
                        GS-10             42,824      18,047
O-2            48,240  GS-9               37,756      10,484
                        GS-8              34,953      13,287
O-1            36,064  GS-7               31,294       4,770
E-9            63,011  GS-6               28,370      34,641
 E-8           53,313                                 24,943
 E-7           46,144                                 17,774
E-6            39,815  GS-5               25,507      14,308
 E-5           33,750                                  8,243
E-4            29,234  GS-4               22,840       6,394
E-3            24,361  GS-3               20,417       3,944
 E-2           22,274   GS-2              18,720       3,554
 E-1           20,163   GS-1              15,727       4,436
Notes:  Numbers have been rounded to the nearest dollar. 

Data are based on military and civilian grade level comparisons
established for Geneva Convention purposes (DOD Instruction 1000.1,
Jan.  30, 1974). 

\1 Adele R.  Palmer and David J.  Osbaldeston, "Incremental Costs of
Military and Civilian Manpower in the Military Services," A RAND Note
(July 1988), N-2677-FMP. 

------------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:1

All personnel entitled to active-duty compensation receive the sum of
four main elements of military compensation included in Regular
Military Compensation (RMC); basic pay, basic allowance for quarters
(including any variable or overseas housing allowance), basic
allowance for subsistence (or subsistence in kind), and Federal
income tax advantage.  RMC is the basic level of compensation every
service member receives, directly or indirectly, in cash or in kind
every payday, that is consistent with all military personnel of a
particular pay grade, years of service, and family size.  For the
purpose of comparing military and civilian compensation, an
additional amount is included in the RMC to account for the
nontaxibility of the allowances for quarters and subsistence.  This
is known as "federal income tax advantage." Federal income tax is
computed using the standard deduction and 1994 tax rates, including
the earned income tax credit. 

Military personnel may also receive other elements of compensation,
depending on their military specialty (such as physician), where they
are stationed, the nature of their duty assignment, and so forth. 
For example, some personnel may be entitled to a variable housing
allowance if they are stationed in a high-housing-cost area of the
United States and are not assigned to government quarters.  Other
personnel may receive hostile fire (or imminent danger) pay for
serving in hostile areas that may subject them to physical harm or
imminent danger.  The RMC data in this report are applicable only to
personnel in the continental Unites States (CONUS) because they
include the variable housing allowance, but not the overseas housing

For the purpose of this report we used all cash pay grade averages
for RMC from DOD's Selected Military Compensation Tables:  January
1994 Pay Rates Report.\2 Table III.2 shows the annual RMC, including
retirement benefits, received by military personnel.  The retirement
benefits are actuarially costed as a percentage (36 percent as of FY
1994)\3 of active-duty basic pay.  An actuarially-costed retirement
benefit assumes that if the percentage of basic pay is set aside
annually in an interest bearing account, it would accrue enough
principal and interest to pay off future benefits as needed.  We did
not include other costs associated with providing such benefits as
medical care, training, or unemployment compensation. 

                         Table III.2
                 1994 Annual Regular Military
              Compensation, including retirement
                      benefits, in CONUS

                    Retirement       Regular           Total
                      benefits      military     (Retirement
        Military          (36%  compensation    benefits and
Grade   base pay  of base pay)         (RMC)            RMC)
------  --------  ------------  ------------  --------------
O-10    $108,202       $38,953      $131,883        $170,836
O-9       99,212        35,716       122,596         158,312
O-8       89,896        32,363       112,845         145,208
O-7       79,333        28,560       101,974         130,534
O-6       66,364        23,891        86,772         110,663
O-5       53,816        19,374        72,903          92,277
O-4       44,313        15,953        60,163          76,116
O-3       35,385        12,739        48,132          60,871
O-2       27,581         9,929        38,311          48,240
O-1       20,051         7,218        28,846          36,064
E-9       36,095        12,994        50,017          63,011
E-8       29,653        10,675        42,638          53,313
E-7       24,993         8,997        37,147          46,144
E-6       20,983         7,554        32,261          39,815
E-5       17,393         6,261        27,489          33,750
E-4       15,137         5,449        23,785          29,234
E-3       12,035         4,333        20,028          24,361
E-2       11,200         4,032        18,242          22,274
E-1        9,994         3,598        16,565          20,163
Note:  Numbers have been rounded to the nearest dollar. 

\2 Department of Defense, OASD, Directorate of Compensation,
"Selected Military Compensation Tables:  January 1994 Pay Rates,"
undated publication. 

\3 Source:  DOD Office of the Actuary.
Note:  The actuarially determined percentage is also known as the
Normal Cost Percentage. 

------------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:2

For the purpose of this report, civilian compensation consists of
base pay, other pay, and benefits.  Base pay is regular salaries and
wages; other pay includes overtime and holiday pay; and benefits
include life insurance, health benefits, worker's compensation, and
pension and retirement benefits.  We used a 17 percent average
civilian compensation adjustment factor for other pay and regular
benefits for nonwage-rate workers.\4

The adjustment factor for other pay and regular benefits was
multiplied by the annual base amounts to calculate civilian annual
direct costs. 

Table III.3 provides average adjusted basic pay for general schedule
and senior executive service positions in CONUS.  The average
adjusted basic pay is equal to basic pay plus any locality
adjustment.  Average adjusted basic pay was taken from the Office of
Personnel Management's Central Personnel Data File.  The base pay for
senior executive service professionals is an average of all locality
pay areas in the United States provided by the Office of Personnel

                         Table III.3
             1994 Annual Civilian Compensation in

                                  factor for     Total (base
                               other pay and      pay, other
                     Average         regular        pay, and
              adjusted basic   benefits (17%         regular
Grade                   pay)    of base pay)       benefits)
------------  --------------  --------------  --------------
ES-6                $120,553         $20,494        $141,047
 through             through         through         through
 ES-1                $96,801         $16,456        $113,257
GS-15                 81,926          13,927          95,853
GS-14                 68,226          11,598          79,824
GS-13                 57,168           9,719          66,887
GS-12                 47,456           8,068          55,524
GS-11                 39,177           6,660          45,837
GS-10                 36,602           6,222          42,824
GS-9                  32,270           5,486          37,756
GS-8                  29,874           5,079          34,953
GS-7                  26,747           4,547          31,294
GS-6                  24,248           4,122          28,370
GS-5                  21,801           3,706          25,507
GS-4                  19,521           3,319          22,840
GS-3                  17,450           2,967          20,417
GS-2                  16,000           2,720          18,720
GS-1                  13,442           2,285          15,727
Note:  Numbers have been rounded to the nearest dollar. 

\4 Although this adjustment factor is taken from the 1988 RAND Note,
DOD officials stated that the factor has not changed significantly in
recent years.  Therefore, for the purpose of this report we have used
the same adjustment factors to calculate direct costs per civil
service staff year in CONUS as of 1994.  Source:  Adele R.  Palmer
and David J.  Osbaldeston, "Incremental Costs of Military and
Civilian Manpower in the Military Services," A RAND Note, (July
1988), N-2677-FMP. 

========================================================== Appendix IV

Service       Number  Functions       Number  Functions
------------  ------  --------------  ------  --------------
                      Contracting             Maintenance

                      Training                Transportation

                      Logistics               Logistics

                      Plumbing                ADP support

                      Food service


                      and supply






Army Total     2,000                   3,894

                      Maintenance/            Maintenance

                      Civil                   Transportation

                      Mortuary                Aircraft
                      affairs                 specialists

Air Force        213                     154

                      Engineering             Ship crews






Navy Total     3,000                   5,126

DOD Total      5,213                   9,178

Total DOD                             14,391
Source:  DOD and service after-action reports on the Persian Gulf War
and studies by outside organizations under contract to the services. 

(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix V
========================================================== Appendix IV

(See figure in printed edition.)

(See figure in printed edition.)

(See figure in printed edition.)

========================================================== Appendix VI

-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix VI:1

Norman J.  Rabkin
Barry W.  Holman
Valeria G.  Gist
David E.  Moser
Brenton E.  Kidd
Leah B.  Cates

-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix VI:2

Thomas R.  Kingham
Maricela Camarena
Pamela K.  Tumler